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1. SUMMARY: Petrs, vari_ous large and small oil -companies, ~rgue that the CA10 should not have upheld the_po~ of 
/ 




2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petrs are all non-Indian 
producers of oil and gas that operate wells on the reservation of -
the Jicarilla Apaches under leases with the tribe. These leases 
provide for the payment of royalties to the tribe. In 1976, the 
tribal council passed an ordinance imposing a "severance tax" on 
"any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal · 
lands." This tax was · imposed in addition to ~ fe rally -------- ..-
authorized tax imposed by the state of New Mexico. The ordinance, 
'-- ,.,_, ~ - ~ 
which was ~proved by the Secretary of the Interior, also -----------
contained a provision consenting to the jurisdiction of the United 
States District Court for actions concerning the tax. 
Two suits were brought challenging this ordinance, naming 
the tribe and the Secretary of the Interior as defendants. These 
were consolidated for trial. The DC held the ordinance invalid on 
several grounds: (1) that the statute authorizing state taxation 
of oil and gas production on reservations, 25 U.S. C. § 398 (c), 
gave an exclusive right to the states, (2) that the tax imposes a 
multiple burden on interstate commerce, ( 3 ) that the tax 
discriminates against interstate commerce, and {4) that the 
sovereignty of the tribe does not include the power to impose this 
tax. 
On appeal, the~ 10 en bane reversed by a vote of 5-2. 
After dealing with certain jurisdictional issues not raised here, 
the court rejected each of the DC' s arguments. Discussing the . . 
sovereignty issue first, · the court stated that Indian tribes 
retain all sovereign powers not relinquished by treaty or divested 
by statute and not inconsistent with the superior interests of the 
(_~ United States as a sovereign, citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 




313 (1978). It concluded that the power to tax even nonmembers 
when they engage in energy production on the reservation is not 
inconsistent with any federal interest. It rejected the argument 
that taxes can only be imposed as conditions on the right to enter · 
the reservation, a right that the tribe here had already conveyed 
through leases. 
As for the commerce clause arguments, the court rejected 
the notion that it was discriminatory for the tribe to impose its 
tax only on oil and gas leaving the reservation. It would simply 
be wasteful, the court reasoned, for the tribe to impose a tax 
o'f'/any products destined to stay on the reservation. A second 
discrimination claim--that the tax imposed a burden on interstate 
commerce because 80% of the production left New Mexico--was also 
rejected on the basis of the "settled" rule that the severing of 
mineral resources is a "local activity properly subject to local 
taxation." The court found the "multiple taxation" argument to be 
flawed because even though the tribe and the state both tax this 
production, this is not a case where a tax burden is being added 
merely because a commodity is in interstate commerce. 
Finally the court considered the effect of 25 · u.s.c. § 
398c, a 1927 enactment that authorizes the state to impose its tax 
on oil and gas production on the reservation. The same statute 
gave the Indians exclusive royalties, but the CA10 was unconvinced 





Judge McKay's concurrence, mainly a response to Chief 
Judge Seth's dissent, discusses the history of New Mexic6 and the 
Apaches and defends the concept of limited Indian sovereignty. 
Chief Judge Seth uses the history of the Jicarillas to 
argue that they never possessed true sovereignty because they were 
merely a disorganized nomadic group. He asserts that the treaty 
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, in which Mexico ceded the Western lands to 
this country, did not reserve any sovereignty for Indians. He 
would have held that the concept of Indian sovereignty really 
means nothing more than self-determination and does not extend to 
this kind of tax. 
Judge Barrett in dissent accepted the notion of Indian 
sovereignty, ------nonmembers. but argued 
~~ 
that it does ...to" extend to taxation of 
~" 
He also stated that his review of the legislative 
history of § 398c convinced him that Congress did intend to give 
an exclusive power of taxation to the states, while allowing the 
tribes to collect royal ties. He would also have accepted the 
commerce clause arguments made by ' petrs. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue in their two petitions that 
this is an exceptionally important case in light of the nation's ---energy needs and the number of cases pending in lower courts 
involving similar taxes. Five states and at least one tribe filed 
amicus briefs in the CA10. 
Petrs allege a conflict with the Court's recent decision 
in Washington v. Confed e rated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, No. 78-630 (June 10, 1980). In Colville, the 
? 
cigarette taxes upheld, unlike the tax here, did not implicate 
important federal interests or intrude on , cornprehens i ve federal 
regulation. Section 398c was a carefully drafted compromise 
giving the royalties to the Indians and the power to tax to the 
states. This tax has upset that balance. Moreover there is an 
entire federal statutory scheme here that implicitly preempts this 
tax ordinance. 
In addition, the idea of Indian sovereignty should not 
apply here because it is premised solely on the right to exclude 
people from the reservation, a right that cannot support the tax 
at issue. If Indians do have genuine governmental authority over 
nonmembers, then constitutional constraints must apply to their 
actions, and the Court should so hold. Finally; the Court should 
act to correct this rnanifest )Purden on interstate commerce. 
In response, the v(G argues that the CA 10 's decision is 
plainly correct and does not merit review. Colville only 
reinforced the legal principle that tribe's possess the power to 
tax. No dist-inction can be drawn between this "executive order 
reservation" and other reservations established by treaty. 
Section 398c, while authorizing state taxation, does not bar 
taxation by the tribes and we should not infer such an intent. As 
for the Commerce Clause, it probably does not apply to tribal 
actions any more than the Bill Of Rights, which has been held to 
be inapplicable. See Wheeler, supra. Moreover commerce clearly 
is not burdened here in any event. 
· 4. DISCUSSION: Colville, which of course carne down after 
the CA10's decision, does contain a strong affirmation of the 
6. 
"acknowledged tribal power to tax non-~ndians entering the 
reservation to engage in economic activity." Thus it is no longer 
possible to argue, as Chief Judge Seth did below, that Indian 
sovereignty is strictly limited to the governance of members of 
the tribe. Because this particular tax does not appear to 
conflict with any essential aspect of federal sovereignty, the 
"' V CA 10 's view has strong support. 
But the case does raise more specific issues of 
preemption under § 398 and burdens on commerce. These appear to 
be substantial, and the case itself is clearly impor:tant, but I 
would recommend a denial on the ground that this is the first 
circuit court decision in this area and · more are likely soon. If 
a conflict develops, the argument ~or review by this Court will be 
stronger. 
There is a response. 
8/24/80 Smith Opn. in apps. to petns. 
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80-11} Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
80-15} Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
80-581 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 
The above cases involve multiple parties, 
primarily oil companies and coal companies. The 
Commonwealth Edison case also involves a number of electric 
utility companies. 
I have checked the briefs in these cases, 
' 
carefully I believe, and I find no party, subsidiary or 
affiliate in which we own any interest. Moreover, we own no 
stock in any of the major oil companies nor any coal 
company. The Ethyl Corporation owns a small acreage of coal 
land (in west Virginia} through a subsidiary, that is leased 
to some ·producing company. I consider this too remote and 
negligible to disqualify, particularly since neither Ethyl 
nor its sub is a party. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
cc: My Clerks: In cases such as the above, I would 
particularly like each of you to exercise care when you 
review the briefs. The foregoing cases are Greg's, and I 




This case involves a tax imposed by the 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe upon the serverance of oil and gas 
2. 
from trust property on its reservation. The questions are 
(1) whether the Tribe has an inherent sovereign power to 
impose the tax? ~ whether Congress has divested the 
Tribe of such a power by authorizing the States to impose 
'249 
their own severance taxes? and (3) whether the Tribe's tax 
violates the Commerce Clause? ~ 
Background 
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe (Tribe) occupies a 
reservation in New Mexico. All of this reservation is 
"trust land"--that is, land held by the federal government 
in trust for the Indians; there is no allotted land or 
non-Indian tracts on the reservation. For many years, the 
Tribe has leased oil and gas reserves under its land to 
non-Indian producers. The Secretary of the Interior 
approves such leases. Approximately 80% of the oil and 
' ..---;':" 










In July 1976, the Tribe instituted a severance /~ 
tax on oil and natural gas removed from its land. This~ 
t::, which the Secretary of the Interior approved, is 4 
$u~ 
separate and beyond the severance tax that the producers · 
cj., ~ 






or transported off the Reservation." 
Tribe takes as a royalty in kind is exempt from the tax. 
In May 1977, a group of 
holding leases from the Tribe 
enjoin enforcement of the Tribe 1 s severance tax. These 
producers are petitioners in N~ Sometime later, 
two different oil production companies filed a lawsuit 
seeking similar relief. These companies are petitioners 
in No@ After consolidating the suits for trial, 
the District Court for the District of New Mexico (Payne, 
J.) held that the Tribe 1 s tax is invalid. The Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. 
It held that the Tribe has the sovereign power to impose 
the tax, that Congress did not divest the Tribe of that 
power by authorizing New Mexico to impose a similar tax, 
and that the Tribe 1 s tax does not violate the Commerce 
Clause either by discriminating against interstate 
commerce or by imposing a multiple burden upon it. 
Discussion 
Petitioners in Nos. 80-11 and 80-15 make 
essentially the same three-step argument. It is their 
\ 
initial position that the Tribe has,no sovereign power to 
"" ""'\ ' 
' '\ \ I 
-..'\· 
4. 
impose this tax. Even if the Tribe has such a power, 
petitioners contend that Congress has divested the Tribe 
of it. If the Tribe has this power and it has not been 
divested, petitioners contend that the tax is 
unconstitutional nonetheless, for they believe that it 
violates the Commerce Clause. I conclude that 
petitioners' initial position is foreclosed by Washington 
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
u.s. (1980), and that their second position is 
unsupported. I find that petitioners' third argument 
presents a unique and difficult question. 
I. Sovereign Power 
It is beyond dispute that Indians may exercise 
sovereignty and that "[t]he power to tax transactions 
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a 
tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of 
sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it 
by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent 
status." Colville Indian Reservation, supra, slip op., at 
15. Petitioners attempt to skirt this holding in three 
ways. 
k- /3/A/;-~ ~ ~1-tUuJL­
-f s .'s~~ 
5. 
First, petitioners contend that the power to tax 
recognized in Colville is based upon a tribe's power to 
exclude nonmembers from the reservation or to attach 
conditions to nonmembers' entry. Petitioners rest this 
assertion upon two unconnected phrases in the Colville 
opinion. In one, the Court referred to "tribal power to 
tax non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in 
economic activity." Slip op., at 16. In the second, the 
Court referred to an "inherent tribal power to exclude 
non-Indians or impose conditions on those permitted to 
enter." Id., at 19. The tax at issue here, petitioners 
contend, is not based upon the Tribe's power to exclude 
the oil and gas producers, but is imposed after the 
producers have entered the reservation under the 
negotiated terms of the oil and gas leases. Thus, the 
argument concludes, the tax is beyond the Tribe's 
sovereign power. 
This argument fails because the premise is 
unpersuasive. Colville did not hold that a tribe's 
sovereign authority to tax is dependent on its authority 
to exclude non-Indians. Neither the question presented 
nor the holding in Colville support petitioners' reading 
•' 
6. 
of the opinion. The phrases cited by petitioners are not 
supportive when read in context. 
Second, petitioners suggest that the Tribe has 
no sovereign authority to impose this oil and gas 
severance tax because the tax does not concern "internal 
and social relations." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, U.S. (1980) . But again, Col ville seems 
to foreclose this argument. The pumping of oi 1 and gas 
and the transportation of those resources off the 
reservation is an activity that substantially affects the 
reservation and its self-government. Indeed, such an 
activity must affect the economy and governance of the 
reservation much more than the sale of cigarettes, which 
was the issue in Colville. 
Third, petitioners suggest that the Tribe's 
sovereign authority to tax is diminished by the fact that 
its reservation was created by Executive Order. From 
this, petitioners conclude that the Tribe's authority to 
tax cannot be based upon "ownership" of the resources and 
therefore is less than the authority a sovereign otherwise 
would have. There are two responses to this argument. 
First, Colville involved tribes residing on reservations 
created either by Executive Order or by treaty. There is 
7. 
no indication in Colville that the manner of the 
reservation's creation affects the scope of the resident 
tribe's sovereignty. Second, United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978), suggests that a tribe's 
sovereign power is limited only to the extent that that 
power is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status; 
the fact that the tribe resides on land held for it by the 
federal government does not by itself diminish tribal 
sovereignty. 
~ 
In sum, I conclude that the Tribe a sovereign 
power to impose this tax. Of course, that is only the 
first step in petitioners' argument. 
II. Divestiture ftc 
Petitioners contend that the Tribe's sovereign 
power to impose this severance tax has been divested (1) 
by the Act of March 3, 1927, which authorizes states to 
impose a severance tax, and (2) by overriding national 
interests. 
In the Act of 1927, Congress authorized the 
leasing of lands in reservations created by Executive 
Order. The Act provides that the resident tribe shall Set 3(<: ~ 
------- ------ - - --------




from the leases, 25 U.S.C~~ The Act also provides 
that "[t]axes may be levi~llected by the State or 
local authority u~~-~-~tput of ... oil and gas wells •.. in 
the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and 
collected." 25 u.s.c. §398c. The state also may levy 
taxes against the share obtained by the tribe as a bonus, 
rental, or royality. Id. No provision in the Act 
-------~~------------prohibits tribes from imposing a tax in addition to the 
--~~._........__.....____..----._.....-....... _- ~-...__ ___ ......._ _______ _ 
tax imposed by the state. ut petitioners contend that 
"[a] review of the historical events" prompting the Act 
reveals that such was Congress• intent. Brief, at 16. 
Even as recounted by petitioners, the 
"historical events" to which petitioners refer do not 
reveal a ~~:_nt~ng~~ 
a~~~-~-r_i ty ~~_:-~-~s. Prior to the Act of 1927, there was ~ 
a dispute between departments of the Executive Branch over 
the question whether the manner in which a reservation was 
~? 
-~ 
created--by executive order or by treaty--determined ~-  
whether land upon the reservation could be leased under 
prior Acts. In addition, some officials considered prior 
Acts to give too much lease compensation to Indians in 
comparison to the states; others considered prior Acts to 
give too little. The Act of 1927 established that lands 
9. 
upon Executive Order reservations could be leased as well 
as could lands under treaty reservations. It further 
provided that the resident tribe receives rentals and 
royalities and that the state may impose taxes. 
Petitioners conclude from this that Congress intended the 
states 1 taxing authority to be exclusive. Had Congress 
intended tribes to have a concurrent taxing authority, 
petitioners conclude, Congress would have so provided. 
Petitioners 1 argument is a reasonable one, but /~ 
it is not well supported. Most pertinently, petit~s ~ 
fail to cite clear legislative history supporting the~ 
proposition that Congress 1 silence as to tribal taxing 
authority evinces an intent to deny such authority. It 
certainly is not self-obvious that Congress must have 
meant to deny such authority to tribes. Furthermore, it 
appears that taxation by Indians tribes was sufficiently 
acknowledged by 1927 that Congress is unlikely to have 
denied such a power without comment. See Morris v. 
Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 
947 (CA8 1905), app. dismissed, 203 u.s. 599 (1906). 
sum, petitioners have failed to marshall much evidence 
l \ 
that Congress implicitly intended the Act to deny taxing 
authority to resident tribes. 
10. 
Petitioners also contend that the Tribe's taxing 
power is divested by an overriding national interest in 
uniform federal standards for the leasing and development 
of oil and gas reserves and in the development of domestic 
sources of energy. Like the argument that the Act of 1927 
works a divestiture, this argument is reasonable but not 
well supported. Petitioners must rely upon general 
statements of policy in tangentially related federal 
statutes. Furthermore, petitioners' argument is refuted 
at least in part by the facts (1) that the Secretary of 
the Interior has approved the Tribe's severance tax and 
(2) that the Secretary, who presumably is aware of federal 
energy policy, is defending the Tribe's tax in this 
lawsuit. 
In sum, I am inclined to conclude that the 
Tribe's sovereign taxing power has not been divested by 
federal statutes or "overriding national interests." 
"#-~~~---------- ·---III. Commerce 
Clause restrict the commercial activities of Indian 





same restrictions upon tribes as it imposes upon states, ~ 
and that the Tribe's tax violates those restrictions. The 
SG disagrees. He contends that tribes and states are to 
be treated quite differently under the Commerce Clause. 
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to 
lL \ \ 
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
If \ 
among the ----- d J/ ' \\ d' ' II several States, an w1th the In 1an Tr1bes. In the SG's -
view, the Court should construe the structure and language 
to mean that Congress may regulate commerce "with" tribes 
as it regulates commerce "with" foreign nations, not as it 
regulates commerce "among" states. Because commercial 
activities of a foreign nation do not violate the Commerce 
Clause even if those activities burden interstate 
commerce, the SG contends that burdensome commercial 
activities by Indians do not violate the Clause either. 
Under this view, it is Congress' duty to remedy Indian ---activity that is inimical to interstate commerce, just as 
it is Congress' duty to negotiate with foreign nations. 
The SG concludes that the Court therefore should decide 
that the Commerce Clause of its own power does not impose 
any restrictions upon the Tribe's severance tax. 
The SG is correct that the Commerce Clause 
refers to the states and tribes in distinct phrases and 
.. 
12. 
that the Court acknowledged this distinction in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georiga, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831). But I 
question the SG's conclusion. It is true that the Clause 
refers to Indian tribes in the same manner that it refers 
to foreign nations, and of course it is settled that 
tribes retain sovereignty. But unlike any other foreign 
nation, Indian tribes reside among the states of this 
nation. Because of this concurrent residence, Indian 
tribes are not considered the equivalent of foreign 
nations for all purposes. For example, petitioners note 
that Congress has abandoned the notion that tribes must be 
dealt with by treaty. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 
553, 565-66 (1904). I would think that commercial I 
activity is an area in which tribes are quite unlike 1;0---
foreign nations, and quite like states. They are unlike 
foreign nations by virtue of the elaborate federal 
legislation controlling trade between Indians and non-
Indians. The federal government obviously does not 
regulate the commercial activity of foreign nations in 
this pervasive manner. I therefore am inclined to~ 
conclude that the standards developed under the Commerce ~, 
' 
Clause to restrict the commercial activity of states apply 
~ 
to commercial activity of Indian tribes. 
~ 
13. 
Assuming that the Commerce Clause standards ~ 
applicable to s tates apply to tribes as well, the  
remaining question is whether the Tribe's severance tax ~
violates the Clause either by discriminating against or 
imposing a multiple burden on interstate commerce. It 
seems to me that the important question of the two is 
whether the Tribe's severance tax imposes a multiple 
burden on interstate commerce, for petitioners contend 
that even a nondiscriminatory tribal severance tax imposes 
a multiple burden. The factual premise to petitioners' 
argument is fairly simple: Because both the Tribe and New ~ 
Mexico impose a tax upon the severance of the oil and gas, ~ - - - ------:-------:-:--1 t \' 
the act of extracting oil and gas is taxed twice at its --- --------------------------------------------------full value. The legal implications of this fact are --hardly as simple. I am inclined to conclude that 
petitioners are correct, but not for the reason they 
advance. 
As an initial matter, I disagree with the SG's 
contention that a multiple taxation is permissible in this 
case. In the SG's view, the two taxes upon the same act 
of extracting oil and gas are simply incremental costs to 
petitioners. But the Court has _held that - "[i]t is a -
commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple 
14. 
taL ion may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause." 
Ja~~ Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 u.s. 434 
(1979). I therefore do not think that the SG can toss off 
the risk of multiple burden so easily. 
Petitioners contend that Japan Line provides a 
proper analogy for determining whether the Tribe may 
impose its severance tax on top of the state's. In that 
case, the County of Los Angeles imposed a property tax on 
freight containers that already had been taxed by Japan. 
The Court held that the tax could be invalid even though 
it passed the 4-part test in Complete Auto Transit, Inc v. 
Brady, 430 u.s. 274 (1977), for state taxes upon 
interstate commerce. In addition to satisfying that test, 
the Court held, the tax also had to avoid the risk of 
multiple taxation and had to be consistent with federal 
policy. Applying that holding to this case, petitioners 
contend that the Tribe's tax creates an impermissible risk 
of multiple taxation. 
The pertinent point in Japan Line for our 
purposes is the Court's reason for deciding that the risk 
of multiple taxation had to be avoided. Where two states 
impose a tax upon essentially the same act or transaction, 
each state can apportion its own tax to the extent of the 
15. 
_L/~~ 




its b6-uftdar ies. The ~t ~
Court demands such apportionment. See ~' Complete~~-
Auto. But where one of the taxing authorities is a 
foreign country, as in Japan Line, the Court cannot 
enforce apportionment. As the Court explained in Japan 
Lines, " [ t] he bas is for this Court's approval of 
apportioned property taxation ... has been its ability to 
enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing 
bodies." 441 U.S., at 447. It seems to me that this 
statement distinguishes Japan Line from this case, for the 
Court can demand apportionment by both New Mexico and the 
Tribe . There is no reason therefore to conclude by ......____ 
analogy to Japan Line that the Tribe's tax must be invalid 
on the ground that New Mexico cannot be forced to 
apportion. It also seems to me, however, that the Court's 
cases require apportionment by both New Mexico and the 
Tribe; for without some apportionment by each, the 
extraction of oil and gas is taxed twice at full value. 
In sum, I am inclined to conclude that the 
Commerce Clause restricts the commercial activities of the 
Tribe and that it requires the Tribe, as well as New 
Mexico, to apportion its severance tax in some manner. 
16. 
Conclusion 
I am inclined to recommend reversing the Court 
of Appeals on the ground that the Tribe's tax violates the 
Commerce Clause. 
GM 03/23/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
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Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 
Given that these cases became my responsibility 
because I lost the draw for case-selection, the first thing I 
did upon picking up the briefs was to check--search!--for a 
party or subsidiary that might disqualify you. I could not 
find one, even with the aid of the "Special Appendix" filed in 
Nos. 80-11 & 15 which purports to list all of the subsidiaries 
of all of the parties. 
I will double-check before oral arguments. 
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Memorandum 
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GM 04/02/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: No. 80-11: Merrion v. Jicarrilla Apache Tribe 
You asked for a case involving the apportionment of 
taxes imposed on interstate commerce by two or more States. I 
looked at the cases cited by Japan Line Ltd. v. Country of Los 
Angeles, 441 u.s. 434 (1979), for the proposition that "[i]t is 
a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple 
taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause." The 
citations include Central Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 
U.S. 607 (1962), in which Justice Harlan generally discussed 
~
the requirement of apportioning state taxes. 
At issue in Central Railroad was an ad valorum 
property tax upon railroad cars. The Court stated that the 
Commerce Clause barred Pennsylvania, the domiciliary state, 
from taxing the railroad cars at full value if some other state 
could tax them. Each state could apportion its tax upon some 
reasonable basis--for example, on the basis of the amount of 
time that the railroad car spent during the year in each state. 
The severance tax in the case now before us strikes me 
~~ff~e~~ in some ways ~t generally susceptible to the 
apportionment doctrine. The tax on severance of oil and gas 
differs from the property tax on railroad cars because the 
severance absolutely occurs only in one State. But two 
/ 
2. 
~sovereign :.:_ res ~d_: _i r:_ t~te: New Mexico and the Tribe. 
Thus, there is as great a risk of multiple taxation as in 
Central Railroad where the railroad cars roll between states. 
For that reason, I would think that the apportionment doctrine 
generally can be applied. I am perplexed, however, because I 
do not see a ready basis for apportionment. I see no basis as -/" 
logical, for example, as the basis in Central Railroad: the 
amount of time the railraod cars spent in each state. Perhaps 
the Court can hold simply that the apportionment doctrine 
requires the the State and the Tribe either to devise between 
themselves some reasonable apportionment or to split the tax in 
half. 
In any event, I think that you will find Central 
Railroad helpful. 
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~Mr-. -:;-Ju---=--st-,--ic-e ;:;-:-St-evens ~.·--------
~~C.f. ~·· 
L1z.7 ~~~ ~p~ 
April 6, 1981 
30-11 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
80-15 Amoco v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
80-581 Commonwealth Edison v. Montana 
Dear Harry: 
I am happy for you to write for us in the above 
cases. 
I agree that they are important, particularly 
Commonwealth Edison. It is especially appropriate for you -
as the author of Comelete Auto - to write. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~UJtUUU ~ll'Urlltf tJrt ~b ,jfatts 
'htslfittgtott. ~. ~· 2llp'l$ 
April 6, 1981 
Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Lewis: 
You and I stand alone as the swing votes for the judgment in 
~ 
this case. May I try to write something that sets forth my 
views? I feel the Commonwealth Edison case is the more vital 
one, and I shall regard that as the primary writing. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:vttmt QJourt of fltt ~e~ .§hili.tr 
~cwJringfott, ~. <q. 20,?>1-;l 
June 1, 1981 
Re: 80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, etc. 
Dear John: 
I took no part in the consideration or 
decision of these cases. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHA~BE RS OF' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
:§upuut.t <!Jo-url o-f tltr 'J!irtiu~ ~tatrg 
'Jilfa$'1thtgto-n. ~. <!f. 20,?J.I..;l 
June 1, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe; Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
My study of what has turned out to be an 
especially interesting assignment has persuaded me that 
this case should be decided on a quite different 
rationale than seemed correct at the time of our 
conference. Accordingly, with apologies for taking so 
m~ch time with this important case, I submit herewith a 
memorandum that will speak for itself and that I 






JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~upumt <qtrurt of t!rt ~tb ~taits 
'J]llrasfrington, :!fl. <!f. 20~J.l-~ 
June 1, 1981 
Re: Nos. 80-11 & 80-15 Amoco Production Co. v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe; Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe 
Dear John: 
Your opinion of June 1st, while as you note in your 
cover letter is somewhat different than the reasoning of the 
Conference discussion, seems persuasive to me and I am 
prepared to join it. I wonder if you could cite somewhere 
in the opinion Byron's Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145 (1973), and Thurgood's McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). They are more or less 
the "flip side" of this case, but since they are fairly 
recent opinions dealing with state authority to tax income 
of a tribe or individual Indians residing on a reservation 
I think they are consistent with your analysis and are more 
tax-related than Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), 
which you cite on p. 17 of your draft. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
' ""' vul.<::l.J.. uu:::~~ce 
!Jr. Justice Brennan 
!Jr. Jus ti0e StS"ra:rl 
Mr. Justice White 
1: T' . 
C' . 
~'r . 
From : Mr. Justice Stevens 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
JUN 1'81 
Circul ated : ______ ~-------
] : 80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla ~~c~~aTEdbe; 
I 
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE STEVENS 
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before 
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sovereigns . 
They ruled th emselves and they exercised dominion over the lands 
that nourished them. Many of those tribes, and some attributes 
of their sovereignty, survive today. This Court, since its 
earliest days, has had the task of identifying those inherent 
sovereign ~owers that survived the creation of a new nation and 
the introduction of an entirely new system of laws applicable to 
both Indians and non-Indians. In this case we must decide 
whether one such surviving attribute of tribal sovereignty is the 
power to lease tribal property to a non-member and, after the 
lease is signed, to impose a tax on the exercise of the rights 
granted by the lease. 
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The 
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are 
extracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term 
leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In 1976 
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the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on the 
oil and gas produced under these leases, and petitioners brought 
suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The District Court 
granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617 F.2d 537. We granted 
certiorari u.s. Before addressing the legal issues, we 
shall recount some of the history of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
the derivation of the Indian leasing power, and the facts of 
these cases. 
I 
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a 
reservation in northern New Mexico.l Most of the residents of 
the reservation live in the town of Dulce, New Mexico, near the 
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation became 
a part of the United States when the Mexican War ended in the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. See 9 Stat. 922. Between 
1848 and 1871, the United States did not enter into any treaty 
with the Jicarillas or, as far as we are advised, enact any 
special legislation relating to them. In 1871 Congress outlawed 
any future treaties with Indian tribes.2 In 1887 President 
1 
2 
See Plaintiff's Exhibit E p. 14. 
"(H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the 
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or 
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power 
with whom the United States may contract by treaty: 
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Cleveland issued a simple executive order setting aside a tract 
of public lands in the Territory of New Mexico "as a reservation 
for the use and occupancy of the Jicarilla Apache Indians."3 
Except for a provision protecting bona fide settlers from 
deprivation of any previously acquired valid rights, the 
executive order contained no special rules applying to the 
reservation.4 
Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall 
be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of 
any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with 
any such Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566, 
current version at 25 U.S.C. § 71. 
3 Two previous e xecutive orders setting aside land as a 
reservation for the Jicarillas had been cancelled. In 1874 
President Grant set aside land in an order that he cancelled in 
1876. See I Kappler, C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws, and 
Treaties 874 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). In 1880 President 
Hayes established a reservation in an order that President Arthur 
cancelled in 1884. Id., at 875. 
4 The ~ntire executive order reads as follows: 
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887. 
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the 
public domain in the Territory of New Mexico which, 
when surveyed, will be embraced in the following 
townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, ranges 1 
east and 1, 2, and 3 west; 31 and 32 north, ranges 2 
west and 3 west, and the south half of township 31 
north, range 1 west, be, and the same is hereby, set 
apart as a reservation for the use and occupation of 
the Jicarilla Apache Indians: Provided, That this 
order shall not be so construed as to deprive any bona 
fide settler of any valid rights he may have acquired 
under the law of the United States providing for the 
disposition of the public domain." 
GROVER CLEVELAND. 
Id., at 875. 
The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by 
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The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any, 
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953. 
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes to 
enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress passed 
a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian lands. Act of 
February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 u.s.c. §397. Because the 
statute applied only to lands "occupied by Indians who have 
bought and paid for the same," the statute was interpreted to be 
inapplicable to reservations created by executive order. See 
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 
u.s. 159, 161-162, 164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the 
Interior took the position that Indian reservations created by 
executive order were public lands and that Indians residing on 
such reservations had no right to share in the royalties derived 
from oil and gas leases on such lands.5 In 1927 Congress enacted 
executive orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on 
November 11, 1907 and January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on 
February 17, 1912. See App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-
15, at 22a-24a. 
5 This decision held that the land on executive order 
reservations was subject to leasing, as "lands of the United 
States," under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 
1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 u.s.c. §181 et seq. 49 I.D. 139. In 
1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opinion stating that the 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive Order 
reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 
Attorney General Stone instituted litigation in the District 
Court of Utah to cancel certain leases that had been authorized 
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act. See United States v. Harrison, Equity No. 8288 (D. 
Utah 1925). See H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 
(1927). The case was dismissed by stipulation after the 1927 Act 
referred to in the text was passed. See United States v. 
McMahon, 273 u.s. 782. 
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a statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any Indian 
reservation created by executive order may be leased for oil and 
gas mining purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior.6 The statute directed that all rentals, royalties, or 
A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's 
position was correct. In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 317, the Court held that an Indian tribe was not 
entitled to any compensation from the United States when an 
executive order reservation was abolished. The Court said: 
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief 
shared by Congress and the Executive that the Indians 
were not entitled to compensation upon the abolition of 
an executive order reservation is the very absence of 
compensatory payments in such situations. It was a 
common practice, during the period in which 
reservations were created by executive order, for the 
President simply to terminate the existence of a 
reservation by cancelling or revoking the order 
establishing it. That is to say, the procedure 
followed in the case before us was typical. No 
compensation was made, and neither the Government nor 
the Indians suggested that it was due. 
* * * * * 
"We conclude therefore that there was no express 
constitutional or statutory authorization for the 
conveyance of a compensable interest to petitioner by 
the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no 
implied Congressional delegation of the power to do so 
can be spelled out from the evidence of Congressional 
and executive understanding. The orders were effective 
to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant 
the use of the lands to the petitioner. But the 
interest which the Indians received was subject to 
termination at the will of either the executive or 
Congress and without obligation to the United States. 
The executive orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an 
exercise of this power of termination, and the payment 
of compensation was not required." 316 U.S., at 330-
331. See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 
348 u.s. 272, 279-282. 
Footnote(s) 6 appear on following page(s). 
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bonuses from such leases should be paid to the Treasurer of the 
United States for the benefit of the tribes.? The statute 
further provided that State taxes could be levied upon the output 
of such oil and gas leases8 but made no mention of the 
6 Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, 
current version at 25 U.S.C. §398a, provided: 
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any 
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order 
for Indian purposes or for the use or occupancy of any 
Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining 
purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in 
the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 u.s.c. § 398]. " 
See also 25 U.S.C. §398. Unallotted land was land which had not 
been allotted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the 




Section 2 of the Act provided: 
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of 
oil and gas leases upon lands within Executive order 
Indian reservations or withdrawals shall be deposited 
in tne Treasury of the United States to the credit of 
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation 
or withdrawal was created or who are using and 
occupying the land, and shall draw interest at the rate 
of 4 per centum per annum and be available for 
appropriation by Congress for expenses in connection 
with the supervision of the development and operation 
of the oil and gas industry and for the use and benefit 
of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their 
tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the 
expenditure of such money, but no per capita payment 
shall be made except by Act of Congress." 25 U.S.C. 
§398b. 
Section 3 of the Act provided: 
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or 
local authority upon improvements, output of mines or 
oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets 
of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian 
reservations in the same manner as such taxes are 
No. 80-11; 80-15 
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possibility that the Indian tribes, in addition to receiving the 
royalties, could impose taxes on the output.9 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 
Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq., which authorized any Indian 
tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution and by-
laws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 
The Act provided that in "addition to all other powers vested in 
an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law," the 
constitution should also vest certain specific powers, such as 
the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe.lO 25 U.S.C. 
otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be 
levied against the share obtained for the Indians as 
bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of 
the Interior is authorized and directed to cause such 
taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the 
Treasury: Provided, That such taxes shall not become a 
lien or charge of any kind against the land or other 
property of such Indians." 25 u.s.c. § 398c. 
9 In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 
Stat. 347, 25 U.S.C. §396a-g, which was designed in part to 
achieve uniformity for all mineral leases of Indian lands. Like 
the 1927 Act, the statute also provided that the tribes were 
entitled to the royalties from such leases. The statute made no 
mention of state taxes. See nn. 51, 59, infra. 
10 The statute provided, in part: 
"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same 
reservation, shall have the right to organize for its 
common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate 
constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective 
when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members 
of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such 
reservation, as the case may be, at a special election 
authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior 
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe. 
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§476. The Act further authorized the Secretary of the Interior 
to issue a charter of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and 
provided that the charter may convey to the tribe the power to 
purchase, manage and dispose of its property.ll The 1934 Act 
said nothing about the power to levy taxes.l2 The first 
* * * 
"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian 
tribe or tribal council by existing law, the 
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also v e st in 
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights 
and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of 
counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent 
the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal 
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets 
without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with 
the Federal, State, and local Governments." 25 U.S.C. 
§ 476. 
11 Section 477 provides: 
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition 
by at least one-third of the adult Indians, issue a 
charfer of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That 
such charter shall not become operative until ratified 
at a special election by a majority vote of the adult 
Indians living on the reservation. Such charter may 
convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, 
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, 
manage, operate, and dispose of property of every 
description, real and personal, including the power to 
purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in 
exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and 
such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct 
of corporate business, not inconsistent with law; but 
no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or 
lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land 
included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter 
so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by 
Act of Congress." 25 u.s.c. § 477. 
12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) 
(hereinafter Cohen) . 
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Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved by the Secretary of 
the Interior in 1937.13 
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with 
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease, which is 
on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the 
Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later leases 
executed between other companies and the Tribe.l4 The lease 
provides that in return for a cash bonus of $71,345.99, to be 
paid to the tr e asurer of the Tribe, and rents and royalties, the 
Tribe as l e ssor granted to the lessee "the exclusive right and 
privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all 
the oil and natural gas deposits in or under" the described 
tracts of land, together with the right to construct and maintain 
buildings, plants, tanks, and other necessary structures on the 
surface. App. 22-23. The lease is for a term of 10 years after 
. ....-
approval by the Secretary of the Interior "and as much longer 
thereafter as oil and/or gas is produced in paying quantities 
from said land." Ibid. The lessee is obligated to use 
13 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to 
assess taxes against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and By-
Laws of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G 
(hereinafter 1937 Constitution). 
14 The original plaintifs in No. 80-11 operate under this 
lease. The original plaintiffs in No. 80-15 also executed a 
lease with the Tribe in 1953. See App. 62. Leases of Jicarilla 
tribal property in the aggregate cover over 500,000 acres of 
land, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla 
Reservation. Brief for Respondent 2. 
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reasonable diligence in the development of the property and to 
pay an annual rental of $1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12 1/2% 
"of the volume or amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" 
from the leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the 
lessee for development and operation of the lease is royalty-
free. Id., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of 
charge sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by 
the Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind. 
Id., at 27-28. 
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any taxes. 
The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all regulations of 
the Secretary of Interior 
"[N]ow or hereafter in force relative to such leases: 
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall 
effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental 
herein specified without the written consent of the 
parties to this lease." Id., at 27. 
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on 
behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. Id., at 32. Both of 
the 1953 leases described in the record are still producing. 
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution giving the 
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secretary 
of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members of the 
tribe doing business on the reservation." App. to Brief for 
Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a. Eight years later, on July 
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9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and Gas Severance Tax 
Ordinance, which was later approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides that the severance tax 
"is imposed on any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed 
from Tribal lands ...• " App. 38. The rate of the tax is $.05 
per million BTU of gas produced on the reservation and sold or 
transported off the reservation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil 
or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported 
off the reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as 
well as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. 
App. 39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall 
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will produce 
over $2,000,000 in revenues annually.l5 
Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the 
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal 
authorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any 
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated the 
two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the 
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First, after 
finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise a power of 
taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorporation in 1937, 
1 5 See District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Finding No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to 
interrogatories indicate that in 1976 the royalties on the leases 
received by the Tribe amounted to $3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit E p. 7; Tr. 269. 
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and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 did not confer 
that power on the Tribe, the District Court concluded that the 
attributes of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe did not extend 
to the imposition of a severance tax on nonmembers. Second, the 
court held that the statute enacted by Congress in 1927, which 
authorized oil and gas leases on reservations created by 
executive order, had granted State and local authorities the 
exclusive right to impose severance taxes on oil and gas 
production from such reservations. Finally, after finding that 
approximately 80% of the oil and gas production from the 
reservation is shipped interstate for sale outside of New Mexico, 
that the tax burden amounts to a significant percentage of the 
price of gas and oil,l6 and that the tax is only imposed on gas, 
oil, or condensate sold or transported off the reservation, the 
court concluded that it discriminated against and created an 
impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F.2d 537. The 
court held that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of 
sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934. The court further held that that 
16 Finding No. 36 reads: "That if the Jicarilla Apache Oil 
and Gas Severence Tax were valid the combined tax burden amounts 
to more than 29% of the interstate price of old gas and over 
12.5% of the price of old oil." App. 130. The Tribe contends 
that this finding is not supported by the record, but the Court 
of Appeals did not set it aside. 
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power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the Tribe, had not 
been divested by Congress, and was not inconsistent with any 
superior interest of the United States. The Court of Appeals 
rejected the argument that the 1927 Act had pre-empted the 
Tribe's power to levy a severance tax, because a review of the 
legislative history indicated that "Congress simply did not think 
of the issue when it enacted the statute." Id., at 547. The 
Court of Appeals' reversal of the District Court's commerce 
clause holding was based on the two courts' different readings of 
the ordinance: whereas the District Court had construed the 
taxable event as removal of the oil or gas from the boundaries of 
the reservation, the Court of Appeals construed severance from 
the land as the critical event. Id., at 546. Under the Court of 
Appeals' view, the ordinance would not discriminate against 
interstate commerce because oil or gas sold within the 
reservation as well as oil or gas transported off the reservation 
would be taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties 
paid in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory, 
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate taxes on 
the same taxable event did not create an impermissible multiple 
burden on commerce. Id., at 545-546. 
II 
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three 
sources: federal statutes, treaties, or the tribe's inherent 
sovereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the federal government seeks 
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to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the basis of 
any federal statute,l7 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who reside on 
an executive order reservation, executed no treaty with the 
United States from which they derive any sovereign powers. 
Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must be as an 
exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last Term, in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on cigarettes sold on the 
reservations of the Colville, Makah, and Lummi tribes to 
nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible exercise of the 
tribes' retained sovereign power to tax.l8 We must determine 
whether the severance tax imposed on nonmembers of the tribe in 
this case can likewise be characterized as a valid exercise of 
the tribe's inherent powers. To make this determination, we must 
first consider the source and scope of tribal sovereignty and 
more particularly the source and scope of the sovereign power to 
17 Congress may delegate "sovereign" powers to the tribes. 
See Mazurie v. United States, 419 U.S. 544. As we have 
indicated, however, neither the 1927 statute permitting Indians 
to receive royalties from the lease of tribal lands nor the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention of the 
authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp.4-8, supra. 
18 The Court stated: 
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands 
and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a 
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes 
retain unless divested of it by federal law or 
necessary implication of their dependent status." 447 
U.S., at 152. 
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levy taxes. 
Tribal sovereignty, unlike the sovereignty of the United 
States and the individual states, is not derived from the 
Constitution.l9 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have 
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the 
time of their incorporation into the United States. In Worcester 
v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia 
criminal statute purporting to regulate residency of non-Indians 
in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, 
the Court held that the Cherokees, although submitting to the 
protection of the United States, nevertheless retaine d some 
aspects of sovereignty: 
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed 
themselves under the protection of the United States: 
they have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to 
invoke the protection of any other sovereignty. But 
such engagements do not divest them of the right of 
self government, nor destroy their capacity to enter 
into treaties or compacts." Id., at 581-582.20 
19 The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution 
is in Art i c 1 e I , § 8 ( 3 ) , which provides that " [ t ] he Congress s h a 11 
have the Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." More 
significant than this reference to Indian tribes is the absence 
of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth Amendment, which 
provides: 
20 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." 
The Court also stated: 
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been 
recognized as existing in the Indians, but they have 
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty, the 
United States retains plenary authority to divest the tribes of 
any such attributes.21 Moreover, this Court's decisions since 
Worcester have recognized that not all attributes of sovereignty 
are consistent with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent 
nations."22 In determining what sovereign powers the tribes 
been always admitted to possess many of the attributes 
of sovereignty. All the rights which belong to self 
government have been recognized as vested in them. 
Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, but 
the fee in the soil has been considered in the 
government. This may be called the right to the 
ultimate domain, but the Indians have a present right 
of possession." 31 U.S., at 580. 
21 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319; Winton 
v. Amos, 255 u.s. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s. 
553, 565; 1 American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final 
Report, 106-107 (1977) (hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, 
for example, Congress can waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. 
See United States v. u.s. Fidelity, 309 u.s. 506, 512. 
22 In.The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, the 
Court held that the tribes were not ''foreign nations" within the 
meaning of the Constitution: 
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an 
unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to 
the lands they occupy, until that right shall be 
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; 
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which 
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United 
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated 
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a 
territory to which we assert a title independent of 
their will, which must take effect in point of 
possession when their right of possession ceases. 
Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward 
to his guardian." 
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retained in submitting to the authority of the United States, the 
Court has repeatedly recognized a fundamental distinction between 
the right of tribes to govern their own internal affairs and the 
right to exercise powers affecting nonmembers of the tribe.23 
The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from 
interference with tribal control over its members. See, e.g., 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 65. The Court has 
recognized that the power to preosecute members of the tribe for 
violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from power 
delegated by the United States but is an inherent attribute of 
sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313. 
Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to create 
substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff 
v.Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 
29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 
(domestic relations and family law). They also may enforce that 
law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217; Fisher v. 
District Court, supra. Moreover, the Indian tribes' sovereignty 
2 3 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382, the 
Court stated that the tribes 
"[W]ere, and always have been, regarded as having a 
semi-independent position when they preserved their 
tribal relations: not as States, not as nations, not as 
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as 
a separate people, with the power of regulating their 
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought 
under the laws of the Union or of the State within 
whose limits they resided." 
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over their own members is, in many respects, significantly 
greater than the States' powers over their own citizens. The 
tribes' virtually absolute control over their own membership 
carries with it the power to enforce discriminatory rules that 
would be intolerable in a non-Indian community.24 Their criminal 
jurisdiction over their own members is unconstrained by 
constitutional limitations that are applicable to the States and 
the Federal Government.25 Thus the use of the word "sovereign" 
to characterize tribal powers of self-government is surely 
appropriate. 
In sharp contrast to the Tribe's broad powers over their own 
always been narrowly 
_; 
confined.26 The Court has emphasized that "exercise of tribal 
24 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 
77, 25 U.~C. §§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribe.s from denying 
"to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
its laws," see id., §1302(8), the provisions of the United 
States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
limit federal or state authority do not similarly limit tribal 
authority. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 
and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that sovereign 
immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, that the Act did not create a private cause of action 
cognizable in federal court, and that a tribal court was the 
appropriate forum for vindication of rights created by the Act. 
25 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, the Court held that the 
restrictions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions 
in tribal courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S., 
at 328-329; Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 355. 
26 Treaties which specifically granted the right of self 
government to the tribes often also specifically excluded 
jurisdiction over nonmembers. See, ~' Treaty with the 
Cherokees, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 (1835); Treaty with the Choctaws 
and Chickasaws, art 7, 11 Stat 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks 
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power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government 
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the 
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without 
express Congressional delegation." Montana v. United States, 
u.s. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 
191, the Court held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by nonmembers within the reservations.27 
In Montana v. United States, supra, the court, in holding that 
the Crow Tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by 
nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe, 
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant--limited tribal 
power over nonmembers--was applicable in a civil as well as a 
and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1856). 
27 The Court stated in support of that holding: 
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United 
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the 
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their 
exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to 
conflict with the interests of this overriding 
sovereignty. '[T)heir rights to complete sovereignty, 
as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished.' 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823). 
"We have already described some of the inherent 
limitations on tribal powers that stem from their 
incorporation into the United States. In Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes' 
'power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased,' was inherently lost to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435 U.S. 
at 209. 
See also New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 499 (state 
court has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed 
against non-Indian on reservation) • 
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criminal context.28 Thus the Court has recognized that it is 
when the tribes attempt to impose controls on nonmembers that the 
tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would be inconsistent with 
their status.29 
28 
"The Court recently applied these general 
principles in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
u.s. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent 
sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian tribes cannot 
exercise power inconsistent with their diminished 
status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice 
Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, 
Cranch 87--the first Indian case to reach this Court--
that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to 
governing every person within their limits except 
themselves.' Id., at 147, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Trib~, supra, 435 U.S., at 209. Though Oliphant only 
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal 
matters, the principles on which it relied support the 
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers 
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe." Montana v. United States, 
U.S., at (footnote omitted}. 
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 
661, (tribes cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they 
occupy}; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes 
cannot enter into direct commercial or foreign relations with 
other nations} • 
29 In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that 
the power to prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not 
"implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status" and stated: 
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of 
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those 
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers of the tribe. 
* * * * * 
These limitations rest on the fact that the 
dependent status of Indian tribes within our 
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent 
with their freedom independently to determine their 
external relations. But the powers of self-government, 
including the power to prescribe and enforce internal 
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The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting 
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the broad 
tribal power over internal affairs involving members.30 The 
power to exercise control over nonmembers--and specifically the 
power to tax recognized in Colville--presumably has a much more 
limited derivation, tied specifically to the exercise of 
particular powers, than the general retention of inherent 
sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must therefore 
examine the cases upholding the the power to tax to determine the 
source of that power and then determine whether the tax imposed 
in this case is consistent with that rationale. 
III 
The sea~ch for the source of the taxing power must focus on 
the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934 when the 
criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve 
only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, 
they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost 
by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. '[T]he 
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a 
weaker power does not surrender its independence--its 
right to self government, by associating with a 
stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. 
Georgia [6 Pet.], at 560-561." 435 U.S., at 326. 
30 This lack of inherent sovereignty over nonmembers is 
supported by the principle that "in this Nation each sovereign 
governs only with the consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall, 
440 U.S. 410, 426. Because the tribe can completely exclude 
nonmembers from participation in the tribal government, the power 
exercised over those so excluded should be a limited one. 
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Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect of preventing 
any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers.31 Shortly after 
the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Department of the 
Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth his understanding 
of the powers that might be secured to an Indian tribe and 
31 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did 
not enlarge the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. 
Congress intended the Act to "stabilize the tribal organization 
of Indian tribes by vesting such tribal organizations with real, 
though limited, authority ..• " S. Rep. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1 (1934). As one commentator interpreted section 16 of the 
Act: 
"[I]t would appear that powers originally held by 
tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained 
by treaties or prior statutes, as well as any 
additional powers conferred in the same manner, would 
be retained by tribes that accepted the terms of the 
1934 Act ..•• The provision is consistent with the 
act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it 
recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may 
already have had as a government." Mettler, A Unified 
Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 Hastings L. 
Rev. _?9, 97 (1978). 
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 
1934 to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of 
the exercise of tribal powers placed a limit on tribal 
sovereignty, that power did not enable the Secretary to add to 
the inherent powers that a tribe possessed before the Act was 
passed. 
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never 
have had the occasion to exercise a particular power over 
nonmembers in its early history is surely not a sufficient reason 
for denying the existence of that power. Accordingly, the fact 
that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe ever 
imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not require us to 
conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent that 
the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by 
Indian tribes when the Reorganization Act was passed, we believe 
Congress intended the statute to preserve those powers for all 
Indian tribes that adopted a formal organization under the Act. 
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incorporated in its constitution by virtue of the statutory 
reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe "by existing 
law."32 He concluded that among those powers was a power of 
taxation and described the permissible exercise of this power: 
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this 
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and 
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept 
privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes 
may be attached as conditions." 55 I.D. 14, 46. 
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this 
32 55 I.D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of 
this opinion as follows: 
"My opinion has been requested on the question of 
what powers may be secured to an Indian tribe and 
incorporated in its constitution and by-laws by virtue 
of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the 
Wheeler-Howard Act (48 Stat. 984, 987): 
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian 
tribe- or tribal council by existing law, the 
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest * * 
* [Italics added.] 
"The question of what powers are vested in an 
Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law cannot 
be answered in detail for each Indian tribe without 
reference to hundreds of special treaties and special 
acts of. Congress. It is possible, however, on the 
basis of the reported cases, the written opinions of 
the various executive departments, and those statutes 
of Congress which are of general import, to define the 
powers which have heretofore been recognized as 
lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian tribe. 
My answer to the propounded question, then, will be 
general, and subject to correction for particular 
tribes in the light of the treaties and statutes 
affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes 
contain peculiar provisions restricting or enlarging 
the general authority of an Indian tribe." Id., at 17-
18. -
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opinion. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CAS 
1905), app. dismissed, 203 u.s. 599; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 
U.S. 384; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. 807 (Ct 
App. Ind. T.), aff'd., 105 Fed. 1003, (CA8 1900), were decided 
shortly after the turn of the century and are the three leading 
cases considering the power of an Indian tribe to assess taxes 
against nonmembers.33 The three cases are similar in result and 
in their reasoning. In each the court upheld the tax; in each 
the court relied on the Tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from 
its reservation and concluded that the Tribe could condition 
entry or continued presence within the reservation on the payment 
of a license fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the 
remedy for nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or 
intervention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe. 
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54 s.w. 807 
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affimed an order 
by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint filed by 
non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation. They had 
sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civilized Tribes 
from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25.00 on each non-
Indian lawyer residing and practicing his profession on the 
33 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, 
published in 1942, also relies on these cases in his discussion 
of tribal taxation of nonmembers. Cohen 266-267. The Court in 
Colville cited both Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in 
upholding tribal power to tax. 447 u.s., at 153. See pp. 36-37, 
infra. 
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reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim, the Court of 
Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties between the United 
States and the Creeks and noted that they had "carefully guarded 
their sovereignty, and their right to admit, and consequently to 
exclude, all white persons, except such as are named in the 
Treaty." rd., at 809. The United States, pursuant to a treaty 
with the Creeks, had agreed that all persons not expressly 
excepted who were present in the Creek Nation "without the 
consent of that nation are deemed to be intruders, and pledges 
itself to remove them." Ibid. Because attorneys were not within 
any excepted class,34 the Tribe had the authority to require them 
to obtain permits or to require their removal as "intruders."35 
34 
"Attorneys practicing in the United 1States courts are 
not persons who come within the exceptions, for they 
are not 'in the employment of the government of the 
United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or 
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading 
therein under license from the proper authority of the 
United States." 54 S.W., at 809. 
35 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on 
two opinions of the Attorney General of the United States. In 
the first opinion, issued in 1881, Attorney General McVeagh 
upheld the validity of Indian permit laws regulating which 
persons would be permitted to reside on the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
reservations. 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. In his discussion of the 
right of non-Indians to enter and remain on tribal lands Attorney 
General McVeagh stated: 
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from 
what has been already said that, besides those persons 
or classes mentioned by you, only those who have been 
permitted by the Choctaws or Chickasaws to reside 
within their limits, or to be employed by their 
citizens as teachers, mechanics, or skilled 
agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the 
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The Court thus held: 
"[T]hat unless since the ratification of the treaty of 
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of 
congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the 
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it 
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men) 
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian 
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the 
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all 
persons not authorized by its terms to reside in the 
Creek Nation should be deemed to be intruders, and had 
obligated itself to remove all such persons from the 
Creek Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of 
the treaty was a removal by the United States from the 
Creek Nation of the delinquent as an intruder." Id., 
at 809-810.36 ---
lands of these tribes; and the right to remain is gone 
when the permit has expired." Id., at 136 (emphasis 
added) • 
In the second opinion, on the same subject, Attorney General 
Phillips stated in 1884 that in the absence of a treaty or 
statute, the power of the Indian tribe "to regulate its own 
rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate therein and 
upon what conditions, can not be doubted." 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34, 
36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw tribes excepted from the grant of self-government power 
over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this 
provision to limit the tribes's power to exclude: 
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not 
limit the right of these tribes to pass upon the 
question, who (of persons indifferent to the United 
States, i.e., neither employees, nor objectionable) 
shall share their occupancy and upon what terms. That 
is a question which all private persons are allowed to 
decide for themselves; ••. " Id. , at 3 7. 
36 In other parts of its opinion, the court restated the 
proposition that the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit 
white men, or not, at its option, which as we hold, gave it the 
right to impose conditions," id., at 811, and that a lawyer who 
refused to pay for the privilege of remaining would become an 
"intruder": 
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who 
No. 80-11; 80-15 
- 27 -
Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384, decided by this Court in 
1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of the 
Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay annual permit 
fees.37 The complainants owned cattle and horses that were 
is a white man, and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, 
is, pursuant to their statute, required to pay for the 
privilege of remaining and practicing his profession in 
that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the 
payment thereof, he becomes, by virtue of the treaty, 
an intruder, and that in such a case the government of 
the United States may remove him from the nation; and 
that this duty devolves upon the interior department. 
Whether the interior department or its Indian agents 
can be controlled by the courts by the writs of 
mandamus and injunction is not material in this case, 
because, as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the 
amount r equired by the statute by its very terms 
becomes an intruder, whom the United States promises by 
the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in 
such cases the officers and agents of the interior 
department would be acting clearly and properly within 
the scope of their powers." 
Id., at 812. 
The court~lso reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the 
tax without the intervention of the Federal Government: 
"And when it is r emembered that up to the time that the 
United States courts were established in the Indian 
Territory the only remedy for the collection of this 
tax was by r emoval, and that the Indian Nations had no 
power to collect it, except through the intervention of 
the interior department, it is quite clear that if, in 
the best judgment of that department, it was deemed 
wise to take charge of the matter, and collect this 
money, and turn it over to the Indians, it had the 
power to do so, under its superintending control of the 
Indians, and the intercourse of white men with them 
granted by various acts of congress;" Id., at 812. 
37 J. George Wright, the Indian inspector, and J. Blair 
Shoenfelt, the defendants in Maxey v. Wright, supra, were also 
named as defendants in Morris v. Hitchcock. The other defendants 
in the Hitchcock case were the Secretary of the Interior and the 
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grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant to contract with 
individual members of the Tribe. Complainants filed suit in the 
District of Columbia praying for an injunction preventing the 
defendant federal officials from removing their cattle and horses 
from the Indian Territory because complainants refused to pay the 
permit fees assessed by the Tribe. An order dismissing the 
complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia and by this Court. 
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the 
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the Tribe the 
right "to control the presence within the territory assigned to 
it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as intruders"38 and 
that the United States had assumed the obligation of protecting 
the Indians from aggression by persons not subject to their 
jurisdiction. Id., at 389. The Court then reviewed similar 
legislation that had been adopted by the Chickasaw Nation in 
1876, and noted that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had, 
in 1879, specifically referred to such legislation requiring 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
38 The Court stated: 
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of 
these treaties, the Chickasaw Nation has exercised the 
power to attach conditions to the presence within its 
borders of persons who might otherwise not be entitled 
to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U.S., at 
389. 
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licensed merchants and traders to obtain a permit and to pay a 
fee of $25, and had expressed the opinion that such legislation 
was not invalid.39 
The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attorney 
General of the United States that had concluded that the powers 
of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not been 
withdrawn by Congress.40 Although Congress had subsequently 
39 
"Legislation of the same general character as that 
embodied in the act of the legislature of the Chickasaw 
Nation here assailed as invalid had been enacted by the 
Chickasaw Nation before the passage of the Curtis Act. 
The essential provisions of one such law, passed on 
October 17, 1876, were recited in a report made to the 
Senate by the Committee on the Judiciary, on February 
3, 1879, from which we copy the following: 
"'The law in question seems to have a twofold 
object--to prevent the intrusion of unauthorized 
persons into the territory of the Chickasaw Nation, and 
to raise revenue. By its terms no citizen of any State 
or Territory of the United States can either rent land 
or procure employment in the Chickasaw country without 
entering into a contract with a Chickasaw, which 
contract the latter is to report to the clerk of the 
county where he resides, and a permit must be obtained 
for a time not longer than twelve months, for which the 
citizen is to pay the sum of $25. 
"'Every licensed merchant, trader, and every 
physician, not a Chickasaw, is required to obtain a 
permit, for which the sum of $25 is exacted.' 
"Declaring in substance that under the existing 
treaties with the tribe, the Chickasaws were not 
prohibited from excluding from the territory of the 
nation the persons affected by the act, the committee 
expressed the opinion that the act which was the 
subject of the report was not invalid." 194 U.S., at 
389-390. 
Footnote(s) 40 appear on following page(s). 
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created an express exception in favor of owners of town lots, 
protecting them from being evicted as intruders, the Court noted 
that no comparable protection had been given to owners of cattle 
and horses. 194 U.S., at 392-393. The Court accordingly 
concluded that the Chickasaw legislation imposing grazing fees 
was valid. 
40 In the first opinion, by Attorney General John W. Griggs, 
see 23 Op. Atty Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorney General stated: 
"The treaties and laws of the United States make 
all persons, with a few specified exceptions, who are 
not citizens of an Indian nation or members of an 
Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation 
without permission, intruders there, and require their 
removal by the United States. This closes the whole 
matter, absolutely excludes all but the excepted 
classes, and fully authorizes these nations to 
absolutely exclude outsiders, or to permit their 
residence or business upon such terms as they may 
choose to impose, and it must be borne in mind that 
citizens of the United States, have, as such, no more 
right:or business to be there than they have in any 
foreign nation, and can lawfully be there at all only 
by Indian permission; and that their right to be or 
remain or carry on business there depends solely upon 
whether they have such permission. 
As to the power or duty of your Department in the 
premises there can hardly be a doubt. Under the 
treaties of the United States with these Indian nations 
this Government is under the most solemn obligation, 
and for which it has received ample consideration, to 
remove and keep removed from the territory of these 
tribes, all this class of intruders who are there 
without Indian permission. The performance of this 
obligation, as in other matters concerning the Indians 
and their affairs, has long been devolved upon the 
Department of the Interior." Id., at 218. 
The Court also relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528 (1901). 
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CA8 1905), was 
a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against federal 
inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs from doing 
business within the reservation because they had refused to pay a 
permit tax assessed by the Tribe. The court of Appeals relied on 
Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright in upholding the tax. 
The opinion for the court by Judge Sanborn emphasized that the 
tax was in the nature of a condition precedent to transacting 
business within the reservation and that the plaintiffs had ample 
notice of the tax: 
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the 
subject of this controversy, is the annual price fixed 
by the act of its national council, which was approved 
by the Pre s ident of the United States in the year 1900, 
for the privilege which it offers to those who are not 
citizens of its nation of trading within its borders. 
The payment of this tax is a mere condition of the 
exercise of this privilege. No noncitizen is r e quired 
to exercise the privilege or to pay the tax. He may 
refrain from the one and he remains free from liability 
for the other. Thus, without entering upon an extended 
discu~sion or consideration of the question whether 
this charge is t e chnically a license or a tax, the fact 
appears that it partakes far more of the nature of a 
license than of an ordinary tax, because it has the 
optional feature of the former and lacks the compulsory 
attribute of the latter. 
"Re peated decisions of the courts, numerous 
opinions of the Attorneys General, and the practice of 
years place beyond debate the propositions that prior 
to March 1, 1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority 
to require the payment of this tax as a condition 
precedent to the exercise of the privilege of trading 
within its borders, and that the executive department 
of the government of the United States had plenary 
power to enforce its payment through the Secretary of 
the Interior and his subordinates, the Indian 
inspector, Indian agent, and Indian police. Morris v. 
Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384, 392, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. 
Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4 C.C.A. 408, 410, 413, 
54 Fed. 426, 428, 431; Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 
54 S.W. 807; Maxey v. Wright, 44 C.C.A. 683, 105 Fed. 
1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys General, 34, 36; 23 
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Opinions of Attorneys General, 214, 217, 219, 220, 
528." 135 Fed., at 949-950. 
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that the 
traders had entered the reservation with full knowledge of the 
permit obligation, and therefore could be deemed to have accepted 
the condition precedent.41 The court also held that even though 
41 After citing the opinion of Attorney General Griggs from 
which this Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Hitchcock, 
Judge Sanborn wrote: 
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes 
were charging, and the Indian agent was collecting, 
taxes from noncitizens engaged in business in these 
nations. It was under this state of facts that the 
United States and the Creek Nation made the agreement 
of 1901. Did they intend by that agreement that the 
Creek Nation should thereby renounce its conceded power 
to exact these permit taxes? Both parties knew that 
this power existed, and the United States, by the act 
of its ?resident approving the law of the Creek 
national council, and the Secretary of the Interior by 
enforcing it, had approved its exercise. The subject 
of these taxes was presented to the minds of the 
contracting parties and was considered during the 
negotiation of the agreement, for that contract 
contains express stipulations that cattle grazed on 
rented allotments shall not be liable to any tribal tax 
(chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no 
noncitizen renting lands from a citizen for 
agricultural purposes as provided by law, whether such 
lands have been selected as an allotment or not, shall 
be required to pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 
Stat. 871, § 39). But they made no provision that 
noncitizens who engaged in the mercantile business in 
the Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As 
the law then in force required such noncitizens to pay 
such taxes, as both parties were then aware of that 
fact and considered the question, and as they made no 
stipulation to abolish these taxes, the conclusive 
presumption is that they intended to make no such 
contract, and that the power of the Creek Nation to 
exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary 
of the Interior and of his subordinates to collect 
them, were neither renounced, revoked, nor restricted, 
but that they remained in full force and effect after 
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noncitizens of the Tribe had lawfully acquired ownership of lots 
within the Creek Nation, they had no right to conduct business 
within the reservation without paying the permit taxes.42 
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions 
considering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on 
nonmembers.43 These cases demonstrate that the power to impose 
as before the agreement of 1901." 135 Fed., at 954. 
42 The court stated: 
"The legal effect , however, of the law prescribing the 
permit taxes is to prohibit noncitizens from conducting 
business within the Creek Nation without the payment of 
these taxes." 135 Fed., at 955. 
43 Two decades after the Reorganization Act was passed the 
problem was revisited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Crow v. 
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (CA8 
1956), the court held that the tribe had the power to assess a 
tax on a nonmember lessee of land within the reservation for the 
privilege of grazing stock on reservation land. And in Barta v. 
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (CA8 
1958), the Court held that the United States could bring an 
action on behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax of three 
cents per acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cents per 
acre per annum for farm land levied on nonmember lessees. The 
court held that the tax did not violate the constitutional rights 
of the nonmember lessees stating, in part: 
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty with the United 
States has power to provide for the admission of 
nonmembers of the tribe onto the reservation. Having 
such power, it has the authority to impose restrictions 
on the presence of nonmembers within the reservation." 
259 F.2d, at 556. 
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta suggests that the Court of 
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taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's power 
to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to impose 
restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reservation for any 
purpose.44 This interpretation of these cases is further 
Appeals, unlike the earlier courts, may not have rested the 
taxing power solely on the power to exclude. The Court of 
Appeals of course did not have the benefit of our decisions in 
Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v. United States. 
44 In his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, Felix Cohen 
states: 
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to 
nonmembers is not clear, it extends at least to 
property of nonmembers used in connection with Indian 
property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers 
in trading with the Indians. The power to tax 
nonmembers is derived in the cases from the authority, 
founded on original sovereignty and guaranteed in some 
instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers 
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the 
tribal .government has the power to exclude, it can 
extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition precedent 
to granting permission to remain or to operate within 
the tribal domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted). 
In another part of his treatise, cited by the government and 
the Tribe here, Cohen describes the power of taxation as "an 
inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless 
withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress ... " Id., at 
142. After discussing Buster v. Wright, Cohen cites that case 
for the proposition that "[t]he power to tax does not depend upon 
the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no power 
in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal 
jurisdiction." Id., at 143. As we have seen, however, the 
license tax in Buster was predicated on the tribe's right to 
attach conditions to nonmembers conducting business on the 
reservation, and the tribe could prevent such nonmembers from 
doing business regardless of whether it could physically remove 
those nonmembers from the reservation. Moreover, Cohen does 
recognize that the tribal taxes have been upheld on the basis of 
the tribe's power to remove nonmembers from the reservation, and 
that "[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of 
tribal taxing powers, to inquire how far an Indian tribe is 
empowered to remove nonmembers from its reservation." Ibid. 
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supported by the fact that the remedy for the nonpayment of the 
tax in all three cases was exclusion from the reservation.45 
Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over nonmembers are 
appropriately limited because nonmembers are foreclosed from 
participation in tribal government. See n. 30, supra. If the 
power to tax is limited to situations in which the tribe has the 
power to exclude, then the nonmember is subjected to the tribe's 
jurisdiction only if he consents by choosing to accept the 
conditions of entry imposed by the tribe.46 The limited source 
of the power to tax nonmembers--the power to exclude intruders--
is thus consistent with this Court's narrow construction of the 
power of Indian tribes over nonmembers in general.47 The source 
The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that 
the court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely 
largely upon the power of tribes to remove persons from the 
reservation, and consequently, to prescribe the conditions upon 
which they shall enter" but argued for a broader source of the 
right to tax. AIPRC Final Report 178-179. 
45 In Buster v. Wright, supra, the penalty for nonpayment of 
the tax was the closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by 
the Secretary of the Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. 
Hitchcock, supra, the remedy was the removal of the nonmember's 
cattle from the reservation, again enforced by the United States. 
In Maxey v.Wright, supra, an attorney refusing to pay the license 
fee to the Interior Department was subject to removal from the 
reservation. 
46 "No noncitizen is required to exercise a privilege or to 
pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he remains free 
from liability for the other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949. 
47 See pp. 18-21, supra. As we have indicated, see note 26, 
supra, the treaties recognizing the inherent power of tribal 
self-government have also deprived the tribes of jurisdiction 
over nonmembers. Treaties with Indian tribes, however, often 
specifically recognized the right of the tribe to exclude 
nonmembers from the reservation and to attach conditions to their 
entry. See~' Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, art. 7, 
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of the taxing authority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in 
this case is therefore not the Tribe's power of self-government, 
but rather its power over the territory that has been reserved 
and set apart for its use and occupation.48 
11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 
699 (1855). See II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 42, 
75, 418, 682, 699, 703, 719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866, 
886, 888, 929, 985, 990, 998, 1008, 1016, 1021. Although such 
treaties obviously have no effect on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
and although we assume that the 1934 Reorganization Act was 
intended to preseve the same sovereign powers of tribes residing 
on executive order reservations as those possessed by tribes 
operating under treaties, such treaties are relevant here, 
because the executive order creating a reservation clearly would 
not permit a tribe to retain more inherent sovereign power than 
would be permitted when a tribe places itself under the control 
of the United States pursuant to a treaty. 
48 The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their 
power to tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
Cohen's treatise notes that: 
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon its 
own members and upon nonmembers doing business within 
the reservations has been affirmed in many tribal 
constitutions approved under the Wheeler-Howard Act 
[Indian Reorganization Act], as has the power to remove 
nonmembers from land over which the tribe exercises 
jurisdiction." Cohen 143. 
The following clause from the 1935 Constitution of the Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe, which Cohen cites as a "typical" statement of such 
"tribal powers," indicates that the tribe perceived the scope of 
its taxation powers over nonmembers to be narrower than the scope 
of that power over members: 
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to 
require the performance of reservation labor in lieu 
thereof, and to levy taxes or license fees, subject to 
review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon non-
members doing business within the reservation. 
(i) To exclude from the restricted lands of the 
reservation persons no legally entitled to reside 
therein, under ordinances which shall be subject to 
review by the Secretary of the the Interior." Ibid. 
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This conclusion is entirely consistent with our decision in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 
supra. In that case we held that the power to tax non-Indians 
entering the reservation had not been divested by virtue of the 
tribe's dependent status and that no overriding federal interest 
would be frustrated by the tribal taxation. The Court quoted 
with approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's 
understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor Margold's 1934 
opinion. The Court noted further that "[f]ederal courts also 
have acknowledged tribal power to tax non-Indians entering the 
reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster v. 
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 447 u.s., at 153. The tax in 
Colville, which was applied to nonmembers who entered the 
reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is clearly valid 
under the rationale that the tribes' power to tax derives from 
the right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and the 
right to attach conditions to the entry of such nonmembers 
seeking to do business on the reservation.49 Thus the inherent 
sovereign power of Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the 
tribes' power to exclude and the exercise of the power must be 
consistent with its source. 
49 A nonmember subjected to the tax could avoid the tax by 
declining to do business on the reservation, and the "sanction" 
to be imposed for refusal to pay the tax would be denial of 
permission to buy cigarettes. 
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IV 
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have ·--
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on petitioners 
when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to 
---------------------~ 
engage in exploration, drilling, and extraction activities.SO 
The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to petitioners' entry, 
however, and therefore the tax is valid only if the Tribe retains 
the power to exclude petitioners from the reservation. 
The leases executed by the Tribe and petitioners are clearly 
~ - ===--
vc:_l_i_d_ and binding on both parties. The Tribe does not contend 
- --::-::.--~
that the leases were not the product of arms length bargaining. 
Moreover, the leases were executed on a form prepared by the 
Department of the Interior, the Department gave specific approval 
to the terms of the leases, and they were executed pursuant to 
explicit Congressional authority.Sl Petitioners therefore have 
50 
"[A]s the the payment of a tax or license fee may be 
made a condition of entry upon tribal land, it may also 
be made a condition to the grant of other privileges, 
such as the acquisition of a tribal lease." Cohen 143. 
51 Congress intended the Act of March 3, 1927 to make 
applicable to executive order reservations the leasing provisions 
already applicable to treaty reservations pursuant to the Act of 
May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 244. S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1927). The Act thus permitted the leasing of unallotted 
Indian land for terms not to exceed ten years and as much longer 
as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on the land. 44 
Stat. 1347. Among the purposes of the 1927 statute were to 
"[p]ermit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive-order 
Indian Reservations," to ••[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil 
No. 80-11; 80-15 
- 39 -
the right under the leases to remain on the reservation to do 
business for the term of the lease.52 Because the execution of 
these leases guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the 
reservation as might be necessary to enable them to perform the 
and gas royalties," and to "[p)lace with Congress the future 
determination of any changes of boundaries of Executive-order 
reservations or withdrawals." Ibid. In light of these purposes, 
it is clear that Congress intended leases executed pursuant to 
the 1927 Act to be binding. 
The Tribe contends that the leases in this case were 
executed pursuant to the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and 
not the 1927 Act. The Tribe notes that the lease with 
petitioners in No. 80-15, which the District Court refused to 
admit into evidence, see 617 F.2a, at 547-548, n. 5, states in 
one of its provisions that it was executed pursuant to the 1938 
Act. See App. 64. Petitioners note, however, that although the 
Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, does not 
require that royalties be paid to the Secretary of the Interior 
for the benefit of the Tribe, petitioners make their royalty 
payments to the United States Geological Survey for the benefit 
of the Tribe. Tr. 79-80. We need not resolve this question, 
because for our purposes the provisions of the 1938 Act do not 
vary significantly from the provisions of the 1927 Act. The 1938 
Act, like the 1927 Act, permitted the leasing of Indian lands for 
a period ·~ot to exceed 10 years and as long therefafter as 
minerals are produced in paying quantities." 25 U.S.C. §396c. 
One of the purposes of the 1938 Act was to establish uniformity 
of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining 
purposes by applying the law as to oil and gas leasing to the 
leasing of land for the mining of other minerals. s. Rep. No. 
985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). Other purposes were to 
"bring all leasing matters in harmony with the Indian 
Reorganization Act," ia., at 3, ana to enact changes designed "to 
give the Indians the greatest return from their property." Ia., 
at 2. There is no indication in the legislative history tha~he 
purposes of the 1938 Act are in any way inconsistent with the 
purposes of the 1927 Act ana prior legislation. Presumably the 
purposes of the earlier legislation were incorporated into the 
uniform scheme achieved by the 1938 Act. 
52 As Attorney General Macveagh stated in 1881, only those 
permitted by the tribe to remain on the reservation may do so, 
"and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired." 
17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 136. 
' I - --·~'----
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leases, petitioners are not intruders, and while the leases 
remain in effect there is no basis for the claim that the Tribe 
retains any power to exclude petitioners from the portions of the 
reservation on which they acquired drilling and extraction 
rights.53 
we might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at 
the time that they signed the leases, had some notice that a 
severance tax might be imposed.54 If the petitioners had such 
53 Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to exclude: 
"Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a 
landowner as well as the rights of a local government, 
dominion as well as sovereignty. But over all the 
lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, 
by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the 
sovereign power of determining the conditions upon 
which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, 
to reside therein, and to do business, provided only 
such determination is consistent with applicable 
Federal laws and does not infringe any vested rights of 
persons now occupying reservation land under lawful 
authority. Morris v. Hitchcock (194 U.S. 384) ." 55 
I.D., at 50 (emphasis added). 
54 In Buster v. Wright, the court relied on the fact that 
the taxpayers had ample notice of their potential liability 
before they entered into the on-reservation activities that gave 
rise to their obligation. The opinion repeatedly emphasized the 
optional character of a tax imposed as a condition precedent to 
engaging in business, see nn. 41, 46, supra, and the fact that 
although both parties were aware of the obligation, they made no 
agreement limiting or abolishing the tax: 
"But they made no provision that noncitize ns who 
engaged in the mercantile business in the Creek Nation 
should be exempt from these taxes. As the law then in 
force required such citizens to pay such t a xes, as both 
parties were then aware of that fact and considered the 
question, and as they made no stipulation to abolish 
these taxes, the conclusive presumption is that they 
7 
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notice, then the possibility that such a tax would be imposed 
could be construed as a condition of entry or a condition to 
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have consented 
by virtue of executing the leases.55 
There is a complete absence of any such notice in this case, ----------- -·--...._ 
however, and petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the 
tribe would attempt to impose an additional condition on the 
exercise of the mining rights granted by the leases.56 At the 
time the leases were executed the Jicarilla Apache Constitution 
contained no authorization of severance taxes of this type.57 In 
intended to make no such contract " 135 F., at 29. 
55 In Colville, for example, the nonmember desiring to 
purchase cigarettes on the reservation knew that his right to do 
so would be conditioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney 
General Griggs, in his 1900 opinion on "Trespassers on Indian 
Lands," diScussed the effect on tribal laws of a federal statute 
providing for the sale of reservation lots to non-Indians: 
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indian 
nation gives to the purchaser no right of exemption 
from the laws of such nation, nor does it authorize him 
to do any act in violation of the treaties with such 
nation. These laws requiring a permit to reside or 
carry on business in the Indian country existed long 
before and at the time this act was passed. And if any 
outsider saw proper to purchase a town lot under this 
act of Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he 
could occupy it for residence or business only by 
permission from the Indians." 23 Op. Atty. Gen., at 
217. 
56 In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commission 
stated that Indian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties. 
Usually they just receive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344. 
Footnote(s) 57 appear on following page(s). 
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addition, the written leases unambiguously stated: 
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a 
change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein 
specified without the written consent of the parties to 
this lease." App. 27. 
Moroever, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied on the 
consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an indication 
of what conditions might be attached to the lease of tribal 
lands. When Congress enacted legislation in 1927 granting the 
Indians the royalty income from oil and gas leases on 
reservations created by executive order, it neither authorized 
nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the tribes. The 
statute did authorize the collection of severance taxes by the 
States. Petitioners have argued that this authorization pre-
empted any tribal power to impose a comparable tax. The 
legislative history, however, indicates that Congress did not 
consider the question of tribal taxes on mineral output from 
reservation lands.58 If Congress had considered it possible that 
57 The fact that the Tribe apparently believed such 
authorization was necessary is indicated by the fact that the 
Tribe amended its constitution in 1968, prior to the imposition 
of the tax, to permit asse s sment of such severance taxes. 
Although the power to exclude might have justified the imposition 
of this tax when petitioners signed their leases, even a tribal 
constitutional provision recognizing the power to exclude, see n. 
48, supra, would not place petitioners on notice of the 
possibility that a severance tax would be levied by the tribe in 
the future. The 1937 Jicarilla Apache Constitution, however, 
contained no reference to the power to exclude or the power to 
tax members or nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution. 
Footnote(s) 58 appear on following page(s). 
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the power to impose severance taxes on leases of this character 
would be shared by the States and the tribes, the issue would 
surely have been mentioned in the legislation or in its 
history.59 
58 The Court of Appeals rejected the pre-emption argument 
because its reading of the legislative history convinced it "that 
Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted the 
statute." 617 F.2d, at 547. 
59 Rep. Leavitt, the Chairman of the Committee on Indian 
Affair stated in discussing the purpose of the 1927 Act: 
"Briefly, the purpose, so far as the Indians are 
concerned, is to make sure by act of Congress that 
there can first be a development of possible oil 
resources on these Executive-order lands; and, in the 
second place, that with the development of the oil 
resources the Indians themselves .•. shall have the 
benefit of the development of the natural resources of 
their reservation instead of having their lands 
considered to be public lands of the United States with 
the benefits of such development going to the white 
people. 
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of this 
country and who now have in their possession only those 
portions that have been given to them by acts of 
Congress, Executive order, and by treaties ought to get 
whatever benefit there is from these remaining areas--
the resources under the soil as well as above it--
without having the white man come in and profit 
entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573. 
Rep. Carter, in support of the bill, stated: 
"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for 
white people, since great States have been carved and 
built from their domain, since they have re s ponded to 
every call of their Government both during peace and 
war, since by our own act, without their consent, via 
et armis we have narrowed them down to a small 
reservation, can it now justly lie in our mouths to say 
that they are not entitled to all proceeds accruing or 
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have 
left?" 68 Cong. Rec. 4579. 
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Thus when the leases in this case were executed, the 
possibility that a tribe could grant lessees access to a 
reservation for specific purposes in exchange for a specific 
consideration and thereafter impose a tax on the exercise of the 
granted authority had never occurred to Congress,60 to the 
The House and Senate reports state that two of the purposes of 
the act were to give th~ Indians "all of the oil and gas 
royalties," and to "authorize the states to tax production of oil 
and gas on such reservations." S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1927); H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1927). 
Thus Congress specifically recognized both the right of the 
Indians to receive the benefits of all oil and gas resources on 
reservation land and the right of the states to impose taxes on 
the output yet made no mention of the possibility of tribal 
severance taxes. Although the absence of such reference does not 
indicate that Congress preempted the right of the tribes to 
impose such taxes, the lack of any mention of tribal severance 
taxes does nevertheless bear on petitioners awareness of the 
possibility that such taxes might be imposed. 
As we have noted, see n. 51, supra, the Tribe argues that 
the 1938 Act, and not the 1927 Act, is the applicable statute 
here. The Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, which makes no 
reference ~o the states' right to impose severance taxes, 
superceded the 1927 statute, and therefore the states no longer 
have the authority to impose severance taxes on the mineral 
output of Indian lands. The Court of Appeals did not need to 
reach this question, because the state of New Mexico was not a 
party, and because the court concluded that the Tribe's tax was 
valid regardless of whether the state retained the right to tax 
the oil and gas resources. 617 F.2d, at 547-548, n. 5. We also 
need not reach this question, because the legislative history of 
the 1938 Act, like the history of the 1927 Act, makes no mention 
of tribal severance taxes. Even if the omission of the states' 
power to impose taxes could be construed as a withdrawal of such 
right from the states, there is certainly no indication in the 
1938 statute or its history that Congress intended to vest such 
power in the tribes or even considered the possibility of doing 
so. See n. 51, supra. 
60 Although the lack of Congressional recognition of such a 
tax would not be relevant to the validity of of a severance tax 
which the tribe either imposed at the outset of the lease 
relationship or imposed after giving fair notice at the outset of 
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States, to the Indian tribes, or to any potential lessees.61 
Thus the conditions attaching to petitioners' right to extract 
oil and gas from the land covered by the leases were not, in the 
contemplation of the parties, subject to change during the terms 
of the leases.62 The Tribe therefore had no authority to change 
such relationship, we clearly do not have such a case here. 
61 The Secretary of the Interior has cited cases holding 
that a license or franchise issued by a governmental body does 
not prevent the later imposition of a tax unless the right to tax 
"has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no 
other reasonable interpretation." St. Louis v. United Rys., 210 
u.s. 266, 280; Ne w Orleans City & Lake R.R. v. City of New 
Orleans, 143 U.S. 192, 195; New York Transit Corp. v. City of New 
York, 303 u.s. 573, 590-593. The principal issue in these cases 
was whether the retroactive imposition of the frachise tax 
violated the contract clause of the Constitution or was so 
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argument 
was by no means frivolous, cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315 
u.s. 610, no such issue is raised here. These cases are 
distinguishable from the instant cases for the simple reason that 
two different types of sovereigns are involved. The fundamental 
differences in their powers have led us to conclude that tribes 
do not have tne same attributes of sovereignty as do states and 
their subdivisions. Therefore, the fact that a state or its 
subdivision may impose taxes after the granting of a license 
would neither give notice to petitioners that such a tax was 
possible nor stand as authority for the proposition that such a 
tax was within the sovereign power of an Indian tribe. 
62 The Secre t ary also argues that petitioners should be 
required to pay the tax as their contribution to tribal services 
which benefit all residents of the Reservation, including 
petitioners. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior 14. In 
calendar year 1976 the Tribe received $3,995,469.69 in oil and 
gas royalties. See n. 15, supra. The Tribe tells us that its 
budget for fiscal 1976, which was tendered to the District Court 
but not received in evidence, was $3,958,201. See Defendants' 
Exhibit AA; Tr. 306; Brief for Respondent 7. Unlike the fixed 
royalty used in some mineral leasing arrangements, see United 
States v. Swank, U.S. , the royalty in these oil and gas 
leases is a percentage of the amount produced and so will allow 
the Tribe to benefit from a rising market. 
Moreover, the tax is not merely an appropriate share of a 
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the terms of the bargain by adding an additional condition in the 
form of a severance tax.63 
The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the 
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of Indian 
~ --------..._______ 
sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized in the past ----------- -----
that we have no hesitation in concluding that it is beyond the 
pow~~--------
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be 
reversed. 
budget largely financed by the sovereign's taxation of its own 
subjects. The principal components of the annual income of the 
members of this Tribe--if the tax should be sustained--would be 
the amount of approximately $4,000,000 of royalties and 
approximately $2,000,000 in severance taxes received from the 
same group of lessees. 
63 We do not have in these cases a tax imposed on both 
members and nonmembers. The economic burdens of the Jicarilla 
Apache severance tax are imposed entirely on taxpayers over whom 
the tribe has no jurisdiction except insofar as rights under the 
leases are being exercised. 
64 Because we rest our decision on the absence of inherent 
tribal sovereignty to impose this severance tax, we need not 
reach the federal preemption and interstate commerce questions 
raised by petitioners. 
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Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE STEVENS 
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before 
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sovereigns. 
They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion over the lands 
that nourished them. Many of those tribes, and some attributes 
of their sovereignty, survive today. This Court, since its 
earliest days, has had the task of identifying those inherent 
sovereign powers that survived the creation of a new nation and 
the introduction of an entirely new system of laws applicable to 
both Indians and non-Indians. In this case we must decide 
whether one such surviving attribute of tribal sovereignty is the 
power to lease tribal property to a non-member and, after the 
lease is signed, to impose a tax on the exercise of the rights 
granted by the lease. 
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The 
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are 
extracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term 
leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In 1976 
~ 
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the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on the 
oil and gas produced under these leases, and petitioners brought 
suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The District Court 
granted the injunction, but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617 F.2d 537. We granted 
certiorari u.s. Before addressing the legal issues, we 
shall recount some of the history of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
the derivation of the Indian leasing power, and the facts of 
these cases. 
I 
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a 
reservation ·in northern New Mexico.l Most of the residents of 
the reservation live in the town of Dulce, New Mexico, near the 
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation became 
a part of the United States when the Mexican War ended in the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. See 9 Stat. 922. Between 
1848 and 1871, the United States did not enter into any treaty 
with the Jicarillas or, as far as we are advised, enact any 
special legislation relating to them. In 1871 Congress outlawed 
any future treaties with Indian tribes.2 In 1887 President 
1 See Plaintiff's Exhibit E p. 14. 
2 
"[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the 
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or 
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power 
with whom the United States may contract by treaty: 
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The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any, 
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953. 
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes to 
enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress passed 
a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian lands. Act of 
February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 u.s.c. §397. Because the 
statute applied only to lands "occupied by Indians who have 
bought and paid for the same," the statute was interpreted to be 
inapplicable to reservations created by executive order. See 
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 
u.s. 159, 161-162, 164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the 
Interior took the position that Indian reservations created by 
executive order were public lands and that Indians residing on 
such reservations had no right to share in the royalties derived. 
from oil and gas leases on such lands.5 In 1927 Congress enacted 
executive orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on 
November 11, 1907 and January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on 
February 17, 1912. See App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-
15, at 22a-24a. 
5 This decision held that the land on executive order 
reservations was subject to leasing, as "lands of the United 
States," under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 
1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. §181 et seq. 49 I.D. 139. In 
1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opinion stating that the 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive Order 
reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 
Attorney General Stone instituted litigation in the District 
Court of Utah to cancel certain leases that had been authorized 
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act. See United States v. Harrison, Equity No. 8288 (D. 
Utah 1925). See H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 
(1927). The case was dismissed by stipulation after the 1927 Act 
referred to in the text was passed. See United States v. 
McMahon, 273 U.S. 782. 
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a statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any Indian 
reservation created by executive order may be leased for oil and 
gas mining purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior.6 The statute directed that all rentals, royalties, or 
A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's 
position was correct. In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United 
States, 316 u.s. 317, the Court held that an Indian tribe was not 
entitled to any compensation from the United States when an 
executive order reservation was abolished. The Court said: 
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief 
shared by Congress and the Executive that the Indians 
were not entitled to compensation upon the abolition of 
an executive order reservation is the very absence of 
compensatory payments in such situations. It was a 
common practice, during the period in which 
reservations were created by executive order, for the 
President simply to terminate the existence of a 
reservation by cancelling or revoking the order 
establishing it. That is to say, the procedure 
followed in the case before us was typical. No 
compensation was made, and neither the Government nor 
the Indians suggested that it was due. 
* * * * * 
"We conclude therefore that there was no express 
constitutional or statutory authorization for the 
conveyance of a compensable interest to petitioner by 
the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no 
implied Congressional delegation of the power to do so 
can be spelled out from the evidence of Congressional 
and executive understanding. The orders were effective 
to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant 
the use of the lands to the petitioner. But the 
interest which the Indians received was subject to 
termination at the will of either the executive or 
Congress and without obligation to the United States. 
The executive orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an 
exercise of this power of termination, and the payment 
of compensation was not required." 316 U.S., at 330-
331. See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 
348 u.s. 272, 279-282. 
Footnote(s) 6 appear on following page(s). 
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bonuses from such leases should be paid to the Treasurer of the 
United States for the benefit of the tribes.? The statute 
further provided that State taxes could be levied upon the output 
of such oil and gas leases8 but made no mention of the 
6 Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, 
current version at 25 U.S.C. §398a, provided: 
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any 
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order 
for Indian purposes or for the use or occupancy of any 
Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining 
purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in 
the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 u.s.c. § 398]. " 
See also 25 U.S.C. §398. Unallotted land was land which had not 
been allotted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the 
formula prescribed in the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 
388. 
7 Section 2 of the Act provided: 
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of 
oil and gas leases upon lands within Executive order 
Indian reservations or withdrawals shall be deposited 
in tne Treasury of the United States to the credit of 
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation 
or withdrawal was created or who are using and 
occupying the land, and shall draw interest at the rate 
of 4 per centum per annum and be available for 
appropriation by Congress for expenses in connection 
with the supervision of the development and operation 
of the oil and gas industry and for the use and be nefit 
of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their 
tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the 
expenditure of such money, but no per capita p a yment 
shall be made e xcept by Act of Congress." 25 U.S.C. 
§398b. 
8 Section 3 of the Act provided: 
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or 
local authority upon improvements, output of mines or 
oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets 
of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian 
reservations in the same manner as such taxes are 
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possibility that the Indian tribes, in addition to receiving the 
royalties, could impose taxes on the output.9 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 
Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq., which authorized any Indian 
tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution and by-
laws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 
The Act provided that in "addition to all other powers vested in 
an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law," the 
constitution should also vest certain specific powers, such as 
the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe.lO 25 u.s.c. 
otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be 
levied against the share obtained for the Indians as 
bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of 
the Interior is authorized and directed to cause such 
taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the 
Treasury: Provided, That such taxes shall not become a 
lien or charge of any kind against the land or other 
propetty of such Indians." 25 u.s.c. § 398c. 
9 In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 
Stat. 347, 25 u.s.c. §396a-g, which was designed in part to 
achieve uniformity for all mineral leases of Indian lands. Like 
the 1927 Act, the statute also provided that the tribes were 
entitled to the royalties from such leases. The statute made no 
mention of state taxes. See nn. 51, 59, infra. 
10 The statute provided, in part: 
"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same 
reservation, shall have the right to organize for its 
common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate 
constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective 
when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members 
of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such 
reservation, as the case may be, at a special election 
authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior 
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe. 
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§476. The Act further authorized the Secretary of the Interior 
to issue a charter of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and 
provided that the charter may convey to the tribe the power to 
purchase, manage and dispose of its property.ll The 1934 Act 
said nothing about the power to levy taxes.l2 The first 
* * * 
"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian 
tribe or tribal council by existing law, the 
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in 
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights 
and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of 
counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent 
the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal 
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets 
without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with 
the Federal, State, and local Governments." 25 U.S.C. 
§ 476. 
11 Section 477 provides: 
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition 
by at least one-third of the adult Indians, issue a 
charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That 
such charter shall not become operative until ratified 
at a special election by a majority vote of the adult 
Indians living on the reservation. Such charter may 
convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, 
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, 
manage, operate, and dispose of property of every 
description, real and personal, including the power to 
purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in 
exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and 
such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct 
of corporate business, not inconsistent with law; but 
no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or 
lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land 
included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter 
so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by 
Act of Congress." 25 u.s.c. § 477. 
12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) 
(hereinafter Cohen) . 
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Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved by the Secretary of 
the Interior in 1937.13 
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with 
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease, which is 
on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the 
Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later leases 
executed between other companies and the Tribe.l4 The lease 
provides that in return for a cash bonus of $71,345.99, to be 
paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents and royalties, the 
Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the exclusive right and 
privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all 
the oil and natural gas deposits in or under" the described 
tracts of land, together with the right to construct and maintain 
buildings, plants, tanks, and other necessary structures on the 
surface. App. 22-23. The lease is for a term of 10 years after 
approval by the Secretary of the Interior "and as much longer 
thereafter as oil and/or gas is produced in paying quantities 
from said land." Ibid. The lessee is obligated to use 
l3 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to 
assess taxes against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and By-
Laws of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G 
(hereinafter 1937 Constitution). 
14 The original plaintifs in No. 80-11 operate under this 
lease. The original plaintiffs in No. 80-15 also executed a 
lease with the Tribe in 1953. See App. 62. Leases of Jicarilla 
tribal property in the aggregate cover over 500,000 acres of 
land, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla 
Reservation. Brief for Respondent 2. 
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reasonable diligence in the development of the property and to 
pay an annual rental of $1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12 1/2% 
"of the volume or amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" 
from the leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the 
lessee for development and operation of the lease is royalty-
free. Id., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of 
charge sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by 
the Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind. 
Id., at 27-28. 
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any taxes. 
The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all regulations of 
the Secretary of Interior 
"[N]ow or hereafter in force relative to such leases: 
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall 
effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental 
herein specified without the written consent of the 
parties to this lease." Id., at 27. 
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on 
behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. Id., at 32. Both of 
the 1953 leases described in the record are still producing. 
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution giving the 
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secretary 
of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members of the 
tribe doing business on the reservation." App. to Brief for 
Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a. Eight years later, on July 
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9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and Gas Severance Tax 
Ordinance, which was later approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides that the severance tax 
"is imposed on any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed 
from Tribal lands ...• " App. 38. The rate of the tax is $.05 
per million BTU of gas produced on the reservation and sold or 
transported off the reservation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil 
or condensate produced on the reservation and sold or transported 
off the reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as 
well as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. 
App. 39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall 
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will produce 
over $2,000,000 in revenues annually.l5 
Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the 
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal 
authorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any 
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated the 
two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the 
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First, after 
finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise a power of 
taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorporation in 1937, 
15 See District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Finding No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to 
interrogatories indicate that in 1976 the royalties on the leases 
received by the Tribe amounted to $3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit E p. 7; Tr. 269. 
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and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 did not confer 
that power on the Tribe, the District Court concluded that the 
attributes of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe did not extend 
to the imposition of a severance tax on nonmembers. Second, the 
court held that the statute enacted by Congress in 1927, which 
authorized oil and gas leases on reservations created by 
executive order, had granted State and local authorities the 
exclusive right to impose severance taxes on oil and gas 
production from such reservations. Finally, after finding that 
approximately 80% of the oil and gas production from the 
reservation is shipped interstate for sale outside of New Mexico, 
that the tax burden amounts to a significant percentage of the 
price of gas and oi1,l6 and that the tax is only imposed on gas, 
oil, or condensate sold or transported off the reservation, the 
court concluded that it discriminated against and created an 
impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F.2d 537. The 
court held that the taxing power was an inherent attribute of 
sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934. The court further held that that 
16 Finding No. 36 reads: "That if the Jicarilla Apache Oil 
and Gas Severence Tax were valid the combined tax burden amounts 
to more than 29% of the interstate price of old gas and over 
12.5% of the price of old oil." App. 130. The Tribe contends 
that this finding is not supported by the record, but the Court 
of Appeals did not set it aside. 
&o. 80-11; 80-15 
- 13 -
power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the Tribe, had not 
been divested by Congress, and was not inconsistent with any 
superior interest of the United States. The Court of Appeals 
rejected the argument that the 1927 Act had pre-empted the 
Tribe's power to levy a severance tax, because a review of the 
legislative history indicated that "Congress simply did not think 
of the issue when it enacted the statute." Id., at 547. The 
Court of Appeals' reversal of the District Court's commerce 
clause holding was based on the two courts' different readings of 
the ordinance: whereas the District Court had construed the 
taxable event as removal of the oil or gas from the boundaries of 
the reservation, the Court of Appeals construed severance from 
the land as the critical event. Id., at 546. Under the Court of 
Appeals' view, the ordinance would not discriminate against 
interstate commerce because oil or gas sold within the 
reservation as well as oil or gas transported off the reservation 
would be taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties 
paid in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory, 
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate taxes on 
the same taxable event did not create an impe rmissible multiple 
burden on commerce. Id., at 545-546. 
II 
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three 
sources: federal statutes, treaties, or the tribe's inherent 
sovereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the federal government seeks 
. 
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to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the basis of 
any federal statute,l7 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who reside on 
an executive order reservation, executed no treaty with the 
United States from which they derive any sovereign powers. 
Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must be as an 
exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last Term, in 
washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on cigarettes sold on the 
reservations of the Colville, Makah, and Lummi tribes to 
nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible exercise of the 
tribes' retained sovereign power to tax.lB We must determine 
whether the severance tax imposed on nonmembers of the tribe in 
this case can likewise be characterized as a valid exercise of 
the tribe's inherent powers. To make this determination, we must 
first consider the source and scope of tribal sovereignty and 
more particularly the source and scope of the sovereign power to 
17 Congress may delegate "sovereign" powers to the tribes. 
See Mazurie v. United States, 419 U.S. 544. As we have 
indicated, however, neither the 1927 statute permitting Indians 
to receive royalties from the lease of tribal lands nor the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention of the 
authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp.4-8, supra. 
18 The Court stated: 
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands 
and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a 
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes 
retain unless divested of it by federal law or 
necessary implication of their dependent status." 447 
u.s., at 152. 
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levy taxes. 
Tribal sovereignty, unlike the sovereignty of the United 
States and the individual states, is not derived from the 
Constitution.l9 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have 
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the 
time of their incorporation into the United States. In Worcester 
v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia 
criminal statute purporting to regulate residency of non-Indians 
in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, 
the Court held that the Cherokees, although submitting to the 
protection of the United States, nevertheless retained some 
aspects of sovereignty: 
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed 
themselves under the protection of the United States: 
they have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to 
invoke the protection of any other sovereignty. But 
such engagements do not divest them of the right of 
self ~overnment, nor destroy their capacity to enter 
into treaties or compacts." Id., at 581-582.20 
19 The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution 
is in Article I, §8(3), which provides that "[t]he Congress shall 
have the Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." More 
significant than this reference to Indian tribes is the absence 
of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth Amendment, which 
provides: 
20 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." 
The Court also stated: 
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been 
recognized as existing in the Indians, but they have 
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty, the 
United States retains plenary authority to divest the tribes of 
any such attributes.21 Moreover, this Court's decisions since 
Worcester have recognized that not all attributes of sovereignty 
are consistent with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent 
nations."22 In determining what sovereign powers the tribes 
been always admitted to possess many of the attributes 
of sovereignty. All the rights which belong to self 
government have been recognized as vested in them. 
Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, but 
the fee in the soil has been considered in the 
government. This may be called the right to the 
ultimate domain, but the Indians have a present right 
of possession." 31 u.s., at 580. 
21 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 u.s. 313, 319; Winton 
v. Amos, 255 u.s. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s. 
553, 565; 1 American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final 
Report, 106-107 (1977) (hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, 
for example, Congress can waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. 
See United States v. u.s. Fidelity, 309 u.s. 506, 512. 
22 InThe Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, the 
Court held that the tribes were not "foreign nations" within the 
meaning of the Constitution: 
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an 
unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to 
the lands they occupy, until that right shall be 
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; 
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which 
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United 
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated 
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a 
territory to which we assert a title independent of 
their will, which must take effect in point of 
possession when their right of possession ceases. 
Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward 
to his guardian." 
. 
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retained in submitting to the authority of the United States, the 
Court has repeatedly recognized a fundamental distinction between 
the right of tribes to govern their own internal affairs and the 
right to exercise powers affecting nonmembers of the tribe.23 
The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from 
interference with tribal control over its members. See, e.g., 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 65. The Court has 
recognized that the power to preosecute members of the tribe for 
violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from power 
delegated by the United States but is an inherent attribute of 
sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313. 
Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to create 
substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff 
v.Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 
29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 
(domestic relations and family law) . They also may enforce that 
law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217; Fisher v. 
District Court, supra. Moreover, the Indian tribes' sovereignty 
2 3 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382, the 
Court stated that the tribes 
"[W]ere, and always have been, regarded as having a 
semi-inde pendent position when they preserved their 
tribal relations: not as States, not as nations, not as 
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as 
a separate people, with the power of regulating their 
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought 
under the laws of the union or of the State within 
whose limits they resided." 
. 
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over their own members is, in many respects, significantly 
greater than the States' powers over their own citizens. The 
tribes' virtually absolute control over their own membership 
carries with it the power to enforce discriminatory rules that 
would be intolerable in a non-Indian community.24 Their criminal 
jurisdiction over their own members is unconstrained by 
constitutional limitations that are applicable to the States and 
the Federal Government.25 Thus the use of the word "sovereign" 
to characterize tribal powers of self-government is surely 
appropriate. 
In sharp contrast to the Tribe's broad powers over their own 
members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always been narrowly 
confined.26 The Court has emphasized that "exercise of tribal 
24 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 
77, 25 u.S:c. §§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribes from denying 
"to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
its laws," see id., §1302(8), the provisions of the United 
States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
limit federal or state authority do not similarly limit tribal 
authority. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 56 
and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that sovereign 
immunity protected the tr1be from suit under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, that the Act did not create a private cause of action 
cognizable in federal court, and that a tribal court was the 
appropriate forum for vindication of rights created by the Act. 
25 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 u.s. 376, the court held that the 
restrictions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions 
in tribal courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S., 
at 328-329; Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 355. 
26 Treaties which specifically granted the right of self 
government to the tribes often also specifically excluded 
jurisdiction over nonmembers. See, ~, Treaty with the 
Cherokees, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 (1835); Treaty with the Choctaws 
and Chickasaws, art 7, 11 Stat 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks 
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power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government 
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the 
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without 
express Congressional delegation." Montana v. United States, 
u.s. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 
191, the Court held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction 
over crimes committed by nonmembers within the reservations.27 
In Montana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that 
the Crow Tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by 
nonmembers on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe, 
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant--limited tribal 
power over nonmembers--was applicable in a civil as well as a 
and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1856). 
27 The Court stated in support of that holding: 
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United 
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the 
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their 
exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to 
conflict with the interests of this overriding 
sovereignty. '[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty , 
as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished.' 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823). 
"We have already described some of the inherent 
limitations on tribal powers that stem from their 
incorporation into the United States. In Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes' 
'power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased,' was inherently lost to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435 u.s. 
at 209. 
See also New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 u.s. 496, 499 (state 
court has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed 
against non-Indian on reservation) • 
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criminal context.28 Thus the Court has recognized that it is 
when the tribes attempt to impose controls on nonmembers that the 
tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would be inconsistent with 
their status.29 
28 
"The Court recently applied these general 
principles in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent 
sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian tribes cannot 
exercise power inconsistent with their diminished 
status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice 
Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, 
Cranch 87--the first Indian case to reach this Court--
that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to 
governing every person within their limits except 
themselves.' Id., at 147, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, supra, 435 U.S., at 209. Though Oliphant only 
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal 
matters, the principles on which it relied support the 
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers 
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe." Montana v. United States, 
U.S., at (footnote omitted). 
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 u.s. 
661, (tribes cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they 
occupy); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes 
cannot enter into direct commercial or foreign relations with 
other nations) • 
29 In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that 
the power to prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not 
"implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status" and stated: 
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of 
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those 
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers of the tribe. 
* * * * * 
These limitations rest on the fact that the 
dependent status of Indian tribes within our 
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent 
with their freedom independently to determine their 
external relations. But the powers of self-government, 
including the power to prescribe and enforce internal 
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The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting 
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the broad 
tribal power over internal affairs involving members.30 The 
power to exercise control over nonmembers--and specifically the 
power to tax recognized in Colville--presumably has a much more 
limited derivation, tied specifically to the exercise of 
particular powers, than the general retention of inherent 
sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must therefore 
examine the cases upholding the the power to tax to determine the 
source of that power and then determine whether the tax imposed 
in this case is consistent with that rationale. 
III 
The search for the source of the taxing power must focus on 
the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934 when the 
criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve 
only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, 
they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost 
by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. '[T]he 
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a 
weaker power does not surrender its independence--its 
right to self government, by associating with a 
stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. 
Georgia [6 Pet.], at 560-561." 435 U.S., at 326. 
30 This lack of inherent sovereignty over nonmembers is 
supported by the principle that "in this Nation each sovereign 
governs only with the consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall, 
440 U.S. 410, 426. Because the tribe can completely exclude 
nonmembers from participation in the tribal government, the power 
exercised over those so excluded should be a limited one. 
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Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect of preventing 
any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers.31 Shortly after 
the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Department of the 
Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth his understanding 
of the powers that might be secured to an Indian tribe and 
31 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did 
not enlarge the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. 
Congress intended the Act to "stabilize the tribal organization 
of Indian tribes by vesting such tribal organizations with real, 
though limited, authority ..• " S. Rep. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1 (1934). As one commentator interpreted section 16 of the 
Act: 
''[I]t would appear that powers originally held by 
tribes that were recognized and allowed to be retained 
by treaties or prior statutes, as well as any 
additional powers conferred in the same manner, would 
be retained by tribes that accepted the terms of the 
1934 Act ...• The provision is consistent with the 
act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it 
recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may 
already have had as a government." Mettler, A Unified 
Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 Hastings L. 
Rev. 89, 97 (1978). --
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 
1934 to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of 
the exercise of tribal powers placed a limit on tribal 
sovereignty, that power did not enable the Secretary to add to 
the inherent powers that a tribe possessed before the Act was 
passed. 
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never 
have had the occasion to exercise a particular power over 
nonmembers in its early history is surely not a sufficient reason 
for denying the existence of that power. Accordingly, the fact 
that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe ever 
imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not require us to 
conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent that 
the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by 
Indian tribes when the Reorganization Act was passed, we believe 
Congress intended the statute to preserve those powers for all 
Indian tribes that adopted a formal organization under the Act. 
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incorporated in its constitution by virtue of the statutory 
reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe "by existing 
law."32 He concluded that among those powers was a power of 
taxation and described the permissible exercise of this power: 
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this 
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and 
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept 
privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes 
may be attached as conditions." 55 I.D. 14, 46. 
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this 
32 55 I.D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of 
this opinion as follows: 
"My opinion has been requested on the question of 
what powers may be secured to an Indian tribe and 
incorporated in its constitution and by-laws by virtue 
of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the 
Wheeler-Howard Act (48 Stat. 984, 987): 
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian 
tribe~ or tribal council by existing law, the 
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest * * 
* [Italics added.] 
"The question of what powers are vested in an 
Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law cannot 
be answered in detail for each Indian tribe without 
reference to hundreds of special treaties and special 
acts of Congress. It is possible, however, on the 
basis of the reported cases, the written opinions of 
the various executive departments, and those statutes 
of Congr e ss which are of general import, to define the 
powers which have heretofore been recognized as 
lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian tribe. 
My answer to the propounded question, then, will be 
general, and subject to correction for particular 
tribes in the light of the treaties and statutes 
affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes 
contain peculiar provisions restricting or enlarging 
the general authority of an Indian tribe." Id., at 17-
18. -
. 
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opinion. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CAS 
1905), app. dismissed, 203 U.S. 599; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 
U.S. 3S4; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. S07 (Ct 
App. Ind. T.), aff'd., 105 Fed. 1003, (CAS 1900), were decided 
shortly after the turn of the century and are the three leading 
cases considering the power of an Indian tribe to assess taxes 
against nonmembers.33 The three cases are similar in result and 
in their reasoning. In each the court upheld the tax; in each 
the court relied on the Tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from 
its reservation and concluded that the Tribe could condition 
entry or continued presence within the reservation on the payment 
of a license fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the 
remedy for nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or 
intervention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe. 
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. S07 
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affimed an order 
by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint filed by 
non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation. They had 
sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civilized Tribes 
from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25.00 on each non-
Indian lawyer residing and practicing his profession on the 
33 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, 
published in 1942, also relies on these cases in his discussion 
of tribal taxation of nonmembers. Cohen 266-267. The Court in 
Colville cited both Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in 
upholding tribal power to tax. 447 U.S., at 153. See pp. 36-37, 
infra. 
. 
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reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim, the Court of 
Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties between the United 
States and the Creeks and noted that they had "carefully guarded 
their sovereignty, and their right to admit, and consequently to 
exclude, all white persons, except such as are named in the 
Treaty." Id., at 809. The United States, pursuant to a treaty 
with the Creeks, had agreed that all persons not expressly 
excepted who were present in the Creek Nation "without the 
consent of that nation are deemed to be intruders, and pledges 
itself to remove them." Ibid. Because attorneys were not within 
any excepted class,34 the Tribe had the authority to require them 
to obtain permits or to require their removal as "intruders."35 
34 
"Attorneys practicing in the United States courts are 
not persons who come within the exceptions, for they 
are not 'in the employment of the government of the 
United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or 
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading 
therein under license from the proper authority of the 
United States." 54 S.W., at 809. 
35 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on 
two opinions of the Attorney General of the United States. In 
the first opinion, issued in 1881, Attorney General McVeagh 
upheld the validity of Indian permit laws regulating which 
persons would be permitted to reside on the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
reservations. 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. In his discussion of the 
right of non-Indians to enter and remain on tribal lands Attorney 
General McVeagh stated: 
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from 
what has been already said that, besides those persons 
or classes mentioned by you, only those who have been 
permitted by the Choctaws or Chickasaws to reside 
within their limits, or to be employed by their 
citizens as teachers, mechanics, or skilled · 
agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the 
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The Court thus held: 
"[T]hat unless since the ratification of the treaty of 
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of 
congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the 
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it 
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men} 
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian 
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the 
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all 
persons not authorized by its terms to reside in the 
Creek Nation should be deemed to be intruders, and had 
obligated itself to remove all such persons from the 
Creek Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of 
the treaty was a removal by the United States from the 
Creek Nation of the delinquent as an intruder." Id., 
at 809-810.36 -
lands of these tribes; and the right to remain is gone 
when the permit has expired." Id., at 136 (emphasis 
added} • 
In the second opinion, on the same subject, Attorney General 
Phillips stated in 1884 that in the absence of a treaty or 
statute, the power of the Indian tribe "to regulate its own 
rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate therein and 
upon what conditions, can not be doubted." 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34, 
36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw tribes excepted from the grant of self-government power 
over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this 
provision to limit the tribes's power to exclude: 
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not 
limit the right of these tribes to pass upon the 
question, who (of persons indifferent to the United 
States, i.e., neither employees, nor objectionable} 
shall share their occupancy and upon what terms. That 
is a question which all private persons are allowed to 
decide for themselves; ... " Id., at 37. 
36 In other parts of its opinion, the court restated the 
proposition that the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit 
white men, or not, at its option, which as we hold, gave it the 
right to impose conditions," id., at 811, and that a lawyer who 
refused to pay for the privilege of remaining would become an 
"intruder": 
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who 
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384, decided by this Court in 
1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of the 
Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay annual permit 
fees.37 The complainants owned cattle and horses that were 
is a white man, and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, 
is, pursuant to their statute, required to pay for the 
privilege of remaining and practicing his profession in 
that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the 
payment thereof, he becomes, by virtue of the treaty, 
an intruder, and that in such a case the government of 
the United States may remove him from the nation; and 
that this duty devolves upon the interior department. 
Whether the interior department or its Indian agents 
can be controlled by the courts by the writs of 
mandamus and injunction is not material in this case, 
because, as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the 
amount required by the statute by its very terms 
becomes an intruder, whom the United States promises by 
the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in 
such cases the officers and agents of the interior 
department would be acting clearly and properly within 
the scope of their powers." 
Id., at 812. 
The court also reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the 
tax without the intervention of the Federal Government: 
"And when it is remembered that up to the time that the 
United States courts were established in the Indian 
Territory the only remedy for the collection of this 
tax was by removal, and that the Indian Nations had no 
power to collect it, except through the intervention of 
the interior department, it is quite clear that if, in 
the best judgment of that department, it was deemed 
wise to take charge of the matter, and collect this 
money, and turn it over to the Indians, it had the 
power to do so, under its superintending control of the 
Indians, and the intercourse of white men with them 
granted by various acts of congress;" Id., at 812. 
37 J. George Wright, the Indian inspector, and J. Blair 
Shoenfelt, the defendants in Maxey v. Wright, supra, were also 
named as defendants in Morris v. Hitchcock. The other defendants 
in the Hitchcock case were the Secretary of the Interior and the 
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grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant to contract with 
individual members of the Tribe. Complainants filed suit in the 
District of Columbia praying for an injunction preventing the 
defendant federal officials from removing their cattle and horses 
from the Indian Territory because complainants refused to pay the 
permit fees assessed by the Tribe. An order dismissing the 
complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia and by this Court. 
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the 
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the Tribe the 
right "to control the presence within the territory assigned to 
it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as intruders"38 and 
that the United States had assumed the obligation of protecting 
the Indians from aggression by persons not subject to their 
jurisdiction. Id., at 389. The Court then reviewed similar 
legislation that had been adopted by the Chickasaw Nation in 
1876, and noted that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had, 
in 1879, specifically referred to such legislation requiring 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
38 The Court stated: 
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of 
these treaties, the Chickasaw Nation has exercised the 
power to attach conditions to the presence within its 
borders of persons who might otherwise not be entitled 
to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U.S., at 
389. 
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licensed merchants and traders to obtain a permit and to pay a 
fee of $25, and had expressed the opinion that such legislation 
was not invalid.39 
The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attorney 
General of the United States that had concluded that the powers 
of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not been 
withdrawn by Congress.40 Although Congress had subsequently 
39 
"Legislation of the same general character as that 
embodied in the act of the legislature of the Chickasaw 
Nation here assailed as invalid had been enacted by the 
Chickasaw Nation before the passage of the Curtis Act. 
The essential provisions of one such law, passed on 
October 17, 1876, were recited in a report made to the 
Senate by the Committee on the Judiciary, on February 
3, 1879, from which we copy the following: 
"'The law in question seems to have a twofold 
object--to prevent the intrusion of unauthorized 
persons into the territory of the Chickasaw Nation, and 
to raise revenue. By its terms no citizen of any State 
or Territory of the United States can either rent land 
or procure employment in the Chickasaw country without 
entering into a contract with a Chickasaw, which 
contract the latter is to report to the clerk of the 
county where he resides, and a permit must be obtained 
for a time not longer than twelve months, for which the 
citizen is to pay the sum of $25. 
"'Every licensed merchant, trader, and every 
physician, not a Chickasaw, is required to obtain a 
permit, for which the sum of $25 is exacted.' 
"Declaring in substance that under the existing 
treaties with the tribe, the Chickasaws were not 
prohibited from excluding from the territory of the 
nation the persons affected by the act, the committee 
expressed the opinion that the act which was the 
subject of the report was not invalid." 194 U.S., at 
389-390. . 
Footnote(s) 40 appear on following page(s). 
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created an express exception in favor of owners of town lots, 
protecting them from being evicted as intruders, the Court noted 
that no comparable protection had been given to owners of cattle 
and horses. 194 U.S., at 392-393. The Court accordingly 
concluded that the Chickasaw legislation imposing grazing fees 
was valid. 
40 In the first opinion, by Attorney General John w. Griggs, 
see 23 Op. Atty Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorney General stated: 
"The treaties and laws of the United States make 
all persons, with a few specified exceptions, who are 
not citizens of an Indian nation or members of an 
Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation 
without permission, intruders there, and require their 
removal by the United States. This closes the whole 
matter, absolutely excludes all but the excepted 
classes, and fully authorizes these nations to 
absolutely exclude outsiders, or to permit their 
residence or business upon such terms as they may 
choose to impose, and it must be borne in mind that 
citizens of the United States, have, as such, no more 
right:"" or business to be there than they have in any 
foreign nation, and can lawfully be there at all only 
by Indian permission; and that their right to be or 
remain or carry on business there depends solely upon 
whether they have such permission. 
As to the power or duty of your Department in the 
premises there can hardly be a doubt. Under the 
treaties of the United States with these Indian nations 
this Government is under the most solemn obligation, 
and for which it has received ample consideration, to 
remove and keep removed from the territory of these 
tribes, all this class of intruders who are there 
without Indian permission. The performance of this 
obligation, as in other matters concerning the Indians 
and their affairs, has long been devolved upon the 
Department of the Interior." rd., at 218. 
The Court also relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528 (1901). 
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CA8 1905), was 
a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against federal 
inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs from doing 
business within the reservation because they had refused to pay a 
permit tax assessed by the Tribe. The Court of Appeals relied on 
Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright in upholding the tax. 
The opinion for the court by Judge Sanborn emphasized that the 
tax was in the nature of a condition precedent to transacting 
business within the reservation and that the plaintiffs had ample 
notice of the tax: 
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the 
subject of this controversy, is the annual price fixed 
by the act of its national council, which was approved 
by the President of the United States in the year 1900, 
for the privilege which it offers to those who are not 
citizens of its nation of trading within its borders. 
The payment of this tax is a mere condition of the 
exercise of this privilege. No noncitizen is required 
to exercise the privilege or to pay the tax. He may 
refrain from the one and he remains free from liability 
for the other. Thus, without entering upon an extended 
discu~sion or consideration of the question whether 
this charge is technically a license or a tax, the fact 
appears that it partakes far more of the nature of a 
license than of an ordinary tax, because it has the 
optional feature of the former and lacks the compulsory 
attribute of the latter. 
"Repeated decisions of the courts, numerous 
opinions of the Attorneys General, and the practice of 
years place beyond debate the propositions that prior 
to March 1, 1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority 
to require the payment of this tax as a condition 
precedent to the exercise of the privilege of trading 
within its borders, and that the executive department 
of the government of the United States had plenary 
power to enforce its payment through the Secretary of 
the Interior and his subordinates, the Indian 
inspector, Indian agent, and Indian police. Morris v. 
Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384, 392, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. 
Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4 C.C.A. 408, 410, 413, 
54 Fed. 426, 428, 431; Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 
54 S.W. 807; Maxey v. Wright, 44 C.C.A. 683, 105 Fed. 
1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys General, 34, 36; 23 
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Opinions of Attorneys General, 214, 217, 219, 220, 
528." 135 Fed., at 949-950. 
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that the 
traders had entered the reservation with full knowledge of the 
permit obligation, and therefore could be deemed to have accepted 
the condition precedent.41 The court also held that even though 
41 After citing the opinion of Attorney General Griggs from 
which this Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Hitchcock, 
Judge Sanborn wrote: 
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes 
were charging, and the Indian agent was collecting, 
taxes from noncitizens engaged in business in these 
nations. It was under this state of facts that the 
United States and the Creek Nation made the agreement 
of 1901. Did they intend by that agreement that the 
Creek Nation should thereby renounce its conceded power 
to exact these permit taxes? Both parties knew that 
this power existed, and the United States, by the act 
of its President approving the law of the Creek 
national council, and the Secretary of the Interior by 
enforcing it, had approved its exercise. The subject 
of these taxes was presented to the minds of the 
contracting parties and was considered during the 
negotiation of the agreement, for that contract 
contains express stipulations that cattle grazed on 
rented allotments shall not be liable to any tribal tax 
(chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no 
noncitizen renting lands from a citizen for 
agricultural purposes as provided by law, whether such 
lands have been selected as an allotment or not, shall 
be required to pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 
Stat. 871, § 39). But they made no provision that 
noncitizens who engaged in the mercantile business in 
the Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As 
the law then in force required such noncitizens to pay 
such taxes, as both parties were then aware of that 
fact and considered the question, and as they made no 
stipulation to abolish these taxes, the conclusive 
presumption is that they intended to make no such 
contract, and that the power of the Creek Nation to 
exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary 
of the Interior and of his subordinates to collect 
them, were neither renounced, revoked, nor restricted, 
but that they remained in full force and effect after 
. 
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noncitizens of the Tribe had lawfully acquired ownership of lots 
within the Creek Nation, they had no right to conduct business 
within the reservation without paying the permit taxes.42 
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions 
considering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on 
nonmembers.43 These cases demonstrate that the power to impose 
as before the agreement of 1901." 135 Fed., at 954. 
42 The court stated: 
"The legal effect, however, of the law prescribing the 
permit taxes is to prohibit noncitizens from conducting 
business within the Creek Nation without the payment of 
these taxes." 135 Fed., at 955. 
43 Two decades after the Reorganization Act was passed the 
problem was revisited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Crow v. 
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (CA8 
1956) , the court held that the tribe had the power to assess a 
tax on a nonmember lessee of land within the reservation for the 
privilege of grazing stock on reservation land. And in Barta v. 
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (CA8 
1958), the Court held that the United States could bring an 
action on behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax- of three 
cents per acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cents per 
acre per annum for farm land levied on nonmember lessees. The 
court held that the tax did not violate the constitutional rights 
of the nonmember lessees stating, in part: 
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty with the United 
States has power to provide for the admission of 
nonmembers of the tribe onto the reservation. Having 
such power, it has the authority to impose restrictions 
on the presence of nonmembers within the reservation." 
259 F.2d, at 556. 
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta suggests that the Court of 
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taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's power 
to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to impose 
restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reservation for any 
purpose.44 This interpretation of these cases is further 
Appeals, unlike the earlier courts, may not have rested the 
taxing power solely on the power to exclude. The Court of 
Appeals of course did not have the benefit of our decisions in 
Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v. United States. 
44 In his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, Felix Cohen 
states: 
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to 
nonmembers is not clear, it extends at least to 
property of nonmembers used in connection with Indian 
property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers 
in trading with the Indians. The power to tax 
nonmembers is derived in the cases from the authority, 
founded on original sovereignty and guaranteed in some 
instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers 
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the 
tribal government has the power to exclude, it can 
extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition precedent 
to granting permission to remain or to operate within 
the tribal domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted). 
~ 
In another part of his treatise, cited by the government and 
the Tribe here, Cohen describes the power of taxation as "an 
inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless 
withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress .•. " Id., at 
142. After discussing Buster v. Wright, Cohen cites that case 
for the proposition that "[t]he power to tax does not depend upon 
the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no power 
in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal 
jurisdiction." Id., at 143. As we have seen, however, the 
license tax in BUSter was predicated on the tribe's right to 
attach conditions to nonmembers conducting business on the 
reservation, and the tribe could prevent such nonmembers from 
doing business regardless of whether it could physically remove 
those nonmembers from the reservation. Moreover, Cohen does 
recognize that the tribal taxes have been upheld on the basis of 
the tribe's power to remove nonmembers from the reservation, and 
that "[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of 
tribal taxing powers, to inquire how far an Indian tribe is 
empowered to remove nonmembers from its reservation." Ibid. 
~ 
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supported by the fact that the remedy for the nonpayment of the 
tax in all three cases was exclusion from the reservation.45 
Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over nonmembers are 
appropriately limited because nonmembers are foreclosed from 
participation in tribal government. See n. 30, supra. If the 
power to tax is limited to situations in which the tribe has the 
power to exclude, then the nonmember is subjected to the tribe's 
jurisdiction only if he consents by choosing to accept the 
conditions of entry imposed by the tribe.46 The limited source 
of the power to tax nonmembers--the power to exclude intruders--
is thus consistent with this Court's narrow construction of the 
power of Indian tribes over nonmembers in g e neral.47 The source 
The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that 
the court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely 
largely upon the power of tribes to remove persons from the 
reservation, and consequently, to prescribe the conditions upon 
which they shall enter" but argued for a broader source of the 
right to tax. AIPRC Final Report 178-179. 
45 In Buster v. Wright, supra, the penalty for nonpayment of 
the tax was the closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by 
the Secretary of the Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. 
Hitchcock, supra, the remedy was the r emoval of the nonmember's 
cattle from the reservation, again enforced by the United States. 
In Maxey v.Wright, supra, an attorney refusing to pay the license 
fee to the Interior Department was subject to r emoval from the 
reservation. 
46 "No noncitizen is required to exercise a privilege or to 
pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he r emains free 
from liability for the other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949. 
47 See pp. 18-21, supra. As we have indicated, see note 26, 
supra, the treaties recognizing the inherent power of tribal 
self-government have also deprived the tribes of jurisdiction 
over nonmembers. Treaties with Indian tribes, however, often 
specifically recognized the right of the tribe to exclude 
nonmembers from the reservation and to attach conditions to their 
entry. See~' Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, art. 7, 
A 
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of the taxing authority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in 
this case is therefore not the Tribe's power of self-government, 
but rather its power over the territory that has been reserved 
and set apart for its use and occupation.48 
11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 
699 (1855). See II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 42, 
75, 418, 682, 699, 703, 719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866, 
886, 888, 929, 985, 990, 998, 1008, 1016, 1021. Although such 
treaties obviously have no effect on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
and although we assume that the 1934 Reorganization Act was 
intended to preseve the same sovereign powers of tribes residing 
on executive order reservations as those possessed by tribes 
operating under treaties, such treaties are relevant here, 
because the executive order creating a reservation clearly would 
not permit a tribe to retain more inherent sovereign power than 
would be permitted when a tribe places itself under the control 
of the United States pursuant to a treaty. 
48 The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their 
power to tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act. 
Cohen's treatise notes that: 
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon its 
own members and upon nonmembers doing business within 
the reservations has been affirmed in many tribal 
const1tutions approved under the Wheeler-Howard Act 
[Indian Reorganization Act], as has the power to remove 
nonmembers from land over which the tribe exercises 
jurisdiction." Cohen 143. 
The following clause from the 1935 Constitution of the Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe, which Cohen cites as a "typical" statement of such 
"tribal powers," indicates that the tribe perceived the scope of 
its taxation powers over nonmembers to be narrower than the scope 
of that power over members: 
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to 
require the performance of reservation labor in lieu 
thereof, and to levy taxes or license fees, subject to 
review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon non-
members doing business within the reservation. 
(i) To exclude from the restricted lands of the 
reservation persons no legally entitled to reside 
therein, under ordinances which shall be subject to 
review by the Secretary of the the Interior." Ibid. 
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This conclusion is entirely consistent with our decision in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 
supra. In that case we held that the power to tax non-Indians 
entering the reservation had not been divested by virtue of the 
tribe's dependent status and that no overriding federal interest 
would be frustrated by the tribal taxation. The Court quoted 
with approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's 
understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor Margold's 1934 
opinion. The Court noted further that "[f]ederal courts also 
have acknowledged tribal power to tax non-Indians entering the 
reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster v. 
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 447 U.S., at 153. The tax in 
Colville, which was applied to nonmembers who entered the 
reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is clearly valid 
under the rationale that the tribes' power to tax derives from 
the right to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and the 
right to attach conditions to the entry of such nonmembers 
seeking to do business on the reservation.49 Thus the inherent 
sovereign power of Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the 
tribes' power to exclude and the exercise of the power must be 
consistent with its source. 
49 A nonmember subjected to the tax could avoid the tax by 
declining to do business on the reservation, and the "sanction" 
to be imposed for refusal to pay the tax would be denial of 
permission to buy cigarettes. 
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IV 
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have 
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on petitioners 
when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to 
engage in exploration, drilling, and extraction activities.50 
The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to petitioners' entry, 
however, and therefore the tax is valid only if the Tribe retains 
the power to exclude petitioners from the reservation. 
The leases executed by the Tribe and petitioners are clearly 
valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does not contend 
that the leases were not the product of arms length bargaining. 
Moreover, the leases were executed on a form prepared by the 
Department of the Interior, the Department gave specific approval 
to the terms of the leases, and they were executed pursuant to 
explicit Congressional authority.51 Petitioners therefore have 
50 
"[A]s the the payment of a tax or license fee may be 
made a condition of entry upon tribal land, it may also 
be made a condition to the grant of other privileges, 
such as the acquisition of a tribal lease." Cohen 143. 
51 Congress intended the Act of March 3, 1927 to make 
applicable to executive order reservations the leasing provisions 
already applicable to treaty reservations pursuant to the Act of 
May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 244. S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1927). The Act thus permitted the leasing of unallotted 
Indian land for terms not to exceed ten years and as much longer 
as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on the land. 44 
Stat. 1347. Among the purposes of the 1927 statute were to 
"[p]ermit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive-order 
Indian Reservations," to "[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil 
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the right under the leases to remain on the reservation to do 
business for the term of the lease.52 Because the execution of 
these leases guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the 
reservation as might be necessary to enable them to perform the 
and gas royalties," and to "[p)lace with Congress the future 
determination of any changes of boundaries of Executive-order 
reservations or withdrawals." Ibid. In light of these purposes, 
it is clear that Congress intended leases executed pursuant to 
the 1927 Act to be binding. 
The Tribe contends that the leases in this case were 
executed pursuant to the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and 
not the 1927 Act. The Tribe notes that the lease with 
petitioners in No. 80-15, which the District Court refused to 
admit into evidence, see 617 F.2d, at 547-548, n. 5, states in 
one of its provisions that it was executed pursuant to the 1938 
Act. See App. 64. Petitioners note, however, that although the 
Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, does not 
require that royalties be paid to the Secretary of the Interior 
for the benefit of the Tribe, petitioners make their royalty 
payments to the United States Geological Survey for the benefit 
of the Tribe. Tr. 79-80. We need not resolve this question, 
because for our purposes the provisions of the 1938 Act do not 
vary significantly from the provisions of the 1927 Act. The 1938 
Act, like the 1927 Act, permitted the leasing of Indian lands for 
a period "~ot to exceed 10 years and as long therefafter as 
minerals are produced in paying quantities." 25 U.S.C. §396c. 
One of the purposes of the 1938 Act was to establish uniformity 
of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for mining 
purposes by applying the law as to oil and gas leasing to the 
leasing of land for the mining of other minerals. S. Rep. No. 
985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). Other purposes were to 
"bring all leasing matters in harmony with the Indian 
Reorganization Act," id., at 3, and to enact changes designed "to 
give the Indians the greatest return from their property." Id., 
at 2. There is no indication in the legislative history tha~he 
purposes of the 1938 Act are in any way inconsistent with the 
purposes of the 1927 Act and prior legislation. Presumably the 
purposes of the earlier legislation were incorporated into the 
uniform scheme achieved by the 1938 Act. 
52 As Attorney General Macveagh stated in 1881, only those 
permitted by the tribe to remain on the reservation may do so, 
"and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired." 
17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 136. 
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leases, petitioners are not intruders, and while the leases 
remain in effect there is no basis for the claim that the Tribe 
retains any power to exclude petitioners from the portions of the 
reservation on which they acquired drilling and extraction 
rights.53 
We might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at 
the time that they signed the leases, had some notice that a 
severance tax might be imposed.54 If the petitioners had such 
53 Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to exclude: 
"Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a 
landowner as well as the rights of a local government, 
dominion as well as sovereignty. But over all the 
lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, 
by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the 
sovereign power of determining the conditions upon 
which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, 
to reside therein, and to do business, provided only 
such determination is consistent with applicable 
Federal laws and does not infringe any vested rights of 
persons now occupying reservation land under lawful 
authority. Morris v. Hitchcock (194 U.S. 384) ." 55 
I.D., at 50 (emphasis added). 
54 In Buster v. Wright, the court relied on the fact that 
the taxpayers had ample notice of their potential liability 
before they entered into the on-reservation activities that gave 
rise to their obligation. The opinion repeatedly emphasized the 
optional character of a tax imposed as a condition precedent to 
engaging in business, see nn. 41, 46, supra, and the fact that 
although both parties were aware of the obligation, they made no 
agreement limiting or abolishing the tax: 
"But they made no provision that noncitizens who 
engaged in the mercantile business in the Creek Nation 
should be exempt from these taxes. As the law then in 
force required such citizens to pay such taxes, as both 
parties were then aware of that fact and considered the 
question, and as they made no stipulation to abolish 
these taxes, the conclusive presumption is that they 
... 
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notice, then the possibility that such a tax would be imposed 
could be construed as a condition of entry or a condition to 
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have consented 
by virtue of executing the leases.55 
There is a complete absence of any such notice in this case, 
however, and petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the 
tribe would attempt to impose an additional condition on the 
exercise of the mining rights granted by the leases.56 At the 
time the leases were executed the Jicarilla Apache Constitution 
contained no authorization of severance taxes of this type.57 In 
intended to make no such contract II 135 F., at 29. 
55 In Colville, for example, the nonmember desiring to 
purchase cigarettes on the reservation knew that his right to do 
so would be conditioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney 
General Griggs, in his 1900 opinion on "Trespassers on Indian 
Lands," d~cussed the effect on tribal laws of a federal statute 
providing for the sale of reservation lots to non-Indians: 
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indian 
nation gives to the purchaser no right of exemption 
from the laws of such nation, nor does it authorize him 
to do any act in violation of the treaties with such 
nation. These laws requiring a permit to reside or 
carry on business in the Indian country existed long 
before and at the time this act was passed. And if any 
outsider saw proper to purchase a town lot under this 
act of Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he 
could occupy it for residence or business only by 
permission from the Indians." 23 Op. Atty. Gen., at 
217. 
56 In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commission 
stated that Indian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties. 
Usually they just receive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344. 
Footnote(s) 57 appear on following page(s). 
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addition, the written leases unambiguously stated: 
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a 
change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein 
specified without the written consent of the parties to 
this lease." App. 27. 
Moroever, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied on the 
consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an indication 
of what conditions might be attached to the lease of tribal 
lands. When Congress enacted legislation in 1927 granting the 
Indians the royalty income from oil and gas leases on 
reservations created by executive order, it neither authorized 
nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the tribes. The 
statute did authorize the collection of severance taxes by the 
States. Petitioners have argued that this authorization pre-
empted any tribal power to impose a comparable tax. The 
legislativ-e history, however, indicates that Congress did not 
consider the question of tribal taxes on mineral output from 
reservation lands.58 If Congress had considered it possible that 
57 The fact that the Tribe apparently believed such 
authorization was necessary is indicated by the fact that the 
Tribe amended its constitution in 1968, prior to the imposition 
of the tax, to permit assessment of such severance taxes. 
Although the power to exclude might have justified the imposition 
of this tax when petitioners signed their leases, even a tribal 
constitutional provision recognizing the power to exclude, see n. 
48, supra, would not place petitioners on notice of the 
possibility that a severance tax would be levied by the tribe in 
the future. The 1937 Jicarilla Apache Constitution, however, 
contained no reference to the power to exclude or the power to 
tax members or nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution. 
Footnote(s) 58 appear on following page(s). 
-
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the power to impose severance taxes on leases of this character 
would be shared by the States and the tribes, the issue would 
surely have been mentioned in the legislation or in its 
history.59 
58 The Court of Appeals rejected the pre-emption argument 
because its reading of the legislative history convinced it "that 
Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted the 
statute." 617 F.2d, at 547. 
59 Rep. Leavitt, the Chairman of the Committee on Indian 
AEfair stated in discussing the purpose of the 1927 Act: 
"Briefly, the purpose, so far as the Indians are 
concerned, is to make sure by act of Congress that 
there can first be a development of possible oil 
resources on these Executive-order lands; and, in the 
second place, that with the development of the oil 
resources the Indians themselves ... shall have the 
benefit of the development of the natural resources of 
their reservation instead of having their lands 
considered to be public lands of the United States with 
the benefits of such development going to the white 
people. 
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of this 
countiy and who now have in their possession only those 
portions that have been given to them by acts of 
Congress, Executive order, and by treaties ought to get 
whatever benefit there is from these remaining areas--
the resources under the soil as well as above it--
without having the white man come in and profit 
entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573. 
Rep. Carter, in support of the bill, stated: 
"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for 
white people, since great States have been carved and 
built from their domain, since they have r e sponded to 
every call of their Government both during peace and 
war, since by our own act, without their consent, via 
et armis we have narrowed them down to a small 
reservation, can it now justly lie in our mouths to say 
that they are not entitled to all proceeds accruing or 
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have 
left?" 68 Cong. Rec. 4579. 
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Thus when the leases in this case were executed, the 
possibility that a tribe could grant lessees access to a 
reservation for specific purposes in exchange for a specific 
consideration and thereafter impose a tax on the exercise of the 
granted authority had never occurred to Congress,60 to the 
The House and Senate reports state that two of the purposes of 
the act were to give the Indians "all of the oil and gas 
royalties," and to "authorize the states to tax production of oil 
and gas on such r e servations." S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1927); H.R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1927). 
Thus Congress specifically recognized both the right of the 
Indians to receive the benefits of all oil and gas resources on 
reservation land and the right of the states to impose taxes on 
the output yet made no mention of the possibility of tribal 
severance taxes. Although the absence of such reference does not 
indicate that Congress preempted the right of the tribes to 
impose such taxes, the lack of any mention of tribal severance 
taxes does nevertheless bear on petitioners awareness of the 
possibility that such taxes might be imposed. 
As we have noted, see n. 51, supra, the Tribe argues that 
the 1938 Act, and not the 1927 Act, is the applicable statute 
here. The Tribe argues that the 1938 Act, which makes no 
reference ~o the states' right to impose severance taxes, 
superceded the 1927 statute, and therefore the states no longer 
have the authority to impose severance taxes on the mineral 
output of Indian lands. The Court of Appeals did not need to 
reach this question, because the state of New Mexico was not a 
party, and be cause the court concluded that the Tribe's tax was 
valid regardless of whether the state retained the right to tax 
the oil and gas r e sources. 617 F.2d, at 547-548, n. 5. We also 
need not reach this question, because the legislative history of 
the 1938 Act, like the history of the 1927 Act, makes no mention 
of tribal severance taxes. Even if the omission of the states' 
power to impose taxes could be construed as a withdrawal of such 
right from the states, there is certainly no indication in the 
1938 statute or its history that Congress intended to vest such 
power in the tribes or even considered the possibility of doing 
so. See n. 51, supra. 
60 Although the lack of Congressional recognition of such a 
tax would not be relevant to the validity of of a severance tax 
which the tribe either imposed at the outset of the lease 
relationship or imposed after giving fair notice at the outset of 
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States, to the Indian tribes, or to any potential lessees.61 
Thus the conditions attaching to petitioners' right to extract 
oil and gas from the land covered by the leases were not, in the 
contemplation of the parties, subject to change during the terms 
of the leases.62 The Tribe therefore had no authority to change 
such relationship, we clearly do not have such a case here. 
61 The Secretary of the Interior has cited cases holding 
that a license or franchise issued by a governmental body does 
not prevent the later imposition of a tax unless the right to tax 
"has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no 
other reasonable interpretation." St. Louis v. United Rys., 210 
u.s. 266, 280; New Orleans City & Lake R.R. v. City of New 
Orleans, 143 u.s. 192, 195; New York Transit Corp. v. City of New 
York, 303 u.s. 573, 590-593. The principal issue in these cases 
was whether the retroactive imposition of the frachise tax 
violated the contract clause of the Constitution or was so 
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argument 
was by no means frivolous, cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315 
u.s. 610, no such issue is raised here. These cases are 
distinguishable from the instant cases for the simple reason that 
two different types of sovereigns are involved. The fundamental 
differences in their powers have led us to conclude that tribes 
do not have tne same attributes of sovereignty as do states and 
their subdivisions. Therefore, the fact that a state or its 
subdivision may impose taxes after the granting of a license 
would neither give notice to petitioners that such a tax was 
possible nor stand as authority for the proposition that such a 
tax was within the sovereign power of an Indian tribe. 
62 The Secretary also argues that petitioners should be 
required to pay the tax as their contribution to tribal services 
which benefit all residents of the Reservation, including 
petitioners. Brief for the Secretary of the Interior 14. In 
calendar year 1976 the Tribe received $3,995,469.69 in oil and 
gas royalties. See n. 15, supra. The Tribe tells us that its 
budget for fiscal 1976, which was tendered to the District Court 
but not received in evidence, was $3,958,201. See Defendants' 
Exhibit AA; Tr. 306; Brief for Respondent 7. Unlike the fixed 
royalty used in some mineral leasing arrangements, see United 
States v. Swank, u.s. , the royalty in these oil and gas 
leases is a percentage of the amount produced and so will allow 
the Tribe to benefit from a rising market. 
Moreover, the tax is not merely an appropriate share of a 
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the terms of the bargain by adding an additional condition in the 
form of a severance tax.63 
The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the 
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of Indian 
sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized in the past 
that we have no hesitation in concluding that it is beyond the 
powers of the Tribe.64 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be 
reversed. 
budget largely financed by the sovereign's taxation of its own 
subjects. The principal components of the annual income of the 
members of this Tribe--if the tax should be sustained--would be 
the amount of approximately $4,000,000 of royalties and 
approximately $2,000,000 in severance taxes received from the 
same group of lessees. 
63 We do not have in these cases a tax imposed on both 
members and nonmembers. The economic burdens of the Jicarilla 
Apache severance tax are imposed entirely on taxpayers over whom 
the tribe has no jurisdiction except insofar as rights under the 
leases are being exercised. 
64 Because we rest our decision on the absence of inherent 
tribal sovereignty to impose this severance tax, we need not 
reach the federal preemption and interstate commerce questions 
raised by petitioners. 
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executed. This is a theory proposed by petr. I was not 
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persuaded by this theory as it was presented in petr's brief, 
but I think that Justice Stevens has done an excellent job of 
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I recommend that you await word from Justice " 
Blackmun, who has undertaken to write in this case and in 
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana. He was to argue that the Court 
should reverse on the ground that the severance tax violated 
the Commerce Clause. This theory assumes (or will decide as a 
threshold matter) that the Tribe had sovereign authority to 
impose the tax. 
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Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al. 
Amoco Production Company and 
Marathon Oil Company, 
Petitioners, 
80-15 v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al. 
On Writs of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit. 
[June -, 1981] 
Memorandum of JusTICE STEVENS. 
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before 
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sover-
eigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion 
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes, 
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today. This 
Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identifying 
those inherent sovereign powers that survived the creation 
of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new sys-
tem of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In 
this case we must decide whether one such surviving attribute 
of tribal sovereignty is the power to lease tribal property to 
a nonmember and, after the lease is signed, to impose a tax 
on the exercise of the rights granted by the lease. 
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The 
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are ex-
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leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In 
1976, the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance 
tax on the oil and gas produced under these leases, and peti-
tioners brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The 
District Court granted the injunction, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617 
F. 2d 537. We granted certiorari, - U. S. -. Before 
addressing the legal issues, we shall recount some of the his-
tory of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the derivation of the In-
dian leasing power, and the facts of these cases. 
I 
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a 
reservation in northern New Mexico.1 Most of the residents 
of the reservation live in the town of Dulce, N. M., near the 
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation 
became a part of the United States in 1848 when the Mexi-
can War ended in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9 
Stat. 922. Between 1848 and 1871, the United States did 
not enter into any treaty with the Jicarillas or. as far as we 
are advised, enact any special legislation relating to them. 
In 1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian 
tribes.2 In 1887, President Cleveland issued a simple Execu-
tive Order setting aside a tract of public lallds in the Territory 
of New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy 
of the Jicarilla Apache Indians." a Except for a provision 
1 See Plaintiff':; Exhibit E, p. 14. 
2 "[H]ereaftcr no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recogniz~·d as an indepPndent na-
tion, tribe, or power with whom the United Slatt•R may coutract by 
treaty: Provided further, Thnt nothing lwrrin coutuinrcl ~hall bt: eonstnu:d 
to invalidate or impair the obligatiou of auy trt'at~· lwrt'lofort• lawfully 
made and ratified with any surh Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566, 
current ver::;ion at 25 U. S. C. § 71. 
8 Two previou:s Executive orders settiug aside laud as a res!:'rva tion for 
the Jicarilla:s had been cancelled. In 1874 President Gruut :set aside laud 
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protecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of any previ-
ously acquired valid rights, the Executive order contained no 
special rules applying to the reservation.4 
The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any, 
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953. 
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes 
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress 
passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian 
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the 
statute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations 
created by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Pro-
ducing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162, 
164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the 
position that Indian reservations created by Executive Order 
in an ordrr that he cancelled in 1876. See I C. Kapplrr, India11 Aft'air~, 
Laws, and Treaties 874 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). In 1880 Pre::;ident 
Hayes el:>tabli::;hed a re~ervation in an order that Pre~:>ident Arthur can-
celled in 1884. /d., at 875. 
4 The entire executive order reads as follows: 
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887. 
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the 
Territory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraced in the 
following townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, rangeH 1 east and 1, 2, 
and 3 wc~:>t; 31 and 32 north, rangeR 2 we~:>t and 3 wc?st, and the ~outh 
half of township 31 north, range 1 wrst., be, and tlw same is hereby, set 
apart as a. rel:!ervation for the m;e and occupation of tlw JieariUa Apa.rhe 
Indians: Provided, That this order shall not be so construed as to deprive 
any bmm fide settler of any valid rights he may have acquired under th~ 
law of the United SttLtes providing for the disposition of the public 
domain." 
Grover Cleveland. 
ld., at 875. 
The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by Executive 
Orders iSl:!ued by President. Theodore Roosevelt on November 11, 1907 and 
January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on February 17, 1912. See App. 
to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 22a-24a. 
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were public lands and that Indians residing on such reserva-
tions had no right to share in the royalties derived from oil 
and gas leases on such lands.5 In 1927 Congress enacted a 
5 This decision held tha.t the land on Executive Order reservation:; was 
subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. § 181 
et seq. 49 I. D. 139. In 1924, Attorney General Stone rend<•red an opin-
ion stating that the Mineral Lands Lea::;ing Act diduot appl~· to Executive 
Order reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 Attor-
ney General Stone instituted litigation in the Di::>trict Court of Utah to 
cancel certain lea:ses that had been authorized b~· the Secretar~· of the 
Interior pursuant to the Mineral Land:; Leasing Act. SPe United States 
v. Harrison. Equity No. 8288 (Utah 1925). SC'e H . R. Rep. No. 1791, 
69th Con g., 2d Sess., 5 ( 1927). The case was di):lmis:;ed by :stipulation 
after the 1927 Act referred to in the text wa::; pas .. ed. See United States 
v. McMahon, 273 U. S. 782. 
A later deci:;:ion by thi:,; Court suggPsts that thP Secrptary's position was 
correct. In Sioux T·ribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U. S. 317, the 
Court hPld that an Indian tribe was not entitled to any compPnsation from 
the United States when an Executive Order re::;ervation was aboli:;hecl 
The Court said: 
"Perhaps the mot striking proof of the belief shared by Congress and 
the Executive that the Indians were not entitled to comJJPn~ation 11110n 
the abolition of an executive order re:servation i:s the very ah:sPtH'e of com-
pensatory payments in such :situations. It was a common practi ce, durirg 
the period in which reservations were crPated by Pxecutive order, for the 
President simply to terminate the existence of a rPservatiou by cancelling 
or revoking the order establishing it. That is to say, the procedure fol-
lowed in the case before u::; wa;; typi ca l. No compen::;ation was made, and 
neither the Government nor the Indians suggested that it was due. 
"We comlude therefore that there was no express constitutional or statu-
tory authorization for the conve)'[tncp of a compensable intPrest to peti-
tic'ner by the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no implied 
Congresoional delegation of the power to do so can be ~Jwlled out from 
the cvidPnce of CongrPs~ional and executive undPrstanding. The orders 
were effective to withdraw from sale the land~ afi'ertrd and to grant the 
nse of the lands to the petitioner. But the interest which the Indians 
received was subjrct to termination at the will of Pither the executive or 
Congress and without obligation to the United States. The executive 
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·statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any In-
dian reservation created by Executive Order may be leased 
for oil and gas mining purposes with the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior. 0 The statute directed that all 
rentals, royalties, or bonuses for such leases should be paid 
to the Treasurer of the United States for the benefit of the 
tribes.7 The statute further provided that state taxes could 
be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases 8 but 
ordC'rs of 1879 and 1884 were simp!~· an exrrci~e of thi:s powpr of termi-
nation, and the payment of rompcn~ation wm; not required." 316 U. S., 
at 3:30-331. SC'e nl::;o Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, v. United f:>tate8 , 34tl U. S. 
272, 279-282. 
6 Section 1 of the Aet of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, current ver~ion 
at 25 U . S. C. § 398a, provided: 
"Unallotted land~ within the limits of any resc-rvation or withdrawal 
created by Executive ordc-r for the use or occupancy of any Indian~ or 
tribe may be lea~rd for oil and gas mining purpo~e:; in arcordance with 
the provisions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924 L25 U. S. C. § 398] ." 
See also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Unallotted land waH land whieh had not been 
allotted in severalty to individual Indians pur~uant to the formula pre-
scribed in the Geneml Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. 
7 Section 2 of the Act provided: 
"The proceeds from rentals, royaltie~, or bomtses of oil and gas leases 
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals 
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the ercdit of 
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was 
ereated or who are using and occupying the land, and shall draw interest 
at the rate of 4 per centum per annum and be available for appropriation 
by Congress for expensC's in connection with the supervision of the devel-
opment and operation of the oil and gas industry alld for the use and 
benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their tribal coun-
cil, i:lhall be consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no 
per capita payment shall be made except by Act of Congress." 25 
U. S. C. § 398b. 
8 Section 3 of the Act provided: 
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon 
improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wrlls, or other rights, prop-
erty, or assets of any lessee upon lands within Ext:'cutive order Indian · 
reservations in the same manner as such taxe~ are otherwise levied and 
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·made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes, in 
addition to receiving the royalties, could impose taxes on the 
output.0 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any 
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution 
and bylaws. subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Act provided that in "addition to all other 
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing 
law," the constitution should also vest certain specific powers, 
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe.10 
25 U. S. C. § 476. The Act further authorized the Secretary 
collected, and ::;uch taxes may be levied again::;t the share obtained for the 
Inditms as bonuses, rentals, and roynltie::;, and the Secretary of the 
Interior is authorized and directed to cum:e ~uch tuxes to be paid ont of 
the tribal fund:;; in the Treasur~': P1'ovided, That such tuxel" ::;hall not 
become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property 
of such Indians." 25 U. S. C. § 398c. 
0 In 1938, Cougress passed the Art of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25 
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformity for 
all mineral leases of Indian landR. Like the 1927 Act, ihe statute ulso 
provided that the tribes were entitlrd to the royalties from surh leases. 
The statute made no mention of state taxe::;. See nu. 54, 62, infra. 
10 The stntute provided, in part: 
"Any Indian tribe, or tribrs, residing on the samr reservation, ::;hall have 
thr right to orgnnize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appro-
priate constitution and bYlaws, which l"hnll become effective when ratified 
by a majority vote of the adult mrmbcrs of the tribe, or of the adult 
Indians residing on such rrsrrvation, as the case mav be, at a special 
election authorizrd and railed by the Secretary of the Interior under such 
rules and regulations as he may prescribe. 
"In addition to nil powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council 
by exi~ting law, the constitution adOJJied by t<aid tribe shall abo ve~t in 
such tribr or its tribal connril the following rights and power::;: To t•mploy 
legal counsel, the choice of counsel anr! fixin~ of fees to be ::;ubjrrt to 
the approval of thr Secretary of thr Interior: to prevent the sale, dis-
po~ition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal land:;, intere;;ts in land~, or other 
tribal assets without the con::;ent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the' 
Federal, State, and local Governments." 25 U. S. C. § 476. 
'· 
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of the Interior to issue a charter of illcorporation to an In-
dian tribe, and provided that the charter may convey to the 
tribe the power to purchase, manage and dispose of its prop-
erty.11 The 1934 Act said nothing about the power to levy 
taxes.12 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved 
by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937.13 
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with 
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease, 
which is on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
of the Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later 
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe.14 
11 Section 477 provides: 
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by at least one-third 
of the adult Indian:;, issue a charter of incorporation to :;uch tribe: 
Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a 
special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the 
reservation. Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the 
power to purchase, take by gift, or beque::;t, or otherwiS(', own, hold, man-
age, operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and per-
sonal, including the power to purchase re:;tricted Indian lands and to issue 
in exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and such further 
powers as mny be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not in-
consi:;tent with law; but no authority shall be granted to ::;ell, mortgage, 
or lease for a period exceeding ten yean; any of the land included in the 
limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or 
surrendered except by Act of Congress." 25 U. S. C. § 477. 
12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (here-
inafter Cohen). 
13 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to assess taxes 
against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and Bv-Laws of the Jicarilla 
Aparhe Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G (hereinafter 1937 Constituti0n). 
14 This hasf' was attached to the complaint of ]lPtitioners in No. R0-11. 
The lf'asP attarhrd to the complaint of petitionerH in :No. 80-15 wa~ abo 
executed in 1953. Ser App. 62. The record i~ unclear a~ to wh<'ll most 
of the IPasrs with prtitioneri:i were executed , but tlw record doP~ indicatP 
that lrasrs were rxerntPcl a~ late m; 1967. Sf'P Plaintiff~' Exhibit 1. L<'ai:ir·~ 
of Jirarilla tr:bal property in the aggregate cover over 500.000 aerci:i of 
J:.md, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla He~erva­
t.ion. Brief for Respondent 2. 
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'l'he lease provides that in return for a cash bonus of 
$71,345.99, to be paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents 
and royalties, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the 
exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, re-
move, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in 
or under" the described tracts of land, together with the right 
to construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other 
necessary structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The lease 
is for a term of 10 years after approval by the Secretary of 
the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil and/ or 
gas is produced in paying quantities from said land." Ibid. 
The lcasee is obligated to usc reasonable diligence in the de-
velopment of the property and to pay an annual rental of 
$1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12%% "of the volume or 
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the 
leased land. App. 24. 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee 
for development and operation of the lease is royalty -free. 
!d., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of charge 
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the 
Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind. 
ld., at 27-28. 
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any 
taxes. The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all 
regulations of the Secretary of Interior 
". . . now or hereafter in force relative to such leases: 
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall 
effect a change in rate or royalty or amwal rental herein 
specified without the written consent of the parties to 
this lease." !d., at 27. · 
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. ld:, at 32. 
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still 
producing. 
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution givinll; the 
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secre-
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tary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members 
of the tribe doing business on the re::oervation." 15 Eight years 
later, on July 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and 
Gas Severance Tax Ordinance, which was later approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides 
that the severance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas 
severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands .... " App. 
38. The rate of the tax is $.05 per million BTU of gas pro-
duced on the reservation and sold or transported off the reser-
vation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate pro-
duced on the reservation and sold or transported off the 
reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as well 
as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. App. 
39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall 
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will pro-
duce over $2 million in revenues annually. 1G 
Petitioners-les~ees commenced two separate actions in the 
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal au-
thorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any 
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated 
thr two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the 
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First. 
after finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise 
a power of taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorpora-
tion in 1937. and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
did not confer that power on the Tribe. the District Court 
concluded that the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the 
Tribe did not extend to the imposition of a severance tax on 
15 App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a. The Tribe'~ 
Hl60 Constitution contained a Rimilnr provi~ion permitting "taxeH ami 
fer:;; rn prrsons doing business on the reservation." See 1960 Con~titulion 
of thr Jicarilla Apache Tribr, Art. VI, § 5, DrfPudant'~ Exhibit A. 
16 See District Court.'~ Findings of Fact and Conclu~ion~ of Law, Finding 
No. 32, App. 130. Tho Tribe's answrrs to intprrogatorics indicate that in 
1976 the royaltirs on the lea~es received by the Tribe amounted to 
$3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 7; Tr. 269. 
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nomnembers. Second. the court held that the statute en-
acted by Congress in 1927. which authorized oil and gas leases 
on reservation created by Executive Order, had granted state 
and local authorities the exclusive right to impose severance 
taxes on oil and gas production from such reservations. Fi-
nally, after finding that approximately 80% of the oil and 
gas production from the reservation is shipped interstate for 
sale outside of New Mexico, that the tax burden amounts to 
a significant percentage of the price of gas and oil,17 and that 
the tax is only imposed on gas, oil, or condensate sold or 
transported off the resPrvation, the court concluded that it 
discriminated against and created an impermissible burden 
on interstate commerce. 
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Anpeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane. reversed. 617 F. 2d 537. 
The court held that the taxing power was an inherent at-
tribute of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The court further held 
that the power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the 
Tribe. had not been divested by Congress, and was not incon-
sistent with any superior interest of the United States. The 
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 1927 Act 
had pre-empted the Tribe's power to levy a severance tax, 
because a review of the legislative history indicated that 
"Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted 
the statute." !d., at 547. The Court of Appeals' reversal of 
tlw District Court's Commerce Clause holding was based on 
the two courts' different readings of the ordinance: whereas 
the District Court had construed the taxable event as removal 
of the oil or gas from the boundaries of the reservation, the 
Court of Appeals construed severancE' from the ]and as the 
17 Finding No. 3G rrud::.: "Thnt if the Jiearilla Apaehr Oil and Om; 
Severance Tax wrrc valid the eombined tax bnrdrn amount~ to more than 
~9% of the iuter~:~tate price of old gm; and m·rr 12.5% of the prie<' of old 
oil." App. 180. The Tribe eontend~ that thii:i finding j;;; not supported 
by the record, but the Court of Appeals did not :::ct it a~ide. 
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critical event. I d., at 546. Under the Court of Appeals' 
view, the ordinance would not discriminate against interstate 
commerce because oil or gas sold within the reservation as 
well as oil or gas transported off the reservation would be 
taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties paid 
in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory, 
and that tho fact that New Mexico had imposed separate 
taxes on the same taxable event did not create an impermis-
sible multiple burden on commerce. !d., at 545-546. 
II 
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three 
sources: federal statutes. treaties, or the tribe's inherent sov-
ereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Government 
seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the 
basis of any federal statute/8 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who 
reside on an Executive Order reservation, executed no treaty 
with the United States from which they derive any sover-
eign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid. it must 
be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last 
'l'erm. in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on 
cigarettes sold on the reservations of the Colville, Makah, 
and Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permis-
sible exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax.1 ' 
We must determine whether the severance tax imposed on 
1s Congres~ mn.y cll·legnte "sovereign" powers to the tribes. See Mazw-ie 
v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As we have indicated, however, neither 
the 1927 statute permitting Indians to receive roynlties from the lease of 
tribal lando nor the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make nny mention 
of the authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 4-7, supra. 
1U The Court stated: 
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and i'i~nifieantly 
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of soverPignty 
which the tribl'S retnin unless divested of it by frdernl law or necessary 
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152. 
·. 
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nonmembers of the tribe in this case can likewise be charac-
terized as a valid exercise of the tribe's inherent powers. To 
make this determination, we must first consider the source and 
scope of tribal sovereignty and more particularly the source 
and scope of the sovereign power to levy taxes. 
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by 
the Constitution.20 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have 
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the 
time of their incorporation into the United States. In W or-
cester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitntional 
a Georgia criminal statute purporting to regulate residency 
of non-Indians in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that the Cherokees, 
although submitting to the protection of the United States, 
nevertheless retained some aspects of sovereignity: 
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed them-
selves under the protection of the United States: they 
have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to invoke 
the protection of any other sovereignty. But such en-
gagements do not divest them of the right of self govern-
ment, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or 
compacts." Id., at 581-582.21 
20 The only refcrencr to Indiun tribe~ in the Cou~;titution is in Art. I, 
§ 8 (a), which provides that "rtllw Congre;;~ t>hall have the Power to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian tribes." More significant than this rcfereuce to 
Indian tribe~ i~ the ab~ence of any mention of the tribe~; in the Tenth 
Amendment, which provides: 
"The powers note delegated to the United State~; by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." 
21 The Court also :;tated: 
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country bern recognized as existing 
in the Indians, but they have been alwa~·H admittrd to pO!:i!:iess mnuy of 
the attributes of sovereig11ty. All the rights which helon~~: to self govern-
ment have bPen recognized as vestl'd in thl'm. Their right of occnpanry 
has never been que!:itioned, but thr fee in the soil hns been considered 
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty, 
the United States retains plenary authority to divest the 
tribes of any such attributes. 2~ Moreover, this Court's deci-
sions since Worcester have recognized that not all attributes 
of sovereignity are consisteut with the tribes' status as "do-
mestic dependent nations." ~a In determining what sover-
eign powers the tribes retained in submitting to the authority 
of the United States, the Court has repeatedly recognized 
a fundamental distinction between the right of tribes to gov-
ern their own internal affairs and the right to exercise powers 
affecting nonmembers of the tribe.~ 1 
in the govemment. This may be called the right to the ultimate domain, 
but the Indians have a present right of po~~e ·~ion." 6 Pet., at 51'0. 
~"See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 319; Winton v. Amos, 
255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565; 1 
American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, 106-107 (1977) 
(hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for example, C011gre~s can 
waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See Uuited States v. U. S. Fidelity, 
309 U. S. 506, 512. 
"a The term "domestie dependent nation;," was fir:st used in 'l'he Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia. 5 Pet. 1, 17, in which the Court held that the 
tribes were not "foreign nation::;" within the meaning of the Com;t itution: 
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, 
heretofore, unquestioned right to the land~ they occupy, until that right 
shall be extinguished by a volunlar~· ce;;siou to our government; yet it 
may well be doubted whether those tribel:l which reside within the 
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with striet accuracy, 
be denominntrd foreign nations. They may, more corrrctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to 
which we nssert a title indrpendent of tlwir will , which must take effect 
in point of posF<eHRion when their right of posse::;;;ion ceasrs. Meanwhile 
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United Stales 
resrmbleR that of a ward to his guardian." 
24 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382, the Court staLed 
that the tribes: 
"[W]cre, and always have been, regarded as having a ::;emi-independent 
position when they preserved their tribal relation:;; not as States, not as 
nation;;, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a 
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social 
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The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from inter-
ference with tribal control over their members. See, e. g., 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 65. The Court has 
recognized that the power to prosecute members of the tribe 
for violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from 
power delegated by the United States but is an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 
313. Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to cre-
ate substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff 
v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan, 
175 U. S. 1. 29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court, 
424 U. S. 382 (domestic relations and family law). They 
also may enforce that law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee, 
358 U. S. 217; Fisher v. District Court, supra. Moreover, the 
Indian tribes' sovereignty over their own members is, in many 
respects, significantly greater than the States' powers over 
their own citizens. The tribes' virtually absolute control over 
their own membership carries with it the power to enforce 
discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a non-In-
dian community. 25 Their criminal jurisdiction over their own 
members is unconstrained by constitutional limitations that 
are applicable to the States and the Federal Govermnent.~0 
relations, and thus far not brought under the law:; of the Union or of the 
State within whose limits thry rPsided." 
25 Although the Indian Civil Right:; Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 
U. S. C. §§ 1301-1303, prohibit:; Indian tribPs from denying "to any 
pPrson within its jurisdiction the equal protec-tion of its law," see id., 
§ 1302 (8), the provisions of the United States Con:;titution, including , the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which limit federal or state authority do not 
similarly limit tribal authority. Sre Sa1tta Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U. S. 49, 56, and n. 7. In Santa Clam Pueblo, the Court held that 
sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Iudian Civil 
Rights Act, that the Act dicluot create a private cause of artion cognizable 
in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for 
vindication of rights creatPd by the Act. 
20 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, tht• Court held that the re:>tric-
tions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions iu tribal 
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Thus the use of the word ffsovereign" to characterize tribal 
powers of self-government is surely appropriate. 27 
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over their-
own members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always 
been narrowly confined.28 The Court has emphasized that 
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is in-
consistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so 
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation." 
Montana v. United States,- U. S. -, -. In Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held 
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by nonmembers within the reservations.20 I_n M mi-
courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 328-329; 'l'urner 
v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 355. 
~7 Tlmi:! although the States have "plenary power over rei:!identi:l within 
their borderi:!," the States may not tax ineome of member:; of: the tribe 
derived from reservation sources. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164, Hi5. This immunity from taxalion-ewn ·for 
tribal enterprii:le:::>-doei:! not apply beyond the boundariei:! of the reserva-
tion. See M e8calero Apache 'l'ribe Y. Jones, 411 U. S. 145. · ·. · · 
28 Certain treaties which sprcifirally gr;mt~·d tlw right of ;;elf govern-
ment to the tribe;; have al;;o specifically rxcluded jurii:!dietion over non-
member;;. See, e. g., Treaty with the Clwrokcei:!, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 
(1835); Treaty with the Choctaws and Chicka;;aw;;, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611 
( 1855); Treaty with the Creeks and Seminolci:!, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 
( 1856). 
29 The Court stated in support of that holding: 
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the Un it ed States, thr Indian 
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States 
and their exercise of separate power is con;;trained so ns not to conflict 
with the interests of this overriding sovereignty. 'i'T]lwir rights to 
complete sovereignty, as independent nat ions, [are] uccef.>sarily dimiuished.' 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823). 
"We have already described some of the iuhercut limitations on tribal 
powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States. In 
Johnson v. M'lntosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes' 'power to 
dispose of the soil at their own will , to whomsoever they pleased,' was 
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tana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that the 
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by non-
members on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe, 
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-Iimited 
tribal power over nonmembers-was applicable in a civil as 
well as a criminal context.30 Thus the Court has recognized 
that it is when the tribes attempt to impose controls on non-
members that the tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would 
be inconsistent with their status.~1 
inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435 
U. S. at 209. 
Sec al;.;o New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (~tate court 
has juri:>diction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed again~l I1on-
Indian on re~ervation). 
80 "The Court recently applied the~e gt'nt'ral principlrs in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian 'l'Tibe, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent 
sovereign authority to exercise criminal juri~dictiou ovrr non-Indians. 
Stre!i!iing that Indian tribes cannot exrrcise power inconsi!itent with their 
diminishrd status a!i !iovereign~, the Court quoted .Justice .Tohn~on's words 
in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-the firHt Indian <·a~e to 
reach thi~ Court-thnt the Indian tribes have lo!it 'any right to goveming 
every per~on within their limit:,; except themselve~.' !d., at 1-17, Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian T1ibe. supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though Oliphant 
only determined inherent tribal authorit~· in crimiual matters, the prin-
ciples on which it relied :,;upport the general propo~itiou that the inherent 
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not exteud to the activitic~ of llon-
members of the tribe." Montana v. United State~;, - U. S., at -
(footnote omitted). 
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, -114 U. S. 661, (tribes 
cannot freely alienate to non-Indian~ the la!1d they oecupy); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribl'~ ennnot enter into direct com-
mercial or foreign rrlations with other nation,;). 
31 In Wheeler v. United States. supra, the Court h<·ld that. the power to 
prosecute its members for tribal offe11~<·~ was noi "implicitly lost by virtue 
of their dependent 8tatus" and stated: 
"The areas in which such implicit clive~titure of ;;oVPreignty har:: bPell held 
to have occurred are tho:;c involviug the relation~ between an Indian tribe 
and nonmembers of the tribe. 
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The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting 
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the 
·broad tribal power over internal affairs involving members. 32 
The power to exercise control over nonmembers-and specifi-
cally the power to tax recoguized in Colville-presumably has 
a much more limited derivation, tied specifically to the ex-
ercise of particular powers, than the ge11eral ~etention of 
inherent sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must 
therefore examine the cases upholding the power to tax to 
determine the source of that power and then determine 
whether the tax imposed 111 this case is consistent with that 
rationale. 
III 
The search for the source of the taxing power must focus 
on the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934 
when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect 
of preventing any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers. 33 
"These limitations rrst on the fact that the dependent Htatus of Indian 
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction i~::~ necessarily incon~i~tPnt with 
their freedom independently to determine their external relation:;. But the 
powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce 
internal criminal Jaws, are of a difl'erent type. The~· involve only the 
relations among members of a tribe. Tlm~;, they are not ~::~uch powers 
as would neces:;arily be lost by virtue of a tribe's drpendent status. 
'[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nation:; is , that a weaker power dces 
not surrender its indrprndence--its right to self government, by a~so­
ciating with a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia 
[6 Pet .l, at 560-561." 435 U. S., at 32G. 
32 This lack of inherent 80vereignty over nonmembers is supported by 
the principle that " in thi~::~ Nation each l:iOvrreign governs only with the 
consent of the governed." Nevada v. Jlall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Because 
the tribe can exclude nonmember::; from participation in the tribal govern-
ment. the power exE'!'cised over those so excluded Hhou1d bo' a limited one. 
3a The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did not. enlarge· 
the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribe~. Congress intrndrd the 
Art to "stabilizP the tribal organization of Indian tribes by ve~tiPg such 
tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority . .. .'' S. Rep , 
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the De-
partment of the Interior issv:ed a formal opinion setting forth 
his understanding of the pqwers that might be secured to an 
Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue 
of the statutory reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe 
"by existing law." 3-l He concluded that among those powers 
No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934). As one commenator interpreted 
§ 16 of the Act: 
"[I]t would ap])(•ar that powers originally held by tribes that were recog-
nized and allowed to be retained b,~· treaties or prior statutes, as well as 
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained 
by tribe~ that accepted the terms of the 1934 Act. . . . The provi:-:ion is 
conl'i~tenL with the act's purpo~e of enhancing tribal government in that it 
recognized aud reconfirmed tho::;e powers a tribe may already have had as 
a government." Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 
30 Ha~tings L. Rev. 89, 97 (1978). 
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 1934 
to the Secretary of the Interior to Hpprove or disapprove of the rxercise 
of tribal power~ placed a limit on tribal sovereignty, that power did not 
enable the Secretary to add to the inherent powers thHt a tribe po::;sessed 
before the Act was pas~ed. 
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the 
occasion to exercise a particular power over nonmembers in its early his-
tory is surely not a sufficient reason for denying the exi~tence of that 
power. Accordingly, the fact that there is no evidemc that the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe ever imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember doe;; not 
require us to conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent 
that the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty po~;;e~::;ed b~r Indian 
tribe::; when the Reorgnaization Act wa::; pas;;ed, we believe Congress 
intended the statute to preserve those power;; for all Indian tribes that 
adopted a formal organization under the Act. 
34 55 I. D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of thi;; opinion 
as follows: 
"My opinion has been requested on the que::;tion of what powers may be 
secured to an Indian tribe and incorporated i11 its con::;tit uti on and by-laws 
by virtue of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the Wheeler-
Howard Act ( 48 Stat. 984, 987): 
"In addition to all power-s vest,ed in any Indian tribe or tribal council 
by exi8ting law, the constitution ttdopted by ;;aid tribe shall al::;o ve::;t ...• 
[Italics added.] 
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was a power of taxation and described the permissible exer~ 
cise of this power: 
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this 
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and 
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may ac-
cept privileges of trade. residence, etc.. to which taxes 
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46. 
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this 
opmwn. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 
(CAS 1905), app. dismissed. 203 U. S. 599; Morris v. Hitch-
cock, 194 U. S. 3S4; and Maxey v. Wn:ght, 3 Ind. T. 243. 54 
S. W. S07 (Ct. App. Ind. T.). aff'd. 105 F. 1003 (CAS 1900), 
were decided shortly after the tum of the celltury and are 
the three leading cases considering the power of an Indian 
tribe to assess taxes against noHmembers.0" The three cases 
are similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the 
court upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's 
power to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and con-
cluded that the Tribe could condition entry or coutinued 
presence within the reservation on the payment of a license 
"The question of what powers nrc vested in nn Indian tribe or tribal 
council by exi~ting law cannot be answered in detail for ea<'h Indian i ribe 
without reference to hundreds of Rpecial treaties and HJweial a<'b of Cun-
gre~s . It is po~~ible, however, on the ba~is of the reportnl casrs, the 
written opinions of the various executive department~, and tlw~e statutes 
of Congre~s which are of general import, to define the power8 which have 
heretofore been recognized as lawfnlly within thr jnri~di<:tioll of an Indian 
tribe. My answer to the propoundrd question, then, will be g!:'ncral, and 
subject to correction for particular tribe~ in the light of the trraties and 
statutes affecting such tribe wherever such treatie~ or statutes contuin 
peculiar provi~ionR restricting or enlarging the general authority of an 
Indian tribe." Id., at 17-18. 
:JG Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indiau Law. publi~ht'd in 
1942, also relies on these cases in his di~cu~~ion of tribal laxation of non-
members. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Colville cited both Bu~te?' v, 
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock In upholding tribal power to tax. 447 
U. S., at 153. Ser p. 30, infra. 
' I 
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fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the remedy for 
nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or inter-
vention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe. 
In the first of these cases. Maxey v. Wright, 54 S. W. 807 
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affirmed an 
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint 
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation. 
They had sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civi-
lized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25 
on each non-Indian lawyer residing and practicing his pro-
fession on the reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim, 
the Court of Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties be-
tween the United States and the Creeks and noted that they 
had "carefully guarded their sovereignty, and their right to 
admit, and consequently to exclude, all white persons, except 
such as are named in the Treaty." Id., at 809. The United 
States, pursuant to a treaty with the Creeks. had agreed that 
all persons not expressly excepted who were present in the 
Creek Nation "without the consent of that Nation are deemed 
to be intruders, and pledges itself to remove them." Ibid. 
Because attorneys were not within any excepted class,~ 6 the 
Tribe had the authority to require them to obtaiu permits or 
to require their removal as "intruders.'' a7 The Court thus 
held: 
"rTlhat unless since the ratification of the treaty of 
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of 
30 "Attorney practicing in tlw United StatPH courts are not persons 
who eome within the exceptions, for the~· are not 'in the employment of 
the government. of t11P Unitrd Statp~,' or 'p<·r~on~ JWHCPabl~· traveling or 
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license 
from the proper authority of the UuitPd State~." 54 S. W., at 809. 
37 In reaching thi::; conclu:;ion thr eourt rclitd heavily on two opiuion$ 
of the Attorney General of thP United StatPs. In the first opinion. i~~ued 
in 1881, Attorney General McVPagh upheld the validity of Indian permit 
law::; regulating which persons would be permitted to re:;idc on the Choc-
taw and Chicka::;aw rcJ:<ervationR. 17 Op. Atty. Geu. 1:34. In his di::;cu8-
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congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the 
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it 
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men) 
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian 
Territory. And inasmuch as the govemment of the 
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all per-
sons not authorized by its terms to reside in the Creek 
Nation should be deemed to be intruders. and had obli-
gated itself to remove all such persons from the Creek 
Nation, the remedy to enforce this provisioll of the treaty 
was a removal by the United States from the Creek Na-
tion of the delinquent as an intruder." ld., at 809-810."~ 
siou of the right of non-Indians to enter and rPmain on tribal land~ 
Attorney GenPntl MrVeagh ~tatPd: 
"Replying to your fourth question: it srems from what has bren already 
said that, beside~ those per:;on:s or classc::; mPntioucd b~· yon, on!~· those 
who have bePn permitted by thP ChoctawH or Chicka~aws to l'<'sidr withiu 
their limits, or to be employed b~· tlwir citizen:;; as teachers, mechanic::;, or 
skilled agriculturists, have a right lo enter and remain on the lands of 
the~e tribes; and the 1ight to remain is gone when the penn-it has expired." 
ld., at 136 (empha~is added). 
In the second opinion, on the same Rubjret, Atlonu?~· G<>ueral Phillip.~ 
stat<>d in 1884 that in tlw abHencr of u treat~· or siatuieR, thr power of 
the Indian tribe "to regulate its own rightH of occupancy, and to say who 
shall participate therein and upon what condition~, can not be doubted.'' 
18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34, 36. Although the tmtties applieablr to the Choctaw 
and Chicka~aw tribes excepted from the grant of self-government power 
over nonmember::;, the Attorne~· General did nol construe this provision 
to limit the tribes' power to exclude: 
"I submit that whatever this may mean it docH not limit the right of 
these tribes to pass upon the que~tion, who (of prr~ous iudifferent to the 
United States , i. e., neithrr employee~, nor objectionable) ~hall ~hare their 
occupancy and npon what trrm:>. That ~~ a que~tion whieh all private 
persons are allowed to decidC' for them~elveH; .. .'' I d., at 87. 
3o In other parts of its opinion, thr romt n·~taiPd the propoo<ition that 
the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit white men, or not, at its 
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court 
in 1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of 
the Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay an-
ual permit fees. 30 The complainants owned cattle and horses 
that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant 
to contract with individual members of the Tribe. Com-
plainants filed suit in the District of Columbia prayilll!: for 
an injunction preventing the defendant federal officials from 
811, and that a lawyer who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining 
would become an "intruder": 
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man, 
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation. i~, pur~uant to their :statute, re-
quired to pay for the privilege of remaining aud practicing hi~ proft'~~ion 
in that nation the ~urn of $25; that, if he refuse the payment therPof, he 
becomes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that iu mrh a ca~e thr 
gm·ernment of the United State::> may remove him from the nation: and 
that this duty devolves upon the interior department. Whether the in-
terior dcpartrll<'nt or it::; Indian agents can be controlled by the courts by 
the writs of mandamus and injunction is not material in this case. berause, 
as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount required by the 
statute b~· its very terms beeames an intruder, whom the United :3tates 
promises by the terms of the treaty to reman,, and then•fon• in such 
rases the officer~ and 11gent::> of the interior department would be acting 
dearly and proJwrl~· within the scope of their power8." 
The court also reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the tax without 
the intervention of the Fl'dentl Government: 
"And when it is remembered that up to the time that the UnitPd States 
courts were established in thl' Indian Territory the on!~, remedy for the 
collection of this tax wa~ by removal, and that the Indian Natiom; had 
no power to collect it, except through the intervention of the interior 
department , it is quite clear that if, in the best judgment of that depart-
ment, it was deemed wi~e to lake charge of the matter, and collect this 
money, and turn il over to the Indian~, it had the power to do so, under 
it~ superintending control of the Indians, and the illtl'rcour~e of white 
men with thrm granted h~' various acts of congres::>;" id., at 812. 
au J. George Wright, tlw Indian in:;pector, and J. Blair Shoenfelt, the 
defendants in Maxey Y. Wright. supra, were also named as defendants in 
Morris v. Ilitchcock. The other defendant::> in the Hitchcock ca~e were 
the Secretary of the Interior and the Commi~~ioner of Indiau Affairs. 
·. 
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·removing their cattle and horses from the Indian Territory 
because complaiuants refused to pay the permit fees assessed 
by the Tribe. An order dismissing the complaint was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
and by this Court. 
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the 
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granterl the 
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory 
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as 
intruders" ·lo and that the United States had assumed the 
obligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by per-
sons not subject to their jurisdiction. !d., at 389. The 
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been adopted 
by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876. and noted that the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary had, in 1879, specifically referred 
to such legislation requiring licensed merchants and traders 
to obtain a permit and to pay a fee of $25, and had expressed 
the opinion that such legislation was not iuvalid . .u 
4o The Court stated: 
'And it is not di~puted that, under the authority of thel'e treatie>', the 
Chickasaw Nation hal' exerri~ed the power to at tach condition~ to the 
presence within ils borders of pt·r~onH who might otlwrwi::;c not be en-
titled to rt>main within tht> tribal territory." 194 U. 8., at 889. 
41 "legislation of thr same grneral charaeter as that embodied iu the 
act of thr legi~lature of the Chirka~aw Nation herr a~~ailed as invalid had 
been enacted by the Chicka:,;aw ration before the pas~agr of tlw Curtis 
Art. The essential 11rovi~ionH of onr such law, passed on October 17, 1870, 
wen• recited in a report made to the Senate by the Committee on the 
Judiciary, on Frbruary 3, 1R79, from which we cop~· the following: 
"'The Jaw in que~tion srrm~ to have a twofold objrd-to prev<•nt the 
intrusion of unauthorized per::>Olll:i into the territory of the Chirka~aw 
Nation, and to raise n•venue. B~· it" term:; no citizen of an~· State or 
Territory of the United State:,; ca11 eitlwr rent land or proeure ('lllJlloymPnt 
in the Chickasaw country without entrring iuto a contral'! with a Chicka-
saw, which coutract till' latter i~ to report to the clerk of the eotmty whrre 
he re"idcs, and a permit mu~t be obtained for a time no longer than twelve 
months, for which the <"it izen is to pay the i:lUlll of $:25. 
"'Every liren"ed mNehant, tradrr, nnd every phy::;ieian, not a Chicka-
•. 
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The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attor-
nE'y General of the United States that had concluded that the 
powers of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not 
been withdrawn by Congress.42 Although Congress had sub-
sequently created an express exception in favor of owners of 
town lots. protecting them from being evicted as intruders, 
the Court noted that no comparable protection had been given 
to owners of cattle and horses. 194 U. S., at 392-393. The 
Court accordingly concluded that the Chickasaw legislation 
imposing grazing fees was valid. 
saw, is required to obtain a permit, for which the sum of §25 i~ ~:>xaded.' 
"Declaring in ::;ub~tance that under the existin~ treatirs with the tribe, 
the Chicka~aw:o wrre not prohibited from exrludin~ from the t(·rritory 
of the nation the per::;ons afl'ected by the art, the committ<:>(' expre~sed 
the opinion that the act which was the ::;ubject of tlw report \\'as Bot 
invalid." 194 U. S., at 389-390. 
4~ In the finst opinion, by Attorne~' Gmrral John W. Grigg:;, see 23 
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorne~· Grnrra] stated: 
"The treatie:; and law:; of the United Statr::; makr all p<:>r~ons, with a 
few specified exceptions, who are not citizens of an Indian nation or 
member:; of an Indian trib<:>, and are found within an Indian nation without 
prrmi:;:;ion, intrudrro thrre, and require thrir rrmoval by tiH' United 
State~. This clo:oPs the whole mntter, absolutely exl'ludes all but the 
excepted classes, nnd fully authorizrs thr~r nationR to nb~olutd~· exdude 
out:;idPrs, or to prrmit their re;;idence or bu~inesH upon ~urh trrm~ n~ tlwy 
may choose of the United StatPs, haw, as Rurh, no more right or hu:sine~s 
to be there than they havt> in any foreign nntion, and can lawfully bP there 
at all only by Indian pPrmi~~ion; and that their right to be or remain 
or carry on bu~inec~ there depends sole]~· upon whether they have :such 
permi~Rion. 
"A~ to the power or duty of your Department in the premi:st•o there 
can hadly bP a doubt. Und<:>r the trt>aties of the United Stat!:'~ with the~e 
Indian nation~; this Government is under thr mo;.:t ROI!:'mn obligation, 
and for which it has rN'Pived amplt> considt>ra tion, to remove and keep 
removed from the territory of the;.:p trib!:'~, all thiH cla~H of illtrud('I'H who 
are there without Indian permic~ion. The perfonnanc!:' or thiH obligation, 
as in other matters concerning the Indian~ and their affair:;, hat> Joug 
been devolved upon the Department of the Interior." Jd., aL 21 . 
The Court also relied on 23 Op. Atty. G<:>11 . 528 (1901). 
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CA8 1905) 1 
was a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against fed ... 
eral inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs 
from doing business within the reservation because they had 
refused to pay a permit tax assessed by the Tribe. The Court 
of Appeals relied on Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright 
in upholding the tax. The opinion for the court by Judge 
Sanborn emphasized that the tax was in the nature of a con-
dition precedent to transacting business within the reserva-
tion and that the plaintiffs had ample notice of the tax: 
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the 
subjrct of this controversy. is the annual price fixed by 
the act of its national council, which was approved by 
the President of the United States in the year 1900. for 
the privilege which it offers to those who are not citizens 
of its nation of trading within its borders. The payment 
of this tax is a mere condition of the exercise of this privi-
lege. No noncitizen is required to exercise the privilege 
or to pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he 
remains freC' from liability for the other. Thus, without 
entering upon an extended discussion or consideration of 
the question whether this charge is technically a license 
or a tax. the fact appears that it partakes far more of the 
nature of a license than of an ordinary tax. because it 
has the optional feature of the former and lacks the com-
pulsory attribute of the latter. 
"Repeated decisions of the courts. numerous opinions 
of the Attorneys General. and the practice of years place 
beyond debatP the propositions that prior to March 1, 
1001, the Creek Nation had lawful authority to require 
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the 
exercise of the privilege of trading within its borders, 
and that thP executive department of the government 
of the Unitt>d States had plenary power to enforce its 
payment through the Secretary of the Interior and his 
26 
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subordinates, the Indian inspector, Indian agent. and In-
dian police. Morris v. Hitchcock. 194 U.S. 384. 392. 24 
Sup. Ct. 712. 48 L. Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4 
C. C. A. 408. 410. 413. 54 Fed. 426, 428. 431; M axev v. 
Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807; Maxey v. Wright, 
44 C. C. A. 683, 105 Fed. 1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys 
GPneral 34. 36: 23 Opinions of Attorneys General, 214, 
217, 219, 220, 528." 135 Fed., at 949-950. 
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that 
the traders had entered the reservation with fu11 knowledge 
of the permit obligation, and therefore could be deemed to 
have accepted the condition prececlcnt. 13 The court also held 
43 After c·it ing thr opinion of Attorn<'~' Grneral Gril!g~ from \\'hic·h this 
Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Ilitchcock Judge Sanbom wrote: 
"Pur~uant to thi;,; deci~ion the eivilized tribe~ were charging, and the 
Indian agent wa~ collecting, taxr~ from noncitizfJW engagt>d in bu~inesH in 
the~e nation~. It wn::; nndc•r thi::< :-tate of fact::; that tht> Fnitt>d State~ 
and the Creek Nation made the agreement of 1901. Did the~· intPml by 
that agreement that tlw Creek Nation should thereby renoum·r it~ con-
ceded power to exact tlw~e permit taxe~? Both partie::< knew that this 
power exi~ted, nnd the United StnteH, b~· the aet of its Prel:lidt>nt :tpproviug 
the law of the Creek national couneil. and the Seeretar~· of the Intrrior hy 
enforeing it, had approvrd it~ exerci~r. The !"ubject of thes(' taw~ was 
prr::;ented to the mind::; of the contracting parties and waF con~idrred duri11g 
the negotiation of the a~reement, for that contrnrt rontaiu~ expre~:; stipu-
lation:,: that cattle grazed on rented allotments shnll no( h(' liable to any 
tribal tax (ehapter 676, :31 Stat. 871, § 37), and thnt 'no JIOJICiti~en rent-
ing land~ from a citizen for agricultural purposes as provided b~· law, 
whet her ~neh land~ have been ~elected a~ nn nllotment Ol' not, ,;hall be 
required to pay an~· permit tax' (rhapter 676, 31 Stat. R/1, § a!:J). But 
thr~· maclc no provi~ion that. noncitizen~ who rngagrd iu the mPrcantile 
bu~ine~~ in the CrePk Nation 8hould be exempt from these taxe~ . A~ the 
law thf'n in force n•quired l:l\!Ch nomit izen,; to pn~· sueh tnxe~, a~ both 
part it>~ wpre then awa rc of that fad and cou8idered t hl' qne~tiou, aud ns 
they made 110 stipulation to abolish the~e taxes, the eomlu::<iw pn•stunption 
is that they intended to make no such contract, :\lid that thr power of 
the Creek Natiou to exact the~e taxeH. and the authorit~· of th<· Secretar~' 
of the Interior and of hi::; ~:>ubordiuate::; to collect them, were neither re-
• 
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that even though noncitizens of the Tribe had lawfully ac-
quired ownership of lots within the Creek Nation. they had 
no right to conduct business within the reservation without 
paying the permit taxes.41 
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions con-
sidering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on non-
memhers.4G These cases demonstrate that the power to im-
pose taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's 
power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to 
impose restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reserva-
nounecd, rcvokrd, nor re~tricted, but that thP~' rema!nE'd in full force and 
effect after a~ bE'forc t.he ugreement of 1901." 135 F., at 954. 
41 The court lSta ted: 
"The legal effeet, however, of the law prPseribing the permit taxc~ i::; to 
prohibit noncitizens from conducting bu~ine::;:; within the Cn·ek Nation 
without the paymeut of the::>e taxe:s." 135 F., at 055. 
4 " Two dreadE'::> after the Rrorganization Act wa~ pa::;Hed Ow problem 
was revisited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Cmw v. Oglala Sioux 'l'ribe 
of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CAS 195G), the court held thal 
the tribe had the power to a:;;:;ess a tax on a nomnrmber lc::;:,:ee of land 
within the n~::;ervation for the privilegE' of grazing stoek on rPscrvation 
land. And in Barta v. Oglala Sioux '1'1ibe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 
F . 2d 553 (CAS 1!)58), tlw Court ht:>ld that thr Unitt>d State::; eould bring 
an aetion on behalf of the tribe to collect a Jiern~e tax of thrt>e ecnts per 
acre per annum for grazing land and fiftren Cl'nt~ pE'r acre per annum 
for farm hmd levied on nonmember !PssePs. The eourt held that the tax 
did not violate the con::;titutional right::; of the nonmember l&;::;ee::; stating, 
in part: 
"The tribe by provi~ions of its treaty with the United States ha;; power 
to providE' for the admi~sion of nonmrmbcrH of the tribe onto the rc~erva­
tion. Having such power, it has the authority to impo~c rp::;tridions on 
the prt:>;:;ence of 11onmember::; within the rcHervation." 259 F. 2d, at 556. 
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta Huggr~ts that thP Court. of Ap-
JWal:::, unlike the rarlier court:-;, ma~· not haw rP:<t<'d thr taxin~ pow!'r 
l:iolrly 011 the power to exc· lucle . TbP Court of Appeal~ of rour"c' did uot 
haw tlw lwnefit of our decisions in Oliphant, Wht>eler, and M o11tana v. 
United States. 
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tion for any purpose. 40 This interpretation of these cases is 
further supported by the fact that the remedy for the non-
payment of the tax in all three cases was exclusion from the · 
reservationY Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over non-
40 In tllC' rh11ptrr of hi~ treHtisr entitled "Taxation," Felix C'ohrn statr~: 
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] liS applied to nonmember~ iH not 
clear, it extend~ 11t least to property of nonmembers tts('d in com>('<'tion 
with Indian property liS well liS to privileges enjo~·ed by nonmcmberH in 
trading with the Indians. The power to tax nonmembers i~ derived in 
the easel> from the authority, founded on origin11l sovereignty aud guanm-
teed in Rome instance:; by treaties, to remove I>roperty of noumemben; 
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal gownmwnt has 
the power to exclude, it cau extract a fer from llOI>member~ aH a coudit ion 
precetlt>nt lo granting permi~:;ion to remain or to orwrate within the tribal 
domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted). 
In another chapter, entitled "The Scope· of Tribal Self-C:overmumt," · f 
cited by the Secretary of the Intrrior and thr Tribe hen·, Cohen deserib~s 
the power of taxation as "an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty 
which contiuue~ unless withdrawn or limitPd by treaty or by ad of 
Congrel:'::; .... " ld., at 142. After di~euH::;ing Bu~>ter Y. }l'riyht, Coheu 
citl'i:i that case for the proposition that "[t]he powrr to tax does uot de-
pend upon the power to rrmove and ha~ bee11 uphrld where then• wal-l no 
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal juri:sdiction." 
!d., at 143. As we haw sc•en, howrver, the liceni:it' tax in Busler wa:,; pre-
c!icated on the t.ribe's right to attach eoll(lit ionH to uonmember:,; conducting 
busiues::; on the re::;ervation, and the triht• could pn•vent ~uch nonmember:; 
from doing business regardle~~ of whrther it could ph~·Hieally remove tho:oe 
nonmembers from the rPservation. Mo)'(•over, in thr chapter 011 tribal 
::;elf-government, Cohen dors rrrogilizP that tribal taxc•;; haw been upheld 
ou the ba:si::; of thr tribr'~ power to rrmow nonmember~ from the re~en·a­
tion, and that "[i]t is therefort• prrtineut, in analyzing the i:iCOpe of tribal 
taxing power:;, to inquirr how far an I11dian tribe i)i cmpower('d to rmwve 
nonmember::; from it::; reservation." Ibid. 
The American Indian Policy Review Commi~::;ion recognized that the 
court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing power:; "rely largely upon 
the power of tribeH to remove per><ons from thr reservation, nncl coll:se-
quently, to prescribe the coudition::; upon which they ::;hall e11tcr" but 
argued for a broader ::;ource of the right to tax. AIPRC Final Hcport 
178-179. 
17 In Buster v. Wright, supm, the penalty for nonpayment of the tax 
was the closing of the nonmelllber's bu><ine8", enforced by the Secretary 
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-members are appropriately limited because nonmembers are 
foreclosed from participation in tribal govemment. See n. 
32, supra. If the power to tax is limited to situations iH which 
the tribe has the power to exclude. then the nonmember is 
subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he consents by 
choosing to accept the conditions of entry imposed by the 
tribe!8 The limited source of the power to tax nonmem-
bers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with 
this Court's narrow construction of the power of Indian tribes 
over nonmembers in general.411 The source of the taxing au-
thority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in this case is 
thPrefore not the Tribe's power of self-government but rather 
its power over the territory that has been reserved and set 
apart for its use and occupation.50 
of thf' Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. Hitchcock, supra, the 
remedy was the removal of the nonmember's cattle from the re,.;erva-
tion, again enforced by the Unitrd Statt's. In Maxey v. Wright, supm, 
an attorney refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department 
was ~ubject to removal from the re~ervation. 
4 ~ "Ko noncitizPn is required to exerei,.;e a privilegt' or to pay the tax. 
He mny refrain from the one and lw remains free from liability for the 
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949. 
49 Sec pp. 15-17, supra. A" we have indicated. ~re n. 2R, supra, 
treatir~ recognizing the inherrnt power of tribal self-government have also 
deprived the tribes of jurbdietion over nonmembers. Treat ie~ with In-
dian tribes, however, often specifically reeognizt•d the right of the tribe 
to exclude nonmembers from the re~ervation and to attach conditions to 
their entry. See, e. g, Treaty with the Choctaw and Chicka~aw, art. 7, 
11 Rtat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1855). 
Ree II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17 , 20, 21, 21, 30, 42, 75, ·!18, ()82, ()99, 703, 
719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866, 886, 888, 929, 985, 9YO, 998, 1008, 
1016, 1021. 1-~ 
50 The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their powt'r lo 
tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Att. Cohen';; treati~e note~ 
that: 
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon it~ own member~ and 
upon nonmembers doing bu~inc,.;s within the re~ervation;; ha · been af-
firmed in many trihal con~titutiom; approved under the Wheeler-Howard 
80--ll & 80-15-MEMO. 
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This conclusion is entirely consistent with our decision in 
Washington v. Confederate¢ Tribes of the Colville Reserva~ 
tion, supra. In that case we held that the power to tax non-
Indians entering the reservation had not been divested by 
virtue of the tribe's dependent status and that no overriding 
federal interest would be frustrated by the tribal taxation. 
The Court quoted with approval, as an indication of the Ex-
ecutive Branch's understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor 
Margold's 1934 opinion. The Court noted further that 
" [ f] ederal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax 
non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic ac-
tivity" and cited Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 51 
447 U. S., at 153. The tax in Colville, which was applied to 
nonmembers who entered the reservation and sought to pur-
chase cigarettes, is clearly valid under the rationale that the 
tribes' power to tax derives from the right to exclude non-
members from the reservation and the right to attach condi-
tions to the en try of such nonmembers seeking to do business 
on the reservation. 52 Thus the inherent sovereign power of 
Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribes' power 
Act [Indian Reorganization Aet], as ha~ the power to rC'move nonmember 
from land over which the tribe cxerci~r;; juril:idietiou." Cohen 143. 
The following clause from the 1935 Conl:ititutiou of the llo::;ebud Sioux 
Tribe, which Cohen cite~ a::; a "typical" ::;tatement of :;uch "tribal power ·," 
indicates that the tribe perceived the :;cope of it::; taxation power8 over 
nonmember::; to be narrower than the ::;cope of that power over member~: 
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to require tlw per-
formance of re:;ervation labor iu lieu thereof, and to levy tnxel:i or licen:;e 
fee:;, subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers 
doing business within the reservation. 
"(i) To exclude from the re::;tricted land:; of the re~ervation per~ons 
not legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinance~ which shall be 
subject to review by the Secretary of the Iut!:'rior." Ibid. 
51 The Court abo cited, without di~eu~sion, the Eighth Circuit':; dcci:-;iou I 
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, .suwa 11. 45. 
52 A nomnember Hubjectl•d to the tax could avoid the tax b~· declining 
to do bu~incss on the re:;ervation, and the "sanction" to be imposed for · 
refusal to pay the tax would be denial of permis;;ion to buy cigarettes. 
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to exclude and the exerci~e of the power must be consistent 
with its source. 
IV 
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have 
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on peti-
tioners when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Res-
ervation to engage in exploration. drilling, and extraction 
activities.":l The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to peti-
tioners' entry, however. and therefore the tax is valid only 
if the Tribe retains the power to exclude petitioners from the 
reservation. 
The leases executed by the Tribes and petitioners are 
dearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does 
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms 
length bargaining. Moreover, the leases were executed on a 
form prepared by the Department of the Interior. the De-
partment gave specific approval to the terms of the leases, 
and they were execut(>d pursuant to explicit congressional au-
thority.54 Under the leases petitioners therefore have the 
5a "f A]H the prtYment of a tax or lir·en~e fpc may ur marll' a <'Oil!lition 
of Pntr~· upon tribal land. it mar abo br made a condition to thP J!l'1111t of 
othrr privilrgrs, smh as tlw acqui~;tion of a tribal bt;;r·." Colwn 14:3. 
5 '1 Congrrss intrndNI the Aet of l\IarC'h :3, 1027 to make appliC'ablr to 
Exrrutiw OrdPr rrsrrvatiom; the leasing proviHion:; <dread~· applicable to 
treat~· resernttions pursuant to the Act of Ma~· 29. 1924, 43 Stat. 244. S. 
Rrp. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Se~"·• 3 (1927). The Aet tl1UH permitted 
the !caRing of unallotted Indian land for terms not to exceed 10 ~rears 
nnd as murh longer as oil and gns in paying quantitic·s were found on 
the lnnd. 44 Stat. 1347. Among the Jlllrposes of the 1927 statutP wNe 
to "fplermit the Pxnloration for oil and gas on Executiw-ord('r Inclit~n 
RPRrrvations" to "fglive the Indian tribr:-; Hll thr oil and ga~ royaltie,.;.'' 
nnd to "l'pllarr with Congre~s the future determination of any rhaJJge~ 
of boundaries of Executive-order re"ervHtions or withdrHwab." Ibid. 
In light. of the<e purposes. it is clear that Congress intended leases exe-
rutrd pursuant to the 1927 Act to bE' binding. 
The tribe rontends that the lem;es in this ra.r were rxer:•utPd pursuant 
to the Art of Mav 11, Hl38, 52 Stat. 347, and not thr 1927 AC't. The 
Tribe notes that the IPasr with prtitimwr~ in No. 80-15 ~tatPs in one of 
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right to remain on the reservation to do business for the dura~ 
tion of the leases."" Because the execution of these ]eases 
guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the reservation 
as might be necessary to enable them to perform the leases, 
petitioners are not intruders. and while the leases remain in 
effect there is no basis for claiming that the Tribe retains 
any power to exclude petitioners from the portion of the res~ 
ervation on which they acquired drilling and extraction 
rights. 5° 
ito; provi~ion~ that. it was executed puro;uant to the Hl38 Act. SPe App. 
64. Petitioners note, however, that. although the Tribe argues that the 
19;~8 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, doe;; not require that royal tie:; be· paid to 
the Secretary of the Interior for the bene>fit of the· Tribr, petitioner,; make 
their royalty payment;; to the United Statf'H Geological Survpy for the 
benefit of the Tribe. See Tr. 79-80. We need not resolvr thi" fjll<';-;fion, 
brcau::w for our purpo:::e;; the provi;;ion::; of the 1988 Act do not var~· . ;ignifi-
cantly from the provi::;ion::; of the 1927 Art. The 198~ Ac:t, like the 1927 
Act, permitted the lea;;ing of Indian lands for n period "not to pxeeed 10 
yean; and w,; long thereafter a;; minerab arc prodnred in paying qnauti-
tieH." 25 U. S. C. § 396c. One of the purpo;;rs of thr 1938 AeL waH to 
establiHh uniformity of the law relating to the lra~ing of tribal lamb for 
mining purpo:;e::; by applying the law a;; to oil and ga.!' !rasing to tht> lea::;-
ing of land for the mining of other minerals. S. Hep. No. 985, 75th Co11g., 
1st Ses;;., 1-2 (1937). Other purpo;;e;; wrrr to "bring all )pasing matters 
in harmony with the Indian Heorganization Act," id. at 3, and to enact 
change;; de;;igned "to give the Indian;; the grente~t return from 11wir prop-
erty." !d., at 2. There i~ no indication in the legi~Iativr hi~tory that the 
purposes of the 1938 Act are in an~· way inconsi~tl'nt with tlw purpoti<·s 
of the 1927 Act and prior legi;;lu.tion. Pre~nmably the purpo::>eH of the 
earlier legi;;lation were incorporated into the uniform ~clwme achieved by 
tho 1938 Act. 
"" Ai; Attorney General MacVeagh ::;tatccl in 1881, only thm;r permittPcl 
by the tribe to remain on the re~ervation may do so. "and the right to 
remain i::; gone when the permit hm; expired." 17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 130. 
" 6 Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to cxeluclo: 
"Over tribal land;;, the tribe has the right~,; of a landowner a~ well as the 
right;; of a !oral government, dominion as well a::; ~overeignty. But all 
the laud;; of the rel:iervation, whrther owned by the tribe, b~· members 
thereof, or by out;;ider::;, the tribe ha;; the ~>overcign power of detcnuining 
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We might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at 
the time that they signed the leases. had uotice that a sever-
ance tax might be imposed.57 If the petitioners had such 
notice, then the possibility that such a tax would be imposed 
could be construed as a condition of entry or a condition to 
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have con-
sented by virtue of executing the leases,Gs 
the condition~ upon which per~oni' >:hall be permitted to enter it~ domain, 
to re!'ide therein, am! to do bu~ine;,;s, provided only such determiuation 
is cou~i~leut with applicable Federal laws and does not infriuge any 
ve~Jtetl rights of pe?'IJOns now ocr·upying reservation land urtde1· lawful 
authority. Morris v. llitchcock (194 U. S. :3~4)." 55 I. D., at 50 (cm-
phasi~ ncldrd). 
!;7 In Buster v. Wright. the court rplied on the fact that the taxpa~·er::; 
had ::nnplP notice of their poteutial liability before they entered into the 
on-re"crvation adivitie~ that. gave ri,.;e to their obligation. The opinion 
rl'JWHlPdl~r l'lllpha~izPd thP optional character of a tax imposed ns a comli-
tion prrePdrn1. to Pngnging; in bu~inPRs, ~:~ee n. 43, 48 supra, and the fact 
that al1houg;h both partip,.; were aware of the obligation, they made no 
ngrcrmpnt, limiting or aholi"hing tlw tax: 
"But tlH·~· made no provi~ion that noncitizens who engaged in the mer-
rantill· hu~ine~~ in the Creek Nation ~:;houlu be exempt from the~e taxes. 
Ai' thP law tlwn in force required ~ueh <·itizem; to pay such taxe~, as both 
partie~ were then aware of that faet and ron~idered the que~tion, and as 
they nwde no stipulntion to aboli~h tlw~e taxe~, the conclu~ive presump-
tion i~ that thl'y intpnded to makc no ~uch contract .... " 135 F., at 29. 
r.& In Colville, for example, thl' nonmrmbrr desiring to purchm;e ciga-
rrttr~ on thP rr~Prvation kuew that hi::; right to do so would be condi-
tioned on his rom:cnt to pay the tax. Attorney General Griggs, in his 
lDOO opinion on "Trcspa~srr~ on Indian Lnml::;," discussed the effect on 
tribal law~ of a federal Rtatute providing for the ~ale of reservation lots 
to 11011-Inuians: 
"[T]hr legal right to purchnse land within an Indian nation gives to the 
purehm-er no right of exemption from the laws of such nation, nor does 
it authorize him to do nny net in violatiou of the treaties with such 
nation. The~e laws requiring a permit to re~ide or carry on business in 
the Indian rountr~' exi::;ted long before and nt the time this act was pnssed. 
And if any out~>idPr saw proper to purcha~e a town lot uuder thi::; act of 
Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he could occupy it for resi~ 
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In this case, however, there is a complete absence of any 
such notice; petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the 
tribe would claim that exercise of the mining rights granted 
by the leases was subject to an additional conditio11.5u At the 
time the leases contained in the record were executed the 
Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxing authoriza-
tion whatever. and the severance tax ordinance was not en-
acted until many years after all lessees had been gran ted tho 
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the resorvation.uo 
In addition, the written leases unambiguously stated: 
"[N] o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change 
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified with-
out the written consent of the parties to this lease." 
App. 27. 
Moreover, in 1953 petitioners might reaso11ably have relied 
on the consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an 
indication of what conditions might be attached to the lease 
of tribal lands. When Congress enacted legislation in 1927 
granting the Indians the royalty income from oil and ~as 
leases on reservations created by Executivr Order. it 11either 
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the 
tribes. The statute did authorize the collection of severance 
taxes by the States. Petitioners have argued that this au-
dencc or bnsine::;s only by permi~~ion from the Indian~." 23 Op. Atty. 
Gen., at 217. 
50 In 1977, the American Indian Polir~· RPviPw Commi:s;;io11 ~tatPd that 
Iudian tribe;; "do not both tax and reeeive royalties. U:sually they just 
receive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344. 
uu Although the power to rxrlnclr might havr ju::;tified thr impo::;ition of 
this tax when petitioner:; ~ignPd thrir lease~, ('\ '1' 11 a tribal eon::<titutioual 
provision recognizing the powrr to exrludr, ~<'l' 11. 50, 8Upra, would not 
pluet• petitioner::> on notice of the po::;sibility that a "evNauee tax would be 
levied by the tribe in the futurr. Althongh tlw 19fi0 and 196R tribal eon- ~ 
~t itutiou::> both contained provi~ions granting tlw power to tax, ~ueh power 
of course could be no greater tflan the powPr to exclude from whieh it 
wa~ derived. 
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thorization pre-empted any tribal power to impose a com-
parable tax. The legislative history, however, indicates that 
Congress did not consider the question of tribal taxes on 
mineral output from reservation lands.61 If Congress had 
considered it possible that the power to impose severance 
taxes on leases of this character would be shared by the States 
and the tribes. the issue would surely have been mentioned 
in the legislation or in its history. 0 ~ 
01 The Court of Appeal~ rejected the pre-emption argumeul Ol'rau:-;e it~ 
reading of the legi~lative hi~tory convinced it "that Congre~s :-;imply did 
·not think of the i~sue when it enacted the statute." 617 F. 2cl, at 547. 
6~ Hepre::;entative Leavitt, the Chairmau of 1 he Commit lee 011 Indian 
Affair:-;, "tated in di~cu~~ing the purpose of the 1927 Act: 
"Briefly, the purpo~e, so far as the IndianR are eoncerned, i~ to 111ake 
sure by act of Congre;;;; that there can first be a dewlopmPul of pos;;ible 
oil rr:;omce~ on thr:,;e Executive-order landR: nnd, in the ~el'oml place, 
thnt with the development of the oil resource;; the Indium; themselves ... 
~hall have the benefit of the development of the natural re~ouree~ of their 
reservation iustead of having their land~ considered to be public lands 
of the United States with the benefits of such developmeut going to the 
·white people. 
"Snrely the Indians who once po~se;;sed all of thi~ <'otmtr~· and who 
now have in thPir pos~eH~ion only t hol;'e portions that ha vr been given 
to them by acts of Congre;;s , Executive order, nnd b~· t n·a t i(·~ ought to 
get whatever benefit there is from the!:ie remaining area~-the n •Hourl'es 
under the soil as well as above it-without having the white man l'Ome 
in and profit entirely by the"e devPlopmC'nts." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573. 
Repre~entative Carter, in !:iupport of the bill, stated: 
"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for white people, 
since great StateH have been carved and built from their domain, sinee 
they have reRpon<led to every call of their Government both dming pence 
and war, since by our own act, without their consent, via et armis we 
have narrowed them down to a small re!:iervation, can it now juRtly lie in 
our mouth,; to ~ay that they are not entitled to all proceed" aeeruing or 
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have left'?" 68 Cong. 
Rec. 4579. 
The Hou"e and Senate reports state that two of the purposes of the act 
were to give the Indian~; "all of the oil and gas royaltie~," and to "au-
thorize the states to tax produc'tion of oil and gas on such reservations.'r 
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When the leases in this case were executed, the possibility 
that a tribe could grant lessees access to a reservation for 
specific purposes in exchange for a specific consideration and 
tlwreaftcr imposf' a tax on the exercise of the granted au-
thority had newr occurred to C'ongress.r.~ to the States, to the 
Indian tribes. or to any potential lessef'S. 64 Thus the condi-
, . Rrp. l'\o. 12--10, fi9th Cong .. 2d Sr~~., 3 (1927): H. R. Rrp. No. 1791, 
fiflth Cong., 2d Sr~~., 3 (1927). Tlm8 Congrr~~ ~pecifically rrcognized 
both t hP right of thr Indian~' 1 o rrcrive t hP brnrfits of all oil and gas 
l'l'Homrr~ on rr~rr\'a tion land and the right of thr Stntrs to impose taxes 
on the output ~·rt made no mention of thr po~sibility of t ribnl severance 
tnxrR. Although thr nb~encr of such refrrrnce docs not indicate that 
Congnw J1rr-rmptl'd the right of the tribeR 1o impose such taxes, the 
lac·k of any mention of tribal Rrvrrancr taxes doe~ nevrrthelel:iiS bear on 
prtiti01wrs' awnrrnr~~ of thr po~~ibilit~· that such 1axrs might hr impo!:>ed. 
As wr haw notNI, ~rr 11. 54, supm, the Tribr argues that the 19:38 Act, 
nnd not thr 1927 Act. i~ the applicable f'tatutc here. The Tribe argues 
thai the 1938 Act, which make~ no reference to the States' right to impose 
sewrnnee taxe,, "uperceded the 1927 ~;tatute, and therefore the States no 
longer have the authority to impo~e l:'everancc· taxe~ on the mineral out-
put of Indian Iauck The Court of Appeal~:~ did not need to rrach this 
que~tion, Lecau~e the State of New Mexico was not a party, and because 
the (•ourt concluded that the Tribe'~ tax wa~ valid regardless of whether 
thP Stnte rct:~itwd tlw right to t:~x the oil and gas re~ources. 617 F. 2d, at 
5-17-5-18, n. 5. We abo need not reach this que:stion, becau~r the legi~la­
tiv(' hi~tory of tlJP 19:38 Act, like the hil:ltory of the 1927 Act, makes no 
meution of tribal ~everamr taxe~. Even if thP omi~~ion of the Statr's 
powrr to impo~e taxeH could be con~trued ns a withdrawal of such right 
from the State~, there is certainly no indication in the 1938 ~tntute or 
it ~ hi~tory that Congre~s intended to vest ::mrh power in the tribes or 
cwn eon~iden·d the po~sibility of doing ::~o. Ser 11. 54, supra. 
03 Although the lack of congre~:sioual recognitiou of such a tax would 
uoi bP relevant to the validity of a severancr tax which the tribe either 
impo:-;rd at the out,.,et of the Jea~e relationship or impo~ed after giving 
fair notice at the outl"et of such relationship, we clearly do not have such 
a cn;,;c here. 
04 The Secn·tary of the Interior has cited ca"es holding that. a lirensc 
or franchise i~surd by a governmental body does not prrvent thr Inter 
impo;;ition of n tax unle~s the right to tax "has been sperifirally l'Ur-
rendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable interpretation."· 
St . Louis v. United Rys., 210 U.S. 265, 280; New Orleans City(~ Lake 
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tions attaching to petitioners' right to extract oil and gas 
from the land covered by the leases were not. in the contem-
plation of the parties, subject to change during the terms of 
the leases.u" The Tribe therefore had no authority to change 
the terms of the bargain by adding au additional condition in 
the form of a severance tax.66 
R. R. v. City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 195; New York 1'mnsit 
Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-593. The principal i~~ue 
in these ca~es was whether the retroactive impo~ition of the frauchise tax 
violated the Contract Clau~e of thr C'onstitutio11 or wa~ ~o fundamentally 
unfair a~ to constitute a dena! of due proce~r- in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Although this argumeut w:~s by no mean~ friYoloul:l, 
cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell c~ Co .. 815 U. S. 610, no Huch i::;;,;ue i~ raiHrd 
here. These cases are distiugui~hable from the inl:llant cal:le~ for the 
simple reason that two different t~·pc~ of sovcr<:'igns are involved. The 
fundamental difference~ in their powers have led us to conclude thal 
tribes do not have the same attributes of sovPreignty Hi' do States and 
their ~ubdivisions. Therefore , the faet that a Statr or itl:l ~ubdivi~ion may 
impose taxes aftrr the grantiug of a licen~e would neither give uotiee to 
petitionerl:l that f<ueh a tax was po~~ible uor ~tam! a~ aui horit~· for the 
proposition that such a tax was within the sovereign power of an , Iudian 
tribe. 
az The Secrrtary abo argue~ that }WtitioJ>er:; ~houlll be n·4uirl'd to pa~' 
the tax as their contribution to tribal service~ which benefit all re~idents 
of the Re~ervation, includin~ petiiion('r~. HriPl' for the Seeretary of the 
Interior 14. In ralrndar year 197G tiH' Tribr n•ceivPd $0,!:195,469.69 in oil 
and ~~~s roynlties. See n. 15, supra. The Tribe tell:, u~ that it::; budget 
for fi~ral 1976, whieh wn~ tendered to the Di:;trict Court but 110! received 
in evidence, wa::; $:3,958.201. See DefrlldantH' Exhibit AA; Tr. :106: Brief 
for Respondent 7. Pnlike the fixed royalty med in some miueral lea;,;iug 
nrrnngements, see United States v. 8tl'ank, - U. S. -, the royalty in 
these oil and ~as leases i::; a 1wrcentage of the amount produced and ::;o 
will allow the Tribe to benefit from a rising market. 
Moreover, the taxi~ not llll'rel~· an appropriate share of a budgl>t largely 
finanrecl by the soverei~n';,; taxation of it~ owu ~ubjerts. The principal 
component~ of thP annual iueome of the lllPmbers of ihi::; TriLl'-if the 
tnx should be sustninrcl-would be the amounl of approximatPl~· $4 milliou 
of royalties and approximately $2 million in severame taxe::; received from 
the smne ~roup of lessees. 
00 We do not havr iu these ca::;e~ n tax impo~ed on both membrr::; and 
nonmembers. The economic burden~ of the Jicarilla Apaehe sevPrance tax 
(._' 
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The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the 
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of In-
dian sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized 
in the past that we have no hesitation in concluding that it 
is beyond the powers of the Tribe.67 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be· 
Reversed. 
JusTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of these cases. 
are imposed entirely on taxpaypr~ over whom the 1 ribe lllt~ no juri~dic­
tion except in~ofar as right:; under the lea~p;,; arc being Pxer<"i::<ed. 
07 Because we re<>t our dreision on the a.hsrnec of inhc·rrnt tribal ~over­
eiguty to lmpo~:;e thi~ Sl'\'eraJICe tax, we Jl<'rcl not rPaeh the federal pre-
emption and interstate commerce rnJP:;tion::; rai:oecl by petitioner:;. 
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Memorandum of JusTICE STEVENS. 
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before 
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sover~ 
eigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion 
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes, 
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today. This 
Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identifying 
those inherent sovereign powers that survived the creation 
of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new sys-
tem of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In 
this case we must decide whether one such surviving attribute 
of tribal sovereignty is the power to lease tribal property to 
a nonmember and, after the lease is signed, to impose a tax 
on the exercise of the rights granted by the lease. 
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The 
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases arc ex-
tracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term 
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leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In 
1976, the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance 
tax on the oil and gas produced under these leases, and peti-
tioners brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The 
District Court granted the injunction, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617 
F. 2d 537. We granted certiorari, - U. S. -. Before 
addressing the legal issues, we shall recount some of the his-
tory of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the derivation of the In-
dian leasing power, and the facts of these cases. 
I 
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a 
reservation in northern New Mexico.1 Most of the residents 
of the reservation live in the town of Dulce, N. M., near the 
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation 
became a part of the United States in 1848 when the Mexi-
can War ended in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9 
Stat. 922. Between 1848 and 1871, the United States did 
not enter into any treaty with the Jicarillas or, as far as we 
are advised, enact any special legislation relating to them. 
In 1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian 
tribes.2 In 1887. President Cleveland issued a simple Execu-
tive Order setting aside a tract of public lauds in the Territory 
of New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy 
of the Jicarilla Apache Indians." 8 Except for a provision 
1 See Plaintiff'~ Exhibit E , p . 14. 
2 "[RJereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be arkuowleclged or rerogni~ed a>' an independent na-
tion, tribe, or power with whom lhc Unil('cl SlateR may coutraet by 
treaty: Provided j'Urthcr, Thnt nothing herein coutuinecl ~hull bl; C'on~trm·d 
to invalidate or impair thr obligation of :.uJ~' treat~· lwrl'lofon· lawfully 
made and ratified with any ~urh Indian nation or tribe." 1U Stat. 566, 
current. ver~ion at 25 U. S. C. § 71. 
8 Two previous Executive orders setting aside land as a rcserva tion for 
the Jicurillas had been cancelled. In 1874 President Grant set u:~ide land 
·. 
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protecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of any previ-
ously acquired valid rights, the Executive order contained no 
special rules applying to the reservation.4 
The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any, 
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953. 
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes 
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress 
passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian 
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the 
statute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations 
created by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Pro-
ducing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162, 
164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the 
position that Indian reservations created by Executive Order 
in an ordrr that he cancrllrd in 1876. Ser I C. Kapplrr, Indian Ati'air~, 
Laws, and Treatie;; 874 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). In 1880 Pre~ident 
Hayes established a re~ervation in an order that Prc::~ident Arthur can-
celled in 1884. feZ., at 875. 
• The entire executive order reads a;,; follows: 
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887. 
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the 
Territory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraeed in the 
following townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, rangeH 1 east a11d 1, 2, 
and 3 we;,;t; 31 and 32 north, rangr~ 2 we;,;t and 3 wr~:>t, and the ~:>outh 
half of township 31 north, range 1 wrst, hr, and tlw same i;; hereby, Het 
apart as a re~:;ervation for the usc and oc(·upa.tion of thP Jiearilla Apa.ehe 
Indians: Provided, That this order shnll not be so constnwd m; to drprive 
any bona fide settler of any valid rights he may havp aequirrd under the 
law of the United States providing for the di;,;position of the IJUblic 
domain." 
Grover Cleveland. 
!d., at 875. 
The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by Executive 
Orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on November 11, 1907 and 
January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on February 17, 1912. See App. 
to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 22a-24a. 
80-11 & 80-15-MEMO. 
4 MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE 
·were public lands and that Indians residing on such reserva-
tions had no right to share in the royalties derived from oil 
and gas leases on such lands.5 In 1927 Congress enacted a 
5 This decision held that the land on Exeeutive Order m;ervations was 
subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. § 181 
et seq. 49 I. D. 139. In 1924, Attorney General Stone r0ndert>d an O]Jin-
ion stating that thC' Mineral Land:; Lea:;ing Act did not appl~· to Executive 
Order reservation~. 34 Op. Atty. G<:>n. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 Attor-
ney General Stone instituted litigation in the Di:strict Court of Utah to 
cancel certain lea;ses that had been authorized b~· the Secrctar~· of the 
Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands Leasing Acl. See United States 
v. Harrison, Equity No. 8288 (Utah 1925). S0e H. R. Rep. No. 1791, 
69th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1927). The ca:;e was di:;mi:s:;ecl by :;tipulation 
after the 1927 Act referred to in the text wa:s pa ·;sed. Sec United States 
v. McMahon, 273 U. S. 782. 
A later deci:;ion by thi:; Court suggrsts that the Secretary's position was 
correct. In Sioux 'l'ribe of Indians v. Uuited States, 316 U. S. 317, the 
Court held that an Indian tribe was not entitled to any compem;ation from 
the United States when an Executive Order m;ervation was aboli;shed 
The Court said: 
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief shared by Congress nnd 
the Exerutive that the Indians were not entitled to compen:;ation upon 
the abolition of an Pxecutive order reservation i:; the very absence of com-
pensatory paymentR in surh ~ituations. It was a common pra<"tice, durirg 
the period in whirh re;;ervations were created by executive order, for the 
Pr0sident oimply to terminate the C'xistence of a re:;ervatiou by cmwPlling 
or revoking the order establishing it. That is to ~ay, the procedure fol-
lowed in the ca8e before us wa::; tn1ical. No compen;;ation wa:; made, and 
neither the Government nor the Indians sugge:sted that it was due. 
"We conclude therefore that there was no exprrss constitutional or ~tutu­
tory authorization for the convpyanre of a compensable interest to peti-
ticner by the four expcutive orders of 1875 and 1R76, and that no implied 
CongrPsoional delegation of the powC'r to do ~o can be i:iJWll<'d out from 
lhe evidence of Congrc~:;ioual and executive under:;tanding. The orders 
were diertive to withdraw from salP the land:; affected and to grant the 
use of th0 land::; to the petitioner. But the interPst which the Indian8 
received wa:; subject to termination at the will of either i he executive or 
Congress and without obligation to the Unit eel States. The executive 
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·statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any In-
dian reservation created by Executive Order may be leased 
for oil and gas mining purposes with the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior.6 The statute directed that all 
rentals, royalties, or bonuses for such leases should be paid 
to the Treasurer of the United States for the benefit of the 
tribes.7 The statute further provided that state taxes could 
be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases s but 
orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an exrrcil:ie of this powpr of termi-
nation, and the payment of eompemmtion was not rrquirecl." 316 U.S., 
at 330-331. Sec also Tee-Jlit-'l'on Indiaus, v. United .State8, 348 U. S. 
272, 279-282. 
6 Section 1 of the Art of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, c·urrent version 
at 25 U. S. C. § 398a, provided: 
"Unallottecl lands within tlw limits of any resrrvution or withdrawal 
created by Executive order for the use or occupaney of any Indians or 
tribe may be least'd for oil and gas mining purpOl:iE'ii in accordanee with 
the provisions contained iu the Act of May 29, 1924 L25 U. S. C. § 39 ] ." 
SeE' also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Unallotted land waH land which had not been 
allotted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the formula pre-
scribed in the Grneral Allotmrnt Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 38 . 
7 Section 2 of the Act provided: 
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and p;as lea;;e 
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservation:; or withdrawals 
shall be deposited in the TreaRury of the United Statr::: to the credit of 
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was 
crrated or who are using and orrupying thP land, and shall draw iutt•rest 
at the rate of 4 per centum prr annum and be available for appropriation 
by Congress for expenses in connection with the ::;upervi::;ion of the devel-
opment and operation of the oil and ga::; industry and for the use and 
benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indian::;, or their tribal coun-
cil, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no 
per capita payment shall be made except by Act of Congress." 25 
U. S. C. § 398b. 
s Section 3 of the Act provided: 
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon 
improvements, output of mines or oil and gas welll:l, or other rights, prop-
erty, or a::;sets of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian · 
reservations in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and 
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made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes, in 
addition to receiving the royalties, could impose taxes on the 
output.9 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any 
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution 
and bylaws. subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Act provided that in "addition to all other 
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing 
law," the constitution should also vest certain specific powers, 
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe.10 
25 U. S. C. § 476. The Act further authorized the Secretary 
collected, and ~uch taxes may be levied again~t the share obt£1ined for the 
Indim1s as bonuses, rentals, and roynltie:;, and the Secretary of the 
Interior i~ authorized and directed to eaui"P surh taxes to be paid ont of 
the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such tnxe:; shall not 
become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property 
of such Indians." 25 U. S. C. § 398c. 
9 In 1938, Congress pa~sed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25 
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformit~r for 
all mineral leases of Indian landR. Like the 1927 Act, the statute al~o 
provided that the tribes wrre rntitled to the royalties from ~urh leases. 
The Htatute made no mention of state taxe::;. See 1111. 54, 62, infra. 
to The statute provided, in part: 
"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, ::;hall have 
the right to organize for its eommou welfare, and may adopt an appro-
priate con~titution and b~·laws, which ~hall become effective whrn ratified 
by a mnjority vote of tlw adult mrmbers of the tribe, or of the adult 
Indians residing on such resrrvation, as the case may be, at a sprrial 
election authorizrd and called b~· the Secretary of the Interior under such 
rules nnd regulations as he may pre~cribe. 
"In addition to all powers vestrd in nuy Indian tribe or tribal council 
by exi~ting law, the constitution adopted by ~aid tribe shall al~o w~t in 
sueh tribe or it~ tribal council the following rights and powers: To employ 
legal counsel, the choicr of coun~el and fixing of fees to be ::;ubjt>d to 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior: to prevent the ~ale, dis-
po~ition, leaHe, or encumbrance of tribal laud~, iutere::>tf' in land~, or other 
tribal assets without the com;ent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the-
Federal, State, and local Governmeuts." 25 U. S. C. § 476. 
-. 
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of the Interior to issue a charter of incorporation to an In-
dian tribe, and provided that the charter may convey to the 
tribe the power to purchase, manage and dispose of its prop-
erty.11 The 1934 Act said nothing about the power to levy 
taxes.12 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved 
by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937.13 
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with 
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease, 
which is on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
of the Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later 
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe.14 
11 Section 477 provides: 
"The Secretary of the Interior rna~·. upon petition by at lea~t om•-third 
of the adult Indians, issue a charter of incorporation to ~uch tribe: 
Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a 
special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the 
reservation. Smh charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the 
power to purchase , take by gift, or brqneHt, or otherwi~e, own, hold, man-
age, operate, and di~11ose of property of every dcl:lcriptiou, real and J1er-
sonal, including the power to purchasc rel:ltricted Indian land:> and 1o i~Rue 
in exchange therefor interests in corporate propcrty, and such further 
powers as may bc incidental to the conduct of corporate bu;;iness, not in-
consbtent with law; but no authority ~hall be granted to ::;ell, mortgtlge, 
or lease for a period exceeding ten ~·ea r~ any of the land includt>d in the 
limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or 
surrendered except by Act of Congres::;." 25 U. S. C. § 477. 
12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (here-
inafter Cohen). 
13 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to nny power to a::;::;ess tnxes 
ngainst nonmembers. See 1937 Constitntion and Bv-Lawl:l of the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G (hereinafter 1937 Con~tituti0n). 
11 This lea~e wn~ attached to the complaint of pt>titiout>rs in 1\'"o. R0-11. 
The lra~;e attachrcl to 1hr complaint of petitiou!'l'~ in ~o. il0-15 wa~ al~o 
executrcl in 1953. Srr App. 62. The record i~ nnelear a~ to wlwu mo;;t 
of thr lra~c~ with prtitionrr~ were executed, but tlw record doe~ imlieatr 
that lrasr~ were rwrn1ecl a~ late as 196i. SeP Plaintiff~ ' .Exhibit 1. Lc•a t;P~ 
of .Tirarilla tr'bal propt>rty in the aggn•gatt• eover over 500,000 aere~ of 
land, rompri~ing almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla He~erva­
t.ion. Brief for ReHpondent 2. 
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The lease provides that in return for a cash bonus of 
$71,345.99, to be paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents 
and royalties, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the 
exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, re-
move, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in 
or under" the described tracts of land, together with the right 
to construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other 
necessary structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The lease 
is for a term of 10 years after approval by the Secretary of 
the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil aud/ or 
gas is produced in paying quantities from said land." Ibid. 
The leasee is obligated to usc reasonable diligence in the de-
velopment of the property and to pay an annual rental of 
$1.25 per acre and a royalty of 1 2lj~% "of the volum0 or 
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the 
leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee 
for development and operation of the lease is royalty -free. 
/d., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of char2;e 
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the 
Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind. 
Id., at 27-28. 
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any 
taxes. The le~see does, however, agree to comply with all 
regulations of the Secretary of Interior 
11 
••• now or hereafter in force relative to such leases: 
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall 
effect a change in rate or royalty or amlllal rental hC'rein 
specified without the written consent of the parties to 
this lease." I d., at 27. · 
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. I d:, at 32. 
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still 
producing. 
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution givinl!; the 
Tribal Council authority, "subject to approval by the Secre-
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tary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members 
of the tribe doing business on the reservation." 15 Eight years 
later, on July 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and 
Gas Severance Tax Ordinance, which was later approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides 
that the severance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas 
severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands .... " App. 
38. The rate of the tax is $.05 per million BTU of gas pro-
duced on the reservation and sold or transported off the reser-
vation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate pro-
duced on the reservation and sold or transported off the 
reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as welt 
as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. App. 
39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall 
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will pro-
duce over $2 million in revenues annually.w 
Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the 
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal au-
thorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any 
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated 
the two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the 
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First, 
after finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise 
a power of taxation over nomesidents prior to its incorpora-
tion in 1937, and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
did not confer that power on the Tribe, the District Court 
concluded that the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the 
Tribe did not extend to the imposition of a severance tax on 
15 App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-l:k The Tribe'~ \ 
1960 Constitution contained a <;imilar provitlion IH'nnitting "taxe::; and 
fer)'; rn person~ doing busineRs on the rrservation." SeP 1960 Con:;titution 
of thr Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. VI, § 5, Defrudant'H Exhibit A. 
16 See District Court.'s Findings of Fact and Conrlu~iom: of Law, Finding 
No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to intcrrogatorie~ indicatP that in 
1976 the royalties on thr ]eases rrceiV('d by the Tribe amounted to 
$3,995,469 .69. Sec Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 7; Tr . 269. 
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nonmembers. Second. the court held that the statute en-
acted by Congress in 1927. ·which authori:~:ed oil and gas leases 
on r<:'servation created by Executive Order, had granted state 
and local authorities the exclusive right to impose severance 
taxes on oil and gas production from such reservations. Fi-
nally, after finding that approximately 80% of the oil and 
gas production from the reservation is shipped interstate for 
sale outside of New Mexico, that the tax burden amounts to 
a significant percentage of the price of gas and oil,11 and that 
the tax is only imposed on gas, oil, or condensate sold or 
transported off the reservation. the court concluded that it 
discriminated against and created an impermissible burden 
on interstate commerce. 
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Aopeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F. 2d 537. 
The court held that the taxing power was an inherent at-
tribute of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the 
Indian Reorgani:~:ation Act of 1934. The court further held 
that the power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the 
Tribe, had not been divested by Congress. and was not incon-
sistent with any superior interest of the United States. The 
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 1927 Act 
had pre-empted the Tribe's power to levy a severance tax. 
because a review of the legislative history indicated that 
"Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted 
the statute." Id., at 547. The Court of Aopeals' reversal of 
the District Court's Commerce ClausC' holding was based on 
the two courts' different readings of the ordinance: whereas 
the District Court had construed the taxable event as removal 
of the oil or gas from the boundaries of the reservation, the 
Court of Appeals construed severancC' from the land as the 
1 7 Fillding No. 3G n•ad~ : "That if the .Tirarilln. Apnrhr Oil and Gas 
Severnnee Tax were valid the ('Ombined tax bnrden amount ~ to more than 
29% of the illh·r~ ta te price of old ga~ and ovrr 12.5% of t ]!(' pri('(• of old 
oil." App. 130. The Tribe cont t•nd~ that t.hi~ finding iR not :,;upported 
by the record, but the Court of Appeals did not ~;et it aside. 
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critical event. Id., at 546. Under the Court of Appeals' 
view, the ordinance would not discriminate against interstate 
commerce because oil or gas sold within the reservation as 
well as oil or gas transported off the reservation would be 
taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties paid 
in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory, 
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate 
taxes on the same taxable event did not create an impermis-
sible multiple burden on commerce. Id., at 545-546. 
II 
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three 
sources: federal statutes. treaties, or the tribe's inherent sov-
ereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Government 
seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the 
basis of any federal statute,18 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who 
reside 011 an Executive Order reservation, executed no treaty 
with the United States from which they derive any sover-
eign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must 
be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last 
Term, in Washington Y. Confederated 'l'ribes of the Colville 
Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on 
cigarettes sold on the reservatio11s of the Colville, Makah, 
and Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permis-
sible exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax.18 
We must determine whether the severance tax imposed ou 
18 Congrps~ mn.y cll•lrgatc "Rove reign" powers to th<' tribes. See M azurie 
v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As we have indicated, however, neither 
the 1927 statute permitting Indians to receive royalties from thl:' Jpase of 
tribal lands nor thl:' Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention 
of the authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 4-7, supra. 
10 The Court stated: 
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust landH and i"il!;nifieantly 
involving a tribe or it;; members is a fundamental attribute of RoverPignty 
which the tribes retain unless dive::;ted of it by frdNnl law or necessary 
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152. 
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nonmembers of the tribe in this case can likewise be charac-
tE'rized as a valid exercise of the tribe's inherent powers. To 
make this determination, we must first cons;der the source and 
scope of tribal sovereignty and more particularly the source 
and scope of the sovereign power to levy taxes. 
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by 
the Constitution.20 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have 
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the 
time of their incorporation into the United States. In Wor-
cester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional 
a Georgia criminal statute purporting to regulate residency 
of non-Indians in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that the Cherokees, 
although submitting to the protection of the United States, 
nevertheless retained some aspects of sovereignity: 
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed them-
selves under the protection of the United States: they 
have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to invoke 
the protection of any other sovereignty. But such en-
gagements do not divest them of the right of self govern-
ment, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or 
compacts." Id., at 581-582.~1 
20 The only rpfert>ncr to Indian tribe~ in the Com,;titution ii:i in Art. I, 
§ 8 (3), which provides that "[t]lw Congrel:is "hall have ihe Power to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sevPral Stall's, 
and with the Indian tribt>R." MorE' ~ignificant than thi~ referellCE' to 
Indian tribe~ iR thE' ab~enct> of any mention of the tribei:i in the Tenth 
Amt>ndment, which provides: 
"The powers notE' drlt>gnted to tlw United StatE's by tlw Constitutiou, 
nor prohibited b~· it to the Statei:i, are rel:ierved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." 
21 The Court n !so r;taterl: 
"At no timP has the sovereignty of thr country bern rt>cognizc·d af' exii:iting 
in the Indians, but they have bt>en alwa~·~ admitted to pO::il:ir~s many of 
the attributes of Roverrignty. All thr rights which belong to self govern-
ment have been rccognizrcl as vested in thrm. Their right of occupnnry 
has never been quei:itioned, but the fee in the soil hm; been considered 
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty, 
the United States retains plenary authority to divest the 
tribes of any such attributes. 2 ~ Moreover, this Court's deci-
sions since Worcester have recognized that not all attributes 
of sovereignity are consisteut with the tribes' status as "do-
mestic dependent nations." ~a In determining what sover-
eign powers the tribes retained in submitting to the authority 
of the United States, the Court has repeatedly recognized 
a fundamental distinction between the right of tribes to gov-
ern their own internal afl"airs and the right to exercise powers 
afl"ecting nonmembers of the tribe.~! 
in the government. Thi~ may be called the right to the ultimate domain, 
but the Indians have a present. right of po:s:;e ·sion." 6 Pet., at 5i10. 
~~See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 319; Winton v. Arnos, 
255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565; 1 
American Indian Policy Review Commission, Finn! Report, 106-107 (1977) 
(hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for example, Congtws can 
waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See United States v. U. S. Fidelity, 
309 U. S. 506, 512. 
~a The term "domestic deprndent nation::-" was fir:st u;;ed in 'l'he Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia. 5 Pet. 1, 17, in whirh the Court hrld that the 
tribes were not "foreign nation:;" within tlw meaning of the Constitution: 
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, 
heretofore, unquestioned right to the land~ t!JP,v occupy, until that right 
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it 
may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the 
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, 
be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domE>stic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to 
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect 
in point of po~session when their right of po;;session ceasrs. Meanwhile 
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United Stales 
resemble>~ that of a ward to his guurdiau." 
~4 In United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382, the Court ::;tated 
that the tribes: 
"[W] ere, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent 
position when they prrserved their tribal rcla1iou::;; not as Stnte::;, not as 
natious, not as possessed of the full attribute" of sovereignty, but as a 
separate people, with the power of regulating their intemal nne! social 
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The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from inter-
ference with tribal control over their members. See. e. g., 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. M art?'nez, 436 U. S. 65. The Court has 
recognized tha.t the power to prosecute members of the tribe 
for violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from 
power delegated by the United States but is an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 
313. Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to cre-
ate substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff 
v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan, 
175 U. S. 1, 29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court, 
424 U. S. 382 (domestic relations and family law). They 
also may enforce that law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee, 
358 U. S. 217; Fisher v. District Court, supra. Moreover, the 
Indian tribes' sovereignty over their own members is, in many 
respects, significantly greater than the States' powers over 
their own citizens. The tribes' virtually absolut€ control over 
their own membership carries with it the power to enforce 
discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a non-In-
dian community.25 Their criminal jurisdiction over their own 
members is unconstrained by constitutional limitations that 
are applicable to the States and the Federal Governmeut."6 
relations, and thus far not brought under the law~ of the Union or of the 
State within whose limits they rP~ided." 
25 Although the Indian Civil Right.-; Act of 1958, 82 Stat. 77, 25 
U. S. C. §§ 1301- 13G:3, prohibits Indian tribrs from denying "to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of it~:~ law," i:iee id., 
§ 1302 (8), the provi~ions of the United States Constitution, inc-luding, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which limit. federal or state authority do not 
similarly limit tribal authority. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez , 436 
U. S. 49, 56, and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that 
sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, that the Act did not ereate a private eause of action cognizable 
in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for 
vindication of rights created by the Act. 
26 In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, the Court held that the re:;tric-
tions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to proi:lecutious in tribal 
. , . 
. (
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Thus the use of the word ffsovereign" to characterize tribal 
powers of self-government is surely appropriate.27 
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over their-
own members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always 
been narrowly confined. 28 The Court has emphasized that 
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is in-
consistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so 
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation." 
Montana v. United States,- U.S.-,-. In Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held 
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by nonmembers within the reservations.29 I_n M ori-
courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 328-329; 'l'umer 
v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 355. 
2 ' Thu~ although the Stl.ttrs have "plenary power over re::;ident::; within 
their border::;," the States may not tax income of m(•mber~ of· the tribe 
derived from reservation sources. Sec M cC'lanahan v. Ariz una .State Tax 
Comm'u, 411 U. S. 164, 165. Thi>~ immunity from taxatiou-evm ' for 
tribal enterprise:;-does not apply beyond the boundariP~ of the rcsel'Va-
tion. See Mescalero Apache Tribe Y. Jones. 411 U. S. 145: · ·. · · . ' 
~ 8 Certain treaties which sprcifirally granted thP right of sPlf govern-
ment to the tribes have also sp<>cifically C'xcluded juriHdietion over non-
mPmbers. See, e. g .. TrC'aty with tlw ChProkee~:~, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 
(1835); Treaty with the Choctaws and Chicka;,aw~:~, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611 
( 1855) ; Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 
(1856). 
29 The Court stated in support of that holding: 
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, thC' Indian 
tribes thereby come under the territorial :>ovcreignty of the United States 
and their exerci:,;e of separate power is co11strained so as not to eonfiict 
with the interests of thiR overriding sovereignty. '[T]heir rights to 
complete sovereignty, ns independent nations, [are] uece~sarily diminished! 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823). 
"We have already described some of the inherent limitations on tribal 
powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States. In 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra. we notrd that the Indian tribes' 'power to 
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,' was 
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tana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that the 
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by non-
members on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe, 
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-limited 
tribal power over nonmembers-was applicable in a civil as 
well as a criminal context.30 Thus the Court has recognized 
that it is when the tribes attempt to impose controls on non-
members that the tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would 
be inconsistent with their status.81 
inherently loHt to the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435 
U. S. at 209. 
Sec nl~o New Yo1'k ex rel Ray v. Ma1'tin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (state rourt 
has juri~diction to try a non-Indian for a crime commit ted ngain~t Ilon-
Indian on reservation). 
Sil "The Court recently applied the;;e general J1rinriple::; in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191. rejecting a tribal claim of inherent 
sovereign authority to exercise rriminal jurisdirtion ovPr non-Incliaus. 
Stressing that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their 
diminished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice .Tohn~on's words 
in hi::; concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-thP first Indian <·a~c to 
reach thi::; Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to governing 
every person within their limits except themselves.' /d. , at 147, Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian 1'1'ibe. supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though Oliphant 
only determined inherent tribal authorit~· in crimi11al matters. the prin-
ciples on which it relied support the general propo::;ition that the inherent 
sovereign power::; of an Indian tribe do not exteud to the activities of non-
members of the tribe." Montana v. Unitl'd States, - U. S., at -
(footnote omitted). 
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, (tribes 
cannot freely alienate to non-Indian~ the land they oecupy); Chl'rokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribe;,; eannol enter into direct com-
merrial or foreign relations with other nation~). 
31 In Wheele1' v. United States. suwa. the Comt held that the JlOWer to 
prosecute it::; mE-mbers for tribal offen::;p::; was not "implicitly lost by virtue 
of their dependent status" and Rtated: 
"The areas in which sueh implieit clive~titmc of ><overcignty has beeu held 
to have occurred are tho::;e involving the relationl:i bctwePn an Indian tribe 
and nonmembers of the tribe. 
80-11 & 80-15-MEMO. 
MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE 17 
The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting 
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the 
·broad tribal power over internal affairs involving members.a2 
The power to exercise control over nonmembers-and specifi-
cally the power to tax recognized in Colville-presumably has 
a much more limited derivation, tied specifically to the ex-
ercise of particular powers, than the general ~etention of 
inherent sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must 
therefore examine the cases upholding the power to tax to 
determine the source of that power and then determine 
whether the tax imposed in this case is consistent with that 
rationale. 
III 
The search for the source of the taxing power must focus 
on the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934 
when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect 
of preventing any further erosion of I11dian sovereign powers.aa 
"These limitations rest on the fact that the drpendent ~tatu~ of Indian 
tribes within our territorial juri~diction i~:> necessarily inconi:>ii:>tent with 
their freedom independeutly to determine their external relationD. But the 
powers of srlf-govPI'nment, including the power to pre;,;cribe and enforce 
internal criminal laws, are of a difl'crent type. They involve only the 
relations among member~ of a tribe. Thni:>, they are not l:luch powers 
as would necei:l~arily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. 
'[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power dces 
not F'urrender its indrpcndence--its right to self govemment, by a~so­
ciating with a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia 
r6 Pet.l, at 560-561." 435 U. S., at 326. 
82 This lack of inherent sovrreignty over nonmcmbPrs is supported by 
the principlr that " in this Nation Pach tiOVereign governti only with the 
consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Because 
the tribr can exclude nonmcmbC'ri:l from participation in the tribal govern-
ment. the power exercised over thotir so excluded :;hould b? a. limitrd one. 
as The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did not. enlarge 
the inherent overeign powers of the Indian tribes. Congresi:l intC'nded the 
Art to "stabilize thr tribal organization of Indian tribes by vel:ltir>g such 
tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority .... " S. Rep, 
80-11 & 80-15-MEMO. 
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the De-
partment of the Interior issp:ed a formal opinion setting forth 
his understanding of the pq\vers that might be secured to an 
Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue 
of the statutory reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe 
"by existing law." 34 He concluded that among those powers 
No. 1080, 73cl Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934). As one commenator interpreted 
§ 16 of the Act: 
"LI]t would appt?ar that powers originally ht?lcl by tribes that were recog-
nized and allowed to be retained qy treaties or prior statutt'~, m; well as 
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained 
by tribe;; that aerepted the terms of the 1934 Act. . . . The provi~ion is 
con~i~tent with the act's purpo~e of t?nhancing tribal goverument in that it 
recognized and reconfirmed tho~e powers a tribe may already have had as 
a govemment." Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 
30 Ha~ting:; L. Rev. 89, 97 ( 1978). 
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 1934 
to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or di~approve of the rxerc·i~e 
of tribal powrr~ plact?cl a limit on tribal sovereignty, that JlOwer did 11ot 
enable the Secretary to add to the inherent powers that a tribe po~sel:l~ed 
before the Act was pas~ed. 
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the 
occal:lion to exereif'e a particular power over nomncmberl:l in its early his-
tory il:l surt?ly not a sufficient reason for denying the exi~tmee of that 
power. Aecordingly, the fact that tht?re is no evidenec that thr Ji!'arilla 
Apnehe Tribe ever impo::;ed a tax of any kind on a nonrnt?mbrr does not 
require Ul:i to conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent 
that the power to tax was an attribute of ~overeignty po~:;p:;~ccl b~· Indian 
tribes when the Reorgnaization Act wa~ pas:;ed, we brlieve Congrc:;s 
intended the :;tatute to pre::;erve those power::; for all Indian tribe~ that 
adopted a formal organization under the Act. 
8'1 55 I. D. 14. Solicit.or Margold described the scope of thi:; opinion 
as follows: 
"My opinion has been requested on the que:;tion of what powt?rs may be 
secured to au Indian tribe and incorporated in it8 con::;titution and by-laws 
by virtue of the following phra~e, contained iu :;ection 16 of the Wheeler-
Howard Act ( 48 Stat. 984, 987) : 
"In addition to all powers vest.ed in any Indian tribe o1· tribal council 
by existing law, the constitution ~\dopted by :;aid tribe ::;hall abo ve::;t ...• 
[Italics added.] 
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was a power of taxation and described the permissible cxer~ 
cise of this power: 
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this 
power may be exercised over members of the tribe aud 
over nonmembers. so far as such nonmembers may ac~ 
cept privileges of trade. residence, etc., to which taxes 
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46. 
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this 
opnuon. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 
(CAS 1905), app. dismissed. 203 U. S. 599; Morris v. Hitch~ 
cock, 194 U. S. 384; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243. 54 
S. W. 807 (Ct. App. Ind. T.). aff'd. 105 F. 1003 (C'A8 1900), 
were decided shortly after the turn of the celltury and are 
the three leading cases considering the power of an Indian 
tribe to assess taxes against noumembers.~" The three cases 
are similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the 
court upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's 
power to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and con-
cluded that the Tribe could condition entry or continued 
presence within the reservation on the payment of a license 
"The qnei:lt ion of what powers arr vrstrd in an Indian t rihe or tril)Hl 
council by existing law cannot be an~wrred in detail for ea<"h Indian t rihe 
without rrference to hundrrd~ of ~perial treatiPs and spP<"ial a<"t,.; of Con-
gre~s. It is pol:l;;ible, however, on the ba~is of t lw report<·d <'aH<'s, the 
written opinion~ of the various exf'eutivc d<'partments, and tlwse ~tatutei:l 
of Congret;s which are of general import, to cJpfine the powerl:l which have 
herf'toforf' bePn recognized a~ lawfully within thr jnri~dietiotl of an Indian 
tribe. My answrr to thr propounded quel:ltion, then, will Le gem'ral, and 
subject to correction for particular tribe~ iu ihe light of thr irratie~ and 
statutes affecting such tribe wherever ~\l('h treatir;,; or statuteH eontain 
pec·uliar provi~ion~ restricting or enlarging the general authority of an 
Indian tribP." !d. , at 17-18. 
~ 5 Felix Cohru, in his Handbook on FedPral Indian Law. publi~lll'd in 
1942, al~o rr liel:! on these ca~es in hit> di~cu~,;ion of tribal taxation of non-
membPri5. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Colville cited both Bu1>ter v. 
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock In npholding tribal power to tax. 447 
U. S., at 153. See p . 30, infra. 
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fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the remedy for 
nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or inter-
vention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe. 
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54 S. W. 807 
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affirmed an 
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint 
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation. 
They had sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civi-
lized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25 
on each non-Indian lawyer residing and practicing his pro-
fession on the reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim, 
the Court of Appeal first analyzed the relevant treaties be-
tween the United States and the Creeks and noted that they 
had "carefully guarded their sovereignty, and their right to 
admit, and consequently to exclude, all white persons, except 
such as are named in the Treaty." Id., at 809. The United 
States, pursuant to a treaty with the Creeks, had agreed that 
all persons not expressly excepted who were present in the 
Creek Nation "without the consent of that Nation are deemed 
to be intruders, and pledges itself to remove them." Ibid. 
Because attorneys were not within any excepted class,3" the 
Tribe had the authority to require them to obtain permits or 
to require their removal as "intruders." a7 The Court thus 
held: 
"rTl hat unless since the ratification of the treaty of 
1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of 
ao "Attorney practicing in tlw 1Tnitcd StatrH courts are uot twrsons 
who come within the exceptions, for they arE' not 'in the Pmployruent of 
the government of the United State~,' or 'pC'l'HOil~ pt•acPabl~· travPliug or 
temporarily sojourning in the country, or irading thPrPin unc!Pr license 
from the proper authority of the United State~." 54 S. W., at 809. 
37 In reaching this conclusion thr court rcliPd hravil~· on two opillions 
of the Attorney General of the UnitPd States. In the firHt opillion, i~~ued 
in 1881, Attorney General McVeagh upheld the validity of Indian permit 
lawt> regulating which person::; would be permitted io re;;idP on the Choc-
taw and Chickasaw reservation~ . 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. ln hiH diseus-
.. 
,-
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congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the 
power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it 
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men) 
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian 
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the 
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all per-
sons not authorized by its terms to reside in the Creek 
Nation should be deem.ed to be intruders. and had obli-
gated itself to remove all such persons frorn the Creek 
Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of the treaty 
was a removal by the United States from the Creek Na-
tion of the delinquent as au intruder." I d., at 809-Slo.as 
sion of the right of non-Inr!ians to enter and rrmain on tribal lando 
Attorney General McVeagh stated: 
"Replying to your fourth question: it seem:> from what ha~ bern already 
said that, besides those persons or cht~:>e~> mentioned by yon. ouJ~· tho8e 
who have been permitter! by the Choctaw~ or Chicka~aw~ to re~ide within 
their limits, or to be employed by their citizens a~ teacher~, meehanic8, or 
skilled agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the lands of 
thr~e tribes; and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired." 
!d., at 136 (emphasis mlded). 
In the 8econd opinion, on the same ~ub,jpet, AttonH?~· G('ucral Phillip<1 
stated in 1884 that in tlw absrncr of a treat~ · or i:iiatutes, the powrr of 
the Indian tribe "to rel-'(ulate its own righi~ of occupancy, and to say who 
shall participate therein and upou what eondition~. ean not be doubted." 
18 Op. Ally. Gen. 34, 36. Although tlw lrratie~ applieable io the Choctaw 
nnd Chickasaw tribes excepted from the grant of se!f-govermncnt power 
over noumembers, the Attorney General did uoL construe this provision 
to limit the tribes' power to exclude: 
"I submit that whatever thi~ may menu it doeH not limit tht• right of 
these t1·ibes to pass upon the qu!:'~tion , who (of prr~ons indifferent to the 
United .States, i. e., neithrr !:'mployers, uor objPctionaiJJt>) ~hall share their 
occupancy and upon what terms. That ~~ a que::;tion whirh all J>rivate 
pers:llls arc allowed to decidr for them~clve::;; ... " !d., at :37. 
3o In other ]Jarti:i of its opinion, thr comt rc·ktai<•d the propo::<ition that 
the TribP was "clothed with the power to admit white meu , or not, at its 
option, which as we hold, gave it the right to impose conditiOJl~>," id, at 
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court 
in 1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of 
the Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay an-
ual permit fees. 30 The complainants owned cattle and horses 
that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant 
to contract with individual members of the Tribe. Com-
plainants filed suit in the District of Columbia praying for 
an injunction preventing the defendant federal officials from 
811, and that a law~·er who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining 
would become an "intruder": 
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man, 
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, i~, pursuant to their l:ltatute, re-
quired to pay for the privilt>ge of remaining and practicing hil:l profc~~ion 
in that nation the l:lUJU of $25; that, if he refuse the pa~·ment thert>of, he 
becomes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that in mch a ca~e the 
goYernment of the United State::; may remove him from the nation: and 
that this duty devolves upou the interior department. Whether the in-
terior department or its Indian agents can be controlled by the rourts b~· 
the writ~:; of mamlamu~:; and i11junction is not material in this case. berause, 
as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount r equired by the 
statute by its very terms becamcs an intruder, whom the United States 
promises b~· the terms of the treaty to reman•, and thereforl:' in such 
ca~:;e::; the offirers and agents of the inlt>rior departmPnt would be acting 
clearly and proper]~· within the ~eope of tlwir power.·." 
The court al~o reiterated that the Tribe eould not collect the tax without 
the intervention of the Fl:'deral Gowrnment: 
"And when it is remembered that up to the time that the Unitt>d Statrs 
courts wrre cstabli~:;hed in tht> Indian Territor~· the only reml:'d~ · for the 
collection of this tax wa::; by removal, and that the Indian Nation::; had 
no power to collect it, excepl through the intervention of tht> interior 
department , il is quite elear that if, in thl:' bPsl judgment of that depart-
ment, it was deemed wi~e to take charge of the matter, and eollect thi ::; 
mone~r, and turn it over to the Indimll:l, it had tht> powpr to do ~o. m1der 
it::; superintending control of lhl:' Indian::;, and the intercour~e of whit e 
men with thPm grantt>d b~· varim1s ads of congrc::;~;" id., at 812. 
su J . George Wright , tlw Indian in~pPC'tor, and J. Blair Shoen felt, the 
defendant::; in Maxey v. Wright. supra, were al~o named a::; ddrndant::; in 
Morris v. Hitchcock. The other defendant::; in the Hitchcock ca~e were 
the Secretary of the Interior and the Commi::;:;ioner of Indian Affairl:l. 
.~ 
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·removing their cattle a.nd horses from the Indian Territory 
because complainants refused to pay the permit fees assessed 
by the Tribe. An order dismissing the complaint was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
and by this Court. 
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the 
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the 
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory 
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as 
intruders" 40 and that the United States had assumed the 
obligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by per-
sons not subject to their jurisdiction. ld., at 389. The 
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been adopted 
by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876, and noted that the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary had, in 1879, specifically referred 
to such legislation requiring licensed merchants and traders 
to obtain a permit and to pay a fee of $25, and had expressed 
the opinion that such legislation was not iuvalid.11 
40 The Court i:itatecl: 
'And it is not di~puted that, under the authority of the1<e treatie~, the 
Chickasaw Nation has exerri~ed the power to attach condition::: to the 
presence within its borders of Jll'rHon~ who might otherwi~e not be en-
titled to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U. S., al 889. 
41 "Lrgii:ilation of thr same general character ai:i that embodied iu the 
act of thr lrgi~laturc of the Chicka~aw Nation hrre a~~ailed ai:i invalid had 
been enacted by the Chicka~aw Nation before the pai:iHage of the Curtis 
Act. The eHsential proYision~ of onr i:iuch law, pa~><ed on October 17, 1876, 
were recited in a report made to the Senate by the Committee on the 
Judiciary, on February 3, 1R79, from which we cop~· the following: 
"'The law in que~tion ~ePm~ to have a twofold object-to pr('VPilt the 
intrusion of unauthorized JWr~otli:i into the tl'rritory of the Chirka~aw 
Nation, and to mise rrvemte. B~· it~:~ tt•rm~ 110 citizen of any State or 
Territory of the United Statt·~ can either rent land or proeun• rmploymmt 
in the Chickasaw conntr~· wit hunt enteriug into a rontraet with a Chicka-
Haw, which coutrnct the latter i~ to report to the rlerk of the couuty whPre 
he re~ides, and a 1wrmit mu~t be obtained for a time no longer than twelve 
monthi:i, for whirh thr C"it izPn i::; to pay the ~mn of $:25. 
"'Every liren~ed mNchant, tradPr, and every phy:::ieian, not a Chirka-
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The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attor-
ney General of the United States that had concluded that the 
powers of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not 
been withdrawn by Congress.4~ Although Congress had sub-
sequently created an express exception in favor of owners of 
town lots. protecting them from being evicted as intruders, 
the Court noted that no comparable protection had been given 
to owners of cattle and horses. 194 U. S., at 392-393. The 
Court accordingly concluded that the Chickasaw legislation 
imposing grazing fees was valid. 
saw, is required to obtain a permit, for which the sum of §25 i~ exaetcd.' 
"Dt>claring in :mb~tance that under the exi~ting treaties with the tribe, 
the Chicka~aw~ wrre not prohibited from excluding from the tl'rritory 
of the nation the per~on~ affeetcd by the art, the committee expre~~ed 
the opinion that the act whirh wa~ the ~ubject of the report mts not 
invalid." 194 U. S., at 389-390. 
42 In the first opinion, by Attorne~· Grurral John W. Grigg:.:, see 23 
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorne~· Grnernl Rtntrd: 
"The trentic:; and law~ of the United Stnte~ make all per~on~, with a 
few specified exceptions, who nre not eitizenH of nn Indian nation or 
members of an Indian tribe, and nre found within nn Indian nation without 
permis~ion, intruders there, nnd require thrir removal by the United 
Stales. This rlo~;es the whole matter, absolutely exeludes all but the 
exceptt>d classes, and fully authorize;;: theRr nations to ab~olult·l~· exelude 
out;;ider~, or to permit their re;;idenee or business upon smh trrm~ a;;: they 
may choose of tlw United StatP~, hnv<', as Hueh, no more right or bu~inc~s 
to be there than they have in any foreign nation, and ean lawfully be there 
at all only by Indian permi~~ion; and that their right to bt• or remain 
or carry on bu;,iner:;~ there depends solely upon whether they have ~ueh 
permi~8ion. 
"A;, to the power or duty of your Departmr11t in the premi~r~ 1lwre 
can badly bE' a doubt. Under the treaties of the United Statp~ with these 
Indinn nations this Government is under the mol:'! ~olemn obligation, 
and for which it has reerived ample con~ideration, to remove ami keep 
removed from the territory of the~<' tribe~, all thi:-; elal:'~ of intruder~ who 
are there without Indian perrni~sion. The performance of thi~ obligation, 
as in other matter~ concerning the Indian~ and their afl'air~, has long · 
heen devolved upon the Department of the Interior." Id., at 218. 
The Court al~o relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 52 ' (1!:101). 
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CAS 1905), 
was a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against fed~ 
eral inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs 
from doing business within the reservation because they had 
refused to pay a permit tax assessed by the Tribe. The Court 
of Appeals relied on Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright 
in upholding the tax. The opinion for the court by Judge 
Sanborn emphasized that the tax was in the nature of a con-
dition precedent to transacting business within the reserva-
tion aud that the plaintiffs had ample notice of the tax: 
"The permit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the 
subject of this controversy, is the amJUal price fixed by 
the act of its national council, which was approved by 
the President of the Fnited States in the year 1900. for 
the privilege which it offers to those who are not citizens 
of its nation of trading within its borders. The payment 
of this tax is a mere condition of the exercise of this privi-
lege. No noncitizen is required to exercise the privilege 
or to pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he 
remains free from liability for the other. Thus, withou~ 
entering upon an extended discussion or consideration of 
the question whether this charge is technically a license 
or a tax. the fact appears that it partakes far more of the 
nature of a license than of an ordinary tax, because it 
has the optional feature of the former and lacks the com-
pulsory attribute of the latter. 
"Repeated decisions of the courts, numerous opinions 
of the Attorneys GeneraL and the practice of years place 
beyond debate the propositions that prior to March 1, 
1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority to require 
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the 
exercise of the privilege of trading within its borders, 
and that the executive department of the government 
of the United States had plenary power to enforce its 
payment through the Secretary of the Interior and his 
-26 
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subordinates. the Indian inspector, Indian agent. and In-
dian police. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384. 392. 24 
Sup. Ct. 712. 48 L. Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. Madden, 4 
C. C. A. 408, 410. 413. 54 Fed. 426, 428. 431; M axeu v. 
'Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807; Maxey v. Wright, 
44 C. C. A. 683, 105 Fed. 1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys 
Qpneral 34. 36: 23 Opinions of Attorneys General, 214, 
217, 219, 220, 528." 135 Fed., at 949-950. 
Later in the opinion the court again stressed the fact that 
the traders had entered the reservation with full knowledge 
of the permit obligation. and therefore could be deemed to 
have accepted the condition prccedent.~ 3 The court also held 
43 After c·iting thr opinion of Att.ornry Grnrral Gri!!g~ from whieh this 
Court had quoted at length in Morris v. Hitchcock Judge Sanbom wrote: 
"Pur~uant to thi~ deci~ion the eivilized I ribeR were charging, and the 
Indian agent was collrcting, taxes from nonritizrn~ Cllgaged in bu~ille~~ in 
the~e nations. It wa~ under thi~ )<tatr of fact:; that lht> 1Tuilt>d Stall'S 
and the Creek Nation made the agreement of 1901. Did the~· iulrnd by 
that agreement that thr Creek Nation should lhNeby rt•nouncr it8 eon-
ceded power to rxact thr!<e prrmit taxe~? Both partie~ knew that this 
power exi~ted, and the United State~. by thr act of its Pre~idt•nt HpproYing 
the law of the Crerk national council. and thr Sreretary of the Interior by 
enforeing il, had approved it~ exrrcise. The >:ubject of t lw;;e taxeH was 
pre:;euted to the mind~ of thr contracting partirs and wa>: eou;;idert>d during 
thr nrgotiation of thr ngrrement, for that contract contains expre~l' :;tipu-
btion~ that rattle grazed on rented allotment~ shall not he liable to any 
tribal tax (chapter G7G , :n Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no noncitizen rent-
ing land~ from a citizen for agrirultmal purpo~e~ ao; provided h~· law, 
whethrr ~ueh land;.: have been selected aR an allotment or uot, :<hall be 
required to pay an~· permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 Stat. Sil, § :3!:!) . But 
thr~' made no provi;;ion that noncitizen:; who rngagrd in the nH·rcantile 
bu~inc~H in the Crr<>k Nation ~-;hould be exempt from these tax<•s. As the 
law then iu force required ~ueh noneit izrn~ to pay 8ueh tax('~, ~~~ both 
parties were then awarr of that faet and con~iderrd the que10tion, and ns 
they made 110 :;tipulalion to aboli:,;h the~e taxr;,;, the conclusive Jll'l'SIImption 
is that they intended to make uo !<uch contract , and that the power of 
the Crel'k Nation to exact theR<• taxeR, and thr authorit~· of tlw Seeretar~~ 
of the Interior and of hi::; :;uLordiuale::; to collect them, were neither re-
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that even though noncitizens of the Tribe had lawfully ac-
quired ownership of lots within the Creek Nation. they had 
no right to conduct business within the reservation without 
paying the permit taxes.44 
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions con-
siuering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on non-
members.'" These cases demonstrate that the power to im-
pose taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's 
power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to 
impose restrictions and conditions on entry onto the reserva-
nouneed, revoked, nor re;;lricted, but that they rt!ma!ned in full foree and 
cfft•ct. after a.~ before t.he agreement of 1901." 135 F., aL 054. 
41 The court. :ola ted: 
"The legal effeet, however, of the law prescrihing the permit taxe~ is to 
prohibit noncitizens from conducting bu~inesfi within the Creek Nation 
wifhout the payment of the::>e taxe::;." 135 F., at 055. 
'10 Two decade;; aft!:'r the Rrorgm1ization Act wa~ p<t::;::;ed the problem 
waR revi~ited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux 'l'ribe 
of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CAS 195G), the court held that 
the tribe had the power to a~~e::;!:i a tax on a nonmember lP::;see of land 
withiu the re::;Prvation for the privilege of grazing ~loek on re;;ervation 
laud. And in Barta v. Oglala Sioux '1'1ibe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 
F. 2d 553 (CAS 1958), tlw Court held that the Pnitt'd State~> could bring 
an action on behalf of the tribe to collect a liernse tax of three cent~ per 
acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cPuls per acre per annum 
for farm laud levied on nonmember lessees. The court !wid that the tax 
did not violate the con::;titutional right::; of the nonmember I~~:~ce::; stating, 
in part: 
"The tribe by provil"ion:s of its treaty with the United States has power 
to provide for the admiosion of nonmember:-< of the tribe onto the re~erva­
tion . Having such power, it has the authority to impo:::e re::;trictions on 
the presence of nonmembers within the re»ervaliou." 259 F. 2d, at 556. 
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta Huggr~ts that tht' Court of Ap-
IWal::: , unlike the earlier court::;, mny not haw rr~ted thr tnxing powPr 
::;olrly on the power to exelude. The Court of AppPalti of cour::;e did not 
have the benefit of our decisions in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v. 
United States. 
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tion for any purpose.10 This interpretation of these cases is 
further supported by the fact that the remedy for the non-
payment of the tax in all three cases was exclusion from the · 
rcservation.47 Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over non-
4G In thr chaptrr of hi~ trf'atisf' entitlf'd "Taxation," FPlix C'olwn statr~: 
"Though thr scope of the power [to tax] as applied to nonmembN~ iH not 
clear, it rxtend,; at least to property of nonmember~ mwd in conne<·tion 
with Indian property as well as to privileges enjo~·ed by nonmPmlwr~ in 
trMiing with the Indians. The power to tax nonmPmbers i~ derived in 
the ca~cs from the authority, founded on original ~overeignty am! guaran-
teed in ;;ome instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmember~ 
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal gowmnwnl has 
the power to exclude, it ean extrart a fep from nonmembt•r::< a~ a condition 
precedent lo granting permi~::>ion to remain or to op<·ratc within lhc tribal 
domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnotes omitted). 
In a not her chapter, pntitled "The Sropc· of Tribal Self-Government," · l 
cited by the Secretary of thr Intrrior and thr Tribe hPrP, Cohen de::;eribe::; 
tlw power of taxation as "an inhf'!'rnt att.ribntp of tribal ::;overPignty 
whieh continue::; unlr;,~ withdrawn or limit<'d by trf'aly or b~· ad of 
Congre;;~ .... " !d., at 142. Aftf'r diH<·ns::>ing Bu~ter \". Wriyht, Coht'n 
cite~ that ca::;e for the propo~ition that "[t]he puwrr to tax dol'::; not de-
JWnd upon the power to rrmovr and ha,; been uphrld wherp thpn• wa~ no 
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal juri~dietion." 
Id., at 143. A::; we have' ~ern, howrver, the liePn::>P tax iu Buster wa:,( pre-
dicated on the tribe's rip;ht to attach eoll(litiou~ to Jwnmember~ eumlurling 
business on the re::;ervation, and the trilw eould prt•vPnt such nonmember::; 
from doing busine~::; regardlP~;.; of whetlwr it could phy~icall~· rPmove tho-,;e 
nonmembers from the rr~ervation. MorPOVPr, in thr chapter on tribal 
::;elf-govprnment, Cohen dors rrrognize that tribal taxP~ have bPPn upheld 
011 the ba::;i~ of tlw tribr'1< power to remoV<' nonmrmbrr:< from the n·~erva­
tion, and that "[i]t i~ therefon' prrtiJWJlt, in analyzing the ::;cope of tribal 
taxing power::;, to inquirr how far an Indian tribe i:; empowered to rmwve 
nonmember::; from it::; reservation." Ibid. 
The American Indian Policy RPview Commi~~ion recognized that the 
court deci::;ions upholding the tribes' taxing power::; "rPly largely upon 
the power of tribe::; to remove per"oJJ;.; from the reservation, and COJJ::;e-
quently, to prescribe the eondition~ upon which they ::;hall enter" but 
argued for a broader :;ource of the right to lax. AIPRC Final Report 
178-179. 
H In Buster v. lFJ'"ight, supra, the JWnally for 11onpu~·mpnt of the tax 
was the clo::;ing of the nonmember's lm:<ine::~~, enforced by the Secretary 
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·members are appropriately limited because nonmembers are 
foreclosed from participation in tribal government. See n. 
32, supra. If the power to tax is limited to situations in which 
the tribe has the power to exclude, then the nonmember is 
subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he consents by 
choosing to accept the conditions of entry imposed by the 
tribe. 48 The limited source of the power to tax nonmem-
bers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with 
this Court's narrow construction of the power of Indian tribes 
over nonmembers in geueral.·'u The source of the taxing au-
thority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in this case is 
thC'refore not the T~ibe's power of self-government but rather 
its power over the territory that has been reserved and set 
apart for its use and occupation.50 
of tht> Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. Hitchcock, supra, the 
remedy waR the removal of the nonmember's cattle from the re8ervu-
tion, again enforced by the United Slates. In Ma:rey v. Wright, supra, 
an attorney refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department 
was l"ubject to removal from the re~ervation. 
4 ~ "No noncitizen i~ requirrd to exerei:;p a privilegt• or to pay the tax. 
He may refrain from the one and he remains free from liability for the 
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., ut 949. 
4v See pp. 15-17, supra. Ao wr haw indiratrd. i:'PP n. 2R, supra, 
treatir~ recognizing the inhrrrnt power of tribal ~elf-government have also 
deprived the tribes of juristlirtion over nonmembt•rs. Trratie~< with In-
dian tribrs, however, often specifically reeognized the right of the tribe 
to exclude nonmemberR from the re~ervation and to attaeh conditions to 
their entr~'· Ree, e. g, Treat~· with the Choctaw nnd Chicka~aw, art. 7, 
11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Creeks, arl'. 15, 11 StHt. 099 (1855). 
Ree II Kappler 7, 9, 12, 15, 17 , 20, 21, 27, 30, 42, 75, 41H, ()82, 099, 703, 
719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 860, 886, 888, 929, 985, 990, 998, 1008, 
1016, 1021. ' -~ 
so The various t ribr;; mn~· hnYe tHken H • ·imilar view of tlll•ir power lo 
lax at the time of the Iudian Heorganization Aet. Cohen'::; treati;;e notes 
that: 
"The power of an Indian tribe to l<>vy tuxes upon its owu member::. all(t 
upon nonmembers doing busine,;;; within the reservation;; hal:l been <If-
firmed in many trihnl eon~tit ution~ approved under the Wheelrr-Howard 
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This conclusion is entirely consistent with our decision in 
Washington v. Confederate~ Tribes of the Colville Reserva~· 
tion, supra. In that case we held that the power to tax non-
Indians entering the reservation had not been divested by 
virtue of the tribe's dependent status and that no overriding 
federal interest would be frustrated by the tribal taxation. 
The Court quoted with approval, as an indication of the Ex-
ecutive Branch's understanding of the taxing power, Solicitor 
Margold's 1934 opinion. The Court noted further that 
" [ f] ederal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax 
non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic ac-
tivity" and cited Buster v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 51 
447 U. S., at 153. The tax in Colville, which was applied to 
nonmembers who entered the reservation and sought to pur-
chase cigarettes, is clearly valid under the rationale that the 
tribes' power to tax derives from the right to exclude non-
members from the reservation and the right to attach condi-
tions to the en try of such nonmembers seeking to do business 
on the reservation. 52 Thus the inhere11t sovereign power of 
Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribes' power 
Act [Indian Reorganization Act], a:; has the power to remove nonmembers 
from land over which the tribe cxerci~e~ juri~diction." Cohen 143. 
The following clause from the 1935 Con~t itution of the Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe, which Cohen cite~ a:; a "t~·pical" ;;tatement of such "tribal power~," 
indicates that the tribe perceived the ::;cope of it::; laxation power::; over 
nonmembers to be narrower than the ;;cope of that power over member8: 
"(h) To levy taxel' upon members of the tribe and to require the per-
formance of reservation labor iu lieu thereof, and to levy taxe~ or lieen::;e 
fee!:i, ::;ubject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers 
doing business within the reservation. 
"(i) To exclude from the re~tricted land:; of the reservation pcr~ons 
not legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinances which shall be 
subject to review by the Secretar)· of the Interior." Ibid. 
5r The Court abo cited, without. di~eu;;:;ion, 1he Eighth Circuit'::; dcci::;iou J 
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux 'l'ribl', :;u]JI'a 11. 45. 
"~A nonmember :;ubjectPd to the lax could avoid the tax b~· declining 
to do bu~inc~s on the re:oervatiou, and the "~auction" to be impo~ed for 
refu::;al to pay the tax would be denial of permi~~ion to buy cigarettes. 
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to exclude and the exerci~e of the power must be consistent 
with its source. 
IV 
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have 
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax ou peti-
tioners when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Res-
ervation to engage in exploration, drilling, and extraction 
activities. 53 The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to peti-
tioners' entry, however, and therefore the tax is valid only 
if the Tribe retains the power to exclude petitioners from the 
reservation. 
The leases executed by the Tribes and petitioners are 
dearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does 
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms 
length bargaining. Moreover, the leases were executed on a 
form prepared by the Department of the Interior. the De-
partmeilt gave specific approval to the terms of the leases, 
and they were executt>d pursuant to explicit congressional au-
thority.54 Under the leases petitioners therefore have the 
53 "I' A]:; the pllYmrnt of a tax or liC'ell~t· f<:>e ma~· Lr madr a eoudition 
of rntrY upon tribal land. it maY ahm br madr a. condition to the grant of 
other privileges, suf'h as tlw acqui:;;tiou of a tribal lea:;('." Coht'll 14;), 
54 Congres~ intendPd the Aet of l\larl'h 3, Hl27 to make appliC'abk to 
Exerutive Order reservations the leasing provi::;iom; <dread~· applicable to 
treaty rrsrrnttions pur~uant to the Act of ~Jay 29. 1924, 43 Stal. 244. S. 
Rep . No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Se~::;., 3 (1927). The Act thuN prrmitted 
the lea~ing of unallott ed Indian land for term:; not to pxceed 10 years 
and as much longer as oil and gas in paying fjuantiti<-'8 were found ou 
the land. 44 Stat. 1347. Among the purpo~es of the 1927 :>latut(' wrre 
to " rpJermit the exnlorfltion for oil and ga s on Exeeutivc-ordt•r I11dia1l 
RPsrrvations" to " rgJive thr Indian tribe~ all thr oil and gas ro~·altit•s.' 1 
nnd to "rpllaC'e with Congre;,;~ the future determination of any change~ 
of boundaries of Executivr-order reservatiou~ or withdra\\'ab." Ibid. 
In light of the8e purposes. it is clear that Congre~s intended leaseH exe-
C'Iltrd pursuant to the 1927 Act to be binding. 
The tribe contends that the !rases in this case were rxeC'utrd pursuant 
to the Art of Mav 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and not the 1927 Act. The 
Tribe notes that the lease with petitionrr~ iu No. 80-15 ~tfltes in one of 
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right to remain on the reservation to do business for the dura-
tion of the leases."" Because the execution of these leases 
guaranteed the lessees such rights of access to the reservation 
as might be necessary to enable them to perform the leases, 
petitioners are not intruders. and while the leases remain in 
effect there is no basis for claiming that the Tribe retains 
any power to exclude petitioners from the portion of the res-
ervation on which they acquired drilling and extraction 
rights. 5° 
it,; provi):iion~ that it wa::, executed pursunnt to the Hl38 Act. SPt' App. 
64. Petitioupr:; note, however, that although the Tribe argues that the 
19:38 Act, uulike the 1927 Act, doe::> not require that. royaltir~ b<· paid to 
th<' Srcretary of the Interior for the ben<'fit of tlw Tribe, ])('titioner:o make 
their royalty payments to the United StateH 0<-'ological Smvey for the 
b<'n<'fit of the Tribe. See Tr. 79-80. We need not r('~olve thi~ qu<·~tion, 
because· for our purpo~e!:l the provision::; of the 19a8 Act do not vary .-;ignifi-
cantly from the provisions of the 1927 Act. The HJ:3~ Ad, like the 1927 
Act, permitted the lea::;ing of Indian lands for n period "not to <'xcet•d 10 
yean; and as long thereafter as minerab arc produced in paying qnauti-
ties." 25 U. S. C. § 396c. One of the pmpors<';; of the 1938 AtL was to 
c:,:tablish uniformity of the law relating to the Jca~ing of tribal lamls for 
mining purpo::;es by appl~·ing the law m; to oil aml gal" l(•asing to the l~·ai:i­
illg of lm1d for the mining of other minerals. S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 
1st Ses::;., 1-2 (1937). Other purpose::; were to "bring all leasing matterR 
in harmony with the Indian Heorganization Art," -irl. at 3, ami to enact 
change~ de ·!gned "to give the Indian~ the great<'::;t rrturn from th(•ir prop-
erty." !d., at 2. There is no indication in thr legislative hi~tory that the 
puq1oses of the 1938 Act arc in an~' way inconsi~tent with the }Htrpo::;(•S 
of the 1927 Act and prior legi~lation. l'reHnmabl~· the JlllfJ>OHl'H of the 
earlirr legislation were incorporated into the uniform ~cheme athicved by 
the 1938 Act. 
fiG A.,; Attorney General MacVeagh ::;tated in 1881, only thosP permiltPd 
by the tribe to remain on the reHervation may do so, "and the right to 
remain is gone when the permit hns expired." 17 Op. Att~·. Gen., at 136. 
fiG Solicitor Margold wrote regarding the power to exclude: 
"Over tribal lands, the tribe ha~ the rights of a landowner as well as the 
right:; of a local government, dominion a~ well aH ~overeignty. But all 
tlw lands of the reservation, wh<'ther owned b~· the tribe, b~· membrrs 
thereof, or by out:;ider::;, the tribe has the sovereign power of detcnnining 
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We might reach a different conclusion if the petitioners, at 
the time that they signed the leases. had uotice that a sever-
ance tax might be imposed.5 ' If the petitioners had such 
notice, then the possibility that such a tax would be imposed 
could be co11struecl as a condition of entry or a condition to 
remaining on the land to which petitioners would have con-
sented by virtue of .executing the leases."8 
the condition~ upon which perRon~ l:ihall be permitted to enter it~ domain, 
to rel:lide therein, and to do bu:;ine~:>s, provided only :;uch determiuation 
il:l cousil:lleut with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any 
Veiiterl rights of persons now occupying reservation land under lawful 
au.lhoritu. Morris v. Ifitchcock (194 U. S. :384)." 55 I. D., at 50 (em-
phasi~ nrlrled). 
57 In Buster v. Wright. the court relied on the fact that the taxpn~·ers 
had mnple not ice of thPir J>oteutial liability before they entered into the 
on-rc~ervntion aetiviiic~ that gave rise to their obligation. The opinion 
rcJwnledly emphaRized the optional character of a tax impo:;ed as a concli-
tion prc•c·pdcnL to C'ngaging in btt~inrRs, :;ee n. 43, 48 supra, and the fact 
thnt although both partiP~ were aware of the obligation, they made no 
agreement limiting or abolilihing the tax: 
"But thp~· mmle no provision that noncitizens who engaged in the mer-
cantile' huHiue~R in the Creek Nation should be exempt from the:;e taxes. 
As lhe law tlwu in force required such citizeus to pay such taxe~, as both 
partie~ were then aware of that fart and con~idered the que;,;tion, and as 
thP~' umdP no :;tipulation to abolish the~e taxes, the conclu~:>ive presump-
tion i~ that they intendPd to make uo such contract .... " 135 F., at 29. 
" 8 In Colville, for exnmple, tlw nonm(·mber dei:>iring to purchase ciga· 
ret tc~ on the reservation kuew that his right to do so would be condi-
tioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney General Griggs, in his 
1!)00 opinion on '"l'reRpa~l:iers on Indian Lancb," discussed the effect on 
tribal law~ of n, federal statute providing for the sale of reservation lots 
to non-Indians: 
" [T]he legal right to purchasr land within nn Indian nation gives to the 
purcha~er no right of exemption from the laws of such nation, nor does 
it authorize him to do any act in violation of the treaties with such 
nation. Thc~e htwR requiring a permit to re:;ide or carry on business in 
the Indian country rxisted long before and at the time this act was passed. 
And if nny out~idPr saw proper to purchase n, town lot under this act of 
Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he could occupy it for resi~ 
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In this case, however, there is a complete absence of any 
such notice; petitioners had no reason to anticipate that the 
tribe would claim that exercise of the mining rights grauted 
by the leases was subject to an additional conditio11.5v At the 
time the leases contained in the record were executed the 
Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxillg authoriza-
tion whatever, and the severance tax ordinance was not en-
acted until many years after all lessees had been granted the 
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the reservation.00 
In addition, the written leases unambiguously sta.ted: 
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change 
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified with-
out the written consent of the parties to this lease." 
App. 27. 
Moreover, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied 
on the consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an 
indication of what conditions might be attached to the lease 
of tribal lands. When Congress enacted legislation in 1927' 
granting the Indians the royalty income from oil and gas 
leases on reservations created by Executive Order. it lleither· 
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the 
tribes. The statute did authorize the collection of severance 
taxes by the States. Petitioners have argued that this au-
dcnce or business only by permission from the Iudians." 23 Op. Atty. 
Gen., at 217. 
59 In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commi~;,;ion stated that 
Indian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties. Usually they just 
receive royalties." AIPRC Final Hcport 344. 
00 Although the power to exclude might. hav<· jutitified the impo~ition of 
this tax when petitioners signed thrir leaseR, evrn a tribal const.itutioual 
provi~ion recognizing the power to exclude, ;,;ee 11. 50, ~'upm, wonld not 
place petitioner,; on notice of the possibility that a ~evrntiJcc tnx would be 
levied by the tribe in the future. Although tlw 19GO and 1968 tribal con-
stitution~ both eontained provisions granting the· power to i ax, ~uch power 
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thorization pre-empted any tribal power to impose a com-
parable tax. The legislative history, however, indicates that 
Congress did not consider the question of tribal taxes on 
mineral output from reservation lands.u1 If Congress had 
considered it possible that the power to impose severance 
taxes on leases of this character would be shared by the States 
and the tribes, the issue would surely have been mentioned 
in the legislation or in its history.0 ~ 
01 The Court of Appeals rejected the prr-emption argmnrnt berau;;e it~ 
reading of the legi~lative hi~tory convinced it "that Congre~s ;,imply did 
·not think of the i;,;me when it enactPd the statute." 617 F. 2cl, at 547. 
0~ HE"prt>HPntative Leavitt, the Chairm:m of 11H' Committee on ludian 
Affair~, ~tatPd in di~ru~~in~ thr purpo;;e of the HJ:27 Act: 
"Briefly, the purpo~e, so far as the Indians arc concerned, i~ to make 
sure by act of Cougress that there ('an first be a developnH'Ilt of po~;;ible 
oil re~:>onrces on t!H:':>c Executive-order land~: and, in the ~e<·orul place, 
that with lhP development of the oil resources thr Indians them~clw~ ... 
~hall have the benefit of the development of the nalural rr~ouree~ of their 
reservation instead of having their lands considPr<:'d to be public lands 
of the United States with the benefits of :>uch development going to the 
·white people. 
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of thifl country all() who 
now have in thPir po:s~e;;~ion only those portions that have heen given 
to them by actb of Congre~s, Executive order, and b~· tmtt it•H ought to 
get whatever benefit there is from these remainin~ arPa:::-the re~ourees 
under the soil as welJ as above it-without having the white man eome 
in and profit entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573. 
Repre~eutativc Carter, in support of the bill, stated: 
"Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for while people, 
since great States have been carved and built from their domain, since 
they have rP~potHled to every call of their Government both during peace 
and war, since by our own act, without thPir consent, vin et armis we 
have narrowed them down to a small re:>ervation, ran it now ju~lly lie in 
our mouths to ~ay that they are not entitled to all proceeds acerniug or 
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have left?" 68 Cong. 
Rec. 4579. 
The Hou~e and Smate reports state that two of the purposes of the act 
were to give the Indian:; "alJ of the oil and gas royaltiP~," and to "au-
thorize the states to tax production of oil and gas on ~:>nch reservations.'r 
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Whrn the leases in this casr wen' executed. the possibility 
that a tribe could grant lessees access to a reservation for 
specific purposrs in exchange for a spf'cific consideration and 
thrreafter imi)OS<' a tax on the exercise of the granted au-
thority had nrwr occurrf'd to C'ongress.r.~ to the States. to the 
Indian tribes, or to any potential lessers.64 Thus the condi-
S. Tirp. 1\o. 1240, f\9th Cong .. 2d Sr~;;., 3 (1927): H. R. Urp. No. 1791, 
60th C'ong., 2d Sr""·• 3 (1927). Thus Congrr~R ~Jlecificnlly recognized 
hot h t hr right of tbr Indinn::< to rrrrivr thr brndits of nil oil nnd gas 
rpsome<':; on rP:'Pt-vntion lnnd nnd the right of thr StnteR to impo~r tnxes 
on thr output ~·rt mnde no mention of thr po~sibility of tribal ;;everance 
taws. Although thr nb~Pnce of F<ueh refrrrnce does not indicate that 
Congn'"" J1rr-empt!'d the right of the tribe~< to impose such taxes, the 
lark of any mrntiou of tribal ~everancr taxPI' doe" nevertheles;; bear on 
petitionPr~' nwnrrnr"~ of the po,.~ibility that such taws might be imposed. 
As w<· h;we nofPd, ~e<' n. 54, supra. the Tribr argues that the 19:38 Act, 
nnd not the 1927 Act. i" the npplicable ~;tatute here. The Tribe argues 
that the 193, Ad, which mah" no refermce to the States' right to impose 
:::everance !axe~. ~uperceded tlH:' 1927 statute. and therefore thP States no 
longer have the authority to impose severance taxc::; ou the mineral out-
put of Indian landJ;. Tlw Court of Appeal::; did not need to reach thi8 
que~tion, Lecau>'e the State of New Mexico wa~ not a part~', and because 
tlw court coneluded that the Tribe'~< tax wa~ valid regardle&; of whether 
thl' State retaim'd the right to tax the oil and ga~ re~ourees. 617 F. 2d, at 
547-548, n. 5. We al~o ueed not reaeh thi::; que::;tion, becau~e the Jegi~la­
tive hi~tory of t lw 1938 Act, like the· hi~tor~' of tin• 1927 Act, makes no 
meution of tribal "everanee tax<'~. Even if the omission of ilw State's 
powrr to impo~P taxer-: could be con~trued as a withdrawal of surh right 
from the States, there if: certainly no indication in the 1938 ~;tatHte or 
iti-i hi"tory thnt Congre>'s intPnded to ve~t :-mch power in the tribes or 
even eon~iderPcl t hr pos;:;ibility of doing :;o. SeP n. 54, supra. 
0 3 Although the lack of congre~sional recognition of surh n tax woulu 
not be relevant to the validity of a severance tax which the tribe either 
imposed at the out::;et of the lease relation::;hip or imposed after gh·ing 
fair notice at the out:;et of ~uch relationship, we clearly do not have such 
a ca~c here. 
o1 The Secn·tary of thE' Interior has citeu ra::;e~ holding that. n lirensr 
or franchise issued by a governmental body doe::; not prewut the Inter 
imposition of a tax unles::; the right to tax "has been sperifirally ~ur­
rendered in terms which admit of no other remsonable interpretntion." · 
St . Louis v. United Rys., 210 U. S. 266, 280; New Orlean,s City <~ Lake 
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tions attaching to petitioners' right to extract oil and gas 
from the land covered by the leases were not. in the contern-
plation of the parties, subject to change during the terms of 
the leases. 0" The Tribe therefore had uo authority to change 
the terms of the bargain by addillg an additional condition in 
the form of a severance tax. ua 
R. R. v. City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 1\:12, 195; New York Transit 
Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-5H3. The principal i~~ue 
in the~e ca~es was whether the retroactive impo~itiou of the franr'hiHe tax 
violated the Contract Clau~:;e of the Constitution or wa~ :;o fundamental!~· 
unfair as to con:;titute a dena! of duP proce~~ in violation of the Four-
tet•nth Amendment. Although this argtum·nt wa~ by no mean~ J'rivolouR, 
cf. Puerto R-ico v. Russell & Co., 315 U. S. (.llO, no Huch i~~ue i~ raisrd 
here. The~:;e ca~:;e:; are distiugni:;hable from the instaut ca~e;.: for the 
simple reason that two differeut typrH of ;;overeiguH arc involved. The 
fundamental differences in their power~:; have led us to condude that 
tribes do not have the ~amc attribute:; of sovereignt~· ai" do States and 
their ~:;ubdivi:;ions. Thrrefore, the fa<:l that a Stale or it:; i"ubdivi~iou may 
imposE taxes aftpr the !!:rantiu11: of a liceu~e would neither give not ic·e to 
petitioner:; that ~uch a tax was po~~il>lc nor stand a~ authority for the 
propor:;ition that suth a tax was within the sovereign power of an Imlian 
tribe. 
6 " The Secrchtr~· nbo argm·~ that pt'titioner::; should be rpquin·d to pa~' 
the tax as their contribution to tribal serviet·~ which Lell(·fit all re~idents 
of the Re~:;ervation, inelucling petiti01wr~. Briel' for the Secretar~· of the 
Interior 14. In calendar year 1976 the Tribe received $:~,9\:.15,469.69 in oil 
and gas roynlties. Src n. 15, supra. The Tribe tell" u~ that it" budget 
for fi::;eal 1976, which waH t(')ltlerecl to the Di::;trict Court Lut 11ot received 
in evidence, was $3,958.201. St•e Defendant,.;' Exhibit AA; Tr. :106; Brief 
for Respondent 7. Unlike thP fixl'd royalty u~ed in some miueral ]C'a~iug 
arrangements. sec United States v. Stmuk, - U. S. -, the royalty in 
these oil and gas lca~:;c·s is a percentage of the amount produced and ~o 
will allow the Tribe to benefit from a ri::;ing markcl. 
:Moreover, the tax i~ not mprel~r an appropriate share of a budgt>t largely 
finanred by the sovereign's tuxaliou of its owu ~ubjects. The principal 
componentP of the annual income of the nwmlwr~ of thi::> TribP-if the 
tax ~:;hould b e ~:;u~:;taiiJcd-would be the amouut of approximately $4 million 
of royalties nnd approxirnatPly $2 million in severauce taxe~ reteived from 
the ~arne group of les~ees. 
uu We do not huvc in theRe casr~ a tax im]lo~etl on both membPrs and 
nonmember~:;. The economic burdrn~ of the Jiearilla Apache ~everance tax 
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The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the· 
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of In-
dian sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recogni~ed 
in the past that we have no hesitation in concluding that it 
is beyond the powers of the Tribe.G7 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be· 
Reversed. 
Jm;TICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of these cases. 
are impo~ed entirely on taxpayPr~ over whom the tribe ha~ no juri:sdic-
tiou except inl:'ofar as right:,; under the lra~eH are being exerei~ed. 
07 Because we re:st our d<'ci~<ion on the uh:<rnc·e o[ inhrrrnt tribal ~O\'l'r­
eignty to impo~e thi~ scvernncr. lax, we 1wed not rrach the federal pre-
emption and interstate c·ommcrce q~w:<tion:s ra i:sed by petitioners. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
..Suvrtmt <!fomt of tqt ~b ~fattg 
.:utlfingt~ ~. <!f. 2llc?.l!~ 
June 17,  
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Company v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Because I agreed with Thurgood at Conference that the 
Jicarilla possess the sovereign power to levy the challenged 
severance tax, I shall await his dissent on this point. As 
my dissent in Commonwealth Edison indicates, however, 
Thurgood and I are not in agreement on the Commerce Clause 
issue presented in both of these cases. I expect, 
therefore, that I shall write a short opinion explaining my 
view that Jicarilla should be remanded to determine whether 
the tax was "fairly related" within the meaning of the 
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tribes that occupied North America before 
Europeans settled the continent were unquestionably sover-
eigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion 
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes, 
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today. This 
Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identifying 
those inherent sovereign powers that survived the creation 
of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new sys-
tem of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In 
this case we must decide whether one such surviving attribute 
of tribal sovereignty is the power to lease tribal property to 
a nonmember and, after the lease is signed, to impose a tax 
on the exercise of the rights granted by the lease. 
The lessor in this case is the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. The 
21 petitioner-lessees in these two consolidated cases are ex-
tracting oil and gas from tribal lands pursuant to long-term 
.Seh-11 .&.8()..,.15-MEMO. 
2 MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE , . 
.leases, some of which have been in effect since 1953. In 
1976, the Tribe enacted an ordinance imposing a severance 
tax on the oil and gas produced under these leases, and peti-
tioners brought suit to enjoin the collection of the tax. The 
.District Court granted the injunction, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, upholding the tax. 617 
F. 2d 537. We granted certiorari, - U. S. -. Before 
addressing the legal issues, we shall recount some of the his-
tory of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the derivation of the In-
dian leasing power, and the facts of these cases. 
I 
The 2100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a 
reservation in northern New Mexico.1 Most of the residents 
of the reservation live in the town of Dulce, N. M., near the 
Colorado border. The area encompassed by the Reservation 
became a part of the United States in 1848 when the Mexi-
can War ended in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9 
Stat. 922. Between 1848 and 1871, the United States did 
not enter into any treaty with the Jicarillas or, as far as we 
are advised, enact any special legislation relating to them. 
In 1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian 
tribes.2 In 1887, President Cleveland issued a simple Execu-
tive Order setting aside a tract of public lands in the Territory 
of New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy 
of the Jicarilla Apache Indians." 3 Except for a provision 
1 See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p . 14. 
2 "[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent na-
tion, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by 
treaty : Provided further, That nothing herein contained ~hall be con~trued 
to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully 
made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566, 
current version at 25 u. s. c. § 71. 
3 Two previous Executive orders setting aside land as a reservation for 
the Jicarillas had been cancelled. In 1874 President Grant se t aside land-
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protecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of any previ-
ously acquired valid rights, the Executive order contained no 
special rules applying to the reservation.4 
The record does not indicate what leasing activity, if any, 
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953. 
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes 
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress 
passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian 
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the 
statute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations 
created by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Pro-
ducing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162, 
164. Thus in 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the 
position that Indian reservations created by Executive Order 
in an order that he cancelled in 1876. See I C. Kappler, Iudian AtTair~, 
Law::; and Treaties 874 (1904). In 1880 Pn'sident Haye~ c~tabli~hed a 
re~:>ervation in au order that President Art,hur cancelled iu 1884. Jd., 
at 875. 
4 The entire exeeutive order reads as follows: 
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887. 
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the 
Territory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraced in the· 
following townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, nwges 1 eal:lt ami 1, 2, 
and 3 west; 31 and 32 north, mnge;; 2 west and 8 we::;t, and the llouth 
half of township 31 north, range 1 west., be, and the :oame i:,; hereby, set 
apart as a re:,;ervation for the use and oceupa.tiou of the .Jicarilla Apa.che· 
Indian;;: Provided, That this order shall not be so eoustrued m; to deprive 
ally bona fide rsettler of any valid rights he may hnve acquired under the 
law of the Unjteq State;:; providing for the di~po~;ition of the publiu 
domain." 
Grover Cleveland. 
ld., at 875. 
The boundaries of the Reservation were redefined or clarified by Executive 
Orders is~;ued by Prersident Theodore Roo~evelL on Novembet· 11, 1907 amf 
January 28, 1908, and by Pre~ideut Taft ou .February 17, 1912. lll C .. 
~appler, Indian Affair·::;, Laws aud . Tr.eatie::; 681, ol:l2, ol:l4 (1916), 
., 
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were public lands and that Indians residing on such reserva-
tions had no right to share in the royalties derived from oil 
and gas leases on such lands. 5 In 1927 Congress enacted a 
s This decision held that the land on Executive Order reservations was 
subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the Mineral 
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. § 181 
et seq. 49 I. D. 139. In 1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opin-
ion stating that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive 
Order reservations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). Then in 1925 Attor-
ney General Stone instituted litigation in the District Court of Utah to 
cancel certain leases that had been authorized by the Secretary of the 
Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act. See H. R. llC:'p. No. 
1791, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1927). The ca8c wn~ di~mi~l:ied Ly l:itipula-
tion after the 1927 Ad referred to in the text wn:; passed. See United 
States v. McMahon, 273 U. S. 782. 
A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's position was 
correct. In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Un-ited States, 316 U. S. 317, the 
Court held that a.n Indian tribe was not entitled to any compensation from 
the United States when an Executive Order reservation was Hboli::;hed. 
The Court said: 
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief shared by Congress and 
the Executive that the Indians were not entitled to compensation upon 
the abolition of an executive order reservation is the very absence of com-
pensatory payments in such situations. It was a common practice, during 
the period in which reservations were created by executive order, for the 
President simply to terminate the existence of a reservation by cancelling 
or revoking the order establishing it. That is to say, the procedure fol-
lowed in the case before us was typical. No compensation was made, and 
neither the Government nor the Indians suggested that it was due. 
"We conclude therefore that there was no express constitutional or statu-
tory authorization for the conveyance of a compensable interest to peti-
tioner by the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no implied 
Congres~ional delegation of the power to do so can be spelled out from 
the evidence of CongrC:'::;::;ional and executive understanding. The orders 
were effective to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant the 
use of the lands to the petitioner. But the interest which the Indians 
received was subject to termination at the will of either the executive or 
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statute expressly providing that unallotted lands on any In-
dian reservation created by Executive Order may be leased 
for oil and gas mining purposes with the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior.6 The statute directed that all 
rentals, royalties, or bonuses for such leases should be paid 
to the Treasurer of the United States for the benefit of the 
tribes.7 The statute further provided that state taxes could 
be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases 8 but 
orders of 1879 and 1884 were simply an exerci:oe of this power of tenni-
nation, and the payment of compensation was not required." 316 U. S., 
at 330-331. See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, v. United States, 348 U. S. 
272, 279-282. 
6 Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, current version 
at 25 U. S. C. § 398a, provided: 
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any reservation or withdrawal 
created by Executive order for the use or occupancy of any Indians or 
tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining purposes in accordance with 
the provisions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 U. S. C. § 398]." 
See also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Uuallotted land was land which had nut. been 
allotted in severalty to individual Indiaus pur:suant to the formula pre-
scribed in the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. 
7 Section 2 of the Act provided: 
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas leases 
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals 
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of 
the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the re1:>ervation or withdrawal was 
created or who are using and occupying the laud, and ~hall draw interest 
at the rate of 4 per centum per annum and be available for appropriation 
by Congress for expenses in connection with the supervision of the devel-
opment and operation of the oil and gas industry and for the use and 
benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their tribal coun-
cil, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no 
per capita payment shall be made except by Act of Congres~." 25 
U. S. C. § 398b. 
8 Section 3 of the Act provided: 
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon 
imJJrovements, output of mines or oil and gas well:;, or other right::;, Jn·op-
erty, or assets of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian 
reservations in the eame manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and 
r -
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made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes, in 
addition to receiving the royalties, could impose taxes on the 
output.9 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any 
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution 
and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Act provided tha.t in "addition to all other 
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing 
law," the constitution should also vest certain specific powers, 
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the Tribe.10 
25 U. S. C. § 476. The Act further authorized the Secretary 
eollected, and such taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the 
Indians as bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of the 
Interior is authorized and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of 
the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such taxes shall not 
become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property 
vf such Indians." 25 U. S. C. § 398c. 
9 In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25 
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformity for 
all mineral leases of Indian lands. Like the 1927 Act, the statute also 
provided that the tribes were entitled to the royalties from such leases. 
The statute made no mention of state taxes. See nn. 54, 58, infra. 
to The statute provided, in part: 
11Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have 
the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appro-
priate constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified 
by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult 
Indians residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a special 
election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under such 
rules and regulations as he may prescribe. 
11In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council 
by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in 
such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To employ 
legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent the sale, dis-
position, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other 
ttibal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the· 
Federal, State, and local Governments." 25 U. S. C. § 476. 
.... 
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pf the Interior to issue A- ch!irtel' of incorporation to an In-
dian tribe, and provided that the charter may convey to the 
tribe the power to purchase, manage and dispose of its prop-
erty.11 The 1934 Act said nothing about the power to levy 
taxes.12 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was approved 
by the. Secretary of the Interior in 1937.13 
In 1953, the Tribe entered into an oil and gas lease with 
the Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease, 
which is on a form prepared by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
of the Department of Interior, is presumably typical of later 
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe.14 
11 Section 477 provides: 
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by at least one-third 
of the adult Indians, issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe: 
Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a 
special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the 
reservation. Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the 
power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, man-
age, operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and per-
sonal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue 
in exchange therefor intrrests in corporate property, and such further 
powers as may be incidental to the eo11duct of corporate business, not in-
consistent with law; but no authority shall be grunted to sell, mortgage, 
or lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land included in the 
limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or 
surrendered except by Act of Congress." 25 U. S. C. § 477. 
12 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (here-
inafter Cohen). 
18 The 1937 Constitution mnde no reference to any power to assess taxes 
against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and B:v-Laws of the .Jicari!la 
Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G (hereinafter 1937 Constitution). 
14 This lease was attachrd to the complaint of petitioners in No. 80-11 . 
The lease attached to the complaint of petitioners in No. 80-15 was also 
executed in 1953. See App. 62. The record is unclrar as to when most 
of the leases with petitioners were rxecuted, but the record does indicate 
that leasrs were executed as late as 19fi7. See Plaintiff~' Exhibit 1. Leases 
of Jicarilla tr;bal property in the aggregate cover over 500.000 acres of 
land, comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jica.rilla Re~erva­
tion. Brief for Respondent 2. 
.:: 
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The lease provides that in return for a cash bonus of 
$71,345.99, to be paid to the treasurer of the Tribe, and rents 
and royalties, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the 
exclusive right and privilege to drill for , mine, extract, re-
move, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in 
or under" the described tracts of land, together with the right 
to construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other 
necessll,ry structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The lease 
is for a term of 10 years after approval by the Secretary of 
the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil and/ or 
gas is produced in paying quantities from said land." Ibid. 
The leasee is obligated to use reasonable diligence in the de-
velopment of the property and to pay an annual rental of 
$1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12%% "of the volume or 
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the 
leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee 
for development and operation of the lease is royalty-free. 
ld., at 24. The Tribe reserved the right to use free of charge 
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the 
Tribe on the leased premises and to take its royalty in kind. 
!d., at 27-28. 
The lease contains no reference to the payment of any 
taxes. The lessee does, however, agree to comply with aU 
regulations of the Secretary of Interior 
" ... now or hereafter in force relative to such leases: 
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall 
effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein 
specified without the written consent of the parties to 
this lease." !d., at 27. 
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. !d., at 32. 
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still 
producing. 
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised constitution giving the 
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tary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members 
of the tribe doing business on the reservation." 15 Eight years 
later, on July 9, 1976, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and 
Gas Severance Tax Ordinance, which was later approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides 
that the severance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas 
severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands .... " App. 
38. The rate of the tax is $.05 per million BTU of gas pro-
duced on the reservation and sold or transported off the reser-
vation and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate pro-
duced on the reservation and sold or transported off the 
reservation. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as well 
as gas or oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. App. 
39. Thus the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall 
on nonmembers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will pro-
duce over $2 million in revenues annually.16 
Petitioners-lessees commenced two separate actions in the 
United States District Court seeking to enjoin the tribal au-
thorities and the Secretary of the Interior from taking any 
action to collect the tax. The District Court consolidated 
the two cases, allowed other lessees to intervene, and held the 
taxing ordinance invalid on three separate grounds. First, 
after finding that the Tribe had never attempted to exercise 
a power of taxation over nonresidents prior to its incorpora-
tion in 1937. and that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 
did not confer that power on the Tribe, the District Court 
concluded that the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the 
Tribe did not extend to the imposition of a severance tax on 
15 App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 12a-13a. The Tribe's 
1960 Constitution contained a Bimila.r proviBion permitting "taxes and 
fees en persons doing bmine::;s on the reservation ." See 1960 Constitution 
of the J :carilla Apache Tribe, Art. VI , § 5, Defendant'::; Exhibit A. 
1 6 See District Court'l:i Findings of Fac t and Conclusions of Law, Finding 
No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to interrogatories indicate that in 
1976 the royalties on the lenses received by the Tribe amounted to 
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nonmembers. Second, the court held that the statute en-
acted by Congress in 1927, which authorized oil and gas leases 
on reservations created by Executive Order, had granted state 
and local authorities the exclusive right to impose severance 
taxes on oil and gas production from such reservations. Fi-
nally, after finding that approximately 80% of the oil and 
gas production from the reservation is shipped interstate for 
sale outside of New Mexico, that the tax burden amounts to 
a significant percentage of the price of ga,s and oil,17 and that 
the tax is only imposed on gas, oil, or condensate sold or 
transported off the reservation, the court concluded that it 
discriminated against and created an impermissible burden 
on interstate commerce. 
Over the dissent of two judges, the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F. 2d 537. 
The court held that the taxing power was an inherent at-
tribute of sovereignty possessed by the Tribe prior to the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The court further held 
that the power had not been voluntarily relinquished by the 
Tribe, had not been divested by Congress, and was not incon-
sistent with any superior interest of the United States. The 
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the 1927 Act 
had pre-empted the Tribe's power to levy a severance tax, 
because a review of the legislative history indicated that 
"Congress simply did not think of the issue when it enacted 
the statute." !d., at 547. The Court of Appeals' reversal of 
the District Court's Commerce Clause holding was based on 
the two courts' different readings of the ordinance: whereas 
the District Court had construed the taxable event as removal 
of the oil or gas from the boundaries of the reservation, the 
Court of Appeals construed severance from the land as the 
17 Finding No. 36 reads: "That if the Jicarilla. Apache Oil and Gas 
Severance Tax were valid the combined tax burden amounts to more than 
29% of the interstate price of old gas and over 12.5% of the price of old 
oil." App. 130. The Tribe contends that t.his finding is not supported 





80-11 & 80-l~MEMO. 
MERRION v. JICAijiLL.-\. APACHE T~IBE lJ. 
critical event. ld., at 546. Under the Co4rt of Appeals' 
view, the ordinance would not discriminate against interstate 
commerce because oil or gas sold within the reservation as 
well as oil or gas transported off the reservation would be 
taxed. The court concluded that the fact that royalties paid 
in kind are exempt did not render the tax discriminatory, 
and that the fact that New Mexico had imposed separate 
taxes on the same taxable event did not create an impermis~ 
sible multiple burden on commerce. !d., at 51:5-546. 
II 
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three 
sources: federal statutes, treaties, or the tribe's inherent sov-
ereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Government 
seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on the 
basis of any federal statute,18 and the Jicarilla Apaches, who 
reside on an Executive Order reservation, executed no treaty 
with the United States from which they derive any sover-
eign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it must 
be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. Last 
Terml in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, we held that a tribal tax on 
cigarettes sold on the reservations of the Colville, Makah, 
and Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permis-
sible exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax.10 
We must determine whether the severance tax imposed on 
te Congress ma.y delegate "sovereign" powers to t.he tribes. See M azurie 
:v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As we have indicated, however, neither 
the H}27 statute permitting Indians to receive roynlties from the lease of 
tribal lands nor the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 make any mention 
of the authority of Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 4-7, supra. 
19 The Court stated: 
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly 
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty 
which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary 
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152. 
,_ 
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nonmembers of the tribe in this case can likewise be charac-
terized as a valid exercise of the tribe's inherent powers. To 
make this determination, we must first consider the source and 
scope of tribal sovereignty and more particularly the source 
and scope of the sovereign power to levy taxes. 
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by 
the Constitution.20 Rather, Indian tribes are assumed to have 
retained powers of self-government that they possessed at the 
time of their incorporation into the United States. In Wor-
cester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the Court held unconstitutional 
a Geor~ia criminal statute purporting to regulate residency 
of non-Indians in the Cherokee Nation. In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Ma.rshall, the Court held that the Cherokees, 
although submitting to the protection of the United States, 
nevertheless retained some aspects of sovereigni ty: 
"By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed them-
selves under the protection of the United States: they 
have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to invoke 
the protection of any other sovereignty. But such en-
gagements do not divest them of the right of self govern-
ment, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or 
compacts." Id., at 581-582.21 
2B The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution is in Art. I, 
§8 (3), which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the Power to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian tribes ." More significant than this reference to 
Indian tribes is the absence of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth 
Amendment, which provides: 
"The powers not delegated to the United State~ by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." 
21 The Court also stated: 
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognized as existing 
in the Indians, but they have been alwnys admitted to possess many of 
the attributes of sovereignty. All the rights whirh belong to self govern-
ment have been recognized as vested in them. Their right of occupancy 
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Although Indian tribes retained some elements of sovereignty, 
the United States retains plenary authority to divest the 
tribes of any such attributes. 2z Moreover, this Court's deci-
sions since Worcester have recognized that not all attributes 
of sovereignity are consistent with the tribes' status as "do-
mestic dependent nations." 23 In determining what sover-
eign powers the tribes retained in submitting to the authority 
of the United States, the Court has repeatedly recognized 
a fundamental distinction between the right of tribes to gov-
ern their own internal affairs and the right to exercise powers 
affecting nonmembers of the tribe.24 
in the government. This may be called the right to the ultimate domain, 
but the Indians have a present right. of pos~ession." 6 Pet .. , at 580. 
22 See United States v. Wheelel', 435 U. S. 313, 319; Winton v. Amos, 
255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565; 1 
American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, 106-107 (1977) 
(hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for example, Congress can 
waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See United States v. U. S. F-idelity, 
309 U. S. 506, 512. 
23 The term "domestic dependent nations" was first used in The Chel'-
okee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, in which the Court held that the" 
tribes were not "foreign nations" within the meaning of the Constitution: 
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, 
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right 
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it 
may well be doubted whether those tribe~ which reside within the 
acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, 
be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to 
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect 
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile 
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 
24 In United States v. Kagmm1, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382, the Court stated 
that the tribes 
"were, and always have been, rPgarded as having a semi-independent 
position when they preserved their triLal rela1ions; not as States, not as 
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a 
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social 
·' 
,, 
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The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from inter-
ference with tribal control over their members. See, e. g., 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 65. The Court has 
recognized that the power to prosecute members of the tribe 
for violations of tribal criminal law does not derive from 
power delegated by the United States but is an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 
313. Furthermore, the Indian tribes retain the power to cre-
ate substantive law to govern their internal affairs. See Roff 
v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 (membership); Jones v. Meehan, 
175 U. S. 1, 29 (inheritance rules); Fisher v. District Court, 
424 U. S. 382 (domestic relations and family law). They 
also may enforce that law in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee, 
358 U. S. 217; Fisher v. District Court, supra. Moreover, the 
Indian tribes' sovereignty over their own members is, in many 
respects, significantly greater than the States' powers over 
their own citizens. The tribes' virtually absolute control over 
their own membership carries with it the power to enforce 
discriminatory rules that would be intolerable in a non-In-
dian community.25 Their criminal jurisdiction over their own 
members is unconstrained by constitutional limitations that 
are applicable to the States and the Federal Government.20 
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the 
State within whose limits they resided." 
25 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 
U. S. C. §§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribes from denying "to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law," see id., 
§ 1302 (8), the provisions of the United States Constitution, including, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which limit. federal or state authority do not 
similarly limit tribal authority. See Santa Clara P·ueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U. S. 49, 56, and n. 7. In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that 
sovereign immunity protected the tribe from suit under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, that the Act did not create a private cause of action cognizable 
in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for 
vindication of rights created by the Act. 
2o In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, the Court held that the restric-
tions of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to prosecutions in tribaf 
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Thus the use of the word "sove~·eign" to characterize tribal 
powers of self-government is surfly appropriate.27 
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over their 
own members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always 
been narrowly confined. 28 The Court has emphasized that 
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is in-
consistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so 
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation." 
Montana v. United States,- U.S.-,-. In Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court held 
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by nonmembers ·within the reservations.20 In Mon-
courts. See also United States v. Wheelet·, 435 U. S., at 328-329; Turner 
v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 355. 
27 Thus although the States have "plenary power over residents within 
their borders," the States may not tax ineome of members of the tribe 
derived from rt>servation sources. Sec McClanahan v. Arizona State 1'ax 
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 165. This immunity from taxation-even for 
tribal enterprises-does not apply be~·oncl the boundaries of the reserva-
tion. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145. 
28 Certain treaties which specifically granted the right of self govern-
ment to the tribes have also specifically excluded juri:sdiction over non-
members. See, e. (J., Treaty with the Cherokl'es, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 
(1835); Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611 
( 1855); Treaty with the Creeks and Seminole;;, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 
(1856). 
29 The Court stated in support of that holding: 
"Upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian 
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States 
and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict 
with the interests of this overriding sovereip;nty. '[T]heir rights to 
complete sovereignty, as independent nation~, [urc] necessarily diminished.' 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823). 
"We have already described some of the inherent limitations on tribal 
powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States. In 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra, we noted that the Indian tribes' 'power to 
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,' was 
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tana v. United States, supra, the Court, in holding that the 
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by non-
members on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe, 
indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-1imited 
tribal power over nonmembers--was applicable in a civil as 
well as a criminal context.30 Thus the Court has recognized 
that it is when the tribes attempt to impose controls on non-
members that the tribes' exercise of sovereign powers would 
be inconsistent with their status.31 
inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the United States." 435 
U. S. at 209. 
See also New York ex rel Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (state court 
has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed against non-
Indian on reservation). 
80 "The Court recently applied these general principles in Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent 
lilovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Stressing that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their 
diminished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice Johnson's words 
in hi~ concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-the first Indian case to 
reach this Court-that the Indian tribes have lost 'any right to governing 
every person within their limits except themselves.' /d., at 147, Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though Oliphant 
only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters , the prin-
ciples on which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent 
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-
members of the tribe.'' Montana v. United States, - U. S., at -
(footnote omitted). 
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, (tribes 
cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy) ; Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes cannot enter into direct com-
mercial or foreign relations with other nations) . 
81 In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that the power to 
prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not "implicitly lost by virtue 
of their dependent status" and stated: 
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held 
to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe 
and nonmembers of the tribe. 
,, 
80-11 & 80-15-MEMO. 
MERRION v. JICA:R,ILLA APACHE TRIBE 1'7 
The tribes' limited authority to enact legislation affecting 
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than the 
broad tribal power over internal affairs involving members.32 
The power to exercise control over nonmembers--and specifi-
cally the power to tax recognized in Colville-presumably has 
a much more limited derivation, tied specifically to the ex-
ercise of particular powers, than the general retention of 
inherent sovereignty to govern internal affairs. We must 
therefore examine the cases upholding the power to tax to 
determine the source of that power and then determine 
whether the tax imposed m this case is consistent with that 
rationale. 
III 
The search for the source of the taxing power must focus 
on the tribal power to tax nonmembers that existed in 1934 
when the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 had the effect 
of preventing any further erosion of Indian sovereign powers.33 
"These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian 
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with 
their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the 
powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce 
internal criminal laws, are of a difl'erent type. They involve only the 
relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers 
as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. 
'[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power dces 
not surrender its independence--its right to self government, by asso-
ciating with a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia 
[6 Pet.l, at 560-561.'' 435 U. S., at 326. 
32 This lack of inherent sovereignty over nonmembers is supported by 
the principle that "in this Nation each sovereign governs only with the 
consent of the governed." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Because 
the tribe can exclude nonmember~ from participation in the tribal govern-
ment, the power exerci~ed over those so excluded should be a limited one. 
sa The Indian Reorganization Act. of 19~~4 confirmed but did not enlarg<t 
the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. Congress intended the 
Act to "stabilize the tribal organiz[]tion of Indian tribes by vestiPg such 
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the De~ 
partment of the Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth 
his understanding of the powers that might be secured to an 
Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue 
of the statutory reference to powers vested in an Indian tribe 
"by existing law." 84 He concluded that among those powers 
No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Scss., 1 (1934) . As one commenator interpreted 
§ 16 of the Act: 
"[I] t would appear that powers originally held by tribes that were recog-
nized and allowed to be retained by treaties or prior statutes, as well as 
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained 
by tribes that accepted the terms of the 1934 Act . . . . The provision is 
consistent with the act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it 
recognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may already have had as 
a government." Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 
30 Hastings L. Rev. 89, 97 (1978) . 
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act of 1934 
to the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of the exercise 
of tribal powers placed a limit on tribal sovereignty, that power did not 
enable the Secretary to add to the inherent powers that a tribe possessed 
before the Act was passed. 
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the 
occasion to exercise a particular power over nonmembers in its early his-
tory is surely not a sufficient reason for denying the existence of that 
power. Accordingly, the fact that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe ever imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not 
require us to conclude that it has no such taxing power. To the extent 
that the power to tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by Indian 
tribes when the Reorgnaization Act was passed, we believe Congress 
intended the statute to preserve those powers for all Indian tribes that 
adopted a formal organization under the Act. 
84 55 I. D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of this opinion 
as follows : 
"My opinion has been requested on the question of what powers may be 
secured to an Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution and by-laws 
by virtue of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the Wheeler-
Howard Act ( 48 Stat. 984, 987): 
"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council 
by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest ..• . 
[Italics added.] 
·. 
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was a power of taxation and described the permissible exer-
cise of this power: 
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this 
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and 
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may ac-
cept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes 
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46. 
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this 
opmwn. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 
(CAS 1905), app. dismissed, 203 U.S. 599; Morris v. Hitch-
cock, 194 U. S. 3S4; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 
S. W. S07 (Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F. 1003 (CAS 1900), 
were decided shortly after the turn of the century and are 
the three leading cases considering the power of an Indian 
tribe to assess taxes against nonmembers.8" The three cases 
are similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the 
court upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's 
power to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and con-
cluded that the Tribe could condition entry or continued 
presence within the reservation on the payment of a license 
"The question of what powers are vested in an Indian tribe or tribal 
council by existing law cannot be nnswered in detail for each Indian tribe 
without reference to hundreds of special treatie~ and o;pecial acts of Con-
gress. It is possible, however, on the basis of the reported cn8es, the 
written opinions of the various executive departments, and those statutes 
of Congress which are of general import, to define the powers which have 
heretofore been recognized as lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian 
tribe. My answer to the propounded question, then, will be general, and 
subject to correction for particular tribes in the light of the treaties and 
statutes affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes contain 
peculiar provisions restricting or enlnrging the genernl authority of an 
Indian tribe." Id., at 17-18. 
35 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law, published ill 
1942, also relies on these cnses in his discussion of tribal taxation of non• 
members. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Colv·ille cited both Buster v. 
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in upholding tribal power to tax. 447 
U. S., at 153. See p. 30, infra. 
,,, 
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fee or a tax; in each the court assumed that the remedy for 
nonpayment would be exclusion from the reservation or inter-
vention by the Interior Department on behalf of the Tribe. 
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright, 54 S. W. 807 
(1900), the Court of Appeal of Indian Territory affirmed an 
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint 
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation. 
They had sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five Civi-
lized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of $25 
on each non-Indian lawyer residing a.nd practicing his pro-
fession on the reservation. In rejecting the attorneys' claim, 
the Court of Appeai first analyzed the relevant treaties be-
tween the United States and the Creeks and not€d that they 
had "carefully guarded their sovereignty, and their right to 
admit, and consequently to exclude, all white persons, except 
such as are named in the Treaty." !d., at 809. The United 
States, pursuant to a treaty with the Creeks, had agreed that 
all persons not expressly excepted who were present in the 
Creek Nation "without the consent of that Nation are deemed 
to be intruders, and pledges itself to remove them." Ibid. 
Because attorneys \Vere not within any excepted class,8 6 the 
Tribe had the authority to require them to obtain permits or 
to require their removal as "intruders." 3 7 The Court thus 
held: 
"[Tlhat unless since the ratification of the treaty of 
1856 there has been a trea.ty entered into, or an act of 
86 "Attorneys practicing in the United States courts are not persons 
who come within the exceptions, for they are not ' in the employment of 
the government of the United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or 
temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license 
from the proper authority of the United States ." 54 S. W., at 809. 
37 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on two opinions 
of the Attorney General of the United States. In the first opinion, issued 
in 1881, Attorney General McVeagh upheld the validity of Indian permit 
laws regulating which persons would be permitted to reside on the Choc-
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congress passed, repealing it, the Creek nation had the 
power to impose this conditio11 or occupation tax, if it 
may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men) 
residing and practicing their profession in the Indian 
Territory. And inasmuch as the government of the 
United States, in the treaty, had declared that all per-
sons not authorized by its terms to reside in the Creek 
Nation should be deemed to be intruders, and had obli-
gated itself to remove all such persons from the Creek 
Nation, the remedy to enforce this provision of the treaty 
was a removal by the United States from the Creek N a-
tion of the delinquent as an intruder." Id., at 809-810.88 
sion of the right of non-Indinns to enter and remain on tribal lands 
Attorney General McVeagh stated: 
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from what has been already 
said that, besides those persons or classes mrntioned by you, only those 
who have been permitted by the Choctaw~:> or Chickasaws to reside within 
their limits, or to be employed by their citizens as teachers, mechanics, or 
skilled agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the lands of 
these tribes; and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired." 
ld., at 136 (emphasis added). 
In the second opinion, on the same subject, Attorney General Phillips 
stated in 1884 that in the absence of a treaty or statutes, the power of 
the Indian tribe "to regulate its own rights of occupancy, and to say who 
shall participate tlll'rrin and upon what conditions, can not be doubted." 
18 Op. Atty. Gen. 34, 36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw 
and Chickasaw tribes excrpted from the grant of self-government power 
over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this provision 
to limit the tribes' power to exclude: 
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not limit the right of 
these tribes to pass upon the question, who (of persons indifferent to the 
United States, i. e., neither employees, nor objectionable) shall share their 
occupancy and upon what terms. That is a question which all private 
persons are allowed to decide for themselve~; ... " I d., at 37. 
ss In other part::; of its opinion, the court restuted the proposition that 
the Tribe was "clothrd with the power to admit white men, or not, at its 
option, which as we hold, gave it the right to impo~r conditions," id., at 
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court 
in 1904, also arose out of a challenge to legislation by one of 
the Five Civilized Tribes requiring non-Indians to pay an-
ual permit fees. 39 The complainants owned cattle and horses 
that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation pursuant 
to contract with individual members of the Tribe. Com-
plainants filed suit in the District of Columbia praying for 
an injunction preventing the defendant federal officials from 
811, and that a lawyer who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining 
would become an "intruder": 
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man, 
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, is, pmsuant to their statute, re-
quired to pay for the privilegP of remaining and practicing his profession 
in that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the payment thereof, he 
becomes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that in such a case the 
government of the United States may remove him from the nation; and 
that this duty devolves upon the interior department. Whether the in-
terior department or its Indian agents can be controlled by the courts by 
the writs of mandamus and injunction is not material in this case, because, 
as we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount rrquired by the 
statute by its very terms becames an intruder, whom the United States 
promises by the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in such 
cases the officers and agents of the interior department would be acting 
clearly and properly within the scope of their powers." 
The court also reiterated that the Tribe could not collect the tax without 
the intervention of the Federal Government: 
"And when it is remembered that up to the time that the United States 
courts were established in the Indian Tenitory the only remedy for the 
collection of this tax was by removal, and that the Indian Nations had 
no power to collect it, except through the intervention of the interior 
department, it is quite clear that if, in the bPst judgment of that depart-
ment, it was deemed wise to take charge of the matter, and collect this 
money, and turn it over to the Indians, it had the power to do so, under 
its superintending control of the Indians, and the intercourse of white 
men with them granted by various acts of congress;" id., at 812. 
S9 J. George Wright, the Indian inspector, and J . Blair Shoenfelt, the 
defendants in Maxey v. Wright, supra, werP also named as defendants in 
Morris v. Hitchcock. The olher defendants in the Hitchcock case were 
the Secretary of the Interior and the Commi~~ioncr of Indian Affairs. 
I~ 
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removing their cattle and horses from the Indian Territory 
because complainants refusPd to pay the permit fePs assessed 
by the Tribe. An order dismissing the complaint was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
and by this Court. 
The Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the 
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the 
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory 
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as 
intruders" 40 and that the United States had assumed the 
obligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by per-
sons not subject to their jurisdiction. !d., at 389. The 
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been adopted 
by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876, and noted that the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary had, in 1879, specifically referred 
to such legislation requiring licensed merchants and traders 
to obtain a permit and to pay a fee of $25, and had expressed 
the opinion that such legislation was not invalid.n 
to The Court stated: 
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of thesr treaties, the 
Chickasaw Nation has exerci:sed the power to attach condition::; to the 
presence within its borders of perRon~ who might otherwi:;e not be en-
titled to remain within the tribal territory." 194 U. S., at 389. 
H "Legislation of the same grneral chnrader as that embodied in the 
act of the legislature of thr Chirkasnw Nation hen• a~::;ailecl as invalid hnd 
been enacted by the Chirkasaw Nation before the ]Xt~Rnge of the Curtis 
Act. The essential provisions of one ~uch law, passed on October 17, 1876, 
were recited in a report made to the S!'nnte by tht• Committee on the 
Judiciary, on February 3, 1879, from whic·h wr copy the following: 
"'The law in question l:'e!'tn~ to lwve a twofold objPrt-to prevent the 
intrusion of unauthoriz~>d per~o!IS into the territory of the Chickasaw 
Nation, and to raise revenue. Ry its tenm; 110 eitizen of any State or 
Territory of the United States can either rent land or procure employment 
in the Chickasaw country without Pntering iuto a contract with a Chicka-
eaw, which contract the latter is to rPport to tlw clerk of the county where 
he resides, and a permit mu~t be obtained for a tillll' no longer tlwu twelve 
months, for whirh the ritizen is to pay the :;wn of $25. 
"'Every licensed merr·haut, trader, and ever ' phy~ieian, not a Chirka• 
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The Court then reviewed two recent opinions of the Attor-
ney General of the United States that had concluded that the 
powers of the Civilized Tribes to impose permit fees had not 
been withdrawn by Congress.42 Although Congress had sub-
sequently created an express exception in favor of owners of 
town lots, protecting them from being evicted as intruders, 
the Court noted that no comparable protection had been given 
to owners of cattle and horses. 194 U. 8., at 392-393. The 
Court accordingly concluded that the Chickasaw legislation 
imposing grazing fees was valid. 
1aw, is required to obtain a permit, for which the sum of §25 is exacted.' 
"Declaring in substance that under the existing treaties with the tribe, 
the Chickasaws were not prohibited from excluding from the territory 
of the nation the persons affected by the act, the committee expressed 
the opinion that the act which was the subject of the report was not 
invalid." 194 U. S., at 389-390. 
• 2 In the first opinion, by Attorney General John W. Griggs, see 23' 
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900), the Attorney General stated: 
"The treaties and laws of the United States make all persons, with a 
few specified exceptions, who are not citizens of an Indian nation or 
members of an Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation without 
permission, intruders there, and require their removal by the United 
States. This closes the whole matter, absolutely excludes all but the 
excepted classes, and fully authorizes these nations to absolutely exclude 
outsiders, or to permit their residence or business upon such terms as they 
may choose of the United States, have, as such, no more right or business 
to be there than they have in any foreign nation, and can lawfully be there 
at all only by Indian permission; and that their right to be or remain 
or carry on business there depends solely upon whether they have such 
permission. 
"As to the power or duty of your Department in the premises there 
can hardly be a doubt . Under thE' treaties of the United StatE's with these· 
Indian nations this Government is under the most solemn obligation, 
and for which it has received ample consideration, to remove and keep 
removed from the territory of these tribes, all this class of intruders who 
are there without Indian permission. The performance of this obligation, 
as in other matters concerning the Indians and their affairs, has long · 
been devolved upon the Department of the Interior." !d., at 218~ 
Tlae Court als.o relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528 (1901). 
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The third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CAS 1905) 1 
was a suit by nonmembers of the Creek Nation against fed~ 
eral inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs 
from doing business within the reservation because they had 
refused to pay a permit ta.x assessed by the Tribe. The Court 
of Appeals relied on Morris v. Hitchcock and Maxey v. Wright 
in upholding the tax. The opinion for the court by Judge 
Sanborn emphasized that the tax was in the nature of a con-
dition precedent to transacting business within the reserva .. 
tion and that the plaintiffs had ample notice of the tax: 
"The pennit tax of the Creek Nation, which is the 
subject of this controversy, is the annual price fixed by 
the act of its national council, which was approved by 
the President of the United States in the year 1900, for 
the privilege which it offers to those who are not citizens 
of its nation of trading within its borders. The payment 
of this tax is a mere condition of the exercise of this privi-
lege. No noncitizen is required to exercise the privilege 
or to pay the tax. He may refrain from the one and he 
remains free from liability for the other. Thus, without 
entering upon an extended discussion or consideration of 
the question whether this charge is technically a license 
or a tax, the fact appears that it partakes far more of the 
nature of a license than of an ordinary tax. because it 
has the optional feature of the former and lacks the com-
pulsory attribute of the latter. 
"Repeated decisions of the courts, numerous opinions 
of the Attorneys General, and the practice of years place 
beyond debate the propositions that prior to March 1, 
1901, the Creek Na,tion had lawful authority to require 
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the 
exercise of the privilege of trading within its borders, 
and that the executive department of the government 
of the United States had plenary power to enforce its 
payment through the Secretary of the Interior and hie 
·26 
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subordinates, the Indian inspector, Indian agent, and In-
dian police. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384. 392, 24 
Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. Ed. 1030; Crabtree v. ~Madden, 4 
C. C. A. 408, 410, 413, 54 Fed. 426, 428. 431; Ma."CeJt v. 
Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807; Maxcy v. Wright, 
44 C. C. A. 683, 105 Fed. 1003; 18 Opinions of Attorneys 
General 34. 36; 23 Opinions of Attorneys General, 214, 
217, 219, 220, 528." 135 Fed., at 949-950. 
Later in the opinion the eourt noted that the traders. who had 
purchased town lots on the Creek Nation pursuant to a 1901 
agreement between the Crreks and the United States, could 
not rely on that agreement as an implied divestiture of a pre-
existing power to tax.4 " The court also held that even though 
43 After citing the opinion of Attorney Gc>neral Griggs from which this 
Court had quotc>d at length in Morris v. Hitchcock Judge Sanborn wrote: 
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes \\Ue charging, and the 
_Indian agent wns collecting, tnxes from noncitizens engaged in business in 
tpese nations . It. wns under this state of fncts that- the United States 
and the Creek Nation mnde the ngrecment of 1901. Did the~- intend by 
that agreement that the Creek Nntion should the.reby renounce its con-
ceded power to exact these permit tnxes? Both ·pnrties knew that this 
po\\·er e:-.isted, and the United States, b~r the net of its President npproving 
the law of the Creek national council. and the Secretary of the Interior by 
enforcing it, had approved its exercise. Tl1e subject of these taxes was 
pre~ented to the minds of the contmcting parties and was considered during 
the negotiation of the agreement, for that contract cont::~ins express stipu-
lations that cattle grazed on rented nllotments ~hnll not be liable to any 
tribal t:1x (chapter 676, 31 St:1t. 871, § 37), and that 'no noncitizen rent-
ing lands from a citizen for agricultural purposes as proYidrd by law, 
whether such lands have been selected as nn nlloiment or not, :::hall be 
required to pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 Stnt.. 871, § 39). But 
they made no provi~ion that noncitizens wi10 engng('d in the mercnntile 
business in the Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As the 
law then in force required such non cit izcns to pny such taxes, ns both 
parties were then aware of that fact nne! considered the question, nnd as 
they made no stipulation to abolish thc·se taxe~, the conclusin pre::umption 
is that they intended to make no such contrnct, nnd that the power of 
the Creek Nation to exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary· 
•' 
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noncitizens of the Tribe had Ia,,·fu1ly acquired ownership of 
lots pursuant tD the 1901 agrel,ment and could not be eYicted 
from those lots, they had no right to conduct business within 
the reservation without paying the permit taxes.44 
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions con-
sidering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on non-
members.15 These cases demonstrate that the po\Yer to im-
pose taxes on nonmembers of the tribe derives from the tribe's 
power to Pxclude nonmembers from the reservation and to 
impose restrictions and conditions on entry onto the resen·a-
of the Interior nnd of l1is subordinates to collect them, were neither re-
nouneed, reYohd, nor rc~trirted, but that they remnincd in full force and 
effect after as before the agreement of 1901." 135 F., at 954. 
44 See ibi-d. The <.:omt ~::tated: 
"The legal effect, however, of the l:n1· prc~l'ribing the permit taxes i~ to 
prohibit noncitizens from cm1ducting buoiness within the Creek Nation 
without. the payment. of thc:::r tnxrs." 135 F., nt 055. 
45 Two dec!ldc•s nfter the Reorg:anizat ion Ad. mts pas~ecl Ow prohl<'tn 
was revi~ited by the Eighth Circuit. In /run Cww v. Oglala Sioux Tribe 
of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CAS 1950), the ('ourt held that 
the tribe had the po\rer to a8sess a tnx on a nonmt•nJlJer ll'~see of land 
within the rest' rYn tion for the priYilege of grazing stock on re~erva t ion 
land. And in Barta v. Oglala Sio-ux Tribe of Pine Ridge Resen·ntion, 259 
F. 2d 553 (CAS 1958), the Court held thnt the Unit rd States c-ould bring 
an action on behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax of thrre tents per 
acre per annum for grazing land and fifteen cents per aerc per nnnum 
for farm land levied on nonmember lessees. The eourt held that the tax 
did not violate the constitutional rightl:: of the nonmember le~~ecs stating, 
1n part: 
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty '"ith the United States has power 
to provide for the adp1i so: ion of JlOllmembers of the tribe onto tlJe resernt-
tion. Having such power, it has tl1c authority to impose W'lrictions on 
the presence of nonmt·mbers within the reFen·at ion." 259 F. 2d, at 556. 
Language in both Iron Crow nnd Barta ongge,ts that. the Court of Ap-
peals, unlike the earlier courts, may not. hnve rc;;tcd the taxing power 
solely on the powc·r to exclude. Tl1c Court of Appenl." of <·our~e did not 
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tion for any purpose.40 This interpretation of these cases is 
further supported by the fact that the remedy for the non-
payment of the tax in all three cases was exclusion from the 
reservation.47 Moreover, tribal sovereign powers over non-
' 0 In the chapter of his treatise entitled "Taxation," Felix Cohen ~tates: 
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to nonmembers is not 
clear, it extends at least to property of nonmembers used in connection 
with Indian property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers in 
trading with the Indians. The power to tax nonmembers ib derived in 
the cases from the authority, founded on original sovereignty and guaran-
teed in some instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers 
from the territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal government has 
the power to exclude, it can extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition 
precedent to granting permission to remain or to operate within the tribal 
domain." Cohen 266-267 (footnote omitted). 
In another chapter, entitled "The Scope of Tribal Self-Government," 
cited by the Secretary of the Interior and the Tribe here, Cohen dE'~cribes 
the power of taxation as "an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty 
which continues unleb'S withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of 
Congress .... " !d., at 142. After discussing Bu~ter v. Wright, Cohen 
cites tha.t case for the proposition that "[t]he power to tHX docs not de-
pend upon the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no 
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal jurisdiction." 
!d., at 143. As we have seen, however, the license tnx in Buster was pre-
dicated on the tribe's right. to attach conditions to nonmembers conducting 
business on the reservation, and the tribe could prevPnt such nommmbers 
from doing business regardless of whether it could pby~ically remove those 
nonmembers from the reservation. Moreover, in the cbaptE'r on tribnl 
self-government, Cohen does recognize that tribal tnxel:l have been upheld 
on the basis of the tribe's power to remove nonmembNs from the re~erva­
tion, and that "[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of tribal 
taxing powers, to inquire how fa.r an Indian tribe is empowered to remove 
nonmembers from its reservation." Ibid. 
The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that the 
court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely l:ugely upon 
the power of tribes to remove pE'rsons from the reservation, and <'onse-
quently, to prescribe the conditions upon which they shall enter" but 
argued for a broader source of the right to tax. AIPRC Final Report 
178-179. 
41 In Buster v. Wright, .~upra, the penalty for nonpayment of the tax 
was the closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by the Secretary 
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;members are appropriately limited because nonmembers are 
foreclosed from participation in tribal government. See n, 
32, supra. If the power to tax is limited to situations in which 
the tribe has the power to exclude, then the nonmember is 
subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he consents by 
choosing to accept the conditions of entry imposed by the 
tribe.48 The limited source of the power to tax nonmem-
bers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent with 
this Court's narrow construction of the power of Indian tribes 
over nonmembers in general. 40 The source of the taxing au-
thority asserted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in this case is 
therefore not the Tribe's power of self-government but rather 
its power over the territory that has been reserved and set 
apart for its use and occupation.50 
o: the Interior. See 135 F., at 954. In 111 orris v. Hitchcock, supra, the 
remedy was the removnl of the nonmember's cattle from the reserva-
tion, again enforced by the United States. In Maxey v. Wright, supra, 
an attorney refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department 
was subject to removal from the reservation. 
48 "No noncitizen is required to exl·rei~c a privil<>gc or to pay the tax. 
He may refrain from the one and he remains free from liability for the 
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949. 
40 See pp. 15-17, supra. As we hnw indicated. r,:t•e n. 28, supra, 
treaties recognizing the inherent power of tribal self-government have also 
deprived the tribes of jurisdiction over nonmembers. Treatief' with In-
dian tribes, however, often specifically recognized the right of the tribe 
to exclude nonmembers from the reservation and to attach conditions to 
their entry. See, e. g, Trraty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, mt. 7, 
11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with the Crerks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1855). 
See II C. Kappler, Indian Affair::: Lnw~ and Treatie~ 7. 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 
21, 27, 30, 42, 75, 418, 682, 699, 7Ga. 719, 7(H, 774, 77!:1,. 7UO, 7!:14, 800, 866, 
886, 888, 929, 985, 9!:10, 9\!8, 1008, 1016, 1021 (1904). 
no The various tribes may have takPn a similar view of their power to 
tax at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act. Cohen'~ treatil:le notes 
that: 
"The power of an Indinn tribP to Jr,·y 1axi'S upon its own member::; and 
upon nonmembers doing bushw::;:-; within tlw re»ervations ha~ bPen af-
firmed in mnny tribal con~titution:> Hpprovcd under the Wheckr-Howard 
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This conclusion is entirely consiotent with our derision in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reserva~ 
tion, supra. In that case we held that, the power to tax non-
Indians entering the reservation hnd not b<>en divested by 
virtue of the tribe's dependent status and that no m erriding 
federal interest would be frustrated by the tribal tnxntion. 
The Court quoted with approval, as an indication of the Ex-
ecutive Branch's understanding of the taxing poYver, Solicitor 
Margold's 1934 opinion. The Court noted further that 
"[f]ederal courts also have acknowledged tribal powrr to tax 
non-Indians entering the reservation to Pnv;agr in economic ac-
tivity" and cited Buster v. Wright and Morris Y. Ilitchcock. 51 
447 U. S., at 153. The tax in Colville, which was applied to 
nonmembers who entered the reservation and sought to pur-
chase cigarettes, is clearly valid under the rationale that the 
tribes' power to tax derives from the right to exrludc non-
members from the reservation and the right to attach condi-
tions to the entry of such nonmembers seeking to do bu~iness 
on the reservation. 52 Thus the inherent sovereign power of 
Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribe. ' powCJ' 
Act [Indian Reorganization Act], as has the power to remove nonmembers 
from land over which the tribe exer('i::;es jurisdiction." Cohen 1-13 
The following clause from the 1935 Con~tilution of the Hosebud Sionx 
Tribe, which CohC:'n cites as a "t~rpical" statement of ;,\l('h "tribal power~," 
indicates that the tribe perceived the seope of its luxation puwer~:; over 
nonmembers to be narrower than the scope of that power over members: 
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe :llld to require the per-
formance of reservation labor in lieu thereof, and to lc1·y taxes or Iic· ense 
fees, subject to review by the Secretary of the Iuterior, upon nonmembers 
doing busine~:;s within the re~:>ervation. 
"(i) To exclude from the restricted landl:l of the n~~erva tion per~ons 
not legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinances which shall be 
ubject to review by the Secretary of the Interior." Ibid. 
51 The Court al;;o cited, without cii::;c·u:,;~ion, the Eighth Cireuit ·, Lkci,.;JOn 
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe. supra n. 15. 
52 A nonmember ·ubjectcd to tile lax could :n 01d I he lax b~· dcdllling· 
to do business on the reservation, and the "sanction" to be impol:led for 
refusal to pay the tax would be denial of penni5sion lo buy ci"arettrl.'. 
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to exclude and the cNepcis of the power must be consisten~ 
with its ource, 
IV 
The exercise of the power to exclude petitioners would have 
supported the imposition of a tribal severance tax on peti-
tioners when they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Res-
ervation to engage in exploration, drilli11g, and extraction 
activities.53 The Tribe did not impose the tax prior to peti~ 
tioners' entry, however, ami therefore the tax is valid only 
if the Tribe retains the power to exclude petitioners from the 
reservation. 
The leases executed by the Tribes and petitioners are 
clearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does 
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms 
length bargaining. Moreover. the leases were executed on a 
form prepared by the Department of the Interior. the De-
partment gave specific approval to the terms of the leases. 
and they were executed pursuant to explicit congressional au-
thority.G1 Under the leases petitioners therefore have the 
33 "[ A]s the payment of a tax or lit·<•nse fee may be made a l.'ondition 
of entD· upon tribal land, it mn? ul~o bE> madE> a ('omlition to tlw ~rant of 
other privileges, such as the acquiHition of a trih:d leal:le." Cohen 143. 
54 CongresH intendc•d the Act of l\1ard1 3, 1927 to make appli('able to 
Exc>cutive Order re~ervutions the lc·a ·ing proviHion;, already applicable to 
treaty reservation!' pnr~uant to the Act of May 29 , 1924, 43 Stal. 244. S. 
Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1927). The Act lhu~ permitted 
the leasing of una !lotted Indian land for term~ not to cxeePd 10 ) ear~ 
nnd ns murh longer as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on 
the land. 44 Stat. 1347. Among the purpoHes of the 1927 statute were 
to " [p]ermit the exnloration for oil and grts on Executive-order Indian 
Rrservations" to "[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil and ga~ ro~·aJtie:s ." 
and to "[pllace with Congre::;s the future determination of auy ('hangel:l 
of boundaries of Executive-order reservations or withdrawab." Ibid. 
In light of these purposes. it i~ ch•ar thut Congre;;s intt•nded lease:< exe-
cuted pursuant to the 1927 Act to be binding. 
The tribe contend~ that the lea;,;c:; iu this ca~e were exeeuted purt:-uant 
to the Act of May 11 , 193 , 52 Stat. 347, and not the 1927 Atl. The 
':frib~ notl(s thnt the lea.~e with petitioners in o. O-J5 state;, in one o£" 
-
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right to remain on the reser\'ation to do business for the dura-
tion of the leases.55 ~ ~ 
Furthermore, petitioners had no reason to anticipate that tltc 
tribe would claim that exercise of the mining rights granted 
by the leases was subject to an additional conclition.r.c At the 
its provisions that it was executed pursuant to the 1938 Act. See App. 
64. Petitioners note, howe\'er, that. although the Tribe argues th:~t the 
1938 Act, unlike the 1927 Act, does not require that royalties be paid to 
the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the Tribe, petitioners m:-tke 
their royalty pnyments to th'e United States Geological Sun·ey for the 
benefit of the Tribe. See Tr. 79-80. We need not re~oh·e thi" quc,tion, 
becau~e for our purpo~es the prO\·isions of the 1938 Act do not nry :-ignifi-
cantly from the prorisions of the 1927 Act. The 1938 Act, like the 1927 
Act, permitted the leasing of Indian lands for a period "not. to rxeeeo 10 
years and :~s long thereafter as minerals are prooucrd in p[l~·ing quanti-
ties." 25 U. S. C. § 39Gc. One of the purposes of the Hl38 Art was to 
est;1blish uniformity of the law relating to the le:~sing of trib:ll lands for 
mining purposes by applying the lnw as to oil [llld gas leasing to the leas-
ing of land for the mining of other minerals. S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong., 
1st St:'ss., 1-2 (1937 ) . Other purposrs \\'t:'re to "bring all lensing matters 
in harmony \rith the Indian Reorganiz:1tion Act," id., at 3, and to enact 
changes designed "to give the Inoinns the greate::;t. return from tlwir prop-
erty." !d., at. 2. There is no indication in the lrgi:;lative hi~tory that the 
purposes of the 1938 Act are in any way inconsi,:tent with the purpo,es 
of the 1927 Act and prior legislation. Pre~umably the pnrposes of the 
earlier legislation were incorporated into the uniform s~heme :1chieYcd by 
the 1938 Act. 
fi 5 As Attorney G0neral MacVeagh stated in 1881, only those permitted 
by the tribe to remain on the resen·ation may do !OO, "and the right to 
remnin i::; gone when the permit has expired." 17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 13~ O"Y>~ 
~u In Cvlville, for example, the noJimember cle:;iring to pur('h:i.<r ciga-
rettes on the n~~er\'ation knew that hi:; right to do so \I'Otlld be condi-
tioned on his consent to pay the tax. Attorney Genrr:-t l Grigg~, in his 
1\JOO opinion on "Trespa,:;crs on Indian Lands," cliscn>'sr·d thr efTect on 
tribal laws of a federal 1::tatute providing for the sale of resen·ation lots 
to non-Indian.;;: 
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indinn nation gives to the 
pureha~er no right of exemption from the laws of "'uch nation, llOr does 
it autl1orizc him to do any act in Yiolation of the treaties with such 
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time the leases contained in the record were exeeuted th() 
Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxing authoriza-
tion whatever, and the ~everance tax ordinanee was not. en-
acted until many years after all lessees had been granted the 
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the rcs(·n·a tion. 
In addition, the 'vritten leases unambiguously stated: 
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change 
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified with-
out the written consent of the parties to this lease." 
App. 27. 
Moreover, in 1953 petitioners might reasonably have relied 
on the consideration of a comparable issue by Congress as an 
indication of what conditions might be attached to the lease 
of tribal lands. \Vhen Congress enacted legislation in 1927 
granting the Indians the royalty income from oil and gas 
leases on reservations created by Executive Order, it neither 
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the 
tribes. The statute did authorize the collection of severance 
taxes by the States. Petitioners have argued that this au-
thorization pre-empted any tribal power to irnpose a com-
parable tax. The legislative history, however, indicates that 
Congress did not consider the question of tribal taxes on 
minrral output from rcs('rvation lands."7 If Congress had 
considered it possible that the power to impose severance 
taxes on leases of this chara~.ter would be shared by the States 
the Indian country exi;otPd long brfore and at. the time thio act was p:lE~ed. 
And if any ontl'idrr f':tl\' proper to pm('ha:;c a town lot under this net of 
Congrel'~, he die! f'O with fnll knowledge that, he could oecupy it fur rC'si-
dl·nce or bu~ineEs only by permission from the Indians." 23 Op. Atty. 
Gen., at 217. 
In 1077, thr Am('rir·an Incli:-~n Polif'y ReYicw Conm1i;;,ion ~t:ltC'd that 
!lillian tribE's "do not both tax nnd reepive royalties. Usually they just 
re('eive ro)·aHies." AIPTIC Fin:tl Report 344. ..,(--- o-n-r_,~ 
. G7 The Court nf Appr·nl.< n ·jr·drd thr Jll'l'-t'll1]ltion ~trgmnPnt bl'c:tn~e it~ 
Tt'arliug of t ht, lPgi~lat iYe hi~t ory convinf'erl it "that. Cougrpss l'impl)· did 
uot think of 1lJC i~~tJC \l'hcn it en;letccl the ;;tatute." Gl7 F. 2d, at. 547. 
/ 
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and the tribes, the issue would surely have been mentioned 
in the legislation or in its history."8 
When the leases in this case were executed, the possibility 
that a tribe could grant lessees access to a reservation foi· 
58 Rrpl'Psrnifliivc Lrnviit, i"llP Chnirman of ihc Commltice on I~~tlian 
Affairs, stated in discu~sing the purpose of the 1927 Act: 
"Briefly, the purpose, so far as the Indians are coneerued. iR to make 
sure by act of Congress that there can first be a developnWJlL of po~8ible 
oil resources on these Executive-order lands; and, in the seeond place, 
that with the development of the oil resources the IndiaJlS themselves ... 
shall have the benefit of the development of the natural re;;onrces of their 
reservation insteHd of having their lands considered to be public lands 
of the United States with the benefits of such development going to the 
while people. 
"Surely the Indians who once possessed all of thi;; country and who 
now have in their possession only those portions that have bet-'ll given 
to them by acts of Congress, Executive order, and by treaties ought to 
get whatever benefit there is from these remaining area15-the resources 
under the soil as well as above it-without having the white man eome 
ln and profit entirely by these developments." 68 Cong. Rec. 4573. 
Representative Carter, in support of the bill, stated: 
11Since we have taken much of their lands for homes for white people, 
since great States have been carved and built, from their domain, since 
they have rPsponded to every call of their Government both duriug peace 
and war, since by our own act, vithout. their consent, via et armis we 
have narrowed them down to a Rmall reservation, eun il 11ow ju~tly lie in 
our month:; to sny that they are not entitled to all procerds ac<·ruing or 
that may accrue from the small patrimony they have left¥" 68 Cong. 
Rec. 4579. 
The House and Senate reports state that two of the purposeR of the act 
were to give the Indians "all of the oil aud gns roya!Lie:;," and to "au~ 
thorize the sta tcs to tax production of oil and gas on ~uch re~prva t ions." 
S. Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1927); H. R. Hep. No. 1791, 
69th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1927). Thus Congress specifically recognized 
both the right of the Indians to receive the benefits of all oil aud gas 
resources on reservation land and the right of the States to impose taxes 
on the output yet made no mention of the possibility of tribal severance 
taxes. Although the absence of such reference does not indicate that 
Congress pre-empted the right of the tribes to impose such tuxes, the 
lack of any mention of tribal severance tuxes does neverthele::,s bear on 
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specific purposes in exchange for a specific consideration and 
thereafter impose a tax on the exercise of the granted au-
thority had never oecurred to Congress/9 to the States, to the 
whether the po<oibility of ~urh taxe~ wa~ nn nddition:-tl condition to the 
granting of the le:-t.oes. 
As we have noted, see n. 54, snpra, the Tribe arguP~ that the 1938 Act, 
and not the 1927 Act, is the applicable statute here. The Tribe argues 
that the 1938 Act, ,,·hich make~ no reference to the States' right to impose 
~eYerance taxes, superceded the 1927 statute, and therefore the States no 
longer have the authority to impose seYernnce taxes on the mineral out-
put of Indian bnds. The Court of Appeal~ did not need to reac·h this 
que5tion, because the Stnte of New Mexico wns not a party, and bec:1t1se 
the court conrluded that the Tribe's tnx was valid regard!Pss of whether 
the State retained thp right to tax the oil :Jnd gns rf'somres. G17 F. 2d, at 
547-548, n. 5. We al~o need not reach this question, bec:1usc the legisla-
tive history of the 1938 Act, like the history of the 1927 Act, makes no 
mention of tribal severance taxes. Even if the omiP~ion of the State's 
power to impose taxes could be ron~trued as a withdrawal of ~urh right 
from the States, there is certainly no indication in the 1938 statute or 
its history that Congress intended to vest such power in the tribes or 
even considered the possibility of doing so. S0e n. 54, supra. 
59 Although the lnck of congressional recognition qf ~mh a tax would 
not be relevant to the validity of n severance tax whic·h the tribe either 
imposed at the out::::et of the lease relationship or impo~ccl :tfter !'011-
ditioning the lease on a retnined power to levy ~urh a 1:tx, \H' clf':lrl~· do 
not hnve such n c:~se here. Thus tlw Natmal G:-ts Polity Act of 1971', 
Pub. L. 95-621, §§ 110 (a), (c) (1), 92 Stat. 33(58, 15 U.S. C.§§ 3:320 (a}, 
_.,..- (c)(1), cited by JF::-Tll'E l\lAFlSHALL, po~t. fit 5, whif'h wa~ PJJaCtPd lung 
after the leases in thc;;e cases were executed, i~ irrelr,·:-tnt to the i::::'tW 
of what collclitions wPre contained in the lenoe. lVTorroYr'f. that 1-'t:ltute 
provides no authority for the Jll'OJ!Oi'iiion thnt Congre~s h:1~ TPf'ogni~.c·cl 
tribal sovereign power to impo~l' srver:1nce tnxrs on nonmember;:: of the 
tribe. Although the st:-~tute provides that Jndi:~n ~eYrrancc· taxrs m:t~· be 
recowred through frdrral energy pricing, the lrgi,..ht ive hi.-:t ory rll'arl~· 
indicates that Congres~ took 110 pooition on the v.11idit~· of ~mh taxes: 
"\Ybile sew ranee taxes which may be impo~t>d by an Indi:-tn tribe are to 
be treated in the same manner as State impo~rd ~everanr·e taxes, the !'On-
ferees do not intend to prejudge the outf'omr of the ca,;t•::: on appPal hc·forc 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appenls rt>::::perting the right of Indian tribe~ 
to impose taxes on persons or organizations other thau I11cli:ms who an:: 
'. 
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Indian tribes, or to any political 1Pssces.Go Thus the condi-
tions attaching to petitioners' right to extract oil and gas 
from the land covered by the leases were not, in the contem-
plation of the parties. subject to change during the terms of 
the leases.()1 The Tribe therefore had no authority to change 
engnged in bn~ines.;: nctiYities on Indian r<'."rn·ations. The outcome of the 
cases on nppral will drtermine the lrg,ality of impo~ing such taxes." S. 
Con f. Rep. I\' o. 95-409, p. 91 ( 1978). i 
The Brief for the Secretary of thr Int crior ilrknowledges that "Congress's 
enactment of this proyi,ion does not rqmfirm the Tribe's inlwrrnt 11owrr to 
impose scYerance taxes on petitioners." Brief for Seeretary of the Interior 
34-35. 
I 
vo The Srcretnry of the Interior ha! citrd casr;: holding that n liernse 
or franchise issued by a governmentql body does not preYent the later 
imposition of a tax unless the right. to tax "has been specifically Eur-
rendered in terms which admit of np other reasonable interpretation." 
St. Louis v. United Rys., 210 U. S. :!M, 280; New Orleans City & Lake 
R. R. v . City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 195; New York Transit 
Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-593. The principal issue 
in these cases was whether the retroaqtive impo8ition of the franchise tax 
violated the Contra.ct Clauf'e of the Cppstitution or was so fundamentally 
unfair as to constitute a dena! of due process in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Although this argunwnt was by no means frivolous, 
cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315 U. S. 610, no such issue is raised 
here. Thrse ca~es are distinguishable from the instant ca,;es for the 
simple reason that two different types: of sovereigns are involved. The 
fundamental differences in their powers have Jed us to conclude that 
.--- tribes do not have the same attributes of soverE-ignty as do Stntes and 
their subdiYi~ions. Therefore, the nuthority of a State or its subdiYi::ion 
to impose t:nes after the granting of a license does not depend on the 
power to rxcludc and therefore doc~ not Et:md as authority for the proposi-
tion th[lt such a tax was within the soven•ign power of an Indian tribe. 
01 The Srcret:uy also argues that pet 'itioners should be required to pay 
the tax as their contribution to tribal services which benefit all residents 
of the Reservation, including petitioner~. Brief for the Secretary of the 
Interior 14. In calendar year 197G the Tribe receiYed S3,995,4G9.G9 in oil 
and gns royalties. See n. 15, supra. 'The Tribe tells us that its budget 
for fiscal 1976, which was tendered to .the District Court bnt 11ot received 
in evidence, was $3,958,201. See Defe~1dants' Exhibit AA; Tr. 306; Brier 
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the terms of the bargain by adding an additional condition in 
the form of a severance tax.u2 Because the execution of these 
leases guaranteed the lessees s.uch rights of access to the res-
ervation as might be necessary to enable them to perform the 
leases, petitioners are not intruders, and 'vhile the leases re-
main in effect there is no basis for claiming that the Tribe 
retains any power to exclude petitioners from the portion of 
the reservation on which they :1rquired drilling and extraction 
rights.63 
The attempted exercise of the taxing power asserted by the 
Tribe in this case extends so far beyond any exercise of In-
dian sovereignty over nonmembers that has been recognized 
for Respondent 7. Unlike the fixrd ro~·alt)· u~rd in some mineral ]rasing 
arrangrments, see United States v. 8·wank, - U. S. -, the royalty in 
the;;e oil and gas leases is a percentw:·<· of the amount produeed and so 
will allow the Tribe to benefit fron 1 a rising market. 
Moreover, the tax is not merely :111 ~ ppropriate o:hare of a budgrt largely 
financed by the sovereign's taxation of its own subjects . The principal 
componenL of the annual income of thr member;:: of this Tribe-if the 
t~tx should be sustained- would be the :unonnt of approximately $4 million 
of royalties and approximately $2 million in severance taxes rei:eind from 
the ~ame group of lessees. 
92 We do not have in these raRcs :i. tax impo;;ed on both mrmlJC'r::: and 
nonmembers. The economic bnrdrn~ of thc .Ticnrilla Apache severance tax 
are imposed entirely on taxpayers over whom 1 he tribe has no jurisdic-
tion exrept in8ofar as rights under the l en~es are being exercised. 
63 Solicitor Margold wrote rcgnrding the power to exclude: 
"Over trib3l lands, the tribe has the 'rights of a landowner as well as the 
rights of a ]oral government, dominion ns well as oovercignty. But all 
the lands of the reservation, whethEir ownrd by the tribe, b~' members 
thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe hns the :sovereign power of determining 
the conditions upon which persons shall ue pnmittrd to entrr its domain, 
to resi de therein, and to do hu sinc~s, jJfOYidecl only such determination 
is con~istent with applicable Federal laws nnd does not infringe any 
vested n'ghts of persons now occupying reserl!ation land under lawful 
authority. Morris v. Hitchcock (194 U. S. 384)." 55 I. D., at 50 (em-
phasis added). 
(Y\ 0 l)(?'j) 
fr~ .'Y'l 
y, .3:1.. 
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in the past that we have no hesitation in concluding that it 
is beyond the powers of the Tribe.64 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should therefore be 
Reversed, 
JusTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or deci-. 
sion of these cases. 
04 Because we rest our decision on the absence of inherent tribal sover-
~ignty to impose this severance tax, we need not reach the federal pr~­
emption and interstate commerce questions raised by petitioners. 
.. ' 
. .. '
2 5 JUN lSBJ 
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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE MARSHALL 
The boundaries of Indian lana and the scope of Indian 
sovereignty often are disputed by those seeking for themselves 
the benefits of resources within Indian dominion. JUSTICE 
STEVENS properly emphasizes the breadth of authority enjoyed by 
each Indian tribe to govern its own affairs, ana to protect tribe 
members ana their lana through the power to tax members ana 
nonmembers doing business on tribal lands. Memorandum of JUSTICE 
STEVENS, at 17-18, 19-20.1 He concludes, however, that the 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe may not exercise its sovereign power to 
tax petitioners, who lease tribal lands for the purpose of mining 
the resources therein. This conclusion rests on the novel notion 
that an Indian Tribe's sovereign power to tax nonmembers engaging 
in economic acitivity on its reservation may lapse in the absence 
of contractual terms reaffirming that power or particularized 
notice to ana acceptance by persons subject to it. I cannot 
agree that the ~ribe's power to tax is contingent on the 
expectations of private parties. Instead, I am convinced that 
the Tribe retained the power to impose the severance taxes 
involved here, and I agree with the Court of Appeals for the 
2 





Last Term, this Court concluded that Indian tribes enjoy 
the authority to impose taxes as an inherent attribute of Indian 
sovereignty. We held in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 135, (1980), that 
"[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and 
significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental 
attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested 
of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent 
status." In my view, the power to tax is an essential attribute 
of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of 
self-government and territorial management. This power enables --
-" 
the tribal government to raise revenues for its essential 
services. The source of this taxing power is the general 
authority inherent in a sovereign to control economic activity 
within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing 
governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or 
enterprises engaging in economic acitivities within that 
jurisdiction. See, ~' Compania General De Tabacos de 
Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 85 (1927); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824) .2 
The petitioners in these cases avail themselves of the 
"'substantial privilege of carrying on business'" on the 
reservation, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 
425, 437 (1980), quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 
435, 444-445 (1940). They benefit from the provision of police 
protection and other governmental services, as well as the 
"'advantages'of civilized society'" that are assured by the 
existence of tribal government. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't 
of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980), quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 441 u.s. 434, 445 (1979). For similar 
benefits, numerous other governmental entities levy the same type 
of general revenue tax imposed by the Jicarilla Tribe. In these 
circumstances, there is nothing exceptional in requiring non-
Indians like petitioners to contribute through taxes to the 
general cost of tribal government. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. 
v. Montana, ante, at (1981) ~ ante, at - (Blackmun, ~., ---- .) 
dissenting)~ Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, supra, 
at 220, 228~ Mobil Oil Corp v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 
437~ General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436; 440-441 
(1964) .3 As we observed in Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 
supra, at 156-157, the tribes' interest in levying taxes on 
nonmembers as a means of "raising revenues for essential 
governmental programs ... is strongest when the revenues are 
derived from value generated on the reservation by activities 
involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of 
tribal services." This surely is the case here. The mere fact 
that the government imposing the tax also happens to be the 
lessor of the mineral lands does not undermine the validity of 
the tax. The royalty payments from the mineral leases are paid 
4 
to the Tribe in its role as partner in petitioners' commercial 
venture. The severance tax, in contrast, is petitioners' 
"contribut[ion] to the general cost of providing governmental 
services," Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, ante, at 
State governments commonly receive both royalty payments and 
severance taxes from lessess of mineral lands within their 
borders. 
This view of the taxing power of Indian tribes as an 
essential instrument of self-government and territorical 
management has been a "shared presumption" of all three branches 
of the federal government. Cf. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe, 435 u.s. 191, 206 (1978). In washington v. Confederated 
Tribes, supra, we relied in part on the opinion of the Solicitor 
of the Department of Interior, who in 1934 recognized that the 
tribes' sovereign power to tax ' "'may be exercised over members of 
the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may 
accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may 
be attached as conditions,'" absent contrary action by Congress. 
447 U.S., at 153, quoting Powers of the Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 
14, 46 (1934). We furhter noted that official executive 
pronouncements have repeatedly recognized this that "Indian 
tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the 
activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which 
the tribes have a significant interest, 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 
(1881); 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174 (1855), including jurisdiction to 
tax, 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900) ." 437 u.s., at 152-153. 
5 
Similarly, Congress has acknowledged that the tribal power 
to tax is included among the tools necessary to self-government 
and territorial control. As far back as l879, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee acknowledged the validity of a tax imposed by 
the Chickasaw Nation on non-Indians legitimately within its 
territory: 
We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the 
right of self-government and jurisdiction over the 
persons and property within the limits of the territory 
they occupy, except so far as that jurisdiction has 
been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of -
Congress. Subject to the supervisory control of the 
Federal Government, they may enact the requisite 
legislation to maintain peace and good order, improve 
their condition, establish school systems, and aid 
their people in their efforts to acquire the arts of 
civilized life: and they undoubtedl~ possess the 
inherent right to resort to taxation to raise the 
necessary revenue for the accomplishment of these 
vitally important obiects--a right not in any sense 
derived from the Government of the United States. S. 
Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1879)(emphasis 
added) • 
Recently, Congress provided that mineral severance taxes imposed 
by an Indian tribe may be included in the costs recoverable 
through federal energy pricing. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-621, Sections 110 (a), (c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368, 15 
u.s.c. (1976 ed. ,Supp. III) § 3320 (a), (c) (1). 
Thus, the views of all three federal branches and general 
principles of taxation confirm that Indian tribes enjoy authority 
to finance their governmental services through taxation of non-
Indians who benefit from those services. No other conclusion 
comports with the conception of Indian sovereignty reaffirmed 
time after time by this Court. As we observed in United States 
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975), "Indian tribes within 
·~-
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'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary 
organizations.'" Rather, the "Indian tribes are unique 
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 
557 (1832). See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 u.s. 
i64, 173 (1973) ." Ibid. See also Montava v. United States, 180 
U.S. 261 (1901); Talton v. Maves, 163 u.s. 376 (1896); Iron 
Crow v. Oglgala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge, 231 F.2d 89, 92, 
99 (CA 8 1956); Reservation Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. ·426, 428-
429 (CAB 1893). See F. Cohen, "Spanish Origin of Indian Rights," 
in The Legal Conscience 234 (L. Cohen ed. 1960). Adhering to 
this understanding, I would confirm the Tribe's authority to tax 
as necessary to self-government and territorial management. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, however, attempts to limit the Indian tribes' 
authority to tax non-Indians engaging in economic activity on the 
reservation by tracing its source exclusively to their power to 
exclude such persons from tribal lands. Perhaps this view is a 
response to a perceived need for some clear guide to help 
litigants and courts negotiate the trails of overlapping federal, 
state, and tribal taxing authority. But the principle announced 
is far removed from common understanding of the taxing power, and 
from the conception of Indian tribes as domestic dependent 
nations. 
JUSTICE STEVENS claims support for his thesis may be found 
in three early cases upholding tribal power to tax nonmembers. 
Memorandum, at 24-33, discussing Morris v. Hitcock, l94 U.S. 384 
(1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CA 8 1905), appeal 
7 
dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906); Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 
54 S.W. 807, 809 (Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, lOS F. 1003 (CAB 
1900). This discussion correctly notes ·that a hallmark of Indian 
sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian 
lands, and that this authority has been used in decisions 
recognizing the tribal power to tax. None of these cases, 
however, establishes that the power to tax derives solely from 
the power to exclude. Morris v. Hitchcock, for example, suggests 
to the contrary that the taxing power is a legitimate instrument 
for raising revenue and it may properly be wielded where non-
Indians receive privileges from the Tribe, such as the right to 
trade on Indian land. There, the Court approved a tax on cattle 
grazing and relied in part on a report to the Senate by the 
Committee on the Judiciary, which found no legal defect in 
previous tribal tax legislatiort having "a twofold object--to 
prevent the intrusion of unauthorized persons into the territory 
of the Chickasaw Nation, and to raise revenue." 194 U.S., at 389-
390 (emphasis added). In Maxey v. Wright, the question of Indian 
sovereignty was not even raised, for the case turned on the 
construction of a Treaty expressly denying the Tribe any 
governing or jurisdictional authority over nonmembers. 3 Ind. T. 
243, , 54 S.W. 807, 809 (Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F. 
1 0 0 3 ( CA 8 19 0 0 ) . 4 
Finally, the decision in Buster v. Wright actually 
undermines JUSTICE STEVENS' theory. JUSTICE STEVENS concludes 
his discussion of the cases with the assertion that "the inherent 
sovereign power of Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the 
,. 
tribes' power to exclude and the exercise of the power must be 
consistent with its source." Memorandum, at 37. Under this 
conception, a non-Indian who establishes lawful presence in 
Indian territory can then avoid a tax levied by the tribe by 
claiming tha~ no residual portion of the power to exclude 
supports it. This exact result was rejected in Buster v. Wright. 
There, deeds to individual land lots in Indian territory were 
sold to non-Indian residents, and cities and towns were 
incorporated, with the result of prohibiting the Indians from 
removing non-Indian residents. Yet even though the creation of 
non-Indian land-ownership and local government evidenced the 
legitimate presence of non-Indians on Indian land, the court held 
that the tribe retained its power to tax. The court concluded 
that "[n)either the United States, nor a state, nor any other 
sovereignty loses the power to ·govern the people within its 
border by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with 
the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownersh~p nor 
occupancy of the land within its territorial jurisidictions by 
citizens or foreigners." 135 F., at 952 (emphasis added) .5 The 
simple fact of the non-Indian's legitimate presence on Indian 
land did not in that case deprive the Tribe of the power to tax. 
Indeed, the power to tax was preserved even through Congress had 
expressly prohibited the Tribe from excluding the non-Indians 
from the tribal lands. See ibid. This result follows not from 
the Tribe's power to exclude but from the Tribe's power to govern 
and raise revenues to pay for the costs of government. I would 
follow the logic of Buster v. Wright and the demonstrable support 
of the federal branches and general prin~iples of taxation, 
rather than embrace a new restriction on the extent of the tribal 
authority to tax. 
f 
B 
Even if JUSTICE STEVENS is correct in asserting that the 
power to tax derives from to the power to exclude, this premise 
does not by itself lead to the conclusion that petitioners may 
elude the tax levied by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe. His 
Memorandum concedes that a different result might be reached "if 
the petitioners, at the time that they signed the leases, had 
some notice that a severance tax might be imposed." Memorandum, 
at 40. JUSTICE STEVENS thus posits an unusual kind of sovereign 
power that requires for its preservation particularized notice.6 
By granting such importance to ~ctual notice, he implies that the 
power to tax depends on the consent of the taxed as well as on 
the Tribe's power to exclude non-Indians. JUSTICE STEVENS 
expressly relies on a consent requirement in reasoning as 
follows: 
"If the power to tax is limited to situations in which 
the tribe has the power to exclude, then the nonmember 
is subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he 
consents by choosing to accept the conditions of entry 
imposed by the tribe." Id., at 35. 
I cannot accept this conclusion, for I find both the actual 
notice and consent requirements incompatible with sovereignty, 
whatever its source. Imposition of the requirement of consent 
stems from a confusion about the Tribe's roles. According to 
JUSTICE STEVENS, the tribe has lost the power to exclude 
~u 
petitioners, because it has leased to them the use of the mineral 
lands and such rights of access to the reservation as might be 
necessary to enjoy the leases.? This reasoning mistakes the 
Tribe's role as commercial partner with its role as sovereign,B 
and in so doJng turns the inherent powers of sovereignty over to 
the bargaining process undertaken in each of the sovereign's 
commercial agreements. For it is one thing to find that the 
Tribe has agreed to sell the right to use the land and take from 
it valuable minerals: it is quite another to find that ·the Tribe 
has abandoned its sovereign powers simply because it has not 
expressly reserved them through a contract.9 Confusing these two 
results denigrates Indian sovereignty. Indeed, requiring the 
consent of the entrant deposits in the hands of the excludable 
non-Indian the source of the tribe's power, when that power 
instead derives from the fact of sovereignty itself. Only the 
Federal government may limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign 
authority, whatever its source. ~, United States -V. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S., at 322: McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S., at 112.10 Even if the sovereign authority to 
tax is derived from the power to exclude, that authority inheres 
in the Indian tribe, not in the assent of a nonmember. 
Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands therefore remain 
subject to the tribe's the power to exclude them. By entering 
the jurisdiction, the nonmember assumes the risk that the 
governing sovereign will exercise its sovereign power even if 
this power arises from the power · to exclude. This surely is the 
rule by which States are permitted to impose taxes on foreign 
corporations or individuals without their "consent." 
JUSTICE STEVENS, however, reasons that the Tribe's authority 
to impose the severance tax could have been preserved had the 
leases so specified, or had the contemporaneous ordinances, 
tribal constitution, or Federal law specifically so prescribed. 
This notice analysis turns the concept of sovereignty on its 
head, for it presumes a waiver of a sovereign power occurs absent 
express reservation, rather than the reverse. The absence from 
the leases of any mention of the Tribe's taxation authority 
should be of no moment. All contracts in issue here are 
conditioned on compliance with prevailing law. Contractual 
arrangrnents remain subject to subsequent legislation by the 
presiding sovereign. See, ~, Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & 
Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 u.s. ·32 (1940); Home Building & Loan 
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 u.s. 398 (1934). Even where the contract 
at issue requires payment of a royalty for a license -or· franchise 
issued by the governmental entity, the government's power to tax 
remains unless it "has been specifically surrendered in terms 
which admit of no other reasonable interpretation." City of St. 
Louis v. United Rs., 210 u.s. 266, 280 (1908) .11 Deriving the 
Tribe's taxation authority from its power to exclude does not 
undermine these principles; the enduring presence of that 
sovereign power--even when unexercised--governs all contracts 
subject to its jurisdiction. And no claim is asserted here, nor 
could one be, that petitioners' leases enuciate the "clear and 
.. 
' 
unmistakable" surrender of the taxing power required for its 
extinction. 
Similarly, the lack of a provision authorizing a severance 
tax in the Jicarilla Apache Constitution in place at the time 
petitioners signed their leases hardly affects the power itself. 
That power, as JUSTICE STEVENS concedes, is inherent 1n the fact 
of Indian sovereignty, even if linked solely to the power to 
exclude non-Indians. Neither the federal constitution nor the 
Tribe's own constitution is the font of Indian sovereignty, 
although both documents recognize it. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux 
Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d, at 94; Buster v. 
Wright, 135 F., at 950. As the Tribe retains all inherent 
attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the 
Federal Government, the proper inference from silence on this 
point is that the sovereign power to tax remains intact. The 
Tribe's Constitution was amended to authorize the tax before the 
tax was imposed, and that is the critical event necessary to 
effectuate the tax. See Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine 
Ridge Reservation, supra, at 556; Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux 
Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 99. 
By the same token, the omission of an express federal 
statement reserving the Indians' power to tax does not impair the 
vitality of the power. Inherent powers of Indian tribes may be 
restricted only by congressional action, and silence on the 
subject must be presumed to leave the power intact. We concluded 
in Washington v. Confederated Tribes that the "widely held 
understanding within the Federal Government has always been that 
federal law to date has not worked a div,estiture of Indian taxing 
power." 447 U.S., at 152. _As JUSTICE STEVENS properly points 
out, the 1927 Act of Congress relied on :by petitioners "neither 
authorized nor prohibited the imposition of any taxes by the 
tribes," andr in fact "Congress did not consider the question of 
fribal taxes on mineral output from reservation lands." 
Memorandum, at 42, discussing Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 
1347, 25 U.S.C. § 398.12 If there were any ambiguity on this 
point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe, for "[a)mbiguities in 
federal law have been construed generously in order to comport 
with [the) traditional notions of sovereignty and with the 
federal policy of encouraging tribal independence." White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracher, 448 u.s. 136, 143-144 (1980). 
Furthermore, the challenged tax which was imposed pursuant to the 
amended constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, complied with 
the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 
987, 25 u.s.c. § 476, 477. See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe 
of the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 99, and received the 
requisite approval from the Secretary of the Interior. 
Appendices to Petition by Amoco Production Co. and Marathon Oil 
Co., No. 80-15, 5n.l3 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 
supra, at 153. Accordingly, I see no reason to preclude in this 
instance the Tribe's exercise of its inherent power to tax the 
mining activities on its lands. Cf. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). Only by constructing new 
requirements of actual notice and consent by private parties does 
JUSTICE STEVENS reach a contrary result. 
II 
Because I find no defect in the Tribe's exercise of its 
taxing power, I must reach the further constitutional challenge 
pretermitted'by JUSTICE STEVENS: does the tax violate the 
Commerce Clause? 
A 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate 
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian Tribes." u.s. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
Because the Clause expressly treats the Indian tribes as a 
distinct category, it cannot be assumed that the judicial 
standards for analyzing state tax burdens on interstate commerce 
govern challenges to taxes imposed by an Indian tribe. So, 
although the Interstate Commerce Clause has been unders-tood to 
limit the States from interfering with the free flow of commerce, 
the same constraint need not apply to the Indian Tribes. "As 
separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have 
historically been regarded as unconstrained by those 
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on 
federal or state authority." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
u.s. 49, 56 (1978). 
In this spirit, I believe the limitations imposed by the 
interstate Commerce Clause on State regulation have little 
relevance to the exercise of Tribal taxation authority. Any 
other conclusion is belied by the purpos~ and history of the 
"Indian Commerce Clause," and by the Indian tribes' unique 
status. Just as the Foreign Nations Clause provides for federal 
control of commercial relations with foreign nations, the Indian 
Commerce Clause embodies a grant of singular authority to 
Congress to regulate intercourse and trade with Indian tribes. 
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, supra, at 194; 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, at 18. Historically, the 
Clause marked a change from the Articles of Confederation under 
which the Federal Government shared with the States the authority 
to regulate trade with Indians. Id. See The Federalist, No. 42 
(J. Madison). By turning this authority · over to exclusive 
federal control, the Indian Commerce Clause in effect recognizes 
the tribes' unique position as nations-within-a-nation, see Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 56 (1978); Worcester v. 
Georgia, supra, at 559; Cherokee Nation v. Georqia, 5 Pet. 1, 18 
(1831) , and offers them Federal protection from State and local 
interference. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); 
United States v. Antelope, 430 u.s. 641, 645-650 & n. 11 (1977). 
Their unusual position has also justified extensive congressional 
regulation of commercial affairs uniquely affecting Indian 
tribes. 14 It should not be surprising, then, that the Indian 
Commerce Clause has been used in the past solely to shield the 
Tribes from intrusive or abusive activities by nonmembers. See, 
~' United States v. Antelope, supra, at 552; Morton v. 
Mancari, supra, at 645; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
supra, at 201; United States v. Mazurie, supra, at 554. 
The question here is whether the Inoian Commerce Clause of 
its own force places limitations on activities by the Tribes 
themselves. A result along those lines; of course, has been 
enforced through the "negative implications" of its interstate 
counterpart,'under which courts have restricted States from 
unduly burdening or interfering with the free flow of interstate 
commerce even in the absence of congressional action. See, ~' 
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333 
(1977); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 
u.s. 761, 769 (1945). 
Whatever place this concept of latent Commerce Clause 
restraint may have under the Indian Commerce Clause, I conclude 
that it is irrelevant here, where Congress has specifically 
devised a mechanism by which the Indian tax must secure federal 
approval. The Tribe received £he requisite approval of the tax 
from the Secretary of the Interior, as prescribed by the 
Reorganization Act of 1934. This course of events fulfilled the 
administrative process established by Congress to monitor such 
exercises of Tribal authority. As a result, this Tribal tax 
comes to us in a posture significantly different from a 
challenged State tax, which does not need specific federal 
approval to take effect, and which may require judicial review to 
ensure it imposes no undue burden on interstate commerce. 
Judicial review of the Indian tax measure, in contrast, would 
duplicate the administrative review it already has received, and 
therefore have dubious usefulness. A judicial excursion into 
"negative implications" of the Indian Commerce Clause would be 
particularly inapt here, where it is cle~r that Congress is well 
aware that Indian tribes impose mineral severance taxes such as 
the one challenged by petitioners. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, Section 110 (a), (c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368, 
15 u.s.c. (Supp. III) § 3320 (a), (c) (1). Congress, of course, 
retains ple nary power to limit tribal tax authority or to alter 
State power to tax activities affecting interstate commerce, but 
I would not read into this latent power a restriction on the tax 
already in place. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, ante, 
at (White, J., concurring). This Court, in my view, should 
impose no further restriction under the Indian Commerce Clause on 
a tax already endorsed by the properly designated agent of the 
Congress.l5 
B 
It is not difficult, however, to demonstrate that the tax 
challenged here would survive judicial scrutiny even under the 
standards applicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause. As 
summarized in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 u.s. 274, 279 
(1977), a state tax on activities connected to interstate 
commerce must be "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus 
with the taxing State, [be] fairly apportioned, ... not 
discriminate against interstate commerce and (be] fairly related 
to the services provided by the State." The Jicarilla Apache tax 
obviously meets the requirement of a substantial nexus with the 
reservation, for the mining occurs entirely on reservation land. 
In addition, the apportionment requirement is easily met here; it 
is undisputed that 100% of the taxed mining activity occurs 
within the tribal jurisdiction.l6 
Although petitioners make much of the tax's purported 
f 
qiscriminatory effect, the tax does not in fact treat minerals 
transp0rted away from the reservation differently than it treats 
minerals remaining on the land.l7 Nor does the Tribe's tax 
ordinance exempt minerals obtained by members of the Tribe.l8 
The ordinance does exempt minerals received by the Tribe as in-
kind payments on the leases. 19 This exemption merely avoids the 
administrative make-work that would ensue if the ~ribe, as local 
government, had to tax itself, in its role as commercial 
recipient of the royalty payments, and therefore it cannot 
properly be deemed a discriminatory preference for local 
commerce. Were a different conclusion reached, we would have to 
rethink our refusal to impose a Commerce Clause limitation on the 
proprietary activities of the States. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. 
Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria ScraP Corp., 426 
u.s. 794 (1976). 
Finally, the tax satisfies the requirement that it bear a fair 
relationship to the services supplied to the lessees. In 
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, ante, at , we held that this 
final requirement of the Complete Auto Transit test is fulfilled 
if the measure of the tax is reasonably related to the extent of 
the taxpayer's activities within the taxing jurisdiction. Here, 
the severance tax is assessed as a percentage of the value of the 
minerals produced, so the measure of the tax is tied to the 
earnings made possible under the Tribe's auspices. See id., at 
But for the Tribal government, the lessees would not have 
the benefit of law enforcement, public services, and the 
attributes of civilization. Id., at Thus, even were it 
proper to apply the Complete Auto Transit test Clause to the 
challenged tax, it would survive scrutiny. 
III 
In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall observed 
that Indian tribes had "always been considered as distinct, 
independent, political communities, retaining their original 
natural rights;" although subject to the authority of the Federal 
Government, the "weaker power does not surrender its 
independ.ence--it right to self-government--by associating with a 
stronger, and taking its protection." 6 Pet., at 559-569. 
JUSTICE STEVENS endorses this longstanding view, but he 
nonetheless finds the particular exercise of sovereign authority 
involved here defective for want of notice to non-Indians. I 
fear that the effect of this approach may erode Indian 
sovereignty, and produce even more uncertainty than already 
exists in Indian commercial affairs. I would affirm the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
1 The fact that the Jicarilla Apache reservation was 
established by Executive Order rather than by treaty or statute 
calls for no difference in the analysis, as the Tribe's sovereign 
power is not affected by the manner in which the reservation was 
created. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978); 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963); Spaulding v. 
Chandler, 160 u.s. 394, 403 (1895); In re Wilson, 140 u.s. 575, 
577 (1891). t 
2 "A tax is not an assessment of benefits. It is, as we have 
said, a means of distributing the burden of the cost of 
government. The only benefit to which the taypayer is 
constitutionally entitled is that derived from his enjoyment of 
the privileges of living in an organized society, established and 
safeguarded by the devloting of taxes to public purpos~s." 
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 u.s. 495, 522 (1937). 
See generally The Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 
1961) 187, 188; M. Jensen, The Making of the American 
Constitution 79 (1964). 
3 As the concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals observed, 
"[i]t simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry 
out municipal functions approved and mandated by Congress without 
being able to exercise at least minimal taxing powers." J.A., at 
164 (McKay, J., concurring). 
4 Thus, in Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S.W. 807, 809 (Ct. 
App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 10; F. 1003 (CA 8 1900), the governing 
treaty restricted the Tribe's right self-government and 
jurisdiction to members of the Tribe and retained only the power 
to exclude nonmembers. The court relied on opinions by the 
Attorney General that did not begin to address the scope of 
Indian sovereignty, but instead identified the Tribe's right, as 
a social group, to exclude intruders and place conditions on 
their occupancy. For example, one such opinion viewed the power 
to place terms on occupancy as "'a question which all private 
persons are allowed to decide for themselves; and even wild 
animals, not men, have a certain respect paid to the instinct 
which in this respect they share with man.'" 3 Ind. T., at 
54 S.W., at 809 (citing 18 Op. Att. Gen. 36, 37). The same 
opinion proceeded to find such notions as self-government and 
jurisdiction irrelevant to "'the right of a hotel keeper to 
prescribe rules and charges for persons who become his fellow 
occupants,'" and found the Tribe's natural instinct to set terms 
on occupancy unaltered by the treaty. Id. The court's 
dependence on this reasoning hardly bears-on the more general 
question addressed by JUSTICE STEVENS: what is the source of the 
Indian tribes' sovereign power to tax absent a restriction by 
Treaty or other federal law? 
5 Both the classic treatise on Indian law and its subsequent 
revision by the Department of Interior advance the same view. 
United States Solicitor of the Deptartment of the Interior, 
Federal Indian Law 438 (1958) ("The power to tax does not depend 
upon the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no 
power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal 
jurisdiction") (citing Buster v. Wright, supra): F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 142 (1942) ("One of the powers 
essential to the maintenance of any government is the power to 
levy taxes. That this power is an inherent attribute of tribal 
sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn or limited by treaty 
or by act oftCongress is a proposition which has never been 
successfully disputed.") (citing Buster v. Wright, supra). 
6 JUSTICE STEVENS seeks support for this view in Buster v. 
Wright, and quotes a passage discussing the fact that the parties 
to a 1901 agreement knew the tax existed. Memorandum at 32, n. 
41 (citing 135 F., at 954). The passage quoted in fact fails to 
support JUSTICE STEVENS' view that private parties need notice of 
a tax in advance of signing a commercial agreement, for the only 
parties to the 1901 agreement were the Creek Nation and the -_ 
United States. The private traders subject to the tax were not 
even considered when the court examined notice of the tax power 
and the consent of contracting parties. 
7 This rationale in fact conflicts with ' the conclusion in Buster 
v . W r i g h t , 13 5 F • 9 4 7 ( CA 8 19 0 5 ) : 
"The ultimate conclusion of the whole matter is that purchasers 
of lots in town sites in towns or cities within the original 
limits of the Creek Nation, who are in lawful possession of their 
lots, are still subject to the laws of that nation prescribing 
permit taxes for the exercise by noncitizens of the privilege of 
conducting business in those towns." Id., at 958. See Barta v. 
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (CA 8 
1958) (lessees of tribal lands subject to Indian tax on use of 
land) • .a 
8 JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that once the tribe permitted 
petitioners to enter Indian land pursuant to the mineral leases, 
"petitioners are not intruders, and while the leases remain in 
effect there is no basis for the claim that the Tribe retains any 
power to exclude petitioners from the portions of the reservation 
on which they acquired drilling and extraction rights." 
Memorandum, at 40. 
This conclusion appears to confuse the Tribe's position as 
landowner with its position as governing sovereign. Recognizing 
and distinguishing the scope of those two roles, the 1958 
treatise on Indian law written by the U.S. Solicitor of the U.S. 
Department of the Interior embraced as "the present state of the 
law" the following summary: 
"'Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as 
well as the rights of local government, dominion as well as 
sovereignty. But over all the lands of the reservation, whether 
owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the 
tribe has the sovereign power to determine the conditions upon 
which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside 
therein, and to do business, provided only such determination is 
consistent with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any 
vested rights of persons now occupying r ·eservation lands under 
lawful authority.'" Federal Indian Law, supra, at 439, quoting 
Solicitor's Opinion of October 25, 1934 (emphasis added). See F. 
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 143. 
9 Here, the leases extend until the resources are depleted, so 
under JUSTICE STEVENS' approach, the Tribes' power to tax 
petitioners ~ould be withheld indefinitely. 
iO This conclusion is inevitable once Indian sovereignty is 
recognized, for the sovereign powers may be restricted only by 
self-limitation or by constraints imposed by superior or co-equal 
sovereigns. H. Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty 2-4 (1937): 
A. Larson & C. Jenks, Sovereignty Within the Law 11, 26 (1965): 
P. Maxfield, et al., Natural Resources Law on American Indian 
Lands 4-6 (1977). 
11 Furthermore, 
contracted away. 
583' 596 (1908): 
567 (1894). 
the police power of a sovereign may not be 
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U.S. 
New York &. N.E.R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 
1 2 The 1927 Act permitted state taxation of mineral lessees on 
Executive Order reservations, but it indicated no change in the 
taxing power of the affected tribes. Hithout mentioning the 
tribal authority to tax, the Act authorized state taxation of 
royalties from mineral production on all Indian lands, including 
reservations created by Executive Order. Petitioners argue that 
the Act thereby transferred the Indian power to tax mineral 
production to the States in exchange for the rovalties assured 
the tribes. The claim not only lacks any supporting evidence, it 
also deviates from settled principles in this area. For, as 
different sovereigns enjoy powers to tax the same transations, 
e.g., Hayden-Cartwright Act, ch. 582, 49 Stat. 1521, 4 u.s.c. ~ 
104: Buck Act, ch. 787, 54 Stat. 1059, 4 u.s.c. ~~ 105-110, the 
mere fact of state authority to tax does not deprive the Indian 
tribe of its power to tax. Fort Mohave Tribe v. County of San 
Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (CA 9 1976), cert. denied, 430 u.s. 983 
(1977). Cf. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation, supra. Moreover, although Congress is 
empowered to limit tribal sovereignty, "a proper respect both for 
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of 
Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the 
absence of clear indications of legislative intent." Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 60 (1978). No such clear 
indication is present here. 
This principle also defeats petitioners' suggestion that 
tribal taxation of oil and gas conflicts with national energv 
policies, and therefore the tribal ordinance is be pre-empted by 
federal law. Petitioners fail to cite to any specific federal 
statute restricting Indian sovereignty on this basis, nor do they 
explain why state taxation of the same energy production escapes 
This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no 
claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any mdre of petitioners' mining 
activity than the portion occurring within Tribal jurisdiction. 
In such circumstances, the risk of multiple taxation is the 
inevitable consequence of the geographid fact that the 
reservation falls within New Mexico. Such geographic 
convergence does not work to preclude taxation by both a 
municipality and a State, nor by both a State and the federal 
government. t For in such instances, the multiple taxation does 
not result from efforts by distinct governments to seize more tax 
revenues than would fairly be aportioned to the activities 
falling within their jurisdictions. Instead, these are the 
consequences that inhere in a system of hierarchical 
sovereignties, each of which provides services to commercial 
activity and may accordingly require financial support from 
beneficiaries. Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 
(1934); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203-204 (1824); The 
Federalist, No. 33 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) 202-203. In 
this context, "[t]here is no direct conflict between the state 
and tribal schemes, since each government is free to impose its 
taxes without ousting the other." Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, supra, at 158. 
17 Similarly, the ordinance does not distinguish between 
minerals remaining within New Mexico and those transported beyond 
the State boundary. 
18 The tax, by its terms, applies when the resources are 
"produced on the Jicarilla Apa6he Reservation and sold or 
transported off the Reservation." Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
Ordinance of the Tribal Counsel, Oil and Gas Severance Tax, '' 
2,3 reprinted in Appendix N to Petition of Amoco Production 
Company, No. 80-15, at 2n. The Tribe explains that this language 
was used because no sale occurs prior to the transportation off 
the Reservation, just as the State of New Mexico's tax defines 
the taxable value of severed resources as the value when 
transported from the State. N.M. Stat. Ann., ~~7-25-3 (1980). 
The Tribe's tax is due at the time of severance. I believe that 
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the taxable event 
defined by the Tribe's ordinance is the severance of the minerals 
from the soil. See J.A. 155. 
19 Paragraph 4 of the ordinance specifies that "[rloyalty gas, 
oil or condensate taken by the Tribe in kind, and used by the 
Tribe shall be exempt from taxation." App. 2n. 
the asserted conflict with federal policy. Cf. Commonwealth 
Edison v. Montana, ante, at • Indeed, Congress has indicated 
1ts awareness of the Indian severance tax here at issue and 
declined to disapprove it. Instead, Congress has included taxes 
imposed by an Indian tribe in its provision for costs that may be 
recovered through federal energy pricing regulations. Natural 
Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, Section llO(a), 
(c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368, 15 U.S.C. (1976 ed., Supp. III) § 3320 (a), 
(c)(l). r 
1 3 Mor~over, despite petitioners' claims, I discern no implicit 
limitation on the tribes' power to tax imposed by the Act of May 
11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 u.s.c. § 396b. That Act 
permits tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act "to 
assume and define for themselves the leasing process," as 
governed by constitution or charter adopted under the Indian 
Reoganization Act. Joint Appendix (J.A.), at 160 and nn. 6,7. 
As the Act fails to include any express restriction on the Indian 
tax power, I would find none implied. 
14 Thus, pursuant to the Indian Commerce . Clause, Congress has 
regulated the sale of liquor in lands allotted to or ceded by 
Indians, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913): Dick v. 
United States, 208 u.s. 340 (1908), governed trespass and 
settlement of white persons in Indian country, defined crimes, 
and fixed boundaries. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, supra, at 92. See also Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980): Warren Trading Post v. 
Arizona Tax Comm'~380 U.S. 685 (1965). 
15 It remains true that "the Tribes themselves could perhaps 
pre-empt state taxation through the exercise of properly 
delegated federal power to do so." Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, supra, at 156, but we 
are not presented here with a challenge to State taxes imposed on 
petitioners' mining activities. 
16 Petitioners contend that because New Mexico may tax the same 
mining activity at the full value, the Indian tax imposes a 
multiple tax burden on interstate commerce in violation of the 
Commerce Clause. The multiple taxation issue arises where two or 
more taxing jurisdictions point to some contact with an 
enterprise to support a tax on the entire value of its multistate 
activities, or more than the particular connection would justify. 
E.g, Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-385 (1952). To 
guard against this problem, the Court has required an 
apportionment of the tax based on the portion of the activity 
properly viewed as occuring within each relevant State. See, 
e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 
219 (1980): Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash. 
Stevedoring Cos., 435 u.s. 734, 746 & n.l6 (1978). See also 
Japan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, .441 u.s. 434 (1979). 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
I 
For the reasons stated by JUSTICE MARSHALL, I agree that 
respondent Jicarilla Apache Tribe retained the sovereign power to 
impose the severance tax at issue here, and that its power has 
not been divested by subsequent legislation. 
I do not agree, however, that the Indian Commerce Clause 
. 
insulates this tax from challenge under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause. While it is true that the former Clause was designed to 
shield Indian tribes from state and local interference, it does 
not follow that the negative implications of the latter Clause do 
not place any 1 imitations on the act ions of Ina ian Tribes; the 
Indian Commerce Clause cannot be used as a sword to carve out 
what essentially would be foreign nations within the United 
States. 
But here, as JUSTICE MARSHALL notes, Congress explicitly has 
provided a scheme· whereby any Indian tax must secure federal 
approval, and the tax challenged in this case has been approved 
under that scheme. A court acts as the "final arbiter" under the 
Commerce Clause only when Congress has not · acted. See Japan 
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 454 (1979). 
- 2 -
Because here, in contrast to the situation in Commonwealth Edison 
Co. v. Montana, post, at ___ , Congress has affirmatively acted, 
the tax is valid under the Commerce Clause. 




stated at length in the dissent in 
post, I disagree with JUSTICE 
conclusion that the · tax automatically 
at 
would satisfy the fourth prong 
274, 
of the test of Complete Auto 
279 (1977), simply because the Transit v. Brady, 430 u.s. 
tax is "assessed as a percentage of the value of the minerals 
produced .... " Ante, at 18-19. Were that issue properly before 
us, the case, in my view, should be remanded for a trial on the 
issue whether the tax is fairly related to the services provided 
by the Tribe. 
/ 
C HAM BER S O F 
.JUSTIC E BYRON R. WHIT E 
~Ui!ftntt <!Jllttrlcf tlyt ~tb ~taf.tg 
~fti:nghm. g:l. QJ. 20~~~ 
June 26, 1981 
Re: Nos 80-11 and 80-15 - Merrion and Amoco 
Productions Co. v. Jica rilla Apache Tribe 
Dear John, 
With one reservation of some substance about 
1
)bi 
which I shall chat with you , I could make a fifth \f'' 
vote for Part II of your memorandum, i.e., that an ,~ 
Indian Tribe's power to tax non-Indians engaged in k fl'}•'"-
activities or transactions on tribal land is ~f t 
derived from the Tribe's power to exclude. /~..,, 
Nevertheless, for the reasons stated in Parts I-B \1~. 
-~el ~ and II-B of Thurgood's memorandum and without 
1 
.{:\1-4 u-_........ expressing agreement with any other parts of his 
~~~ opinion, I would affirm the judgment below. 
If there are not fi ve for your Part II, I 
would affirm but only a ssume that you are correct 
i n that Part. 
Sincerely yo urs, 
Justice Stevens 

















:.§npuntt C!fcurl of flrf ~fb :§mug 
'Jiirurfrittgton. gl. C!f. 2 o ~ n. 2 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. June 26, 1981 
f 
RE: Nos. 80-11 and 15 Merrion & Amoco Productions Co, 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood: 
Since your opinion reflects my view and conference 
vote I'll be happy to join your memorandum when it is con-
verted into an opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 



















fro : Mr. Justice Blackmrn1 
.pusTIC~JFi"'f• ~diss~ ni'i~-~~-( 
~r~~4~~ I 
~ For th ed by JUSTICE MARSHALL, I 
respondent Jicarilla Apache Tribe retained the sovereign power to --impose the severance tax at issue here, and that its power has - - ...... ,., .. 
not been divested by subsequent legislation. 
I do not agree, however, that the Indian Commerce Clause .,..,. 
insulates this tax from challenge under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause. While it is true that the former Clause was designed to 
shield Indian tribes from state and local interference, it does 
not follow that the negative implications of the latter Clause ~ 
?c.o 
~ place ~ limitations on the actions of Indian Tribes; the 
" Indian Commerce Clause cannot be used as a sword to carve out 
what essentially would be foreign nations within the United 
States. 
But here, as JUSTICE MARSHALL notes, Congress explicitly has 
provided a scheme whereby any Indian tax must secure federal - -----
approval,· and the tax challeng e d in this c as e has bee n approved ----....,- -
under that scheme. A court acts as the " f inal arbiter" under the - ... 
Comme rce Clause only wh e n Congress has not · acted. See J apan --Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Ange l e s, 441 U.S. 434, 454 (1979). 
-· - - 2 -
Because here, in contrast to the situation in Commonwealth Edison 
Co. v. Montana, post, at ___ , Congress has affirmatively acted, 
the tax is valid under the Commerce Clause. 
II 
For the reasons stated at length in the dissent in 
Commonwealth Edison, post, at I disagree with JUSTICE 
---·--
MARSHALL'S lternative conclusio that the tax automatically 
would satisfy the fourth prong of the test of Complete Auto 
Transit v. Brady, 430 u.s. 274, 279 (1977), simply because the 
tax is "assessed as a percentage of the value of the minerals 
produced .... " Ante, at 18-19. Were that issue properly before 
us, the case, in my view, should be remanded for a trial on the ...., -
issue whether the tax is fairly related to the services provided 
by the Tribe. 
June 27, 1981 
lO;' 
80-11 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
SO-IS Kiiioco v. 1.1lcari!Ia Kpacfie Tri6e 
Dear Harry: , I 
Please add my name to your dissenting opinion in 
the above cases. 




Mr. Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
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CHA MBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~ltptl'utt Q}onrl of fl1t ~ifdt .§tatr.s-
~aselyht.gton, ~. <!}. 2!TgJJ!.~ 
June 30, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 80-11; 80-15 - Amoco Production v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe; Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Although there is a slight possibility that yo u 
may not wish to feast on this fare immediately, you may 
want to have the latest version of my memorandum in 
your files for future reference . The changes from the 





Whether the Jicarilla Apache Tribe has~~ ~ 
impose a severance tax on oi 1 and ~ mil tA& umr' b 
this tax violates the Commerce Clause. ~4)~~+·~ 
.p., ~. e-«. /c.d._ ~ ~ 
I. Background 
This case has been set for reargument. Last term the 
Court, in a 5-3 vote, tentatively decided to affirm the CAlO's 
en bane decision (1) that the Tribe had the sovereign power so 
to tax and (2) that this tax, which had been approved by the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs on behalf of the Secretary of 
the Interior, did not offend the so-called "Indian Commerce 
~. ~ .,&.4-.<·.u~ 
~~~~~~ 
J4u.... S:u.~{.._~ u  ~ ~ -~ ~ 1.~- 1-4,_ 
1..c..~~~ ...... ~ .... ~.4. ~M-e..(_~~~~~ IJfJI.'J# 
2 0 
Clause." 1 Justice Stewart did not participate. The remainder 
of the Court divided as follows. Justice Stevens wrote 
inti tially and was joined by the Chief and Justice Rehnquist. 
Justice Stevens said the Tribe lacked the sovereign power to 
impose this tax, under the novel theory was that the Tribe's 
power to tax derives from its power to exclude outsiders; be-
cause the Tribe's oil and gas lease granted petrs a right to 
enter the Tribe's property, the Tribe was not allowed subse-
quently to impose a tax 1 imi ting this right of entry. These 
three Justices therefore would reverse the CAlO's decision 
without reaching the Commerce Clause issue. 
Justices Marshall and Brennan believed that the Tribe 
did possess the sovereign power of taxation and that this tax 
did not transgress the Commerce Clause. (Although he differed 
as to theory to some degree, Justice White joined this position 
1The Commerce Clause provides "The Congress shall have the 
Power To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes " 
Art. I, Section 8 (emphasis added). Because this case involves 
a tribe rather than a State, the emphasized "Indian Commerce 
Clause"--rather than the more typically invoked Interstate Com-
merce Clause--is at issue. The Court, of course, has long in-
ferred a limitation on state authority from this affirmative 
grant of power to Congress. Whether similar restrictions bind 
tribes is an issue in this case. 
"The fact that the constitutional limitations upon 
state interference with interstate commerce are implied rather 
than expressed entails one crucial doctrinal corollary. Given 
their origin as negative judicial inferences from a constitu-
tional grant of power to Congress, the Supreme Court's doctrin-
al limitations are always subject to congressional revision." 
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 321 (1978). 
TM, W,~ y, JJ~w ~~ C/fJd 
3. 
to make in favor of a simple affirmanc of the 
CAlO.) Justice Marshall had three alternative grounds for his 
Commerce Clause holding. ~t, "the limitations imposed by } 
the interstate Commerce Clause on State regulation have little ~ 
relevance to the exercise of Tribal taxation authority." Draft 
op. at 14. S~d, federal approval of the tax in question£ LfL,.c_, 
saved it from any possible violation of the Indian Commerce 5 r-
Clause. Third, even absent federal approval, the tax 
~ 
survived Commerce Clause scrutiny as formulated by the 
prong inquiry of Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 
(1977). 
Justice Blackmun--who you joined--agreed with Justice 
Marshall that the Tribe had the sovereign power to impose the 
tax. Justice Backmun did not agree with Justice Marshall, how--
ever, that the standards of the Interstate Commerce Clause had 
"little relevance" to the Indian Commerce Clause. He did join 
ground r=I:;~~U. Justice Marshall's second alternative 
d..~ --• ~1 approv~ of the tax in question. As to Justice Marshall's 
third alternative ground, Justice Blackmun referred to his dis-
senting opinion in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 
s.ct. 2946, 2964 (7/2/81) • 2 Had this case presented the issue, 
2commonwealth Edison, you will recall, upheld the constitu-
tionality of Montana's coal severance tax. Justice Marshall, 
writing for six Justices, said the severance tax satisfied the 
last prong of the four prong test set forth in Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 u.s. 274, 279 (1977), which asks 
whether a state tax is "fairlL related to the services provided 
bYthe S tate. " ....... Jus't'I ce M ar s hall i nterpreted th1s inquiry to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
the two of you would have remanded for DC consideration of 
whether the Tribe's tax is fairly related to the services the 
Tribe provides--an inquiry presumably to be guided by the test 
proposed in the Commonwealth Edison dissent. 
To summarize the voting in this case, these various 
positions result in a 5-3 to affirm. (Although the file does 
not so disclose, apparently the case was held for reargument in 
hopes of a more substantial majority. Justice Stewart an-
nounced his resignation on June 18. Justice Marshall's draft 
was circulated on June 25. Justice Blackmun's draft circulated 
June 26.) 
The supplemental briefs do not add much substance to 
require only "that the measure of the tax . . . be reasonably 
related to the extent of the contact" between the taxed activi-
ty and the State. 101 s.ct. at 2958 (emphasis in original). 
Montana passed the test, said these Justices, because its sev-
erance tax was proportional to the value of the extracted coal. 
Three Justices dissented in Montana. Justice Blackmun 
(the author of the unanimous Complete Auto Transit decision), 
joined by you and Justice Stevens, argued Justice Marshall's 
reading "emasculates" the fourth prong of the Complete Auto 
Transit test. !d. at 2968. The dissent would have remanded 
the case for trial according to this test: 
If the tax is in fact a legitimate general revenue 
measure comparable to taxes imposed on similar indus-
tries, a court's inquiry is at an end; on the other 
hand, if the tax singles out this particular inter-
state activity and charges it with a grossly dispro-
portionate share of the general costs of government, 
the court must determine whether there is some rea-
sonable basis for the legislative judgment that the 
tax is necessary to compensate the State for the par-
ticular costs imposed by the activity. 
Id. at 2971-72 
5. 
the thorough consideration this case has received to date. The 
bulk of the SG's brief is devoted to arguing the Tribe has the 
power to impose the tax. In its short Commerce Clause discus-
sion at 18-21, the SG disappointingly fails to make the point 
that the tax in question has received federal approval and that 
k 
this removes Commerce Clause difficulties. To ~sure he agrees 
"' 
with Justice Marshall's position, it might be worth asking the 
SG at oral argument whether, assuming some Indian Commerce 
Clause difficulty, he agrees federal approval would negate the 
difficulty. 
The Tribe's supplemental brief has roughly the same 
~ - ........ - ........... -
focus. It similarly fails to make the federal approval point. ----- -
The petrs make three points in their recent (10/22/81) 
supplemental brief. First, the Tribe lacks the governmental 
power of taxation, as is assertedly made clear by the decision 
last term in Montana v. United States, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (1981). 
Second, a study of the particular historical relationship be-
tween a tribe and the United States is necessary to determine 
that tribe's present rights. Third, 25 u.s.c. §398(c) shows 
Congress did not delegate taxation powers to tribes and that 
tribes possess no power based on their proprietary interest. 
II. Discussion 
I agree with Greg's initial bench memo and your tenta-
tive position in this case. Rather than rework this previously 
ploughed ground, I will confine my attention to analyzing both 
9 
6. 
the relevance of two new cases and to the new issues raised in 
the supplementary briefs. 
/ 
The first new case is Montana v. United States, 101 
S. Ct. 1245 ( 3/24/81) • In this case, you joined Justice Stew-
art's majority decision, holding that the Crow Indians pos-·-
sessed neither the ownership right nor the inherent sovereignty -- ~ 
to prohibit all fishing and hunting by non-members of the Tribe 
on non-Indian property within reservation boundaries. The in-
herent sovereignty holding of the case is relevant here. The 
Montana Court noted that tribes, in joining the Union, suffered 
an implicit divestiture of sovereignty respecting relations 
between an Indian tribe and non-members of the tribe. 101 
s.ct. at 1257. Since such a relationship with outsiders is 
present in this case, this tends to cut against Justice Mar-
shall's proposed opinion. Petrs' supplemental brief heavily 
relies upon this language. The Montana opinion continues, how-
ever, in the following manner: 
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sov-
ereign power to exercise some form of civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reser-
vations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A 
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licens-
ing, or other means, the activ1t1es of nonmem-
bers who enter consensual relations with the 
tribe or its members, through commercial deal-
ings, contracts, leases, or other arrange-
ments. [Citing four cases] 
101 s.ct. at 1258 (emphasis added). 
This specific reference to taxation of leasehold interests 
quiets any concern that Justice Stewart's preceeding and more 
·~ 
7. 
general formulation might have created for present purposes. 
(Petrs do respond that they have not "consented" to the "uni-
lateral" tax, but Justice Marshall has already rebutted effec-
tively this argument at 9-13 of his draft.) 
The second recent case of significance is Commonwealth 
Edison, summarized in note 2 supra. As Justice Blackmun • s 
opinion has made clear, Commonwealth Edison d9es not apply be-
cause the federal government has approved of the tax at issue. 
Justice Blackmun also points out that should such approval not 
have been present, however, his view in Commonwealth Edison 
would require further proceedings to ensure that the Tribe's 
tax does not burden commerce unduly. Both propositions are 
sound and require no further modification. 
Petrs' remaining arguments point to no weaknesses in 
Justice Mar shall's reasoning. First, I do agree with resps 
that specific history of federal/tribe relationships count im-
portantly in any analysis of a particular tribe's current pow-
ers. But this should not preclude a more general analysis 
when, as here, the power at issue is as fundamental and general 
as the power of taxation. Second, Justice Marshall's draft 
already adequately responds to petrs' point respecting 28 
u.s.c. §398c. Draft op. at 13. 
III. Conclusion 
I agree with your tentative decision to vote with Jus-
tice Blackmun to affirm. Neither ~he two relevant cases decid-
-\. 
8. 
ed last Term nor the supplemental briefing should alter your 
position. Hopefully Justice O'Connor will be of a similar per-
suasion and will vote to create a 6-3 decision. At worst, how-
ever, her vote could only produce a four vote dissent from a 
majority result in which you concur. 
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ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF .-
J ;r:;! 
~~--~ 
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1981] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to long-term leases with the Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, petitioners, 21lessees, extract and produce oil and gas 
from the Tribe's reservation lands. In these two consoli-
dated cases, petitioners challenge an ordinance enacted by 
the Tribe imposing a severance tax on "any oil and natural 
gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands." See Oil 
and Gas Severance Tax No. 77-0--02, App. 38. We granted 
certiorari to determine whether the Tribe has the authority 
to impose this tax, and, if so, whether the tax imposed by the 
Tribe violates the Commerce Clause. 
I 
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe resides on a reservation in 
northwestern New Mexico. Established by Executive 
80-11 & 80-15-0PINION 
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Order in 1887,' the reservation contains 742,315 acres, all of 
which is held as tribal trust property. The 1887 Executive 
Order set aside public lands in the Territory of New Mexico 
for the use and occupation of the Jicarilla Apache Indians, 
and contained no special restrictions except for a provision 
protecting preexisting rights of bona fide settlers. 2 Ap-
proximately 2,100 individuals live on the reservation, with 
the majority residing in the town of Dulce, New Mexico, near 
the Colorado border. 
The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §§ 461 et seq., 
which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt 
a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior (Secretary). 3 The Tribe's first con-
stitution, approved by the Secretary on August 4, 1937, pre-
served all powers conferred by § 16 of the Indian Reorganiza-
'See I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904) (order 
of President Cleveland). Two earlier orders setting aside land for the 
Tribe had been cancelled. See id., at 874-875 (orders of Presidents Hayes 
and Grant). The boundaries of the reservation were redefined or clarified 
by Executive Orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on Novem-
ber 11, 1907 and January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on February 17, 
1912. See III C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 681, 682, 
684, 685 (1913). 
The fact that the Jicarilla Apache Reservation was established by Exec-
utive Order rather than by treaty or statute does not affect our analysis; 
the Tribe's sovereign power is not affected by the manner in which its res-
ervation was created. E . g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980) (Colville) 
2 The proviso reads as follows: "this order shall not be so construed as to 
deprive any bona fide settler of any valid rights he may have acquired 
under the law of the United States providing for the disposition of the pub-
lic domain." I. C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, supra, at 
875. 
3 The Tribe is also chartered under the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 25 U. S. C. § 477, which permits the Secretary to issue to an Indian 
tribe a charter of incorporation that may give the tribe the power to pur-
chase, manage, operate, and dispose of its property. 
80-11 & 80-15-0PINION 
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tion Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U. S. C. § 476. In 
1968, the Tribe revised its constitution to specify: 
"The inherent powers of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, in-
cluding those conferred by Section 16 of the Act of June 
18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), as amended, shall vest in the 
tribal council and shall be exercised thereby subject only 
to limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United 
States, applicable Federal statutes and regulations of 
the Department of the Interior, and the restrictions es-
tablished by this revised constitution." Revised Con-
stitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. XI, § 1. 
The Revised Constitution provides that "[t]he tribal council 
may enact ordinances to govern the development of tribal 
lands and other resources, "Art. XI, § 1 (a) (3). It further 
provides that "[t]he tribal council may levy and collect taxes 
and fees on tribal members, and may enact ordinances, sub-
ject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, to impose 
taxes and fees on non-members of the tribe doing business on 
the reservation," Art. XI, § 1 (e). The Revised Constitution 
was approved by the Secretary on February 13, 1969. 
To develop tribal lands, the Tribe has executed mineral 
leases encompassing some 69% of the reservation land. Be-
ginning in 1953, the petitioners entered into leases with the 
Tribe. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on behalf of the 
Secretary, approved these leases, as required by the Act of 
May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. §§ 396a-396g 
(1938 Act). In exchange for a cash bonus, royalties, and 
rents, the typical lease grants the lessee "the exclusive right 
and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose 
of all oil and natural gas deposits in and under" the leased 
land for as long as the minerals are produced in paying quan-
tities. App. 22. Petitioners may use oil and gas in develop-
ing the lease without incurring the royalty. Id., at 24. In 
addition, the Tribe reserves the rights to use gas without 
charge for any of its buildings on the leased land, and to take 
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its royalties in kind. !d., at 27-28. Petitioners' activities on 
the leased land have been subject to taxes imposed by the 
State of New Mexico on oil and gas severance and on oil and 
gas production equipment. !d., at 129. See Act of March 3, 
1927, ch. 299, § 3, 44 Stat. 1347, 25 U. S. C. § 398c (permit-
ting state taxation of mineral production on Indian reserva-
tions) (1927 Act). 
Pursuant to its Revised Constitution, the Tribal Council 
adopted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on oil and gas 
production on tribal land. See App. 38. The ordinance was 
approved by the Secretary, through the Acting Director of 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, on December 23, 1976. The 
tax applies to "any oil and natural gas severed, saved and re-
moved from Tribal lands .... " Ibid. The tax is assessed at 
the wellhead at $0.05 per million BTU of gas produced and 
$0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate produced on the 
reservation, and it is due at the time of severance. ·I d., at 
38-39. Oil and gas consumed by the lessees to develop their 
leases or received by the Tribe as in-kind royalty payments 
are exempted from the tax. Ibid.; Brief for Respondent 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe 59, n. 42. 
In two separate actions, petitioners sought to enjoin en-
forcement of the tax by either ,the tribal authorities or the 
Secretary. The United StateS1:>istrict Court for the District 
of New Mexico consolidated the cases, granted other lessees 
leave to intervene, and permanently enjoined enforcement of 
the tax. The District Court ruled that the Tribe lacked the --authority to impose the tax, that only state and local authori-
ties had the power to tax oil and gas production on Indian 
reservations, and that the tax violated the Commerce Clause. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
sitting en bane, reversed. 617 F. 2d 537 (CAlO 1980).4 The 
' Two judges dissented. Both argued that tribal sovereignty does not 
encompass the power to tax nonlndian lessees, 617 F. 2d, at 551-556 (Seth, 
C. J., dissenting); id., at 551H565 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (also arguing the 
80-11 & 80-l~OPINION 
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Court of Appeals reasoned that the taxing power is an inher-
ent attribute of tribal sovereignty that has not been divested 
by any treaty or Act of Congress, including the 1927 Act, 25 
U. S. C. § 398c. The court also found no Commerce Clause 
violation. We granted certioriari, -- U. S. -- (1980), 
and we now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Petitioners argue that an Indian tribe's authority to tax 
nonindians who do business on the reservation stems exclu-
sively from its power to exclude such persons from tribal 
lands. Because the Tribe did not initially condition the 
leases upon the payment of a severance tax, petitioners as-
sert that the Tribe is without authority to impose such a tax 
at a later time. w__e disagree with the premise that t~e 
power to tax de~s only from the power to exclude. Even 
if that premise is accepted, however, we disagree with the 
conclusion that the Tribe lacks the power to impose the sev-
erance tax. 
A 
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville In-
dian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980) (Colville), we ad-
dressed the Indian tribes' authority to impose taxes on 
non Indians doing business on the reservation. We held that 
"[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and 
significantly involving a tribe or its members is a funda-
mental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless 
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their 
dependent status." I d., at 152. The power to tax is an es-
sential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a neces-
sary instrument of self-government and territorial manage-
ment. This power enables a tribal government to raise 
revenues for its essential services. The power does not de-
tax violates the Commerce Clause). 
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rive solely from the Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indi-
ans from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe's 
general authority, as sovereign, t6- control economic activity 
Within its JUnsdiction, and to defray the cost of providing 
governmental services by requiring contributions from per-
sons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that 
jurisdiction. See, e. g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 
(1824). 
The petitioners avail themselves of the "substantial privi-
lege of carrying on business" on the reservation. Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425, 437 (1980); 
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444-445 
(1940). They benefit from the provision of police protection 
and other governmental services, as well as from "'the ad-
vantages of a civilized society'" that are assured by the exist-
ence of tribal government. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. 
of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line, 
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 445 (1979)). 
Numerous other governmental entities levy a general reve-
nue tax similar to that imposed by the Jicarilla Tribe when 
they provide comparable services. Under these circum-
stances, there is nothing exceptional in requiring petitioners 
to contribute through taxes to the general cost of tribal gov-
ernment.5 Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 
- U. S. -,- (1981) [slip op., at 14-16]; id., at-, 
-- (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (dissent slip op., at 10); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 
436-437. 
As we observed in Colville, supra, the tribe's interest in 
5 Through various Acts governing Indian tribes, Congress has ex-
pressed the purpose of "fostering tribal self-government." Callville, 
supra, at 155. We agree with Judge McKay's observation that "[i]t simply 
does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal functions 
approved and mandated by Congress without being able to exercise at 
least minimal taxing powers, whether they take the form of real estate 
taxes, leasehold taxes or severance taxes." 617 F. 2d, at 550 (McKay, J., 
concurring). 
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levying taxes on nonmembers to raise "revenues for essential 
governmental programs ... is strongest when the revenues 
are derived from value generated on the reservation by activ-
ities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipi-
ent of tribal services." 447 U. S., at 15~157. This surely 
is the case here. The mere fact that the government impos-
ing the tax also enjoys rents and royalties as the lessor of the 
mineral lands does not undermine the government's author-
ity to impose the tax. See infra, at-----. The roy-
alty payments from the mineral leases are paid to the Tribe in 
its role as partner in petitioners' commercial venture. The 
severance tax, in contrast, is petitioners' contribution "to the 
general cost of providing governmental services." Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra, at--. State 
governments commonly receive both royalty payments and 
severance taxes from lessees of mineral lands within their 
borders. 
Viewing the taxing power of Indian tribes as an essential 
instrument of self-government and territorial management 
has been a shared assumption of all three branches of the 
Federal Government. Cf. Colville, supra, at 153. In Col-
ville, supra, the Court relied in part on a 1934 opinion of the 
Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. In this opinion, 
the Solicitor recognized that, in the absence of Congressional 
action to the contrary, the tribes' sovereign power to tax 
"'may be exercised over members of the tribe and over non-
members, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges 
of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as 
conditions.'" 447 U. S., at 153 (quoting Powers of Indian 
Tribes, 55 I. D. 14, 46 (1934)). Colville further noted that of-
ficial executive pronouncements have repeatedly recognized 
that "Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdic-
tion over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation 
lands in which the tribes have a significant interest ... , in-
cluding jurisdiction to tax." 447 U. S., at 152-153 (citing 23 
Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900); 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 174 (1855)). 6 
6 Moreover, in its revision of the classic treatise on Indian Law, the De-
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Similarly, Congress has acknowledged that the tribal 
power to tax is one of the tools necessary to self-government 
and territorial control. As early as 1879, the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee acknowledged the validity of a tax imposed 
by the Chickasaw Nation on nonlndians legitimately within 
its territory: 
"We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the 
right of self-government and jurisdiction over the per-
sons and property within the limits of the territory they 
occupy, except so far as that jurisdiction has been re-
strained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress. 
Subject to the supervisory control of the Federal Gov-
ernment, they may enact the requisite legislation to 
maintain peace and good order, improve their condition, 
establish school systems, and aid their people in their ef-
forts to acquire the arts of civilized life; and they un-
doubtedly possess the inherent right to resort to taxation 
to raise the necessary revenue for the accomplishment of 
these vitally important objects-a right not in any sense 
derived from the Government of the United States." 
S. Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 1-2 (1879) 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, the views of the three federal branches of govern-
partment of Interior advances the view that the Indian tribes' power to tax 
is not limited by the power to exclude. See United States Solicitor for the 
Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 438 (1958) ("The power to 
tax does not depend upon the power to remove and has been upheld where 
there was no power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal 
jurisdiction.") (footnote omitted). See also F. Cohen, Handbook of Fed-
eral Indian Law 142 (1942) ("One of the powers essential to the mainte-
nance of any government is the power to levy taxes. That this power is an 
inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn 
or limited by treaty or by act of Congress is a proposition which has never 
been successfully disputed.") (footnote omitted). 
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ment, as well as general principles of taxation, confirm that 
Indian tribes enjoy authority to finance their governmental 
services through taxation of nonindians who benefit from 
those services. Indeed, the conception of Indian sover-
eignty that this Court has consistently reaffirmed permits no 
other conclusion. As we observed in United States v. 
Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975), "Indian tribes within 'In-
dian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary 
organizations.'" Rather, they "are unique aggregations pos-
sessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members 
and their territory." Ibid. See e. g., Worcester v. Georgia, 
6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the 
Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89, 92, 99 (CA8 1956); 
Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. 426, 428-429 (CA8 1893); F. 
Cohen, "The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of 
the United States," in The Legal Conscience 230, 234 (L. 
Cohen ed. 1960). Adhering to this understanding, we con-
firm that the Tribe's authority to tax nonindians who conduct 
business on the reservation does not simply derive from the 
Tribe's power to exclude such persons, but is an inherent 
power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial 
management. 
Of course, the Tribe's authority to tax nonmembers is sub-
ject to constraints not imposed on other governmental enti-
ties: the federal government can take away this power, and 
the Tribe must obtain the approval of the Secretary before 
any tax on nonmembers can take effect. These additional 
constraints minimize potential concern that Indian tribes will 
exercise the power to tax in an unfair or unprincipled man-
ner, and ensure that the tribal power to tax will be consistent 
with national policies. 
We are not persuaded by petitioners' argument that an In-
dian tribe's authority to tax nonindians is extremely limited 
because its only source is the tribe's power to exclude such 
persons from tribal lands. Limiting the tribes' authority to 
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tax in this manner contradicts the conception that Indian 
tribes are domestic, dependent nations, as well as the com-
mon understanding that the sovereign taxing power is a tool 
for raising revenue necessary to cover the costs of gov-
ernment. 
Furthermo~e, early decisions upholding tribal power to tax 
nonmembers do not support this limitation. See, e. g., Mor-
ris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 
F. 947 (CA8 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U. S. 384 (1905); 
Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807, 809 (Ct. App. 
Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F. 1003 (CA8 1900). It is evident from 
these cases that a hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the 
power to exclude nonindians from Indian lands, and that this 
power provides a basis for tribal authority to tax. None of 
these cases, however, establishes that the authority to tax 
derives solely from the power to exclude. 
Morris v. Hitchcock, for example, suggests that the taxing 
power is a legitimate instrument for raising revenue, and 
that a tribe may exercise this power over nonindians who re-
ceive privileges from the tribe, such as the right to trade on 
Indian land. In Morris, the Court approved a tax on cattle 
grazing and relied in part on a report to the Senate by the 
Committee on the Judiciary, which found no legal defect in 
previous tribal tax legislation having "a twofold object-to 
prevent the intrusion of unauthorized persons into the terri-
tory of the Chickasaw Nation, and to raise revenue." 194 
U. S., at 389 (emphasis added). In Maxey v. Wright, the 
question of Indian sovereignty was not even raised: the deci-
sion turned on the construction of a treaty denying the Tribe 
any governing or jurisdictional authority over nonmembers. 
3 Ind. T., at 247-248, 54 S. W., at 809. 7 
7 The governing treaty in Maxey v. Wright restricted the tribal right to 
self-government and jurisdiction to members of the Creek or Seminole 
Tribes. The court relied, at least in part, on opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral interpreting this treaty. For example, one such opinion stated that, 
80-11 & 80-15---0PINION 
MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE 11 
Finally, the decision in Buster v. Wright actually under-
mines the theory that the tribes' taxing authority derives 
solely from the power to exclude nonindians from tribal 
lands. Under this theory, a nonindian who establishes law-
ful presence in Indian territory could avoid paying a tribal 
tax by claiming that no residual portion of the power to ex-
clude supports the tax. This result was explicitly rejected in 
Buster v. Wright. In Buster, deeds to individual lots in In-
dian territory had been granted to nonindian residents, and 
cities and towns had been incorporated. As a result, Con-
gress had expressly prohibited the Tribe from removing 
these nonindian residents. Even though the ownership of 
land and the creation of local governments by non-Indians es-
tablished their legitimate presence on Indian land, the court 
held that the Tribe retained its power to tax. The court con-
cluded that "(n]either the United States, nor a state, nor any 
other sovereignty loses the power to govern the people 
within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein 
whatever the meaning of the clause limiting to tribal members the Tribe's 
unrestricted rights of self-government and jurisdiction, it did 
" 'not limit the right of these tribes to pass upon the question, who ... 
shall share their occupancy, and upon what terms. That is a question 
which all private persons are allowed to decide for themselves; and even 
wild animals, not men, have a certain respect paid to the instinct which in 
this respect they share with man. The serious words 'jurisdiction' and 
'self-government' are scarcely appropriate to the right of a hotel keeper to 
prescribe rules and charges for persons who become his fellow occupants.' " 
3 Ind. T., at 250, 54 S. W., at 809 (quoting 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 36, 37). 
The court, as well as the opinion of the Attorney General, found that the 
Tribe's "natural instinct" to set terms on occupancy was unaltered by the 
treaty. Neither the court nor the Attorney General adressed the scope of 
Indian sovereignty when unlimited by treaty; instead, they identified the 
Tribe's right, as a social group, to exclude intruders and place conditions on 
their occupancy. The court's dependence on this reasoning hardly bears 
on the more general question posed here: what is the source of the Indian 
tribes' sovereign power to tax absent a restriction by treaty or other fed-
eral law? 
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endowed with the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the 
ownership nor occupancy of the land within its territorial ju-
risdictions by citizens or foreigners." 135 F., at 952 (empha-
sis added). 8 This result confirms that the Tribe's authority 
to tax derives not from its power to exclude, but from its 
power to govern and to raise revenues to pay for the costs of 
government. 
We choose not to embrace a new restriction on the extent 
of tTie1TI1>al authoritYto tax, By interpreting these early 
cases as esta lishing that t IS authority to tax derives solely 
from the tribe's authority to exclude nonmembers from tribal 
lands. Instead, based on the views of each of the federal 
branches, general principles of taxation, and the conception 
of Indian tribes as domestic, dependent nations, we conclude 
that the Tribe has the authority to impose a severance tax on 
the mining activities of petitioners as part of its power to gov-
ern and to pay for the costs of self-government. 
B 
Alternatively, if we accept petitioners' position that the 
Tribe's authority to tax derives ~olely from it_~ power o ex-
clude nonlndians from the reservation, we conclude that the 
Trlbe has tlie authority to impose the severance tax chal-
lenged here. Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands 
remain subject to the tribe's power to exclude them. This 
power necessarily includes the lesser power to place condi-
tions on entry, such as a tax on business activities conducted 
on the reservation. When a tribe grants a nonlndian the 
right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees not to exercise its 
ultimate power to oust the nonlndian as long as the non-
8 Both the classic treatise on Indian law and its subsequent revision by 
the Department of Interior, see n. 6, supra, agree with this reading of 
Buster v. Wright. United States Solicitor for the Department of the Inte-
rior, Federal Indian Law, supra, at 438; F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, supra, at 142 (both citing Buster v. Wright, supra, for the 
proposition that the power to tax is an inherent sovereign power not de-
pendent on the power to exclude). 
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Indian complies with the initial conditions of entry. How-
ever, it does not follow that the lawful property~ _!o b~ on 
Indian ~n a so immunizes the non n Ian om the tribe's ex-
ercise of its lesser-me u ed power to tax or to place other 
conditions on the nonindian's conduct~on the reservation. 9 
A nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe re-
mains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its 
sovereign power. The fact that the Tribe chooses not to ex-
ercise its power to tax when it initially grants a nonindian en-
try onto the reservation does not permanently divest the 
Tribe of its authority to impose such a tax. 10 
Petitioners argue that their leaseholds entitle them to 
enter the reservation and exempt them from further exer-
cises of the Tribe's sovereign authority. In other words, pe-
titioners assert that the Tribe has lost the power to tax their 
mining activities because it has leased to them the use of the 
mineral lands and such rights of access to the reservation as 
might be necessary to enjoy the leases. 11 However, this con-
clusion is not compelled by linking the taxing power to the 
pow~r to exclude. Instead, it is based on additional assump-
tions and confusions about the consequences of the commer-
cial arrangement between petitioners and the Tribe. 
Most important, petitioners confuse the Tribe's role as 
commercial partner with its role as sovereign. 12 This confu-
9 See also Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 
F. 2d 553 (CA8 1958) (lessees of tribal lands subject to Indian tax on use of 
land). 
10 Here, the leases extend for as long as minerals are produced in paying 
quantities, in other words, until the resources are depleted. Thus, under 
the petitioners' approach, the Tribe would never have the power to tax 
petitioners. 
11 But see Buster v. Wright , supra, at 958: 
"The ultimate conclusion of the whole matter is that purchasers of lots in 
town sites in towns or cities within the original limits of the Creek Nation, 
who are in lawful possession of their lots , are still subject to the laws of 
that nation prescribing permit taxes for the exercise by noncitizens of the 
privilege of conducting business in those towns . . . . " 
12 In contrast, the 1958 treatise on Indian law written by the U. S. Solici-
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sion relegates the powers of sovereignty to the bargaining 
process undertaken in each of the sovereign's commercial 
agreements. It is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed 
to sell the right to use the land and take from it valuable min-
erals; it is quite another to find that the Tribe has abandoned 
its sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly re-
served them through a contract. 
Confusing these two results denigrates Indian sover-
eignty. Moreover, it implies that the power to tax depends ) 
on the consent of the taxed as well as on the Tribe's power to f 
exclude non-Indians. Whatever place consent may have in 
contractual matters and in the creation of democratic govern-
ments, it has little if any role in measuring the validity of an 
exercise of legitimate sovereign authority. Requiring the 
consent of the entrant deposits in the hands of the excludable 
nonindian the source of the tribe's power, when the power 
instead derives from sovereignty itself. Only the Federal 
Government rna limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign au-
thori~. . g., United tates v. Wheeler, 5 U. S. 313~322 
(1978). 13 Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent 
tor of the U. S. Department of Interior recognized and distinguished the 
scope of these two roles when it embraced as the "present state of the law" 
the following summary: 
"'Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well as the 
rights of a local government, dominion as well as sovereignty. But over 
all the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members 
thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of determining 
the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, 
to reside therein, and to do business, provided only such determination is 
consistent with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any vested 
rights of persons now occupying reservation lands under lawful author-
ity.' " Federal Indian Law, supra, at 439 (quoting Solicitor's Opinion of 
October 25, 1934) (emphasis added). 
See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra, at 143. 
'
3 See alsoP. Maxfield, et al., Natural Resources Law on American In-
dian Lands 4-6 (1977). Federal limitations on tribal sovereignty can also 
occur when the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with 
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of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember's presence 
and conduct on Indian lands is conditioned by the limitations 
the Tribe may choose to impose. 
Viewed in this light, the absence of a reference to the tax 
in the leases themselves hardly impairs the Tribe's authority 
to impose the tax. Contractual arrangements remain sub-
ject to subsequent legislation by the presiding sovereign. 
See, e. g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn of 
Newark, 310 U. S. 32 (1940); Home Building & Loan Assn. 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934). Even where the contract 
at issue requires payment of a royalty for a license or fran-
chise issued by the governmental entity, the government's 
power to tax remains unless it "has been specifically surren-
dered in terms which admit of no other reasonable interpre-
tation." City of St. Louis v. United R. Co., 210 U. S. 266, 
280 (1908). To state that Indian sovereignty is "different" 
than that of States or local governments because it derives 
from the power to exclude does not justify ignoring the prin-
ciples announced by this Court in cases involving city, state, 
and federal taxes imposed under similar circumstances. 
Without regard to its source, sovereign power, even when 
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all con-
tracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction. -
No claim is asserted in this case, nor could one be, that pe-
titioners' leases contain the clear and unmistakable surrender 
of taxing power required for its extinction. We could find a 
waivey of the Tribe's taxing power only if we fnferred it from 
silence in the leases. To presume that a sovereign rorever 
waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers un-
less it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power in a 
commercial agreement turns the concept of sovereignty on its 
head, and we do not adopt this analysis. 14 
overriding national interests. See Colville, supra, at 153. This concern 
is not presented here. See id. 
" Petitioners also argue that we should infer a waiver of the taxing 
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c 
The Tribe has the inherent power to impose the severance 
tax on petitioners, whether this power derives from the 
Tribe's power of self-government or from its power to ex-
clude. Because Congress may limit tribal sovereignty, we 
now review petitioners' argument that Congress, when it en-
acted twOTe"deral acts g~ing Indians and various pieces 
of federal energy legislation, de rived the Tribe of its author-
ity J o imEose the severan~ tax. 
In Colville, supra, we concluded that the "widely held un-
derstanding within the Federal Government has always been 
that federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of In-
dian taxing power." 447 U. S., at 152 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, we noted that "[n]o federal statute cited to us 
shows any congressional departure from this view." ld., at 
153. Likewise, getitioners can cite to no statute that specifi-
cally divests the Tribe of its power to impose t e severance 
tax on their mining act1v1bes. Instead, petitioners argue 
tnat Congress implicitly took away this power when it en-
acted the acts and various pieces of legislation on which peti-
tioners rely. We reiterate here our admonition in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 60 (1978): "a proper 
power from silence in the Tribe's original constitution. Although it is true 
that the constitution in force when petitioners signed their leases did not 
include a provision specifically authorizing a severance tax, neither the 
Tribe's constitution nor the Federal Constitution is the font of any sover-
eign power of the Indian tribes. E. g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of 
the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 94; Buster v. Wright, supra, at 950. 
Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have 
not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from 
silence on this point is that the sovereign power to tax remains intact. 
The Tribe's constitution was amended to authorize the tax before the tax 
was imposed, and this is the critical event necessary to effectuate the tax. 
See Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 
554, 556; Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 
supra, at 99. 
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respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary 
authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread 
lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative 
intent." 
Petitioners argue that Congress preempted the Tribe's 
power to impose a severance tax when it enacted the 1938 
Act, 25 U. S. C. § 396a-396g. In essence, petitioners argue 
that the tax constitutes an additional burden on lessees that 
is inconsistent with the Act's regulatory scheme for leasing 
and developing oil and gas reserves on Indian land. This 
Act, and the regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Interior for its enforcement, establish the procedures to be 
followed for leasing oil and gas interests on tribal lands. 
However, the proviso to § 396b of the Act states that "the 
foregoing provisions shall in no manner restrict the right of 
tribes . . . to lease lands for mining purposes . . . in accord-
ance with the provisions of any constitution and charter 
adopted by any Indian tribe pursuant to sections 461, 462, 
463, 464-475, 476-478, and 479 of this title." (emphasis 
added). 15 Therefore, this Act does not prohibit the Tribe 
from imposing a severance tax on petitioners' mining activi-
ties pursuant to its Revised Constitution, when both the Re-
vised Constitution and the ordinance authorizing the tax are 
approvedy the Secretary. 16 
17 
15 The Secretary has implemented the substance of this proviso by the 
following regulation: 
"The regulations in this part may be superseded by the provisions of any 
tribal constitution, bylaw or charter issued pursuant to the Indian Reorga-
nization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984; 25 U. S. C. 461-479), .. . or by 
ordinance, resolution or other action authorized under such constitution, 
bylaw or charter. The regulations in this part, in so far as they are not so 
superseded, shall apply to leases made by organized tribes if the validity of 
the lease depends upon the approval of the Secretary of the Interior." 25 
C. F . R. § 171.29 (1980). 
16 In arguing that the 1938 Act was intended to preempt the severance 
tax, petitioners attach great significance to the Secretary's approval of the 
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Petitioners also assert that the 1927 Act, 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 398a-398e, divested the Tribe's taxing power. We dis-
agree. The 1927 Act permits state taxation of mineral les-
sees on Executive Order reservations, but it indicates no 
change in the taxing power of the affected tribes. See 25 
U. S. C. § 398c. Without mentioning the tribal authority to 
tax, the Act authorizes state taxation of royalties from min-
eral production on all Indian lands. Petitioners argue that 
the Act transferred the Indian power to tax mineral produc-
tion to the States in exchange for the royalties assured the 
tribes. This claim not only lacks any supporting evidence in 
the legislative history, it also deviates from settled principles 
of taxation: different sovereigns can enjoy powers to tax the 
same transactions. Thus, the mere existence of State au-
thority to tax does not deprive the Indian tribe of its power 
to tax. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 
543 F. 2d 1253 (CA91976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 983 (1977). 
Cf. Colville, supra, at 158 ("There is no direct conflict be-
tween the state and tribal schemes, since each government is 
~ose its taxes without ousting the other."). 17 
etitioners contend that tribal taxation of oil and 
gas conflicts with national energy policies, and therefore the 
leases. Curiously, they attach virtually no significance to the fact that the 
Secretary also approved the tax ordinance that they challenge here. 
17 The Tribe argues that the 1927 Act granting the States the power to 
tax mineral production on Indian land is inapplicable because the leases at 
issue here were signed pursuant to the 1938 Act. The 1938 Act, which 
makes uniform the laws applicable to leasing mineral rights on tribal lands, 
does not contain a grant of power to the States comparable to that found in 
the 1927 Act. As a result, the Tribe asserts that the State of New Mexico 
has no power to tax the production under petitioners' leases with the Tribe. 
Because the State of New Mexico is not a party to this suit, the Court of 
Appeals did not reach this issue. See 617 F. 2d, at 547-548, n. 5. For 
this reason, and because we conclude that the 1927 Act did not affect the 
Tribe's authority to tax, we likewise do not reach this issue. 
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tribal tax is preempted by federal law. Again, petitioners 
cite no specific federal statute restricting Indian sovereignty. 
Nor do they explain why state taxation of the same type of I 
activity escapes the asserted conflict with Federal policy. 
Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,-- U. S. --
(1981). Indeed, rather than forbidding tribal severance 
taxes, Congress has included taxes imposed by an Indian 
tribe in its definition of costs that may be recovered under 
federal energy pricing regulations. Natural Gas Policy Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, §§ 110 (a), (c) (1), 92 Stat. 3368, 15 
U. S.C. §§3320(a), (c) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Although 
this inclusion may not reflect Congress' view with respect to 
the source of a tribe's power to impose a severance tax, 18 it 
surely indicates that imposing such a tax would not contra-
vene federal energy policy and that the tribal authority to do 
so is not implicitly divested by that Act. 
We find no "clear indications" that Congress has implicitly 
deprived the Tribe of its power to impose the severance tax. 
In any event, if there were ambiguity on this point, the doubt 
would benefit the Tribe, for "[a]mbiguities in federal law 
have been construed generously in order to comport with ... 
traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy 
of encouraging tribal independence." White Mountain 
18 The statute provides that Indian severance taxes may be recovered 
through federal energy pricing. However, the legislative history indi-
cates that Congress took no position on the source of the Indian tribes' 
power to impose the tax in the first place: 
"While severance taxes which may be imposed by an Indian tribe are to be 
treated in the same manner as State imposed severance taxes, the confer-
ees do not intend to prejudge the outcome of the cases on appeal before the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals respecting the right of Indian tribes to im-
pose taxes on persons or organizations other than Indians who are engaged 
in business activities on Indian reservations. The outcome of the cases on 
appeal will determine the legality of imposing such taxes." S. Conf. Rep. 
No. 95-1126, p. 91 (1978); H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, p. 91 (1978). 
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Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143-144 (1980). Ac-
cordingly, we find that the Federal Government has not di-
vested the Tribe of its inherent authority to tax mining activ-
ities on its land, whether this authority derives from the 
Tribe's power of self-government or from its power to 
exclude. 
III 
Finding no defect in the Tribe's exercise of its taxing 
power, we now address petitioners' contention that the sev-
et,ance tax violates tne ' 'negative implications"o f t~~ com:-
1;?-erce --C!a~e because It taxes an activity that is an integral 
part of the ow of commerce, discriminates against interstate 
commerce, and imposes a multiple burden on interstate com-
merce. At the outset, we note that reviewing tribal action 
under the Interstate Commerce Clause is not without concep-
tual difficulties. E. g., nn. 21 and 24, infra. Apparently 
recognizing these difficulties, the Solicitor General, on behalf 
of the Secretary, argues that the language/9 the structure, 
and the purposes of the Commerce Clause support the con-
clusion that the Commerce Clause does not, of its own f¢ce, 
limit Indian tribes in their dealings with nonindians. vBrief 
for the Secretary of the Interior 35--40. The Solicitor Gen-
eral reasons that the Framers did not intend "the courts, 
through the Commerce Clause, to impose their own views of 
the proper relationship between Indians and nonindians and 
to strike down measures adopted by a tribe wit].l which the 
political de art~ents of overnment nave not seen-fit to dis-
agree." !d., at 39. Instead, where tn a egislation is in-
imical to the national welfare, the Solicitor asserts that the -Framers contemplated that the remedies would be the nego-
tiation or renegotiation of treaties, the enactment of legisla-
'
9 The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes." U. S. Canst., Art. I , § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
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tion governing trade and other relations, or the exertion of 
superior force by the United States government. !d., at 
38-39. Using similar reasoning, the Solicitor suggests that 
if the Commerce Clause does impose restrictions on tribal ac-
tivity, those restrictions must arise from the Indian Com-
merce Clause, and not its Interstate counterpart. I d., at 
40-43. 
[Wh'le the ear ments are n without force"J.his Court to 
date has relied on the ndian Commerce ause as a shield to 
protect Indian tribes from state and local interference, and 
has not relied on the Clause to authorize tribal regulation of 
commerce without any constitutional restraints. We see no 
need to break new ground in this area today: even if we as-
sume that tribal action is subject to the limitations of the In-
terstate Commerce Clause, this tax does not violate the "neg-
ative implications" of that Clause. 
A 
A state tax may violate the "negative implications" of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause by unduly burdening or 
discrimin¥ng against interstate commerce. See, e. g., 
Comm~~~lth Edison Co. v. Montana, -- U. S. --
(1981); Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 
(1977). Judicial review of state taxes under the Interstate 
Commerce Clause is intended to ensure that States do not 
disrupt or burden interstate commerce when Congress' 
power remains unexercised: it protects the free flow of com-
merce, and thereby safeguards Congress' latent power from 
encroachment by the several States. 
However, we only engage in this review when Congress 
has not acted or purported to act. See, e. g., Prudential In-
surance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 421-427 (1946). 
Once Congress acts, courts are not free to review state taxes 7 
or other regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
When Congress has struck the baTance it deems appropriate, 
the courts are no longer needed to prevent States from bur-
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dening commerce, and it matters not that the courts would 
invalidate the state tax or regulation under the Commerce 
Clause in the absence of congressional action. See Pruden-
tial Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, supra, at 431. 20 Courts are 
final arbiters under the Commerce Clause only when Con-
gress has not acted. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 454 (1979). 
In this case, Congress has affirmatively acted ~providing 
a series of Federal check~ that must be CTeared before a 
tribal tax can take effect. 2' Under the Indian Reorganization 
Act, 25 U. S. C. §§ 476, 477, a tribe u t o tain a roval 
from the Secreta before it adopts or revises its constitution 
to announce 1ts mtention to tax nonmem ers. u er, be-
fore the ordmance 1mposmg e severance tax challenged 
here could take effect, the Tribe was required again to obtain 
approval from the Secretary. See Revised Constitution of 
the Jicarilla Tribe, Art. XI, §§ 1 (e), 2. Cf. 25 U. S. C. 
20 In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, supra, this Court refused 
to invalidate a South Carolina tax on out-of-state insurance companies de-
spite appellant's contention that the tax impermissibly burdened interstate 
commerce. The Court refused to entertain appellant's argument because 
Congress, in passing the McCarran Act, had provided that "silence on the 
part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regula-
tion or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several States." 59 
Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011. 
21 Although Congress has not expressly announced that Indian taxes do 
not threaten its latent power to regulate interstate commerce, it is unclear 
how Congress could articulate that intention any more convincingly than it 
has done here. In contrast to when Congress acts with respect to the 
states, when Congress acts with respect to the Indian tribes, it generally 
does so pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, or by 
virtue of its superior position over the tribes, not pursuant to its authority 
under the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is but one of the difficulties 
inherent in reviewing under the Interstate Commerce Clause both tribal 
action and congressional action regulating the tribes. Therefore, in deter-
mining whether Congress has "acted" to preclude judicial review, we do 
not find it significant that the congressional action here was not taken pur-
suant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
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§§476, 477; 25 C. F. R. § 171.29 (implementing the proviso to 
§ 396b of the 1938 Act, quoted supra, n. 15). 
As we noted earlier, the severance tax challenged by peti-
tioners was enacted in accordance with this congressional 
scheme. Both the Tribe's Revised Constitution and the chal-
lenged tax ordinance received the requisite approval from the 
Secretary. This course of events fulfilled the administrative 
process established by Congress to monitor such exercises of 
tribal authority. As a result, this Tribal tax comes to us in a 
posture significant! different from a cfiallengeastate tax, 
which does no need specific edera approval to take effect, 
and which therefore requires, in the absence of congressional 
ratification, judicial review to ensure that it does not unduly 
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. Judi-
cial review of the Indian tax measure, in contrast, would du-
plicate the administrative review called for by the congres-
sional scheme. 
Finally, Congress is well aware that Indian tribes impose 
mineral severance taxes such as the one challenged by peti-
tioners. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 3320 (a), (c) (1). Congress, of course, retains plenary 
power to limit tribal taxing authority or to alter the current 
scheme under which the tribes may impose taxes. How-
ever, it is not our function nor our prerogative to strike down 
a tax that has travelled through the precise channels estab-
lished by Congress, and has obtained the specific approval of 
the Secretary. 
B 
The tax challenged here would survive judicial scrutiny ? 
under the Interstate Co~erce Clause, even if such scrutiny 
were necessary. In VComplete Auto Transit v. Brady, 
supra, at 279, we held that a state tax on activities connected 
to interstate commerce is sustainable if it "is applied to an ac-
tivity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly 
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-
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merce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the 
State." Petitioners do not question that the tax on the sev-
erance of minerals from the mines 22 meets the first and the 
second tests: the mining activities taxed pursuant to the ordi-
nance occur entirely on reservation land. Furthermore, pe- ~ r 
titioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that the 
amount of the tax is not fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the Tribe. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioners 
in No. 80-15, pp. 11, 17-20.23 
Instead, petitioners focus their attack on the third factor, 
and argue that the tax discriminates against interstate com-
merce. In essence, petitioners argue that the language "sold 
22 Petitioners initially contend that the ordinance taxes the transporta-
tion of the minerals from the reservation, not their severance from the 
mines. As a result, they argue that the ordinance impermissibly burdens 
interstate commerce by taxing the movement in commerce itself, which is 
not a local event. The tax, by its terms, applies to resources that are "pro-
duced on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe Reservation and sold or transported off 
the Reservation." App. 39. The Tribe explains that this language was 
used because no sale occurs prior to the transportation off the Reservation. 
The Tribe's tax is due at the time of severance. I d., at 38. Therefore, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the taxable event defined by the ordi-
nance is the removal of minerals from the soil, not their transportat,ion 
1 
_o 
from the reservation. See 617 F. 2d, at 546. -fv ~
23 The Court of Appeals noted that, because the lessees chose not~t a 
factual foundation to challenge the tax on this ground, there was ri'o basis 
on which to find that the tax was not fairly related to the services provided 
by the Tribe. See 617 F. 2d, at 545, n. 4. Indeed, when the Tribe at-
tempted to introduce at trial evidence of the services it had provided to 
establish this relationship, the District Court rejected this evidence upon 
petitioners' objection that such evidence was irrelevant to their challenge. 
Brief for Respondent Jicarilla Apache Tribe 7-8; VI Record 278-290, 294, 
300-308. In any event, because the severance tax is assessed as a per-
centage of the minerals produced, the measure of the tax is tied to the 
earnings made possible under the Tribe's auspices, and the tax is reason-
ably related to the extent of the taxpayer's activities within the taxing ju-
risdiction. Therefore, after Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 
supra, a factual inquiry into the value of the services provided by the Tribe 
would not be necessary. 
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or transported off the reservation" exempts from taxation 
minerals sold on the reservation, kept on the reservation for 
use by individual members of the tribe, and minerals taken 
by the Tribe on the reservation as in-kind royalty. Although 
petitioners admit that no sales have occurred on the reserva-
tion to date, they argue that the Tribe might induce private 
industry to locate on the reservation to take advantage of this 
allegedly discriminatory taxing policy. We do not accept pe-
titioners' arguments; instead, we agree with the Tribe, the 
Solicitor General, and the Court of Appeals that the tax is im-
posed on minerals sold on the reservation or transported off 
the reservation before sale. See 617 F. 2d, at 546. Cf. 
-::z. ?--- n. ~' supra. 24 Under this interpretation, the tax does not 
treat minerals transported away from the reservation differ-
ently than it treats minerals that might be sold on the res-
ervation. Nor does the Tribe's tax ordinance exempt miner-
als ultimately received by individual members of the Tribe. 
The ordinance does exempt minerals received by the Tribe as 
in-kind payments on the leases and used for tribal purposes,25 
but this exemption merely avoids the administrative make-
work that would ensue if the Tribe, as local government, 
taxed the amount of minerals that the Tribe, as commercial 
partner, receives in royalty payments. Therefore, this ex-
emption cannot be deemed a discriminatory preference for 
local commerce. fJf order to reach a different conclusion, we 
24 The ordinance does not distinguish between minerals remaining within 
New Mexico and those transported beyond the State boundary. As are-
sult, petitioners' argument that the tax discriminates against interstate 
commerce by favoring local sales focuses on the boundary between the res-
ervation and the State of New Mexico and not on any interstate bound-
aries. We will assume for purposes of this argument only that this alleged 
reservation-state discrimination could give rise to a Commerce Clause 
violation. 
25 Paragraph 4 of the ordinance specifies that "[r ]oyalty gas, oil or con-
densate taken by the Tribe in kind, and used by the Tribe shall be exempt 
from taxation." App. 39. 
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would have to ignore our recent cases refusing to impose a 
Commerce Clause limitation on the proprietary activities of 
the States. See, e. g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 
(1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 
(1976).:__) 
IV 
In Worcester v. Georgia, supra, Chief Justice Marshall ob-
served that Indian tribes had "always been considered as dis-
tinct, independent political communities, retaining their orig-
26 Petitioners contend that because New Mexico may tax the same min-
ing activity at full value, the Indian tax imposes a 'iliititipie tax burden on 
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Cia use. The multiple 
taxation issue arises where two or more taxing jurisdictions point to some 
contact with an enterprise to support a tax on the entire value of its multi-
state activities, which is more than the contact would justify. E. g., 
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382, 384-385 (1952). This Court has 
required an apportionment of the tax based on the portion of the activity 
properly viewed as occurring within each relevant State. See, e. g., 
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 219 (1980); 
Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Washington Stevedoring 
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 746, and n. 16 (1978). 
This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no claim that 
the Tribe seeks to tax an more of petitioners' minin activity than the por-
tion occ ng within Tribal jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the risk 
ofinuffiple""taxabon is the inevitable consequence of the fact that the res-
ervation is located within the boundaries of New Mexico. Such geo-
graphic convergence does not preclude taxation b;y both a municipality_y1d 
a~, nor by both a Stru;e and the Federal Government. For in such 
instances, the risk of multiple taxation does not result from efforts by dis-
tinct governments to seize more tax revenues than would fairly be appor-
tioned to the activities occurring within their jurisdictions. Instead, the 
risk is inherent in a system of hierarchical sovereignties, or, in the case of 
tribal and State taxes, of sovereignties independent of one another that en-
compass portions of the same territory, each of which provides services to 
commercial activity. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203-204 (1824); 
The Federalist, No. 32, pp. 202-203 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). In 
this context, "[t]here is no direct conflict between the state and tribal 
schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes without ousting 
the other." Colville, supra, at 158. 
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inal natural rights." 6 Pet., at 559. Although the tribes are 
subject to the authority of the Federal Government, the 
"weaker power does not surrender its independence-its 
right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and 
taking its protection." I d., at 561. Adhering to this under-
standing, we conclude that the Tribe did not surrender its au-
thority to tax the mining activities of petitioners, whether 
this authority is deemed to arise from the Tribe's inherent 
power of self-government or from its inherent power to ex-
clude nonmembers. Therefore, the Tribe may enforce its 
severance tax unless and until Congress divests this power, 
an action that Congress has not taken to date. Finally, the 
severance tax imposed by the Tribe cannot be invalidated on 
the ground that it violates the "negative implications" of the 
Commerce Clause. 
Affirmed. 
C HAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE JO H N PA U L STEVE N S 
.;§;upum.t Qj:o-ttrl ttf fltt 'Jilni±tlt .;§;tlrlt.a-
Jfa.a-Jrittgtttn. Ifl. <!f. 20gtJl.,$ 
December 1, 1981 
Re: 80-11; 80-15 - Merrion et al. v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood: 
It will come as no great surprise that I intend to 
circulate a dissent. I expect to concentrate on Parts 
II-A and II-B (pages 5-15) of your circulation. 
It s eems to me that your discussion in Part II-A 
does . not adequately confront the critical distinction 
between an Indian tribe's power over its own members, 
which is a good deal greater than the power possessed 
by many sovereigns, and its much more limited power 
over nonmembers. And in Part II-B, I do not believe 
you adequately e xplain how a tribe can grant a lessee 
access to the reservation and the privilege of 
extracting minerals and thereafter impose a tax based 
on a power to exclude which has been surrendered by the 
terms of the lease. In all events, I shall circulate 
my dissent as soon as I can. 
Re spe ctfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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cc: The Conference 
jsw 12/01/81 
Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: TM's draft in Nos. 80-11 and -15: Jicarilla Apache 
Justice Marshall's draft closely tracks the memorandum 
he circulated last Term. He has added a factual introduction 
in Part I. Part II generally establishes that A...eaches h~ave 
power. Part IIA argues that this power is 
~~---=------~~--~--
Indians' right to self-government. Part IIB con-
even were this power derived solely from the Indi-
ans' power to exclude (as is Justice Stevens' position) 1 the 
to exclude in this case is sufficient to support 
of the tax in question. These two sections are sub-
identical to Justice Marshall's earlier memo. Part 
~------~~--~---------~~---~---------
the suggestion that subsequent legislation has re-
the Indians' taxation power. This section has been 
strengthened considerably since Justice Marshall's first ef-
which in turn strengthens his opinion. 
You joined Justice Blackmun last Term in accepting 
this much of the opinion. I recommend that you do the same 
this Term. 
Part III of TM' s draft deals with the question of 
whether the Apache's tax contravenes the Commerce Clause. In 
his i~o Part III (draft at 20-21) 1 Justice Marshall 
j 
2. 
describes the SG's dual position on the applicability of the 
Commerce Clause: first, that it imposes no restrictions on In-
~ 
dian inference with interstate commerce (SG brief at 35-40) 
1\ 
and, second, if the Clause does impose some restrictions, they 
are only those from the Indian (as opposed to the Interstate) 
Commerce Clause (SG brief at 40-43). The SG argued this was 
significant because such Indian Commerce Clause restrctions 
should be found to be "far more limited than those placed upon 
the stats in their commercial dealing with one another. SG 
brief at 42. 
Greg's bench memo rejected this reasoning on the 
ground that, in commercial matters, tribes more closely resem-
bl~ states than foreign nations. See his bench memo at 12. 
This reasoning makes sense to me. I therefore agree with him 
that the SG is wrong in contending that the Apaches should not 
be subjected to the same test as are states in the Commerce 
Clause area. 
Justice Marshall ultimately de 'des not "to break new 
ground in this area today," avoids a holding 
on the issue by assuming the govern tribes as 
states. Nevertheless, he does this only after favorably de----------------------
scribing the SG' s arguments as "not without force " 
Ibid. This language is absolutely unnecessary. My preference 
would be to see it dropped. But your judgment may be that 
these three words are not worth fighting about. 
3. 
Part IliA explains that the, Apaches encounter no Com-
merce Clause problems because their tax has been subjected to 
federal approval. This section is sound, in my view, and I 
recommend that you join it. 
Part IIIB attempts to dispell the Commerce Clause is-
sue on the alternate ground that, even absent federal approval, 
the Apache's tax is acceptable under Commerce Clause pr inci-
ples. This Part, as drafted last Term, applied the interpreta-
tion of Complete Auto Transit v. Brady set forth in the major-
ity opinion in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana--viz., that a tax 
"is fairly related to the services provided by the State" so 
long as it meets the minimal requirement that the tax be as-
sessed as a percentage of the minerals produced. You and Jus-
tice Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in Montana. 
TM has now dropped this Montana argument to the final ~ 
sentence in footnote on the logic that "petitioners do not 
challenge the tax on the ground that the amount of the tax is 
not fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe." But 
TM's footnote 26 goes on to argue that tribes--unlike states--
l_ 
are not restricted by any Commerce Clause proscription on mul-
tiple taxation. But Greg's sensible <view was that, for matters 
-----------~----~~------------------~ 
relating to interstate commerce burdens, tribes should be 
treated like states. And if states and tribes are to be treat-
ed similarly, the dissenting position in Montana would have 
difficulties with TM's cheerful acceptance (in footnote 26) of 
the possibility of multiple taxation by States and Tribes. The 
4 0 
Montana dissenters would have avoided this problem by ensuring 
that the taxing jurisdiction's tax was apportioned so as to 
avoid the possibility that the jurisdiction was able to export 
the burden of the tax. See Montana, 101 s.ct. at 2971-72. - B 
Consequently, the logic of Part III9 , as particularly expressed 
by both footnotes 23 and 26, is unfortunate. 
There is one other potentially objectionable aspect to 
~ 
TM's Part III/ : its final sentence and citation. In explain-
ing why the Tribe's decision to exempt from taxation in-kind 
mineral payments made to the Tribe does not offend the Commerce 
Clause, TM states 
this exemption merely avoids the administra-
tive makework that would ensue if the Tribe, 
as commercial partner, receives the royalty 
payments. ~erefore, this exemption cannot be 
deemed a 1d iscr imina tory preference for local 
commerce. In order to reach a different con-
clusion, we would have to ignore our recent 
cases refusing to impose a Commerce Clause 
limitation on the proprietary activities of 
the States. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 
... Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 
Draft at 25-26. 
I am worried only about TM's characterization of Reeves and 
Hughes as cases that refuse to impose the Commerce Clause "on 
the proprietary activities of the States." Your opinion in 
Hughes was based on the fact, not that the state was engaged in 
\ 
proprietary activity, but rather that it had created a market 
for hulks by paying a subsidy for their retrieval. You made it 
clear in your Reeves dissent that you did not view Hughes as 
" standing for a general Commerce Clause exception for "propr i-
5. 
etary" state acts. E.g., Reeves, 447 u.s. at 449-50 ("If . 
the State enters the private market and operates a commercial 
enterprise for the advantage of private citizens, it may not 
evade the constitutional policy against economic 
Balkanization."). You were joined in dissent by Justices 
White, Brennan, and Stevens--and here TM counts on support from 
the first two of these Justices. TM's "administrative 
makework" logic can easily stand without its final "proprietary 
activities" flourish. My inclination is that it would be worth 
the effort t~ ~k TM to strike the ~ sentence and citation 
in Part III~ (quoted above). 
In sum, I recommend that you send Justice Marshall a 
note stating that you join his opinion in all respects except 
b 
for Part III~ (as well as the introduction to Part II~, if 
the bottom of page 2, supra, persuades you). You might comment 
that you will await Justice Blackmun's views, because you have 
previously found yourself in substantial agreement with Justice 
Blackmun's earlier thoughts on the case. Finally, I urge you 
to think about asking Justice Marshall to consider the dissent-
ing views (particularly respecting Justices Brennan and White!) 





Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: Bad news on Nos. 80-11 and -15: Jicarilla Apache 
I am unhappy to report that I have found a conflict in 
this case. This is in spite of Greg's checking on this case 
I O/t8/QI 
last Term, and my /\checking on the new listing that the liti-
gants filed this Term. It was only when I decided as a last 
minute doublecheck to compare the listings that Greg checked 
last year against your most recent investment list that I found 
the Hubson Bay and Cansulex overlaps. Apparently these are new 
additions to your list--hence the miss between Greg's old 
checking and my previous new checking. 
I am extremely sorry to have wasted your time in this 
case by not catching this earlier. I also certainly hope there 
will be no other repercussions. I have alerted my co-clerks 
about the possibility, and we are discussing ways to guard more 
systematically against such eventualities. 
Again, I am very sorry . 
December 3, 1981 
80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Tribe Cases 
Dear Chief: 
One of the parties in these cases is Continental 
Oil Company (Conoco, Inc.). Among the subsidi.aries of 
Conoco listed in the special appendix is Hudson Bay Oil & 
Gas Company, Ltd., and also listed is Cansulex, Ltd., a 
subsidiary of Hudson Bay. 
We own, and trusts from which income is derived 
also own, shares of Dome Petroleum, Ltd., another Canadian 
company. I was advised during the summer that Dome acquired 
a majority interest in Hudson Bay. My understanding is that 
this acquisition had not occured when I participated in 
these cases last Term. 
The present situation, however, presents the 
following question: although my family has no interest of 
which I am aware in any of the parties to this litigation, 
we do have an interest in Dome Petroleum which in turn now 
owns a controlling interest in Hudson Bay. Does this 
present a situation for disqualification? 
Stating the question generally, should one 
disqualify where the only interest is in a subsidiary of a 
party to litigation where the subsidiary itself is not a 
party, and there is no indication that the outcome of the 
litigation will affect the subsidiary? 
We required the listing of subsidiaries, as I 
understand it, for another purpose. If a subsidiary itself 
is the party in a case, and a Justice owns an interest in a 
parent, there is - or at least may be - a reason to 
disqualify. Where, as here, the only party is the parent 
and the Justice owns an interest only in a subsidiary, I 
would think the outcome of the case rarely would affect the 
subsidiary. 
The question with respect to subsidiaries in the 
context of the present cases has not previously arisen for 
me (at least to my knowledge). Yet, we also have two Mobil 
2. 
Oil Corp. cases on the list for tomorrow; and in checking 
again its ~ubsidiaries I find that it lists as a subsidiary 
in which it owns "a five percent or greater interest", the 
Canadian company mentioned above called Cansulex. Hudson 
Bay has some interest (apparently more than five percent) in 
Cansulex and - as noted above - the company in which we do 
have an interest, Dome Petroleum, now controls Hudson Bay. 
What a tangle! 
In view of the conjectural and remote 
relationship, it would never have occurred to me to 
disqualify in these situations were it not for the 
continuing efforts of Mr. Cranberg to embarrass the Court 
and me . I therefore would appreciate the views of the 
Conference . Perhaps we could agree that where the 
subsidiary itself is not a party , and the papers do not 
indicate that the outcome of the case would affect the 
subsidiary in any significant way, that disqualification is 
unnecessary. 
I regret having to impose on you for advi@e. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~lqlUtttt arltltrlltf tlt~ ~Uh ~taltg 
Jragftittghtn. ~. ar. · 2llp~~ 
December 3, 1981 
Re: 80-11 and 80-15 - Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe Cases 
Dear Lewis: 
In your letter to the Chief on the subject of 
disqualification, you indicated that you would welcome 
the views of the Conference. My own view is that the 
situation you describe is not disqualifying. When we 
discussed the amendment to the rule, I took the 
position that we should not even require the listing of 
subsidiaries. I believe it was Potter who felt that 
subsidiaries should be listed and the rest of us 
deferred largely to his judgment in the matter. 
In all events, I would think the subsidiary 
situation in both this case and in the Mobil cases is 




Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 12/09/81 
MEMO TO FILE DISQUALIFICATION QUESTION 
This refers to my letter of December 3 to the 
Conference in which I outlined the remote connection, 
through subsidiaries, between the pending Mobil Oil Corp. 
petitions for certiorari and also the argued case of 80-11 
and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Tribe cses. 
This was discussed at our Conference on December 
4, and there was unanimous agreement that there is no 
occasion to disqualify in these circumstances. Several 
Justices mentioned that we should not have required, in our 
rule change, that subsidiaries be listed unless they are 
parties. 
In the Mobil Oil Corp. cases, for example, the 
subsidiary is Cansulex in which, apparently, Mobil ows some 
interest and also - since last summer - Dome (in which we 
own shares) owns some interest. But neither Dome nor 
Cansulex is a party in any of these cases. 
In sum, I will participate in these cases. Also, 
in light of the views expressed by other Justices - with 
which I agree - unless there is some reason to believe that 
a subsidiary would be substantially affected by the outcome 
of a case involving only the parent, there is no occasion to 
disqualify unless the sub itself is a party. 
2. 
Although John Stevens is the only Justice who 
responded in writing to my letter, the sentiment at the 
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Memorandum to Justice Powell ~ 
Re: JPS dissent in Nos. 80-11 & 80-15: Jicarilla Apache 
Despite its length, Justice Stevens' draft contain lit-
tle that is new; this draft largely reiterates the opinion he 
circulated last year. He does lay more stress on the political 
justification for granting Indians a taxation power based solely 
on their power to exclude: "Tribal powers over nonmembers are 
appropriately limited because nonmembers are foreclosed from par-
ticipation in tribal government." Dissent at 30. See also id. 
at 32-33. 
This rationale has some initial appeal, but I find it 
troubling on closer examination. Sovereign States have virtually 
no power to exclude, under the Commerce and Privileges and Immu-
nities Clauses of the federal Constitution. They nonetheless are 
able to tax all who do business within the State, irrespective of 
whether those individuals and corporations "are foreclosed from 
participation in [state and local] government." This state tax-
ation power is limited by the Equal Protection and the Commerce 
Clauses. As the Commonwealth Edison v. Montana case shows, how-
ever, these limits are quite loose in the context of resource F 
severance taxes . It would have been sensible to tighten these 
. \ 
2. 
limits, as suggested by Justice Blackmun•s dissent in that case. 
And in any event, it is sensible also to subject Tribes to the 
~ ---------------
same Commerce Clause limitations as apply to States--as Justice -Marshall does (in the alternative) in his majority opinion in the 
~,..----..__, 
instant case. But this consistent treatment of States and Tribes 
points out the incongruity of founding tribal taxation power on 
logic that has no applicability to the sovereign model of state-
hood. 
Finally, I do not think Justice Stevens adequately has 
replied to Justice Marshall's demonstration that, even assuming a 
taxing power based solely on the power to exclude, the Jicarilla 
in this case should be found to have contracted away their tax 
power by a lease that is silent on the subject. Also, Justice 
Stevens• predictions (on the last page of his dissent) of future 
unfairness in commercial dealings with Tribes can be avoided if 
non-Indian parties are aware that Tribes have sovereign taxation ~ 
power and make their commercial plans accordingly. Moreover, 
non-Indians can insist on contractual conditions that explicitly 
prohibits additional taxation of the commercial activity in ques-
tion. If the problem of tribal breaches of such contractual con-
ditions becomes serious (as it will not, if Tribes wish to keep 
finding people to do business with them), the federal government 
(through the Indian Commerce Clause) always has the power to leg-
islate to prevent such abuse. 
I recommend you plan generally to join Justice Marshall 
(subject to the caveats I mentioned in my memo on his opinion) 
but that you await Justice Blackmun•s statement on this case, as 
you did last Term. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
December 8, 1981 
Re: 80-11 and 80-15: 
Merrion and Bayless v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Amoco Prod. Co., etc. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am awaiting John's dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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Re: Nos. 80-11 & 80-15 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear John: 
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1st PRINTED DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 80-11 AND 80-15 
J. GREGORY MERRION AND ROBERT L. BAYLESS, 
ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
80--11 v. 
JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, ET AL. 
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY AND MARATHON 
OIL COMPANY, PETITIONERS 
80--15 v. 
JICARILLA APACHE INDIAN TRIBE, ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
[December-, 1981] ( v:S\ tv ~ 
JUSTICE STEVENS,\atssentmg. ~~ ~~-~ 
The Indian tribes that occupied North America before Eu- \~ 
ropeans settled the continent were unquestionably sover- ( 
eigns. They ruled themselves and they exercised dominion 
over the lands that nourished them. Many of those tribes, 
and some attributes of their sovereignty, survive today. 
This Court, since its earliest days, has had the task of identi-
fying those inherent sovereign powers that survived the cre-
ation of a new Nation and the introduction of an entirely new 
system of laws applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. 
In performing that task, this Court has guarded carefully 
the unique status of Indian tribes within this Nation. Over 
its own members, an Indian tribe's sovereign powers are vir-
tually unlimited; the incorporation of the tribe into the 
United States has done little to change internal tribal rela-
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tions. In becoming part of the United States, however, the 
tribes yielded their status as independent nations; Indians 
and non-Indians alike answered to the authority of a new N a-
tion, organized under a new Constitution based on demo-
cratic principles of representative government. In that new 
system of government, Indian tribes were afforded no gen-
eral powers over citizens of the United States. Many tribes, 
however, were granted a power unknown to any other sover-
eignty in this Nation: a power to exclude nonmembers en-
tirely from territory reserved for the tribe. Incident to this 
basic power to exclude, the tribes exercise limited powers of 
governance over nonmembers, though those nonmembers 
have no voice in tribal government. Since a tribe may ex-
clude nonmembers entirely from tribal territory, the tribe 
necessarily may impose conditions on a right of entry granted 
to a nonmember to do business on the reservation. 
The question presented in this case is whether, after a 
tribe has granted nonmembers access to its reservation on 
specified terms and conditions to engage in an economic ven-
ture of mutual benefit, the tribe may impose a tax on the non-
members' share of benefits derived from the venture. The 
Court today holds that it may do so. In my opinion this hold-
ing distorts the very concept of tribal sovereignty. Because 
I am convinced that the Court's treatment of this important 
case gives inadequate attention to the critical difference be-
tween a tribe's powers over its own members and its powers 
over nonmembers, I set forth my views at greater length 
than is normally appropriate in a dissenting opinion. 
I 
The 2,100 members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe live on a 
reservation in northern New Mexico. 1 The area encom-
passed by the Reservation became a part of the United 
States in 1848 when the Mexican War ended in the Treaty of 
'See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 14. 
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Guadalupe Hidalgo. See 9 Stat. 922. Between 1848 and 
1871, the United States did not enter into any treaty with the 
Jicarillas or enact any special legislation relating to them; in 
1871 Congress outlawed any future treaties with Indian 
tribes. 2 In 1887, President Cleveland issued an Executive 
Order setting aside a tract of public lands in the Territory of 
New Mexico "as a reservation for the use and occupancy of 
the Jicarilla Apache Indians." Except for a provision pro-
tecting bona fide settlers from deprivation of previously ac-
quired rights, the Executive Order contained no special rules 
applicable to the reservation. 3 The mineral leases at issue in 
this case were granted by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe on these 
reservation lands. 
The record does not indicate whether any leasing activity 
occurred on the Jicarilla Reservation between 1887 and 1953. 
During that period, however, the authority of Indian tribes 
to enter into mineral leases was clarified. In 1891 Congress 
2 "[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent na-
tion, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty: 
Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to in-
validate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and 
ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe." 16 Stat. 566, current ver-
sion at 25 U. S. C. § 71. 
3 The entire Executive Order reads as follows: 
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, FEBRUARY 11, 1887. 
"It is hereby ordered that all that portion of the public domain in the Ter-
ritory of New Mexico which, when surveyed, will be embraced in the fol-
lowing townships, viz: 27, 28, 29, and 30 north, ranges 1 east and 1, 2, and 3 
west; 31 and 32 north, ranges 2 west and 3 west, and the south half of 
township 31 north, range 1 west, be, and the same is hereby, set apart as a 
reservation for the use and occupation of the Jicarilla Apache Indians: Pro-
vided, That this order shall not be so construed as to deprive any bona fide 
settler of any valid rights he may have acquired under the law of the 
United States providing for the disposition of the public domain." 
Grover Cleveland. 
I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904). 
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passed a statute permitting the mineral leasing of Indian 
lands. Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 397. Because the statute applied only to lands "occupied 
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same," the stat-
ute was interpreted to be inapplicable to reservations created 
by Executive Order. See British-American Oil Producing 
Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U. S. 159, 161-162, 164. 
In 1922 the Secretary of the Interior took the position that 
Indian reservations created by Executive Order were public 
lands and that Indians residing on those reservations had no 
right to share in royalties derived from oil and gas leases. 49 
I. D. 139. 4 
'The Secretary contended that the land on Executive Order reserva-
tions was subject to leasing, as "lands of the United States," under the 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 181 et seq. In 1924, Attorney General Stone rendered an opinion stating 
that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act did not apply to Executive Order res-
ervations. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924). In 1925, Stone instituted litiga-
tion in the District Court of Utah to cancel certain leases that had been 
authorized by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1927). 
The case was dismissed by stipulation after the enactment of the 1927 Act 
noted in the text. See United States v. McMahon, 273 U. S. 782. 
A later decision by this Court suggests that the Secretary's position was 
correct. In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U. S. 317, the 
Court held that an Indian tribe was not entitled to compensation from the 
United States when an Executive Order reservation was abolished. The 
Court said: 
"Perhaps the most striking proof of the belief shared by Congress and 
the Executive that the Indians were not entitled to compensation upon the 
abolition of an executive order reservation is the very absence of compen-
satory payments in such situations. It was a common practice, during the 
period in which reservations were created by executive order, for the Pres-
ident simply to terminate the existence of a reservation by cancelling or 
revoking the order establishing it. That is to say, the procedure followed 
in the case before us was typical. No compensation was made, and neither 
the Government nor the Indians suggested that it was due. 
"We conclude therefore that there was no express constitutional or stat-
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In 1927 Congress enacted a statute expressly providing 
that unallotted lands on any Indian reservation created by 
Executive Order could be leased for oil and gas mining pur-
poses with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 5 
The statute directed that all rentals, royalties, or bonuses for 
such leases should be paid to the Treasurer of the United 
States for the benefit of the tribe for which the reservation 
was created. 6 The statute further provided that state taxes 
utory authorization for the conveyance of a compensable interest to peti-
tioner by the four executive orders of 1875 and 1876, and that no implied 
Congressional delegation of the power to do so can be spelled out from the 
evidence of Congressional and executive understanding. The orders were 
effective to withdraw from sale the lands affected and to grant the use of 
the lands to the petitioner. But the interest which the Indians received 
was subject to termination at the will of either the executive or Congress 
and without obligation to the United States. The executive orders of 1879 
and 1884 were simply an exercise of this power of termination, and the pay-
ment of compensation was not required." 316 U. S., at 330-331. 
See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States , 348 U. S. 272, 279-282. 
5 Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, current version at 25 U. S. C. 
§ 398a. Section 1 of the Act provided: 
"Unallotted lands within the limits of any reservation or withdrawal cre-
ated by Executive order for the use or occupancy of any Indians or tribe 
may be leased for oil and gas mining purposes in accordance with the provi-
sions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924 [25 U. S. C. § 398]." 
See also 25 U. S. C. § 398. Unalloted land is land that had not been allot-
ted in severalty to individual Indians pursuant to the General Allotment 
Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. 
6 Section 2 of the Act provided: 
"The proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas leases 
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals 
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the 
tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was cre-
ated or who are using and occupying the land, and shall draw interest at 
the rate of 4 per centum per annum and be available for appropriation by 
Congress for expenses in connection with the supervision of the develop-
ment and operation for the oil and gas industry and for the use and benefit 
of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or their tribal council, shall be 
consulted in regard to the expenditure of such money, but no per capita 
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could be levied upon the output of such oil and gas leases, 7 
but made no mention of the possibility that the Indian tribes, 
in addition to receiving royalties, could impose taxes on the 
output. 8 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 
48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., which authorized any 
Indian tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution 
and bylaws, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Act provided that, "in addition to all other 
powers vested in an Indian tribe or tribal council by existing 
law," the constitution should vest certain specific powers, 
such as the power to employ legal counsel, in the tribe. 9 
payment shall be made except by Act of Congress." 44 Stat. 1347, current 
version at 25 U. S. C. § 398b. 
7 Section 3 of the Act provided: 
"Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon 
improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wells, or other rights, prop-
erty, or assets of any lessee upon lands within Executive order Indian res-
ervations in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and col-
lected, and such taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the 
Indians as bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of the Inte-
rior is authorized and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of the 
tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, That such taxes shall not become a 
lien or charge of any kind against the land or other property of such Indi-
ans." 44 Stat. 1347, current version at 25 U. S. C. § 398c. 
8 In 1938, Congress passed the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 25 
U. S. C. § 396a-g, which was designed in part to achieve uniformity for all 
mineral leases of Indian lands. Like the 1927 Act, the statute provided 
that the tribes were entitled to the royalties from such leases. The statute 
made no mention of taxes. See n. 45, infra. 
9 The statute provided, in part: 
"Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have 
the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate 
constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified by a 
majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians 
residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a special election au-
thorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and 
regulations as he may prescribe. 
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The Act also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue 
a charter of incorporation to an Indian tribe, and provided 
that the charter could convey to the tribe the power to pur-
chase, manage and dispose of its property. 10 The 1934 Act 
was silent concerning the right of an Indian tribe to levy 
taxes. 11 The first Jicarilla Apache Constitution was ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937. 12 
In 1953, the Tribe executed an oil and gas lease with the 
Phillips Petroleum Company. App. 22-30. The lease, pre-
pared on a form provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of 
"In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by 
existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such 
tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To employ legal 
counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent the sale, disposition, 
lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal as-
sets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, 
State, and local Governments." 25 U. S. C. § 476. 
10 The statute provided: 
"The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by at least one-third of 
the adult Indians, issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, 
That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a special elec-
tion by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the reservation. 
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, 
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and 
dispose of property of every description, real and personal, including the 
power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefor 
interests in corporate property, and such further powers as may be inci-
dental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law; but 
no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period ex-
ceeding ten years any of the land included in the limits of the reservation. 
Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of 
Congress." 25 U. S. C. § 447. 
11 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 267 (1942) (hereinaf-
ter Cohen). 
12 The 1937 Constitution made no reference to any power to assess taxes 
against nonmembers. See 1937 Constitution and By-Laws of the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, Defendants' Exhibit G. 
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the Department of the Interior, presumably is typical of later 
leases executed between other companies and the Tribe. 13 
The lease provides that in return for certain rents, royalties, 
and a cash bonus of$71,345.99, all to be paid to the treasurer 
of the Tribe, the Tribe as lessor granted to the lessee "the 
exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, re-
move, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in or 
under" the described tracts of land, together with the right to 
construct and maintain buildings, plants, tanks, and other 
necessary structures on the surface. App. 22-23. The 
lease is for a term of 10 years following approval by the Sec-
retary of the Interior "and as much longer thereafter as oil 
and/or gas is produced in paying quantities from said land." 
Ibid. The lessee is obligated to use reasonable diligence in 
the development of the property, and to pay an annual rental 
of $1.25 per acre and a royalty of 12Y2% "of the volume or 
amount" of all oil and gas "produced and saved" from the 
leased land. App. 24, 26. Oil and gas used by the lessee for 
development and operation of the lease is royalty-free. I d., 
at 24. The Tribe reserved the rights to use free of charge 
sufficient gas for any school or other building owned by the 
Tribe on the leased premises, and to take its royalty in kind. 
I d., at 27-28. 
The lease contains no reference to the payment of taxes. 
The lessee does, however, agree to comply with all regula-
tions of the Secretary of Interior 
". . . now or hereafter in force relative to such leases: 
Provided, That no regulation hereafter approved shall 
13 This lease is attached to petitioners' complaint in No. 80-11. The 
lease attached to the complaint in No. 80-15 was also executed in 1953. 
See App. 62. The record does not disclose the date on which most of the 
leases with petitioners were executed, but the record does indicate that 
leases were executed as late as 1967. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Leases of 
Jicarilla tribal property cover in the aggregate over 500,000 acres of land, 
comprising almost 69% of the acreage within the Jicarilla Reservation. 
Brief for Respondent, p. 2. 
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effect a change in rate or royalty or annual rental herein 
specified without the written consent of the parties to 
this lease." Id., at 27. 
The lease was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. Id., at 32. 
Both of the 1953 leases described in the record are still 
producing. 
In 1968 the Tribe adopted a revised Constitution giving its 
Tribal Council authority, subject to approval by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, "to impose taxes and fees on non-mem-
bers of the tribe doing business on the reservation." 14 Eight 
years later, the Tribal Council enacted an Oil and Gas Sever-
ance Tax Ordinance, which was approved by the Secretary of 
the Interior. The Tribal Ordinance provides that a sever-
ance tax "is imposed on any oil and natural gas severed, 
saved and removed from Tribal lands .... " App. 38. The 
rate of the tax is $. 05 per million BTU of gas produced on the 
reservation and sold or transported off the reservation and 
$0.29 per barrel of crude or condensate produced on the res-
ervation and sold or transported off the reservation. App. 
39. Royalty gas or oil taken by the Tribe, as well as gas or 
oil used by the Tribe, is exempt from the tax. Ibid. Thus 
the entire burden of the tax apparently will fall on nonmem-
bers of the Tribe. The tax, if sustained, will produce over $2 
million in revenues annually. 15 
II 
The powers possessed by Indian tribes stem from three 
14 App. to Brief for Petitioners in No. 80--15, at 12a-13a. An earlier 
Constitution adopted in 1960 contained a similar provision permitting 
"taxes and fees on persons doing business on the reservation. " See 1960 
Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. VI, § 5, Defendant's Ex-
hibit A. 
15 See District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Finding 
No. 32, App. 130. The Tribe's answers to interrogatories indicate that in 
1976 the royalties on the leases received by the Tribe amounted to 
$3,995,469.69. See Plaintiff's Exhibit E, p. 7; Tr. 269. 
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sources: federal statutes, treaties, and the tribe's inherent 
sovereignty. Neither the Tribe nor the Federal Govern-
ment seeks to justify the Jicarilla Tribe's severance tax on 
the basis of any federal statute, 16 and the Jicarilla Apaches, 
who reside on an Executive Order reservation, executed no 
treaty with the United States from which they derive sover-
eign powers. Therefore, if the severance tax is valid, it 
must be as an exercise of the Tribe's inherent sovereignty. 
Tribal sovereignty is neither derived from nor protected by 
the Constitution. 17 Indian tribes have, however, retained 
many of the powers of self-government that they possessed 
at the time of their incorporation into the United States. As 
stated by Justice M'Lean in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 
580 (concurring opinion): 
"At no time has the sovereignty of the country been rec-
ognized as existing in the Indians, but they have been al-
ways admitted to possess many of the attributes to sov-
ereignty. All the rights which belong to self 
government have been recognized as vested in them." 
Similarly, the Court in United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 
375, 381-382, stated: 
"[The Indians] were, and always have been, regarded as 
16 Congress may delegate "sovereign" powers to the tribes. See 
Mazurie v. United States, 419 U. S. 544. As indicated, however, neither 
the 1927 statute permitting Indians to receive royalties from the lease of 
tribal lands nor the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 conveys authority to 
the Indian tribes to tax. See pp. 5-7, supra. 
" The only reference to Indian tribes in the Constitution is in Art. I, 
§ 8(3), which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the Power to regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian tribes." More significant than this reference to Indian 
tribes is the absence of any mention of the tribes in the Tenth Amendment, 
which provides: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people. " 
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having a semi-independent position when they preserved 
their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as 
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a 
separate people, with the power of regulating their in-
ternal and social relations, and thus far not brought un-
der the laws of the Union or of the State within whose 
limits they resided." 
Two distinct principles emerge from these early statements 
of tribal sovereignty: that Indian tribes possess broad powers 
of self-governance over tribal members, but that tribes do 
not possess the same attributes of sovereignty that the Fed-
eral Government and the several States enjoy. 18 In deter-
mining the extent of the sovereign powers that the tribes re-
tained in submitting to the authority of the United States, 
this Court has recognized a fundamental distinction between 
the right of the tribes to govern their own internal affairs and 
18 The Indian tribes often have been described as "domestic dependent 
nations." The term was first used in The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 
Pet. 1, where Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, explained: 
"Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, 
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right 
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cessation to our government; yet, it 
may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowl-
edged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denom-
inated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denomi-
nated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we 
assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of 
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a 
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a 
ward to his guardian." Id. , at 17. 
The United States retains plenary authority to divest the tribes of any 
attributes of sovereignty. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 
319; Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 373, 391-392; Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 
U. S. 553, 565; 1 American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Re-
port, 106-107 (1977) (hereinafter AIPRC Final Report). Thus, for exam-
ple, Congress can waive the tribes' sovereign immunity. See United 
States v. Fidelity, 309 U. S. 506, 512. 
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the right to exercise powers affecting nonmembers of the 
tribe. 
The Court has been careful to protect the tribes from inter-
ference with tribal control over their own members. The 
Court has recognized that tribes have the power to prosecute 
members for violations of tribal criminal law, and that this 
power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty. United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313. The tribes also retain the 
power to create substantive law governing internal tribal af-
fairs. Tribes may define rules of membership, and thus de-
termine who is entitled to the benefits of tribal citizenship, 
Roffv. Burney, 168 U. S. 218; establish rules of inheritance, 
which supercede applicable state law, Jones v. Meehan, 175 
U. S. 1, 29; and determine rights to custody of a child of di-
vorced parents of the tribe, and thus pre-empt adoption pro-
ceedings brought in state court. Fisher v. District Court, 
424 U. S. 382. This substantive tribal law may be enforced 
in tribal courts. Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217; Fisher v. 
District Court, supra. 
In many respects, the Indian tribes' sovereignty over their 
own members is significantly greater than the States' powers 
over their own citizens. Tribes may enforce discriminatory 
rules that would be intolerable in a non-Indian community. 
The equal protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which limit federal or state authority, do not 
similarly limit tribal power. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, and n. 7. 19 The criminal jurisdic-
tion of the tribes over their own members is similarly uncon-
strained by constitutional limitations applicable to the States 
'
9 The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 1301-1303, prohibits Indian tribes from denying "to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law." !d., § 1302(8). In Santa 
Clara Pueblo, however, the Court held that sovereign immunity protected 
a tribe from suit under the Act, that the Act did not create a private cause 
of action cognizable in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appro-
priate forum for vindication of rights created by the Act. 
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and the Federal Government. 20 Thus the use of the word 
"sovereign" to characterize tribal powers of self-government 
is surely appropriate. 
In sharp contrast to the tribes' broad powers over their 
own members, tribal powers over nonmembers have always 
been narrowly confined. 21 The Court has emphasized that 
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is in-
consistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so 
cannot survive without express Congressional delegation." 
Montana v. United States, -- U. S. --, --. In Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, the Court 
held that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by nonmembers within the reservations. 22 In 
Montana v. United States, supra, the Court held that the 
Crow tribe could not prohibit hunting and fishing by non-
members on reservation land no longer owned by the Tribe, 
and indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant-that 
21) In Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, the Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment right to indictment by grand jury does not apply to prosecu-
tions in tribal courts. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S., at 
328--329. 
21 Certain treaties that specifically granted the right of self government 
to the tribes also specifically excluded jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
See, e. g., Treaty with the Cherokees, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478 (1835); Treaty 
with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611 (1855); Treaty with 
the Creeks and Seminoles, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1856). 
22 In support of that holding, the Court stated: 
"Upon incorportion into the territory of the United States, the Indian 
tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States 
and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict 
with the interests of this overriding sovereignty. '[T]heir rights to com-
plete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished.' 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823)." 
See also New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496, 499 (state court 
has jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for a crime committed against a non-
Indian on a reservation). 
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tribes possess limited power over nonmembers-was appli-
cable in a civil as well as a criminal context. As stated by 
the Court, "[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent 
tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it 
relied support the general proposition that the inherent sov-
ereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activi-
ties of non-members of the tribe." Montana v. United 
States,-- U. 8., at-- (footnote omitted). 23 
The tribes' authority to enact legislation affecting nonmem-
bers is therefore of a different character than their broad 
power to control internal tribal affairs. This difference is 
23 Preceding this statement the Court noted that "the Court [in Oli-
phant] quoted Justice Johnson's words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. 
Peck, 6 Cranch 87-the first Indian case to reach this Court-that the In-
dian tribes have lost 'any right to governing every person within their lim-
its except themselves.' I d., at 147, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
supra, 435 U. S., at 209." Montana v. United States,-- U. S., at--. 
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (tribes 
cannot freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy); The Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, supra, 5 Pet., at 17-18 (tribes cannot enter into direct 
commercial or foreign relations with other nations). 
In Wheeler v. United States, supra, the Court held that the tribes' power 
to prosecute its members for tribal offenses was not "implicitly lost by vir-
tue of their dependent status," but stated: 
"The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held 
to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe 
and nonmembers of the tribe. 
"These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian 
tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with 
their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But 
the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and en-
force internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the 
relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as 
would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. '[T]he 
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not sur-
render its independence-its right to self government, by associating with 
a stronger, and taking its protection.' Worcester v. Georgia [6 Pet.], at 
560-561.'' 435 U. S., at 326. 
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consistent with the fundamental principle that "[i]n this N a-
tion each sovereign governs only with the consent of the gov-
erned." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 426. Since non-
members are excluded from participation in tribal 
government, the powers that may be exercised over them 
are appropriately limited. Certainly, tribal authority over 
nonmembers--including the power to tax-is not unprece-
dented. An examination of cases that have upheld this 
power, however, demonstrates that the power to impose 
such a tax derives solely from the tribes' power to exclude 
nonmembers entirely from territory that has been reserved 
for the tribe. This "power to exclude" logically has been 
held to include the lesser power to attach conditions on a 
right of entry granted by the tribe to a nonmember to engage 
in particular activities within the reservation. 
III 
A study of the source of the tribes' power to tax nonmem-
bers must focus on the extent of the tribal power to tax that 
existed in 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act was en-
acted to prevent further erosion of Indian sovereign powers. 24 
24 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 confirmed but did not enlarge 
the inherent sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. Congress intended 
the Act to "stabilize the tribal organization of Indian tribes by vesting such 
tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority .... " S. Rep. 
No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). As one commentator interpreted 
§ 16 of the Act: 
"[l]t would appear that powers originally held by tribes that were recog-
nized and allowed to be retained by treaties or prior statutes, as well as 
any additional powers conferred in the same manner, would be retained by 
tribes that accepted the terms of the 1934 Act. . . . The provision is con-
sistent with the act's purpose of enhancing tribal government in that it rec-
ognized and reconfirmed those powers a tribe may already have had as a 
government. " Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 
Hastings L. Rev. 89, 97 (1978). 
Moreover, although the power given by the Reorganization Act to the Sec-
retary of the Interior to approve or disapprove of the exercise of tribal 
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Shortly after the Act was passed, the Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of the Interior issued a formal opinion setting forth his 
understanding of the powers that might be secured by an In-
dian tribe and incorporated in its constitution by virtue of the 
reference in the Reorganization Act to powers vested in an 
Indian .tribe "by existing law." 25 Solicitor Margold con-
powers places a limit on tribal sovereignty, that power does not enable the 
Secretary to add to the inherent powers that a tribe possessed before the 
Act was passed. 
On the other hand, the fact that an Indian tribe may never have had the 
occasion to exercise a particular power over nonmembers in its early his-
tory is not a sufficient reason to deny the existence of that power. Ac-
cordingly, the fact that there is no evidence that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
ever imposed a tax of any kind on a nonmember does not require the con-
clusion that it has no such taxing power. To the extent that the power to 
tax was an attribute of sovereignty possessed by Indian tribes when the 
Reorganization Act was passed, Congress intended the statute to preserve 
those powers for all Indian tribes that adopted a formal organization under 
the Act. 
25 55 I. D. 14. Solicitor Margold described the scope of this opinion as 
folows: 
"My opinion has been requested on the question of what powers may be 
secured to an Indian tribe and incorporated in its constitution and by-laws 
by virtue of the following phrase, contained in section 16 of the Wheeler-
Howard Act (48 Stat. 984, 987) [the Reorganization Act of 1934]: 
'In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by 
existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest .... 
[Italics added.]' 
"The question of what powers are vested in an Indian tribe or tribal 
council by existing law cannot be answered in detail for each Indian tribe 
without reference to hundreds of special treaties and special acts of Con-
gress. It is possible, however, on the basis of the reported cases, the 
written opinions of the various executive departments, and those statutes 
of Congress which are of general import, to define the powers which have 
heretofore been recognized as lawfully within the jurisdiction of an Indian 
tribe. My answer to the propounded question, then, will be general, and 
subject to correction for particular tribes in the light of the treaties and 
statutes affecting such tribe wherever such treaties or statutes contain pe-
culiar provisions restricting or enlarging the general authority of an Indian 
tribe." Id. , at 17-18. 
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eluded that among those powers was a power of taxation; his 
opinion described the permissible exercise of that power: 
"Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this 
power may be exercised over members of the tribe and 
over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may ac-
cept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes 
may be attached as conditions." 55 I. D. 14, 46. 
Solicitor Margold cited three decisions in support of this opin-
ion. These three cases, Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CA8 
1905), app. dismissed, 203 U. S. 599; Morris v. Hitchcock , 
194 U. S. 384; and Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 
807 (Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff'd, 105 F. 1003 (CAB 1900), were 
decided shortly after the turn of the century and are the 
three leading cases considering the power of an Indian tribe 
to assess taxes against nonmembers. 2li The three cases are 
similar in result and in their reasoning. In each the court 
upheld the tax; in each the court relied on the Tribe's power 
to exclude non-Indians from its reservation and concluded 
that the Tribe could condition entry or continued presence 
within the reservation on the payment of a license fee or tax; 
and in each the court assumed that the ultimate remedy for 
nonpayment of the tax would be exclusion from the 
reservation. 
In the first of these cases, Maxey v. Wright , 54 S. W. 807 
(1900), the Court of Appeals of Indian Territory affirmed an 
order by a federal territorial court dismissing a complaint 
filed by non-Indian lawyers practicing in the Creek Nation. 
The complaint sought to enjoin the Indian agent for the Five 
Civilized Tribes from collecting an annual occupation tax of 
$25 assessed on each non-Indian lawyer residing and practic-
2<1 Felix Cohen, in his Handbook on Federal Indian Law published in 
1942, also relies on these cases in his discussion of tribal taxation of non-
members. Cohen 266-267. The Court in Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville R eservation, 447 U. S. 134, cited both Buster v. 
Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock in upholding an exercise of the tribal 
power to tax. 447 U. S., at 153. Seep. 27, infra. 
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ing his profession on the reservation. In rejecting the attor-
neys' claim, the Court of Appeals first analyzed the relevant 
treaties between the United States and the Creeks and noted 
that the Indians had "carefully guarded their sovereignty, 
and their right to admit, and consequently to exclude, all 
white persons, except such as are named in the Treaty." 
Id., at 809. The court noted that the United States had 
agreed that all persons who were not expressly excepted and 
were present in the Creek Nation "without the consent of 
that Nation [were] deemed to be intruders," and that the 
Government had "pledge[d] itself to remove them." Ibid. 
Because attorneys were not within any excepted class, 27 the 
court concluded that the Tribe had the authority to require 
them either to pay the license fee or to be removed as "in-
truders." 28 The Court held: 
27 "Attorneys practicing in the United States courts are not persons who 
come within the exceptions, for they are not 'in the employment of the gov-
ernment of the United States,' or 'persons peaceably traveling or tempo-
rarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license from the 
proper authority of the United States.'" 54 S. W., at 809. 
28 In reaching this conclusion the court relied heavily on two opinions of 
the Attorney General of the United States. In the first opinion, issued in 
1881, Attorney General McVeagh supported the validity of Indian permit 
laws that determined which persons would be permitted to reside on the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw reservations. 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134. In his dis-
cussion of the right of non-Indians to enter and remain on tribal lands, 
MeV eagh stated: 
"Replying to your fourth question: it seems from what has been already 
said that, besides those persons or classes mentioned by you, only those 
who have been permitted by the Choctaws or Chickasaws to reside within 
their limits, or to be employed by their citizens as teachers, mechanics, or 
skilled agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on the lands of these 
tribes; and the right to remain is gone when the permit has expired." ld., 
at 136 (emphasis added). 
In a second opinion on the same subject, Attorney General Phillips 
stated in 1884 that, in the absence of a treaty or statute, the power of an 
Indian tribe "to regulate its own rights of occupancy, and to say who shall 
participate therein and upon what conditions, can not be doubted." 18 Op. 
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"[T]he Creek nation had the power to impose this condi-
tion or occupation tax, if it may be so called, upon attor-
neys at law (white men) residing and practicing their 
profession in the Indian Territory. And inasmuch as 
the government of the United States, in the treaty, had 
declared that all persons not authorized by its terms to 
reside in the Creek Nation should be deemed to be in-
truders, and had obligated itself to remove all such per-
sons from the Creek Nation, the remedy to enforce this 
provision of the treaty was a removal by the United 
States from the Creek Nation of the delinquent as an in-
truder." Id., at 809-810. 29 
Atty. Gen. 34, 36. Although the treaties applicable to the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw tribes specifically excepted from the grant of self-government 
the power over nonmembers, the Attorney General did not construe this 
provision to limit the Tribes' power to exclude: 
"I submit that whatever this may mean it does not limit the right of 
these tribes to pass upon the question, who (of persons indifferent to the 
United States, i. e., neither employees, nor objectionable) shall share their 
occupancy and upon what terms. That is a question which all private per-
sons are allowed to decide for themselves; ... " !d., at 37. 
29 In other parts of its opinion, the court restated the propositions that 
the Tribe was "clothed with the power to admit white men, or not, at its 
option, which as we hold, gave it the right to impose conditions," 54 S.W., 
at 811, and that a lawyer who refused to pay for the privilege of remaining 
would become an "intruder'': 
"On the whole case we therefore hold that a lawyer who is a white man, 
and not a citizen of the Creek Nation, is, pursuant to their statute, re-
quired to pay for the privilege of remaining and practicing his profession in 
that nation the sum of $25; that, if he refuse the payment thereof, he be-
comes, by virtue of the treaty, an intruder, and that in such a case the gov-
ernment of the United States may remove him from the nation; and that 
this duty devolves upon the interior department. Whether the interior 
department or its Indian agents can be controlled by the courts by the 
writs of mandamus and injunction is not material in this case, because, as 
we hold, an attorney who refuses to pay the amount required by the stat-
ute by its very terms becomes an intruder, whom the Unites States prom-
ises by the terms of the treaty to remove, and therefore in such cases the 
officers and agents of the interior department would be acting clearly and 
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Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384, decided by this Court 
in 1904, also arose from a challenge to an enactment of one of 
the Five Civilized Tribes that required non-Indians to pay 
annual permit fees. The complainants owned cattle and 
horses that were grazing on land in the Chickasaw Nation 
pursuant to contracts with individual members of the Tribe. 
Complainants filed suit in the District of Columbia seeking an 
injunction preventing federal officials from removing their 
cattle and horses from the Indian Territory for failure to pay 
the permit fees assessed by the Tribe. An order dismissing 
the complaint was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia and by this Court. 
This Court's opinion first noted that treaties between the 
United States and the Chickasaw Nation had granted the 
Tribe the right "to control the presence within the territory 
assigned to it of persons who might otherwise be regarded as 
intruders," 30 and that the United States had assumed the ob-
ligation of protecting the Indians from aggression by persons 
not subject to their jurisdiction. 194 U. S., at 389. The 
Court then reviewed similar legislation that had been 
adopted by the Chickasaw Nation in 1876,31 and noted that in 
1879 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had specifically 
referred to the 1876 legislation and expressed an opinion that 
it was valid. I d., at 38~390. 
The Court also reviewed two opinions of the Attorney Gen-
properly within the scope of their powers." I d., at 812. 
30 The Court stated: 
"And it is not disputed that, under the authority of these treaties, the 
Chickasaw Nation has exercised the power to attach conditions to the pres-
ence within its borders of persons who might otherwise not be entitled to 
remain within the tribal territory." 194 U. S., at 389. 
31 The 1876 legislation required licensed merchants and traders to obtain 
a permit and pay a fee of $25. 
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eral that had concluded that the power of the Chickasaw to 
impose permit fees had not been withdrawn by Congress. 32 
Although Congress subsequently had created an express ex-
ception in favor of owners of town lots and thus protected 
them from eviction as intruders, the Court noted that no 
comparable protection had been given to owners of cattle and 
horses. 194 U. S., at 392-393. On the basis of these au-
thorities, the Court concluded that the Chickasaw legislation 
imposing grazing fees was valid. 
In the third case, Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (CA8 
1905), nonmembers of the Creek Nation brought suit against 
federal inspectors to enjoin them from stopping the plaintiffs 
from doing business within the reservation; the nonmembers 
feared such action because they had refused to pay a permit 
32 The Court relied on 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900) and 23 Op. Atty. 
Gen. 528 (1910). In the first opinion, Attorney General John W. Griggs 
stated: 
"The treaties and laws of the United States make all persons, with a few 
specified exceptions, who are not citizens of an Indian nation or members of 
an Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation without permission, 
intruders there, and require their removal by the United States. This 
closes the whole matter, absolutely excludes all but the excepted classes, 
and fully authorizes these nations to absolutely exclude outsiders, or to 
permit their residence or business upon such terms as they may choose to I 
impose, and it must be borne in mind that citizens of the United States, 
have, as such, no more right or business to be there than they have in any 
foreign nation, and can lawfully be there at all only by Indian permission; 
and that their right to be or remain or carry on business there depends 
solely upon whether they have such permission. 
"As to the power or duty of your Department in the premises there can 
hardly be a doubt. Under the treaties of the United States with these In-
dian nations this Government is under the most solemn obligation, and for 
which it has received ample consideration, to remove and keep removed 
from the territory of these tribes, all this class of intruders who are there 
without Indian permission. The performance of this obligation, as in other 
matters concerning the Indians and their affairs, has long been devolved 
upon the Department of the Interior." 23 Op. Atty. Gen., at 218. 
· - ... - - -- ---- ----------- - - ---- -------, .................. - ....... - ... """'t""'"' ........ """' .... ..... 
of the Attorneys General, and the practice of years place 
beyond debate the propositions that prior to March 1, 
1901, the Creek Nation had lawful authority to require 
the payment of this tax as a condition precedent to the . , . . . 
80-11 & 80-15-DISSENT 
MERRION v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE 23 
that agreement as an implied divestiture of a preexisting 
power to tax. 33 The court held that even though noncitizens 
of the Tribe had acquired lawful ownership of lots pursuant to 
the 1901 agreement and could not be evicted from those lots, 
they had no right to conduct business within the reservation 
without paying the permit taxes. 34 
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 
1934, these three cases were the only judicial decisions con-
33 After citing the opinion of Attorney General Griggs quoted at length in 
Morris v. Hitchcock, Judge Sanborn wrote: 
"Pursuant to this decision the civilized tribes were charging, and the In-
dian agent was collecting, taxes from noncitizens engaged in business in 
these nations. It was under this state of facts that the United States and 
the Creek Nation made the agreement of 1901. Did they intend by that 
agreement that the Creek Nation should thereby renounce its conceded 
power to exact these permit taxes? Both parties knew that this power 
existed, and the United States, by the act of its President approving the 
law of the Creek national council, and the Secretary of the Interior by en-
forcing it, had approved its exercise. The subject of these taxes was pre-
sented to the minds of the contracting parties and was considered during 
the negotiation of the agreement, for that contract contains express stipu-
lations that cattle grazed on rented allotments shall not be liable to any 
tribal tax (chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 37), and that 'no noncitizen renting 
lands from a citizen for agricultural purposes as provided by law, whether 
such lands have been selected as an allotment or not, shall be required to 
pay any permit tax' (chapter 676, 31 Stat. 871, § 39). But they made no 
provision that noncitizens who engaged in the mercantile business in the 
Creek Nation should be exempt from these taxes. As the law then in 
force required such noncitizens to pay such taxes, as both parties were 
then aware of that fact and considered the question, and as they made no 
stipulation to abolish these taxes, the conclusive presumption is that they 
intended to make no such contract, and that the power of the Creek Nation 
to exact these taxes, and the authority of the Secretary of the Interior and 
of his subordinates to collect them, were neither renounced, revoked, nor 
restricted, but that they remained in full force and effect after as before 
the agreement of 1901." 135 F., at 954. 
34 135 F., at 954. The court stated: 
"The legal effect ... of the law prescribing the permit taxes is to prohibit 
noncitizens from conducting business within the Creek Nation without the 
payment of these taxes." !d., at 955. 
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sidering the power of an Indian tribe to impose a tax on non-
members. 35 These cases demonstrate that the power of an 
Indian tribe to impose a tax solely on nonmembers doing 
business on the reservation derives from the tribe's power to 
exclude those persons entirely from tribal lands or, in the al-
ternative, to impose lesser restrictions and conditions on a 
right of entry granted to conduct business on the reserva-
tion. 36 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the 
36 Two decades after the Reorganization Act was passed the problem was 
revisited by the Eighth Circuit. In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of 
Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1956), the court held that the 
tribe had the power to assess a tax on a nonmember lessee of land within 
the reservation for the privilege of grazing stock on reservation land. And 
in Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F. 2d 553 
(CA8 1958), the court held that the United States could bring an action on 
behalf of the tribe to collect a license tax of three cents per acre per annum 
for grazing land and fifteen cents per acre per annum for farm land levied 
on nonmember lessess. The court in Barta held that" the tax did not vio-
late the constitutional rights of the nonmember lessees, stating in part: 
"The tribe by provisions of its treaty with the United States has power to 
provide for the admission of nonmembers of the tribe onto the reservation. 
Having such power, it has the authority to impose restrictions on the pres-
ence of nonmembers within the reservation." 259 F. 2d, at 556. 
Language in both Iron Crow and Barta suggests that the Court of Appeals, 
unlike the earlier courts, may not have rested the taxing power solely on 
the power to exclude. The Court of Appeals of course did not have the 
benefit of our decisions in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana v. United 
States. 
36 In the chapter of his treatise entitled "Taxation," Felix Cohen states: 
"Though the scope of the power [to tax] as applied to nonmembers is not 
clear, it extends at least to property of nonmembers used in connection 
with Indian property as well as to privileges enjoyed by nonmembers in 
trading with the Indians. The power to tax nonmembers is derived in the 
cases from the authority, founded on original sovereignty and guaranteed 
in some instances by treaties, to remove property of nonmembers from the 
territorial limits of the tribe. Since the tribal government has the power 
to exclude, it can extract a fee from nonmembers as a condition precedent 
to granting permission to remain or to operate within the tribal domain." 
Cohen 26&-267 (footnotes omitted). 
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remedy for the non-payment of the tax in all three cases was 
exclusion from the reservation. 37 
As I have noted, a limitation on the power of Indian tribes 
to tax nonmembers is not simply an archaic concept derived 
from three old cases that has no basis in logic or equity. 
Tribal powers over nonmembers are appropriately limited 
because nonmembers are foreclosed from participation in 
tribal government. If the power to tax is limited to situa-
tions in which the tribe has the power to exclude, then the 
nonmember is subjected to the tribe's jurisdiction only if he 
knowingly accepts the conditions of entry imposed by the 
tribe. 38 The limited source of the power to tax nonmem-
In another chapter, entitled "The Scope of Tribal Self-Government," 
cited by the Secretary of the Interior and the Tribe here, Cohen describes 
the power of taxation as "an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which 
con tines unless withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress .... " 
!d. , at 142. After d1scussing Buster v. Wright , Cohen cites that case for 
the proposition that "[t]he power to tax does not depend upon the power to 
remove and has been upheld where there was no power in the tribe to re-
move the taxpayer from the tribal jurisdiction." !d., at 143. As demon-
strated above, however, the license tax in Buster was predicated on the 
tribe's right to attach conditions on the right of nonmembers to conduct 
business on the reservation; the tribe could prevent such nonmembers 
from doing business regardless of whether it could physically remove them 
from the reservation. Moreover, in that same chapter on tribal self-gov-
ernment, Cohen recognizes that tribal taxes have been upheld on the basis 
of the tribe's power to remove nonmembers from the reservation, and that 
"[i]t is therefore pertinent, in analyzing the scope of tribal taxing powers, 
to inquire how far an Indian tribe is empowered to remove nonmembers 
from its reservation." Ibid. 
The American Indian Policy Review Commission recognized that the 
court decisions upholding the tribes' taxing powers "rely largely upon the 
power of tribes to remove persons from the reservation, and consequently, 
to prescribe the conditions upon which they shall enter," but argued for a 
broader source of the right to tax. AIPRC Final Report 178-179. 
37 In Buster v. Wright, the penalty for nonpayment of the tax was the 
closing of the nonmember's business, enforced by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. 135 F., at 954. In Morris v. Hitchcock, the remedy was the re-
moval of the nonmember's cattle from the reservation, again enforced by 
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hers-the power to exclude intruders-is thus consistent 
with this Court's recognition of the limited character of the 
power of Indian tribes over nonmembers in general. 39 The 
proper source of the taxing authority asserted by the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe in this case, therefore, is not the Tribe's inher-
ent power of self-government, but rather its power over the 
territory that has been set apart for its use and occupation. 40 
the United States. 194 U. S., at 392. In Maxey v. Wright, an attorney 
refusing to pay the license fee to the Interior Department was subject to 
removal from the reservation. 54 S. W., at 810. 
38 "No noncitizen is required to exercise a privilege or to pay the tax. 
He may refrain from the one and he remains free from liability for the 
other." Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 949. 
39 See pp. 13-14, supra. As I have indicated, seen. 21, supra, treaties 
recognizing the inherent power of tribal self-government have also de-
prived the tribes of jurisdiction over nonmembers. Nevertheless, those 
same treaties often specifically recognized the right of the tribe to exclude 
nonmembers from the reservation or to attach conditions on their entry. 
See e. g., Treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611 
(1855); Treaty with the Creeks, art. 15, 11 Stat. 699 (1855). See II C. 
Kappler, Indian Affairs Laws and Treaties 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 
42, 75, 418, 682, 699, 703, 719, 761, 774, 779, 790, 794, 800, 866, 886, 888, 
929, 985, 990, 998, 1008, 1016, 1021 (1904) . 
.w The various tribes may have taken a similar view of their power to tax 
at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act. Cohen's treatise notes: 
"The power of an Indian tribe to levy taxes upon its own members and 
upon nonmembers doing business within the reservations has been af-
firmed in many tribal constitutions approved under the Wheeler-Howard 
Act [Indian Reorganiztion Act], as has the power to remove nonmembers 
from land over which the tribe exercises jurisdiction." Cohen 143. 
The following clause from the 1935 Constitution of the Rosebud Sioux 
Tribe, which Cohen cites as a "typical" statement of such "tribal powers," 
indicates that the tribe perceived the scope of its taxation powers over non-
members to be narrower than the scope of that power over members. The 
Constitution conveys tribal power-
"(h) To levy taxes upon members of the tribe and to require the perfor-
mance of reservation labor in lieu thereof, and to levy taxes or license fees, 
subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon nonmembers doing 
business within the reservation. 
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This conclusion is consistent with our recent decision in 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reserva-
tion, 44 7 U. S. 134. In that case we held that a tribal tax on 
cigarettes sold on the reservations of the Colville, Makah and 
Lummi tribes to nonmembers of the tribes was a permissible 
exercise of the tribes' retained sovereign power to tax. 41 We 
recognized that the power to tax non-Indians entering the 
reservation had not been divested by virtue of the tribes' de-
pendent status and that no overriding federal interest would 
be frustrated by the tribal taxation. The Court quoted with 
approval, as an indication of the Executive Branch's under-
standing of the taxing power, Solicitor Margold's 1934 opin-
ion. The Court noted further that "[fJederal courts also have 
acknowledged tribal power to tax non-Indians entering the 
reservation to engage in economic activity" and cited Buster 
v. Wright and Morris v. Hitchcock. 447 U. S., at 153.42 
The tax in Colville, which was applied to nonmembers who 
entered the reservation and sought to purchase cigarettes, is 
clearly valid under the rationale that the tribes' power to tax 
derives from the right to exclude nonmembers from the res-
ervation and the lesser right to attach conditions on the entry 
of such nonmembers seeking to do business there. 43 Colville 
thus supports the principles set forth above. The power of 
"(i) To exclude from the restricted lands on the reservation persons not 
legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinances which shall be subject 
to review by the Secretary of the Interior." Ibid. 
" The Court stated: 
"The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly 
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty 
which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary 
implication of their dependent status." 447 U. S., at 152. 
42 The Court also cited, without discussion, the Eighth Circuit's decision 
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra, n. 35. 
43 A nonmember can avoid the tax by declining to do business on the res-
ervation; the "sanction" imposed for refusal to pay the tax is denial of per-
mission to buy cigarettes. 
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Indian tribes to tax nonmembers stems from the tribes' 
power to exclude those nonmembers; any exercise of this 
power must be consistent with its source. 
In some respects the tribal power to tax nonmembers is 
greater than the taxing power of other sovereigns. States 
do not have any power to exclude nonresidents from their 
borders. Moreover, their taxing statutes, like their other 
laws, must comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. They may not, therefore, impose 
discriminatory taxes as a condition attached to entry into the 
jurisdiction in order to engage in economic activity. But 
since an Indian tribe has exclusive control over the "use and 
occupancy'' of land within its reservation, it may attach spe-
cial discriminatory conditions to any license to a nonmember 
to use or occupy a portion of that land. Specifically, a power 
to tax that is derived from the power to exclude necessarily 
encompasses a power to impose discriminatory taxes as con-
ditions attached to entry or· attached to the exercise of privi-
leges within the Reservation. 
IV 
The power to exclude petitioners would have supported the 
imposition of a discriminatory tribal tax on petitioners when 
they sought to enter the Jicarilla Apache Reservation to ex-
plore for minerals. Moreover, even if no tax had been im-
posed at the time of initial entry, a discriminatory severance 
tax could have been imposed as a condition attached to the 
grant of the privilege of extracting minerals from the earth. 44 
But the Tribe did not impose any tax prior to petitioners' en-
try or as a condition attached to the privileges granted by the 
leases in 1953. As a result, the tax imposed in 1976 is not 
valid unless the Tribe retained in the leases the power either 
to exclude petitioners from the reservation or to prohibit 
"" "[A]s the payment of a tax or license fee may be made a condition of 
entry upon tribal land, it may also be made a condition to the grant of other 
privileges, such as the acquisition of a tribal lease." Cohen 143. 
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them from continuing to extract oil and gas from reservation 
lands. 
The leases executed by the Tribe and petitioners are 
clearly valid and binding on both parties. The Tribe does 
not contend that the leases were not the product of arms 
length bargaining. Moreover, the leases were executed on a 
form prepared by the Department of the Interior, the De-
partment gave specific approval to the terms of the leases, 
and they were executed pursuant to explicit congressional 
authority. 45 Under the leases petitioners clearly have the 
46 Congress intended the Act of March 3, 1927 to make applicable to Ex-
ecutive Order reservations the leasing provisions already applicable to 
treaty reservations pursuant to the Act of May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 244. S. 
Rep. No. 1240, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1927). The Act of 1927 thus per-
mitted the leasing of unallotted Indian land for terms not to exceed 10 
years and as much longer as oil and gas in paying quantities were found on 
~he land. 44 Stat. 1347. Among the purposes of the 1927 statute were to 
"[p]ermit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive-order Indian Res-
ervations," to "[g]ive the Indian tribes all the oil and gas royalties ," and to 
"[p]lace with Congress the future determination of any changes of bound-
aries of Executive-order reservations or withdrawals." Ibid. In light of 
these purposes, it is clear that Congress intended leases executed pursuant 
to the 1927 Act to be binding. 
The Tribe contends that the leases in this case were executed pursuant 
to the Act of May 11, 1938, 52 Stat. 347, and not the 1927 Act. The Tribe 
notes that the lease in No. 80-15 states that it was executed pursuant to 
the 1938 Act. See App. 64. In response , petitioners note that, although 
the Tribe argues that the 1938 Act-unlike the 1927 Act-does not require 
that royalties be paid to the Secretary of the Interior for the benefit of the 
Tribe, petitioners make their royalty payments to the United States Geo-
logical Survey for the benefit of the Jicarilla Apache. See Tr. 79-80. 
There is no need to resolve this question, because for our purposes the pro-
visions of the 1938 Act do not vary significantly from the provisions of the 
1927 Act. The 1938 Act, like the 1927 Act, permits the leasing of Indian 
lands for a period "not to exceed 10 years and as long thereafter as miner-
als are produced in paying quantities. " 25 U. S. C. § 396c. One of the 
purposes of the 1938 Act was to establish uniformity in the leasing of tribal 
lands by applying the law governing oil and gas leasing to all other mineral 
leasing as well. S. Rep. No. 985, 75th Cong. , 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937). Other 
purposes were to "bring all leasing matters in harmony with the Indian Re-
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right to remain on the reservation to do business for the du-
ration of the contracts. 46 
There is no basis for a claim that exercise of the mining 
rights granted by the leases was subject to an additional, un-
stated condition concerning the payment of severance taxes. 47 
At the time the leases contained in the record were executed, 
the Jicarilla Apache Constitution contained no taxing authori-
zation whatever; the severance tax ordinance was not en-
acted until many years after all lessees had been granted an 
unlimited right to extract oil and gas from the reservation. 
In addition, the written leases unambiguously stated: 
"[N]o regulation hereafter approved shall effect a change 
in rate or royalty or annual rental herein specified with-
organization Act," id., at 3, and to enact changes designed "to give the In-
dians the greatest return from their property." ld., at 2. There is no 
indication in the legislative history that the purposes of the 1938 Act are in 
any way inconsistent with the purposes of the 1927 Act and prior legisla-
tion. Presumably the purposes of the earlier legislation were incorporated 
into the uniform scheme intended by the 1938 Act. 
,..; As Attorney General McVeagh stated in 1881, only those permitted by 
the tribe to remain on the reservation may do so, "and the right to remain 
is gone when the permit has expired." 17 Op. Atty. Gen., at 136. 
47 In Colville, the nonmember desiring to purchase cigarettes on the res-
ervation knew that his right to do so was conditioned on his consent to pay 
the tax. Attorney General Griggs, in his 1900 opinion on "Tresspassers on 
Indian Land," discussed in similar terms the effect on tribal laws of a fed-
eral statute providing for the sale of reservation lots to non-Indians: 
"[T]he legal right to purchase land within an Indian nation gives to the pur-
chaser no right of exemption from the laws of such nation, nor does it au-
thorize him to do any act in violation of the treaties with such nation. 
These laws requiring a permit to reside or carry on business in the Indian 
country existed long before and at the time this act was passed. And if 
any outsider saw proper to purchase a town lot under this act of Congress, 
he did so with full knowledge that he could occupy it for residence or busi-
ness only by permission from the Indians." 23 Op. Atty. Gen., at 217. 
In 1977, the American Indian Policy Review Commission noted that In-
dian tribes "do not both tax and receive royalties. Usually they just re-
ceive royalties." AIPRC Final Report 344. 
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out the written consent of the parties to this lease." 
App. 27. 
Nor can it be said that notice of an inherent right to tax 
could have been gleaned from relevant statutory enactments. 
When Congress enacted legislation in 1927 granting the Indi-
ans the royalty income from oil and gas leases on reservations 
created by Executive Order, it neither authorized nor prohib-
ited the imposition of any taxes by the tribes. Although the 
absence of such reference does not indicate that Congress 
pre-empted the right of the tribes to impose such a tax, 48 the 
lack of any mention of tribal severance taxes defeats the ar-
gument that all parties were aware as a matter of law that a 
severance tax could be imposed at any time as a condition to 
the continued performance of a mineral lease. 
Thus, nothing in the leases themselves or in any Act of 
Congress conveyed an indication that petitioners could accept 
the rights conferred by the leases only by accepting a condi-
tion that they pay any subsequently enacted severance tax. 
Nor could such a condition be presumed from prior taxing ac-
tivity of the Tribe. In my opinion it is clear that the parties 
negotiated the leases in question with absolutely no expecta-
tion that a severance tax could later be imposed; in the 
contemplation of the parties, the conditions governing peti-
tioners' right to extract oil and gas were not subject to 
change during the terms of the agreements. There simply is 
no support for the proposition that the Tribe retained the 
power in the leases to impose an additional condition on peti-
tioners' right to enter the reservation and extract oil and gas 
from reservation lands. Since that authority was not re-
48 The statute did authorize the collection of severance taxes by the 
States. Petitioners have argued that this authorization pre-empted any 
tribal power to impose a comparable tax. As recognized by the Court of 
Appeals, however, the legislative history indicates that Congress simply 
did not consider the question of tribal taxes on mineral output from res-
ervation lands. 617 F. 2d, at 547. 
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tained, the Tribe does not now have the power to alter unilat-
erally the terms of the agreement and impose an additional 
burden on petitioners' right to do business on the 
reservation. 49 
In this case, the Tribe seeks to impose a tax on the very 
activity that the leases granted petitioners the right to un-
dertake. As Solicitor Margold wrote long ago: 
"Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a land-
owner as well as the rights of a local government, domin-
ion as well as sovereignty. But on all the lands of the 
reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members 
thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign 
power of determining the conditions upon which persons 
shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside therein, 
and to do business, provided only such determination is 
consistent with applicable Federal laws and does not in-
fringe any vested rights of persons now occupying res-
ervation land under lawful authority." 55 I. D., at 50 
(emphasis added). 
Petitioners were granted authority by the Tribe to extract oil 
49 The Secretary of the Interior argues that a license or franchise issued 
by a governmental body does not prevent the later imposition of a tax un-
less the right to tax "has been specifically surrendered in terms which ad-
mit of no other reasonable interpretation." Brief for United States 13, n. 
7 (quoting St. Louis v. United Rys, 210 U. S. 266, 280). See also New 
Orleans City & LakeR. R. v. City of New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192, 195; 
New York Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 590-593. 
The principal issue in these cases cited by the Secretary was whether the 
retroactive imposition of a franchise tax violated the Contract Clause of the 
Constitution or was so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due 
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this argu-
ment was by no means frivolous, cf. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315 J 
U. S. 610, no such issue is raised here. These cases are distinguishable 
from the instant cases because Indian tribes do not have the same 
attributes of sovereignty as do States and their subdivisions. See pp. 
!}-.15, supra. 
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and gas from reservation lands. The Tribe now seeks to 
change retroactively the conditions of that authority. These 
petitioners happen to be prosperous oil companies. More-
over, it may be sound policy to find additional sources of rev-
enue to better the economic conditions of many Indian tribes. 
If this retroactive imposition of a tax on oil companies is per-
missible, however, an Indian tribe may with equal legitimacy 
contract with outsiders for the construction of a school or a 
hospital, or for the rendition of medical or technical services, 
and then-after the contract is partially performed-change 
the terms of the bargain by imposing a gross receipts tax on 
the outsider. If the Court is willing to ignore the risk of 
such unfair treatment of a local contractor or a local doctor 
because the Secretary of the Interior has the power to veto a 
tribal tax, it must equate the unbridled discretion of a politi-
cal appointee with the protection afforded by rules of law. 
That equation is unacceptable to me. Neither wealth, politi-
cal opportunity, nor past transgressions can justify denying 
any person the protection of the law. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . W HITE 
.§lttrrrmt '(4ntrl of tlrt 'Pni.tt~ .§tatts 
~nas lrin¢M. ~· <q. 202'*~ 
January 5, 1982 
Re: 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood, 
Although I was with you only in part last term, I have 
reconsid e red and now join your proposed opinion for the 
Court. 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
b kh 
Sincerely, 
lfp/ss 01/04/82 MARSH SALLY-POW 
80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Cases 
Dear Thurgood: 
After reviewing your opinion again over the 
holidays, I would be happy to join all of it if you could 
j 1. 
U-L-
In ~r introduction to Part III, you state 
the position of the SG with respect to the Commerce 
Clause. On page 21, you ;: refrain from adopting the SG's 
views, but you commence the first full paragraph by 
stati~ 
0 •while these arguments are not without force • • 
" 
In my view, the SG's position is highly 
doubtful. In commercial matters, tribes resemble states 
more closely than they do foreign nations. It is ~ 
unnecessary to imply any approval of the SG's position. 
2. 
Could you not make it clear that we find it unnecessary to 
consider in this case the merits of the SG's arguments? 
~ 2. I have a somewhat similar problem with 
footnote~23 (p. 24) ana 2z: (~ , 26). In the text on p. 24 
you state that "petitioners do not challenge the tax on 
the ground that the amount of the tax is not fairly 
related to the services provided by the tribe". The first 
sentence of n. 23 adds that the Court of Appeals, for this 
reason, found no basis in the record to find that "the tax 
was not fairly related to the services provided by the 
tribe." If n. 23 were concluded with this sentence, I 
would have no difficulty with it. The remainder of n. 23, 
however, is in effect a finding that "the tax is 
3. 
reasonably related to the extent of the taxpayer's 
activities within the taxing jurisdiction". As it is 
unnecessary to make such 
--~,d~··· &v-
could you ~ follow the 
a holding in view of the record, 
example of the Court of Appeals? 
3. The second paragraph of footnote 26 (p. 26) 
says in effect that the multiple tax burden doctrine of 
\sWesJ 
the Commerce Clause does not apply to taxation by~an~ 
Indian trib~ Again, it is unnecessary t~ ~i~ ~ . ,-
- So t-u..h~e ... r.~~~e i. .... s~n'"'o,J.oooojsl!jolb.o~w~i.!.ln~qL.Jt;,!h!ja~tt;....Jh~l@@oilW': -ftlftil~e-~x~i~e~o,.-,tl!§r""~t a!!'X'x1'1rlil~g th e s arne 
. ;f~~lJ.'t 
l«, 
/vl.f; f>\J. .act iv i t y at ! UH: oe: l tH!:. 
~t,l() tb~·  
!'fcA A paragraph e£ "j2:" ~ in its present form. 
I could not join t.b9 seeond ~ 
I know of no 
decision of this Court that has expressly gone so far as 
to say that there are no limitations to multiple taxation -
by a tribe, a state in which the tribe is located, and the 
federal government • 
.J ~d../fts'«f>* •• 1 ~ 





cited (last at the bottom of p. 25) 
for the view that this Court 1 
limitations on the proprietary of the states". 
t:A-ere eou3:d be- -v i-ewed a~ -l::l lliqtn:!}, --aqil Justices B 
White and Stevens joined me in dissent in Reeves~ 
~~~~ 
A opinion in Alexandria Scrap was based on the fact that 
Maryland had created a market for hulks by paying a 
subsidy for their retrieval in furtherance of the state's 
special interest. ~ I made clear i~J RoovQs dissent, I 
do not view Hughes as supporting a general rule that the 
Commerce Clause is inapplicable whenever the state is 
acting in a proprietary capacity 
r 
t.. .....c.A'l I 
l ''t 1 \ 
•• , I ' 
5. 
Although it has taken me some time to state my 
~ 
concerns, I think you ~ meet all of them without 
altering the analysis or force of your generally fine 
opinion. If you prefer not to make changes along the 
following lines, I will join your judgment and Parts I~~ 
vvt I 1 ~ 
II,Aof the opinion. 
!,,, 
Sincerely, 
jsw 01/04/82 ~rut-- /)A) ~JUt. 
~ 
Mem~dum to Justice Powell 
to TM on Jicarilla Apache 
I agree with your proposed letter. I have only two 
suggestions to make. The first is the minor additions that I 
have pencilled in on pages 4-5. These changes might clarify 
for Justice Marshall the nature of the action you request. 
They also suggest your willingness to join Part IliA of the 
opinion--which seems to me well reasoned and necessary to the 
judgment(!) 
My second proposed concerns Justice Marshall 1 s note 
26, which you discuss on page 3. In addition to the pencilled 
editing suggestions, I recommend that you add the following to 
the end of that page: 
This rule can have no bearing here, 
however, for there can be no claim that the 





mining activity than the portion occurring 
within Tribal jurisdiction. In the absence of 
an assertion that the amount of the Tribal 
taxation is not fairly related to the services 
provided by the Tribe, see note 23 and accom-
panying text supra, the risk of excessive mul-
~~ 
tiple taxation could~ ariset if a State 
attempted to levy a disproportionately large 
tax on the activity in question. This law 
suit, of course, does not involve a challenge 
to excessive State taxation, and we of Q~Q~e 
intimate no opinion regarding State taxation 
-"-
that might be acctt5ed-e.f creat"'\~ ~ a mul-
tiple burden. We do note that a State tax 
could ~ offend the Commerce Clause's multi-
~ 
ple interstate taxation proscription A in the 
absence of congressional authorization to im-
pose such a tax, ~' Prudential Ins. Co. v. 
Benjamin, 328 u.S. 408, 
f 
that petitioner contends 
It 
421-427 (1946), 
th~ State of 
and 
New 
Mexico has taxed the production of oil and gas 
from the Tribe's Reservation 11 [p] ursuant to 
authority granted in 1927 (25 u.s.c. § 398c)) 
II Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, 
at 34 
3. 
These changes would effectuate your intentions, as I understand 
them, and are likely, I think, to be acceptable to Justice 
Marshall. 
I will be happy to discuss further any of these pro-
posals if this would be helpful. 
~// 
80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Cases 
Dear Thurgood: 
After reviewing your opinion again; o~ 
~ 
~' I~wetlle be happy to join all of it if you could 
accept changes along the lines indicated below. 
1. In the introduction to Part III, you state 
the position of the SG with respect to the Commerce 
Clause. On page 21, you refrain from adopting the SG's 
views, but you commence the first full paragraph by 
stating that "While these arguments are not without 
force . . " 
In my view, the SG's position is highly 
doubtful. In commercial matters, tribes resemble states 
more closely than they do foreign nations. It is 
2. 
unnecessary to imply any approval of the SG's position. 
Could you not make it clear that we find it unnecessary to 
consider in this case the merits of the SG's arguments? 
2. I have a somewhat similar problem with 
footnote 23 (p. 24). In the text on p. 24 you state that 
"petitioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that 
the amount of the tax is not fairly related to the 
services provided by the tribe". The first sentence of n. 
23 adds that the Court of Appeals, for this reason, found 
no basis in the record to find that "the tax was not 
fairly related to the services provided by the tribe." If 
n. 23 were concluded with this sentence, I would have no 
difficulty with it. The remainder of n. 23, however, is 
in effect a finding that "the tax is reasonably related to 
the extent of the taxpayer's activities within the taxing 
3. 
jurisdiction". As it is unnecessary to make such a 
holding in view of the record, could you not follow the 
example of the court of Appeals? 
3. The second paragraph of footnote 26 (p. 26) 
Sv..j1~f5 
«~in ef"tect that the multiple tax burd~n doctrine of 
ca r1 nevtv tv!tdltpll J 
the Commerce Clause ~dae~ not apply to~taxation by states 
and Indian tribes. Again, it is unnecessary to say this. 
know of no decision of this Court that has expressly gone 
so far as to say that there are no limitations to multiple 
taxation by a tribe, a state in which the tribe is 
located, and the federal government. 
of this second 
4. 
4. Finally, I note that Reeves and Hughes v. 
Alexandria Scrap arrCited (last sentence commencing at the 
bottom of p. 25) for the view that this Court imposes no 
"Commerce Clause limitations on the proprietary activities 
of the states". Justices Brennan, White and Stevens 
joined me in dissent in Reeves, and I think the Court's 
decision 
any event 
there properly could be limited to~ facts. In 
m~inion in Alexandria Scrap was based on the 
fact that Maryland had created a market for hulks by 
paying a subsidy for their retrieval in furtherance of the 
state's special interest. I do not view Hughes as 
supporting a general rule that the Commerce Clause is 
inapplicable whenever the state is acting in a proprietary 
.>-----. 
capacity. ~~t -s..uppo-£..t -a --o l:lg~esti,.Qc tna.t sncb a 
geReral~xiot~ ~ I would be content, however, if you 
simply omitted the two final sentences in Part III-B, 
beginning with the words "In order to reach •• " 
* * * 
9~~d-~~ 
Although Ai~ haQ tak&n m~ some time to state my 
concerns, I think you could meet all of them without 
~ 
altering the analysis or force of your generally fine 
I\ 
opinion. prefer not to make changes along the 
lines, I will join your judgment and Parts I 




lfp/ss 01/05/81 Jicarilla Apache Cases 
Suggested revision of the second paragraph of 
note 26: 
This rule can have no bearing here, however, for 
there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more 
of petitioners' mining activity than the portion occurring 
within Tribal jurisdiction. In the absence of an 
assertion that the amount of the Tribal taxation is not 
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe, see 
note 23 and accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive 
multiple taxation could arise only if a State attempted to 
levy a disproportionately large tax on the activity in 
question. This law suit, of course, does not involve a 
- -
2. 
challenge to excessive State taxation, and we intimate no 
opinion regarding State taxation that might create a 
i'f\ ..f~J5 C~$1:! 
multiple burde • We do note that a State tax could 
offend the Commerce Clause's multiple interstate taxation 
proscription only in the absence of congressional 
0 ~kkf0 
authorization t~ impose such a ~tax, e.g., Prudential Ins. 
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 u.s. 408, 421-427 (1946), and that 
petitioners contend~that here the State of New Mexico has 
taxed the production of oil and gas from the Tribe's 
Reservation "[p]ursuant to authority granted in 1927 (25 
u.s.c. § 398c)) II Brief for Petitioners in No. 
80-15, at 3. 
CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.®u.pTttttt <!fonrl of tqt ~~ .®taJtg 
'Jiiagfri.nghtn. ~· ~· 20~'1-~ 
January 7, 1982 
/ 
Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion V. Jicari11a Apache Tribe 
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lfp/ss 1/11/8~ Jicarilla Apache Cases 
Suggested revision of the second paragraph of 
note 26: 
This rule can have no bearing here, however, for 
there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more 
of petitioners• mining activity than the portion occurring 
within Tribal jurisdiction. In the absence of an 
assertion that the amount of the Tribal taxation is not 
fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe, see 
note 23 and accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive 
multiple taxation could arise only if a State attempted to 
levy a disproportionately large tax on the activity in 
question. This law suit, of course, does not involve a 
2. 
challenge to excessive State taxation, and we intimate no 
opinion regarding State taxation that might create a 
multiple burden in this case. We do note that a State 
tax could offend the Commerce Clause's multiple interstate 
taxation proscription only in the absence of congressional 
authorization of such a state tax, e.g., Prudential Ins. 
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 u.s. 408, 421-427 (1946), and that 
petitioners contend that here the State of New Mexico has 
taxed the production of oil and gas from the Tribe's 
Reservation "[p]ursuant to authority granted in 1927 (25 
u.s.c. § 398c)) ••• II Brief for Petitioners in No. 
80-15, at 3. 
,January 11, 1982 
80-11 and 80-15 Jicarilla Apache Cases 
Dear Thurgood: 
After reviewing your op1n1on again, I will be 
happy to join all of it if you could accept changes along 
the lines indicated below. 
1. In the introduction to Part III, you state the 
position of the SG with respect to the Commerce Clause. On 
page 21, you refrain from adopting the SG's views, but you 
commence the first full paragraph by stating that "While 
these arguments are not without force ••• " 
In my view, the SG's position is highly doubtful. 
In commercial matters, tribes resemble states more closely 
than they do foreign nations. It is unnecessary to imply 
any approval of the SG's position. Could you not make it 
clear that we find it unnecessary to consider in this case 
the merits of the SG's arguments? 
2. I have a somewhat similar problem with 
footnote 23 (p. 24) • In the text on p. 24 you state that 
"petitioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that the 
amount of the tax is not fairly related to the services 
provided by the tribe". The first sentence of n. 23 adds 
that the Court of Appeals, for this reason, found no basis 
in the record to find that "the tax was not fairly related 
to the services provided by the tribe." If n. 23 were 
concluded with this sentence, I would have no difficulty 
with it. The remainder of n. 23, however, is in effect a 
finding that "the tax is reasonably related to the extent of 
the taxpayer's activit1es within the taxing jurisdiction". 
As it is unnecessary to make such a holding in view of the 
record, could you not follow the example of the Court of 
Appeals? 
3. The second paragraph of footnote 26 (p. 26) 
suggests in effect that the multiple tax burden doctrine of 
the Commerce Clause can never apply to multiple taxation by 
states and Indian tribes. Again, it is unnecessary to say 
'• ,, 
this. I know of no decision of this Court that has 
expressly gone so far as to say that there are no 
limitations to multiple taxation by a tribe, a state in 
which the tribe is located, and the federal government. 
I enclose a suggested revision of this second 
paragraph for your consideration. 
4. Finally, I note that Reeves and Hughes v. 
2. 
Alexandria Scrap are cited (last sentence commenc1ng at the 
bottom of p. 25) for the view that this Court imposes no 
"Commerce Clause limitations on the proprietary activities 
of the states". Justices Brennan, White and Stevens joined 
me in dissent in Reeves, and I think the Court's decision 
there properly could be limited to its facts. In any event 
my opinion in Alexandria Scrap was based on the fact that 
Maryland had created a market for hulks by paying a subsidy 
for their retr1eval in furtherance of the state's special 
interest. I do not view Hughes as supporting a general rule 
that the Commerce Clause 1s 1napplicable whenever the state 
is acting in a proprietary capacity. I would be content, 
however, if you simply omitted the two final sentences in 
Part III-B, beginning with the words "In order to 
reach • " 
* * * 
Although I have written at some length to state my 
concerns, I think you could meet all of them without 
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Suggested revision of the second paragraph of note 
26: 
This rule can have no bearing here, however, for 
there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more 
of petitioners' mining activity than the portion occurring 
within Tribal jurisdiction. In the absence of an assertion 
that the amount of the Tribal taxation is not fairly related 
to the services provided by the Tribe, see note 23 and 
accompanying text supra, the risk of excessive multiple 
taxation could arise only if a State attempted to levy a 
disproportionately large tax on the activity in question. 
This law suit, of course, does not involve a challenge to 
excessive State taxation, and we intimate no opinion 
regarding State taxation that might create a multiple burden 
in this case. We do note that a State tax could offend the 
Commerce Clause's multiple interstate taxation proscription 
only in the absence of congressional authorization of such a 
state tax, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 u.s. 
408, 421-427 (1946), and that petitioners contend that here 
the State of New Mexico has taxed the production of oil and 
gas from the Tribe's Reservation "[p]ursuant to authority 
granted in 1927 (25 U.S.C. § 398c)) .••. " Brief for 
Petitioners in No. 80-15, at 3. 
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cc: The Conference 
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Suggested revision of the second paragraph of note 
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CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
January 11, 1982 
Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood: 
Lewis joined me last 
concerning (1) the Indian 
Clause relationship and (2) 
of Complete Auto Transit. 
Term in a proposed short "dissent" 
Commerce Clause/Interstate Cammer ce 
the satisfaction of the fourth prong 
In your presently circulating majority opinion , you have 
accommodated the first of these two points, and I am content as to 
that feature. Because of the second point , however, I am 
concerned with the last two sentences of your footnote 23 and 
would prefer to have at least those two sentences eliminated . 
Lewis Powell is writing separately with four suggestions . 
One Qf these has to do with footnote 2 3. If you see your wa y 
clear to adopt his first two suggestions , you have my vote . You 
also may wish to go along with his last two suggestions . I have 
no objections to them, but you have my vote whether or not you 
adopt them. 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
. ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
(proposed letter) 
$51tp"rtlltt <!Jomi trf tltt ';!linitdt _§~g 
~ IU'f !yin¢ on. 1f). <!J. 20 g;: J.1. ~ 
Re: No. 80-11 - Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
January 11, 1982 
No. 80-15 - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood: 
Lewis joined me last 
concerning (1) the Indian 
Clause relationship and (2) 
of Complete Auto Transit. 
-
Term in a proposed short "dissent" 
Commerce Clause/Interstate Commerce 
the satisfaction of the fourth prong 
In your presently circulating majority opinion, you have 
accommodated the first of these two points, and I am content as to 
that feature. Because of the second point , however, I am 
concerned with the last two sentences of your footnote 23 and 
would prefer to have at least those two sentences eliminated . 
Lewis Powell is writing separately with four suggestions . 
One of these has to do with footnote 23. If you see your way 
clear to adopt his first two suggestions , you have my vote. You 
also may wish to go along with his last two suggestions . I have 
no objections to them, but you have my vote whether or not you 
adopt them . 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~ttFtm:t <!fouri d tlft 'Jlttitt~ ~taftg 
'~hut!tiugbm. ~. <!f. 2llp~,;l 
Re: No . 80 - 11 - Merrion v . Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
v 
January 11, 1982 
No . 80-15 - Amoco Production Co . v . Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
Dear Lewis : 
I appreciate your letting me see your proposed letter to 
Thurgood . I enclose a copy of what I propose to write him . I 




.1anuar.y t5, 1982 
80-11 ~errion v. Jicarilla ~pache TribP 
80-15 Amoco v. ,Jicadlla Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.§u:p-umt <!Jtnni a-f tift 2!tttitl'lt ~ffi:±tg 
'Jllaglyhtgfon, tB. <!J. 2D.?J!.~ 
January 15, 1982 
Re: No. 80-11) Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
No. 80-15) - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me . 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.§tttnrm.t <!Ion.rt o-f tlyt 'J!ittitdt ~hUts 
'J,'ila.slfhtg-tntt, ~· <!f. 2llc?Jl.$ 
January 15, 1982 
Re: No. 80-11) Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
No. 80-15) - Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me . 
Justice Marshal l 
cc: The Conference 
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